Opinion
No. 21925-9-III.
Filed: March 18, 2004. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of Spokane County. Docket No. 02-1-03358-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 02/27/2003. Judge signing: Hon. Jerome J Leveque.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Kevin Michael Korsmo, Attorney at Law, 1100 W Mallon Ave, Spokane, WA 99260-2043.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Janet G. Gemberling, Attorney at Law, 1314 S Grand Blvd Ste 2, Spokane, WA 99202-1174.
The State of Washington appeals an order suppressing evidence discovered during a search of the trunk of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation. It contends the search was lawful because the trunk was accessible from the passenger compartment of the vehicle. We affirm.
An officer stopped a vehicle driven by Anthony L. King for speeding on August 31, 2002. The officer saw Mr. King gain access to the vehicle's trunk area by pushing a button on the back seat and pushing the seat down; Mr. King then threw a backpack into the trunk area and returned the seat back to the closed position.
The officer determined Mr. King was driving with a suspended license and placed him under arrest. The officer then searched the passenger compartment of the car and pushed the button on the back seat, enabling him to pull the back seat down, reach into the trunk area, and retrieve the unlocked backpack. The officer searched the backpack and discovered contraband.
Based on this evidence, the State charged Mr. King with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The superior court granted Mr. King's motion to suppress the evidence, effectively terminating the case. The State appeals.
`As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.' State v. Williams, 102 Wn.2d 733, 736, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984). The State bears the burden of establishing that a valid exception to this general rule applies. Id. at 736.
One exception to the general rule is a search incident to a lawful arrest. `During the arrest process, including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence.' State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). The exception historically has been justified by the `exigencies' of the circumstances related to a person's arrest in a vehicle. Id. at 147 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)). `These exigencies include the danger that the suspect could destroy the evidence in the car, the car could be driven away, or the suspect could grab a weapon secreted somewhere in the passenger compartment.' Id.; but see Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (lawful arrest alone justifies reasonable intrusion; no further justification necessary); State v. Smith, 119 Wn.2d 675, 680, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992).
The Supreme Court in Stroud considered this exception in light of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, which, `unlike any provision in the federal constitution, explicitly protects the privacy rights of Washington citizens.' Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 148; see State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443-50, 909 P.2d 293 (1996). The Stroud court's new rule was expressly developed to avoid a case-by-case determination of the exigencies surrounding the arrest of a vehicle's passenger. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 151 (overruling State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983)).
To weigh the actual exigent circumstances against the actual privacy interests on a case-by-case basis would create too difficult a rule to allow for both effective police enforcement and also protection of individual rights. However, a reasonable balance can be struck. During the arrest process, including the time immediately subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a warrant. . . . This rule will more adequately address the needs of officers and privacy interests of individuals than the rules set forth by either Belton or Ringer. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d at 152-53.
This balance expressly limits the search to the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Authorities on which the State relies do not support its contention that the search should be extended beyond the passenger compartment. In Johnson, the issue was whether a tractor-trailer's sleeping compartment was subject to search under Stroud. The court held it was, because the sleeping compartment was not physically partitioned from the truck's passenger compartment. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d at 448. And in State v. Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d 489, 28 P.3d 762 (2001), the issue was whether a motor home's interior living quarters were subject to search under Stroud. The court held it was, holding there was no `constitutionally meaningful difference' between a tractor-trailer's sleeping compartment and the interior of a motor home. Id. at 496. To avoid disrupting Stroud's `reasonable balance,' we hold the reach of such a search is limited to areas not physically separated from the vehicle's passenger compartment.
The State also cites authorities from other jurisdictions, which do not address the heightened protections of article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution, on which the Stroud rule is based. They therefore do not apply here.
The State points out that accessibility of the passenger compartment by the arrestee is one of the reasons for the Stroud exception to the warrant requirement. See Vrieling, 144 Wn.2d at 496 (defendant actually accessed interior of motor home during stop); Johnson, 128 Wn.2d at 448 (person `could' access sleeping area from cab of truck). It contends that because the trunk was actually accessible to Mr. King here, the search was proper under Stroud. However, engaging in such a case-by-case factual determination whether a person potentially could access an area outside a vehicle's passenger compartment would risk evisceration of the bright-line rule announced in Stroud.
The superior court properly concluded the search of the vehicle's trunk was unlawful.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SCHULTHEIS, J., and KURTZ, J., concur.