Opinion
I.D. No. 0305016966.
Submitted: March 12, 2008.
Decided: March 19, 2008.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S THIRD MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED
This 19th day of March, 2008, it appears to the Court that:
1. On October 21, 2003, a jury found Jimmie Lewis ("Lewis") guilty of Carjacking in the Second Degree, Felony Theft, and Resisting Arrest. The Court sentenced him to eight years at Level V, suspended after six years for decreasing levels of supervision. The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
Lewis v. State, No. 64, 2005 (Del. Sept. 29, 2005) (ORDER).
2. In this third postconviction motion, Lewis raises two arguments. Specifically, Lewis complains that his counsel was ineffective for failing to have him evaluated for mental illness. Lewis also argues that his due process rights were violated because he was returned to the Department of Corrections without an officially docketed court order or a competency hearing.
3. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, in order to protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim. In those cases, the Court may summarily dismiss the defendant's claim "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief[.]"
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
4. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules unless the movant shows prejudice to his rights or cause for relief; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. The bars to relief under (1), (2), and (3), however, do not apply "to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." Moreover, the procedural bars of (2) and (4) may be overcome if "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice."
If the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, the motion must be filed within three years. If the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005, however, the motion must be filed within one year. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (July 1, 2005) (amending Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (May 1, 1996)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Id. R. 61(i)(4).
5. Lewis's claims are all procedurally barred. First, Rule 61(i)(4) bars consideration of his claims because the Superior Court and Supreme Court have already addressed his ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to mental illness and found them to be without merit. Second, Rule 61(i)(2) precludes his claim of a due process violation because it was never raised in either of his two previous postconviction motions, nor in his appeals to the Supreme Court. Third, Lewis's motion is time-barred by Rule 61(i)(1) because he filed this motion on February 29, 2008, more than one year after his conviction became final. This Court will not consider the merits of his motion, despite the procedural bars, because nothing in Lewis's motion demonstrates a miscarriage of justice or warrants this Court's consideration in the interest of justice.
State v. Lewis, 2006 WL 2560145, at *4 (Del.Super.Ct. Aug. 29, 2006); Lewis v. State, 884 A.2d 512, 2005 WL 2414293, at *4 (Del. Sept. 29, 2005) (TABLE); Lewis v. State, 940 A.2d 946, 2007 WL 3385910 (Del. Nov. 15, 2007) (TABLE).
Lewis was transferred to the Department of Corrections in either June or July of 2004. See Dockets 40-42. As a result, Lewis should have raised this claim at trial, in one of his many appeals, or in his prior postconviction motions. His failure to do so precludes this Court's consideration under Rule 61.
The Supreme Court issued its mandate affirming his convictions and sentences on September 29, 2005. See Docket 90.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). See also State v. Lewis, 2007 WL 1241873, at *1-2 (Del.Super.Ct. Apr. 27, 2007) (finding no basis to overcome the procedural bars).
6. Because Lewis's claims have been fully addressed and dismissed by both this Court and the Supreme Court on numerous occasions and are time-barred, it plainly appears to this Court that Lewis is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, Lewis's motion for postconviction is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.