Opinion
ID No. 0101002067.
Submitted: April 11, 2007. Decided: July 31, 2007.
On Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
Robert Surles, Deputy Attorney General, Wilmington, Delaware 19801.
Al-Hajj M. Lewis, Delaware Correctional Center, 1181 Paddock Road, Smyrna, Delaware 19977. Pro se.
ORDER
On this 31st day of July 2007, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief it appears to the Court that:
1. On July 7, 2006 Al-Hajj M. Lewis ("Defendant"), filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Lewis's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
2. On May 23, 2001, Mr. Lewis entered a guilty plea to the charges of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony and Possession of a Controlled Substance within 1,000 Feet of a School. That same day the Defendant was sentenced on these charges to ten years of incarceration. Mr. Lewis did not file a direct appeal, but filed three motions for modification of his sentence, each of which the Court denied.
3. On June 7, 2006 Mr. Lewis filed a motion for postconviction relief, which is the motion currently before this Court (the "motion"). Within this motion, Mr. Lewis asserts one claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, at the Court's request Mr. Lewis's trial counsel, Kester I. H. Crosse, provided the Court with an affidavit regarding the representation provided to the Defendant. The Court has examined the record, and the motion is now ripe for decision.
4. Before this Court will review the merits of a postconviction claim, it must first ensure the motion meets the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 61(i), and Mr. Lewis's motion does not. Rule 61(i)(1) requires motions for postconviction relief to be filed no later than three years from the date a defendant's conviction is final. Because Mr. Lewis pled guilty and did not appeal, his conviction is considered final thirty days from May 23, 2001, the date he was sentenced. Thus, his conviction was final on June 22, 2001, and any postconviction motions were required to be filed by June 22, 2004. Mr. Lewis's motion was filed on June 7, 2006 and is therefore untimely.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) states that "[a] motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than three years after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than three years after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court." Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) was amended to bar postconviction motions filed more than one year from the final judgment, however, the amended rule is not applicable to the case at hand since it became effective on July 1, 2005 and is only applicable to subsequent final judgments.
Miller v. State, 2005 WL 1950222 (Del.Super.Ct.) (The Defendant's motion was filed more than three years past the date his conviction became final and was therefore considered untimely and procedurally barred.).
5. However, Rule 61(i)(5) allows this procedural bar to be overcome if the defendant asserts a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a colorable claim and therefore the Court must address the claim on its merits.
Rule 61(i)(5) states the procedural bar of untimeliness can be overcome if the court lacked jurisdiction or if the defendant asserts a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
State v. Redding, 2006 WL 1148833 (Del.Super.Ct.) ("[C]laims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel escape the bar of Rule 61(i)(3) by virtue of Rule 61(i)(5). Those claims must be addressed on their merits.") (citations omitted).
6. To be successful on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the following two-part test:
(1) that defense counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to his defense i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Wright v. State, 608 A.2d 731 (Del. 1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 W.S. 663 (1984) and Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del.Super.Ct. 1988).
7. In support of his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Lewis outlines five separate assertions of trial counsel's ineffectiveness. To summarize these points, the Defendant is asserting that trial counsel failed to investigate the Defendant's case thoroughly and failed to file certain pre-trial motions. It is Mr. Lewis's contention that these alleged shortcomings "pressured him to plead guilty."
Def. Mot.
8. However, the record reflects a number of reasons to discount Mr. Lewis's arguments. First, prior to accepting Mr. Lewis's guilty plea, the Court engaged in a lengthy colloquy to ensure the Defendant was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entering a guilty plea. Included in this colloquy, the Court asked Mr. Lewis if he was threatened or forced to enter the plea, to which Mr. Lewis responded "no." In addition, Mr. Lewis was asked if he was satisfied with his representation, to which Mr. Lewis responded "yes."
Tr. at 6.
Tr. at 9.
9. Second, Mr. Lewis completed the "Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form" and in doing so indicated that he understood his waiver of rights and that he was satisfied with the representation he was provided. Further, the form asks "Has your attorney, the State, or anyone threatened or forced you to enter this plea?" to which the Defendant marked "No." In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Mr. Lewis is bound by the statements made on the guilty plea form and the consistent statements he made to the Court.
Truth in Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, May 23, 2001.
Wright, 608 A.2d 731; see also, State v. Watts, 1994 WL 164612 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citations omitted).
10. In an attempt to provide this Court with contrasting clear and convincing evidence, Mr. Lewis provided the Court with a letter, dated March 9, 2001, sent to the
Defendant from Mr. Crosse regarding the pending charges and including copies of the Defendant's record, indictment and affidavit of probable cause (the "letter"). It is Mr. Lewis's contention that the letter establishes Mr. Crosse's desire to "pressure" the Defendant to enter a guilty plea. However, the Court finds the letter to merely be a tool used to provide Mr. Lewis the necessary information to allow him to make an informed decision by advising him of the plea offer from the State, indicating the potential outcomes if he accepted the plea offer or if he declined, and providing documentation of his case and the Defendant's criminal history. In fact, the Court finds this letter was not only a reasonable means of providing the necessary information to allow the Defendant to make an informed decision, but the Court also notes that the letter was sent about two weeks prior to the day Mr. Lewis pled guilty, providing him time to adequately reflect upon his decision and its consequences. In other words, if Mr. Lewis thought certain pre-trial motions should be filed or a more thorough investigation needed to be done, he had at least two weeks to discuss such actions with his counsel. Instead, Mr. Lewis chose to accept the State's plea offer and advise the Court he was satisfied with his legal representation. The Court also notes that the plea accepted by the Defendant eliminated the potential of receiving a significantly greater period of mandatory incarceration and it resolved numerous violations of probation. The decision to accept the State's offer was a reasonable and logical decision which minimized the Defendant's potential incarceration.
Def. Mot. Ex. C.
The letter further indicated that a video interview would be set up to allow Mr. Lewis and Mr. Crosse to discuss the matter, and it indicated that Mr. Crosse consulted with a more experienced defense attorney to determine the reasonableness of the plea offer.
The Court is not suggesting these actions were not taken, nor that they should have been taken by trial counsel.
11. The record does not reflect that Mr. Lewis had ineffective assistance of counsel nor does the record provide clear and convincing evidence that would allow the Court to disregard the oral and written statements made by Mr. Lewis to the Court with respect to his guilt, his waiver of rights and the quality of his legal representation.
12. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Lewis's Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby denied.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4) states as follows:
Summary Dismissal. If it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief, the judge may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.
IT IS SO ORDERED.