Opinion
I.D. No. 0305016966.
Submitted Date: March 20, 2007.
Decided: April 27, 2007.
Upon Consideration Of Defendant's Pro Se Motion For Postconviction Relief SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
1. On October 23, 2003, a jury found Jimmie Lewis ("Lewis") guilty of car jacking in the second degree, theft, and resisting arrest. He was sentenced to six years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed Lewis' conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Lewis has since filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief, which was denied by this Court. Now before the Court is Lewis' second pro se motion for postconviction relief.
See Docket 19; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 835, 841, 1257.
Lewis appealed this Court's denial of his motion for postconviction relief; however the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. See Docket 114.
See Docket 74, 90, 95, 111, 114, 115.
2. Lewis asserts the following claims in his motion: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) denial of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (3) deprivation of a full and fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Lewis claims his counsel failed to address his incompetence that arose during trial, failed to petition the Court for an insanity defense, failed to petition the Court for a competency hearing, and failed to impugn the "June 10, 2004 competency report." Lewis also contends that the failure of the "competency report" to address the "McGarry criteria" and the "Guatney functions" resulted in a due process violation. Lastly, Lewis argues that counsel's ineffective assistance coupled with the due process violation have deprived him of a full and fair trial.
The "competency report" Lewis refers to is the "Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation" performed by Sylvia Foster, M.D. to determine Lewis' competency to stand trial.
The McGarry criteria (or questions) are "known as the Competency to Stand Trial Instrument" and are a "widely used assessment procedure in the area of competency to stand trial." State v. Shields, 593 A.2d 986, 1000 n. 23 (Del.Super.Ct. 1990). The McGarry questions are: "Performance of defendant role may require the ability to 1. Consider realistically the possible legal defenses. 2. Manage one's own behavior to avoid trial disruptions. 3. Relate to attorney. 4. Participate with attorney in planning legal strategy. 5. Understand the roles of various participants in the trial. 6. Understand court procedure. 7. Appreciate the charges. 8. Appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties. 9. Perceive realistically the likely outcome of the trial. 10. Provide attorney with available pertinent facts concerning the offense. 11. Challenge prosecution witnesses. 12. Testify relevantly. 13. Be motivated toward self-defense." Id.
The Guatney functions (or factors) are derived from State v. Guatney, 299 N.W.2d 538 (Neb. 1980) and are "relevant to the determination of competency." State v. Irving, 2003 WL 21357601, at *2 n. 14 (Del.Super.Ct. May 27, 2003). The Guatney factors are: "(1) That the defendant has sufficient mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place, and things; (2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he understands that he is in a court of law charged with a criminal offense; (3) That he realizes there is a judge on the bench; (4) That he understands that there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge; (5) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against the charge; (6) That he knows that he will be expected to tell his lawyer all he knows or remembers about the events involved in the alleged crime; (7) That he understands that there will be a jury present to pass upon evidence in determining his guilt or innocence; (8) That he has sufficient memory to relate answers to questions posed to him; (9) That he has established rapport with his lawyer; (10) That he can follow the testimony reasonably well; (11) That he has the ability to meet stresses without his rationality or judgment breaking down; (12) That he has at least minimal contact with reality; (13) That he has the minimum intelligence necessary to grasp the events taking place; (14) That he can confer coherently with some appreciation of proceedings; (15) That he can both give and receive advice from his attorneys; (16) That he can divulge facts without paranoid distress; (17) That he can decide upon a plea; (18) That he can testify, if necessary; (19) That he can make simple decisions; and (20) That he has a desire for justice rather than undeserved punishment." Id.
3. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
4. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. However, under Rule 61(i)(5), the bars to relief under (1), (2) and (3) do not apply to a "claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction."
5. In applying the procedural imperatives to this case, Lewis' claims are barred. First and foremost, these claims have been formerly adjudicated in Lewis' prior postconviction motion and in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Specifically, Lewis asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his previous postconviction motion, and this Court appropriately addressed the merits of that claim in its Order denying Lewis postconviction relief. Lewis also previously asserted claims relating to his mental health in his direct appeal. The Supreme Court addressed the merits of those claims and held that the mental health issues alleged by Lewis were unsubstantiated and appropriately resolved by this Court prior to his appeal. Therefore, having been formerly adjudicated, Lewis' claims are procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4). The Court does not find that "reconsideration of [these] claim[s] is warranted in the interest of justice."
See State v. Lewis, 2006 WL 2560145, at *4 (Del.Super.Ct. Aug. 29, 2006) ("Lewis has filed a litany of complaints against his defense counsel. These ineffective assistance of counsel claims are properly proffered on a motion for postconviction relief, and will therefore be addressed here.").
See Docket 90; Lewis v. State, 2005 WL 2414293, at *4 (Del. Sept. 29, 2005) ("Lewis claims that the judge did not take proper account of his mental status for purposes of trial, including continuing the trial so that he could be evaluated and considering his mental condition as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The record reflects that, on the morning of trial, Lewis claimed to be having a psychotic episode because he had forgotten to take his medicine. Defense counsel reported to the judge that Lewis had never mentioned mental health problems in any of their five pretrial interviews. The judge questioned Lewis directly about his mental health status and ordered trial to proceed pending the receipt of information from the prison. Defense counsel reported to the judge that Lewis had been prescribed two medications while in prison, one of which he refused to take, and that he originally had been placed in the "mental health pod," but was now housed with the general population. . . . The record further reflects that, following the trial and prior to sentencing, the Superior Court ordered Lewis transferred to the Delaware Psychiatric Center for further evaluation. The primary diagnosis in the report was that Lewis was malingering — that is, intentionally exaggerating his physical and psychological symptoms in order to avoid being sentenced to prison. The record simply does not support Lewis's claim that the Superior Court failed to take account of his mental health status. To the contrary, the judge appropriately dealt with Lewis's claims.").
Rule 61(i)(4). See also State v. Wright, 653 A.2d 288, 298 (Del.Super.Ct. 1994) ("The interest of justice has been narrowly defined to require the movant to show that the trial court lacked the authority to convict or punish him.").
6. What is more, Lewis' claims are untimely as they were not asserted within one year of the Supreme Court's mandate affirming Lewis' conviction and sentence, which occurred on September 29, 2005. There is also no basis upon which to excuse the untimely filing of Lewis' motion because the claims contained therein present no evidence of "a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." This Court has already determined that Lewis' counsel was not ineffective in his representation and that Lewis was competent to stand trial and, as such, he was not denied due process nor was he deprived of a fair trial. Therefore, the Court concludes that Lewis has not presented "colorable" claims that would overcome the procedural time bar.
See Docket 90.
7. Based on the foregoing, Lewis' motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.