Opinion
CR-2021-1118
06-01-2022
STATE OF MAINE v. CHARLES JUSKO Defendant
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPRESS
DEBORAH P. CASHMAN JUSTICE, MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
This matter came before the court on May 10, 2022, for hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. Defendant did not appear, having previously waived his right to be present, but was represented by Attorney Darrick X. Banda, Esq. The State was represented by Assistant District Attorney Tracy McCarthy, Esq.
At the onset of the hearing, defendant clarified the issue raised by his motion to suppress: whether there was sufficient probable cause to stop his vehicle.
The court heard the testimony of Trooper Kevin Foley of the Maine State Police, and admitted State's Motion Exhibit 1, a video taken from the officer's cruiser camera. The parties requested to file written summation which the court granted. Defendant filed his bench memo in support of defendant's motion to suppress on May 20, 2022, which included the attachment of relevant sections of the Maine Motor Vehicle Inspection Manual (16-222, Chapter 1 section 170, pages 13-15). The state filed its bench memo in support of denial of Defendant's motion to suppress on May 25, 2022, which included attached copies of State v. Webber, 2000 ME 168, 759 A.2d 724; State v. Taylor, 1997 ME 81, 694 A.2d 907; and State v. Boutin, Order on Motion to Suppress No. KENCD-CR-2019-20350 (Kennebec Cnty., September 19, 2019). After hearing, and having considered all of the evidence and written and oral arguments presented, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Kevin Foley has been employed as a law enforcement officer with the Maine State Police for two years. He was employed in a law enforcement capacity for three years prior to joining the Maine State Police, for a total of 5 years in law enforcement. He is a graduate of the San Francisco, California police academy and has had additional training at the Maine Criminal Justice Academy, including training in vehicle requirements under Maine law.
On. July 21, 2021, Trooper Foley was working the evening shift. He was in full uniform and in a marked cruiser. At approximately 10:30 pm he was stopped in a parking lot conducting stationary traffic observation on Route 9 in Randolph. Just after 10:30 pm, Trooper Foley observed a silver-colored sedan travel in front of his location with only one of the two registration plate lights working. Due to the non-functioning registration plate light, Trooper Foley was unable to read the registration plate as it traveled past him, less than 30 feet away. Trooper Foley entered the roadway behind the vehicle where he was able to confirm that the plate light was out. Trooper Foley then initiated a stop of the vehicle to inform the operator of the defect. The vehicle stopped upon request. The driver was identified as the defendant, Charles Jusko.
Maine law refers to a registration plate, which is commonly known as a license plate.
Maine law states: "A vehicle must have a white light capable of illuminating the rear registration plate so that the characters on the plate are visible for a distance of at least 50 feet." 29-A M.R.S. § 1909 (in pertinent part). Further, Maine law states a violation of this section constitutes a traffic infraction. 29-A M.R.S. § 104 (in pertinent part). Finally, "if an officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that a violation of law has taken or is taking place, the officer, if the officer is in uniform, may stop a motor vehicle for the purpose of... issuing appropriate written process for a [ ... ] traffic infraction. 29-A M.R.S. § 105(1)(B) (in pertinent part).
In order to justify a brief investigatory stop of a vehicle, a police officer must have an "objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur." State v. Sasso, 2016 ME 95, ¶ 7, 143 A.3d 124. "A stop is justified when an officer's assessment of the existence of specific and articulable facts indicating a possible violation of law or a public safety risk is objectively reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances." State v. Simmons, 2016 ME 49, ¶ 8, 135 A.3d 824. ¶T]he officer's assessment of the existence of specific and articulable facts sufficient to warrant the stop [must be] objectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances." State v. Blier, 2017 ME 103, ¶ 1, 162 A.3d 829. "An investigatory stop is valid when it is supported by specific and articulable facts which, taken as a whole and together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the police intrusion." State v. Taylor, 1997 ME 81, ¶ 9, 694 A.2d 907.
The Law Court has recognized "that the threshold for demonstrating an objectively reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a vehicle stop is low, in that 'reasonable articulable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Lafarge, 2012 ME 65, ¶10, 43 A.3d 961, quoting State v. Porter, 2008 ME 175, ¶ 9, 960 A.2d 321.) "(T]he reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause that a crime was being committed, but more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch." State v. Sampson, 669 A.2d 1326 at 1328 (Me. 1996). "This standard balances the driver's right to be free from excessive restraint by the State against the public's right not to be placed at risk by an impaired driver." State v. Porter, at ¶ 9.
Trooper Foley was parked that night for the specific purpose of observing traffic. He observed Defendant's vehicle as it traveled in front of his location, without a fully working plate light, and as such, Trooper Foley was unable to read registration plate from less than 30 feet away (much less than the required 50 feet). The court finds the officer's testimony credible as to his observations of Defendant's vehicle on that night. The court finds that the officer had an objectively reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense had been committed. "The violation of a traffic infraction witnessed by a police officer is sufficient justification for the stop of the vehicle." State v. Webber, 2000 ME 168, ¶ 7.
Based on the foregoing, the court is satisfied that the officer had objectively reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Defendant's vehicle, and therefore, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
The Clerk shall enter this Order upon the docket by reference.