Opinion
No. 5-641 / 04-1754
Filed October 12, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark J. Smith, Judge.
Terry Larson appeals from his convictions for second degree criminal mischief and stalking while in possession of a dangerous weapon. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and James G. Tomka, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Julie Walton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Terry Larson appeals from his convictions for second degree criminal mischief and stalking while in possession of a dangerous weapon. We now affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A reasonable person viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State could find the following facts. In November of 2003, Terry Larson moved out of the home he had shared with his wife, Lynn Gibson-Larson. Citing Larson's increasingly volatile behavior toward her, Lynn later sought and obtained a protective order against Larson. Larson had previously accused Lynn of having an affair with Robert Belman, a personal investment advisor who worked in the same office building as Lynn. Later that same month, Julia Belman began receiving numerous messages from Larson indicating that her husband Robert was involved in an extramarital relationship with Lynn.
Also in November of 2003, Robert Belman began having a series of escalating encounters with Larson. Larson followed Belman to and from a restaurant where Belman was dining. A few days later, Belman noticed Larson sitting in his vehicle parked along the street near Belman's home. Larson immediately drove away when he saw Belman, who followed Larson and persuaded him to talk. When Belman asked Larson when the threatening behavior toward himself and his family would stop, Larson responded that he loved his wife and would do anything for her.
In December of 2003, Lynn came to Belman's office to express her concern for Belman's safety given Larson's increasingly erratic behavior. Larson suddenly appeared outside Belman's office window, pounded on the glass, shouted "I knew it," and quickly departed. A few days later, Belman's vehicle, clearly identifiable from its personalized license plate, was vandalized. In that incident, the side of Belman's vehicle was gouged and its front tire was slashed. The episodes of vandalism continued. On January 10, 2004, Belman's front tire was slashed again, and the following day his rear tire met with the same fate.
In early February of 2004, Larson contacted a friend named Jerry Clark, who was a trustee in the Scott County Jail. Larson informed Clark of his desire to harm Belman and requested Clark's help in the endeavor. Convinced Larson was serious in his quest, Clark promptly contacted police. Gilbert Proehl, an undercover police officer, arranged a meeting with Larson, through Clark, at which Proehl posed as a "hit man" who would make his services available should Larson wish to cause physical harm to Belman. In response to the proposal, Larson gave Proehl a ring to be appraised, but did not expressly accept Proehl's offer. Larson did, however, accompany Proehl to Belman's residence, Belman's office, and Lynn's residence. A portion of the conversation between Proehl and Belman was recorded and transcribed by Proehl. The transcript reveals that Larson knew of the recent vandalism of Belman's vehicle but does not evidence an express claim by Larson of responsibility for the specific acts.
Officer Proehl, in probing for information related to the vandalism of Robert's vehicle, asked Larson whether a particular incident occurred after Larson damaged the vehicle. Larson answered in the affirmative.
Following his encounter with the undercover officer, a warrant was issued and Larson was arrested. A knife with a blade exceeding five inches was found in the trunk of Larson's vehicle. Although Larson maintained the knife remained at all times in the trunk, his wife Lynn testified that Larson always kept the knife within his reach in the passenger compartment of his vehicle. The State subsequently charged Larson with (1) second degree criminal mischief, (2) stalking while in possession of a dangerous weapon, and (3) stalking in violation of a protective order. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned verdicts of guilty on each charge. Larson now appeals, contending insufficient evidence exists from which the jury could have concluded (1) he committed the acts of vandalism supporting the criminal mischief charge, and (2) he possessed the knife during any of the acts constituting the stalking of Belman.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the challenged charges for correction of errors at law, and we will uphold the jury's verdict if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Evidence is substantial where a rational jury could be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1999). While direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative of guilt, the evidence when viewed in totality must allow the fact-finder to draw "a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime." State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 2001). And while we review the entire record, not just evidence supporting guilt, we must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d at 377. We also note that "[t]he possibility of drawing inconsistent conclusions from the same body of evidence does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Matter of Scott, 508 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Iowa 1993).
III. Discussion. A. Criminal Mischief.
It is true, as Larson argues, that no witness claimed to have seen Larson commit the acts of vandalism occasioned upon Belman's clearly identifiable vehicle. However, it is also true that a guilty verdict may rest on circumstantial evidence alone. State v. Moses, 320 N.W.2d 581, 586 (Iowa 1982). The jury was presented with strong motive evidence linking Larson to the vandalism. Larson had long suspected Belman was having an affair with Lynn and had harassed Belman and his wife with letters and phone messages about his suspicions during the month leading up to the vandalism. More telling, however, was Larson's repeated surveillance of Belman, including Larson's sudden appearance outside Belman's office during a conversation between Lynn and Belman — a few days prior to the acts that resulted in the criminal mischief charge. Following the vandalism, Larson made inquiries of Jerry Clark soliciting help in causing physical harm to Belman and acted in furtherance of that objective when he transported the undercover officer to Belman's home and workplace.
A knife capable of slashing Belman's tires was found in Larson's vehicle. Larson admitted he always kept the knife in his vehicle, although he maintains the knife remained in the trunk at all times pertinent to this appeal. As noted above, however, Lynn testified that Larson routinely kept the knife within his reach in the passenger compartment of the vehicle. And while Larson did not explicitly admit committing the vandalism, he was able to identify Belman's vehicle and appeared well-versed in the details of the vandalism when conversing with the undercover officer. Given the litany of circumstantial evidence linking Larson to the acts of vandalism occasioned on Belman's vehicle, we conclude a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Larson perpetrated the acts of vandalism constituting the crime of criminal mischief. See Iowa Code § 716.4 (2003). We therefore affirm on this issue.
Larson informed the undercover officer that Belman began parking his vehicle in the garage after the vandalism occurred, suggesting Larson had continued to surveil Belman's vehicle and residence.
B. Stalking While in Possession of a Dangerous Weapon.
In order to satisfy the stalking element in Iowa Code section 708.11(2), the State was required to prove Larson engaged in a course of conduct directed at Robert Belman that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death. "Course of conduct" is defined as "repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person without legitimate purpose or repeatedly conveying oral or written threats, threats implied by conduct, or a combination thereof, directed at or toward a person." Iowa Code § 708.11(1)(b) (emphasis supplied). Given the evidence of (1) Larson's repeated, unsolicited correspondence, (2) his physical encounters with and surveillance of Belman, (3) his communication and contacts with a purported "hit man," (4) his expressed desire to cause harm to Belman, and (5) the substantial evidence tending to prove he vandalized Belman's vehicle, we conclude Larson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the stalking element of the charge must fail.
We next address whether the record sufficiently establishes that Larson possessed a dangerous weapon while stalking Belman. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record contains substantial evidence tending to prove Larson kept a knife with a blade exceeding five inches somewhere in his vehicle at all times. See Id. (knife having blade exceeding five inches is presumed to be a dangerous weapon). Larson's vehicle was present at or very near the scene of virtually every encounter Larson had with Belman. Although the knife was discovered in Larson's trunk by law enforcement officers, we believe the jury could credit Lynn's testimony and reasonably infer that Larson in fact was able to exercise immediate dominion and control over the knife during at least some of his encounters with Belman and Belman's property. See State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 39 (Iowa 2005) (stating that actual possession of an object occurs when the object is located in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control).
We also believe the circumstantial evidence of Larson's use of the knife to commit multiple acts of vandalism against Belman's vehicle supports a reasonable inference that Larson either intended or knew Belman or his family would be placed in fear of bodily injury or death. See Iowa Code § 708.11(1)(b) (defining "course of conduct" to include threats implied by conduct). Because the jury could reasonably infer Larson used the knife to slash Belman's tires on multiple occasions and that doing so constituted a threat against Belman implied by conduct, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to find Larson guilty of stalking while in possession of dangerous weapon. We therefore affirm Larson's convictions and sentence.