Opinion
ID No. 0205011859 (R-2).
March 12, 2010.
N440 State Mail, Samuel L. Layton, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, DE.
Dear Mr. Layton:
On March 8, 2010, the Court received your second Motion for Postconviction Relief filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). It is denied as being procedurally barred.
Following a jury trial, you were convicted of numerous sex offenses involving two young girls. You were sentenced to 72 years of Level V incarceration followed by probation. The Supreme Court affirmed your conviction. Layton v. State, 2003 WL 22001181 (Del. Aug. 4, 2003), 829 A.2d 936 (Del. 2003) (TABLE).
In your first postconviction motion, you were represented by counsel. Numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims were raised. Most of these grounds alleged a failure to conduct investigations. The postconviction motion was denied and that decision was affirmed. Layton v. State, 2007 WL 2582181 (Del. Sept. 7, 2007), 933 A.2d 1250 (Del. 2007) (TABLE).
In the present motion, you allege four grounds for relief. The first is a factual attack concerning witness testimony. The second is an ineffective assistance of counsel complaint alleging other witnesses should have been interviewed. (However, you make no proffer as to how these witnesses' testimony would have been helpful). The third complaint concerns allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity; and the fourth is another ineffective assistance of counsel allegation with eleven (11) separate complaints. Some are similar to past complaints; regardless, none of the complaints address the necessary criteria for such claims as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Your conclusory allegations fail to make concrete allegations of your attorney's mistakes or omissions that caused actual prejudice.
PROCEDURAL BARS
The present motion is dismissed as being procedurally barred for the following reasons:
(1) It comes more than six (6) years after the return of the mandate when the Supreme Court affirmed your direct appeal in 2003. Rule 61(i)(1).
(2) It is repetitive. Rule 61(i)(2).
(3) It contains allegations that were raised in the first postconviction motion and were previously adjudicated. Rule 61(i)(4).
(4) As to the new claims, you have made no effort to address why the claims were not timely made to the trial court or on appeal. Nor have you made any effort to address the prejudice prong of Rule 61(i)(3).
For all of these reasons, this second Motion for Postconviction Relief is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.