Opinion
No. 62058-4-I.
May 11, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-8-04245-0, LeRoy McCullough, J., entered July 21, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Agid, J., concurred in by Dwyer, A.C.J., and Becker, J.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
J.T. appeals the juvenile court's order of disposition finding him guilty of residential burglary. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding that he intended to commit a crime against property inside the residence because the State failed to prove that he damaged any property other than soiling a pillowcase. Because the evidence showed that J.T. stained and contaminated the pillowcase by ejaculating on it, its value was diminished and the owner incurred a cost to restore or replace it. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the court's finding that he physically damaged the pillowcase. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 18, 2006, Kim Obbink returned to her home and found the sliding door to her kitchen ajar. She noticed that the curtains in her family room were drawn, the television was on, and the case to one of her exercise DVDs was out. She also noticed that items from her bedroom had been moved in to the family room, including a pillow from her bed, a bottle of massage oil, and a bottle of hand lotion. The pillowcase had a large wet stain on it, measuring approximately ten inches by three inches on one portion and five inches by three inches on another portion. Obbink threw out the pillow, but forensic testing of the pillowcase determined that the stain was semen that matched the DNA profile of J.T. J.T. was apparently friends with Obbink's son, but did not have permission to be in Obbink's house on that day.
Later that evening, J.T.'s mother came to Obbink's house and gave her a duffel bag that belonged to Obbink's son. Inside the bag were items taken from Obbink's house, including a laptop computer, jewelry, a digital camera and her son's Ipod and X-box. Also in the duffel bag was a guitar that did not belong to Obbink or her son. J.T.'s mother told Obbink that she found the items in the trunk of J.T.'s car.
The State charged J.T. with one count of residential burglary with sexual motivation. After a fact-finding hearing, the court found him guilty as charged and imposed local sanctions with a total financial obligation of $100.
DISCUSSION
J.T. argues that because he merely soiled the pillowcase, the State was unable to prove that he damaged it. Thus, he contends, the evidence does not support the court's finding that he intended to commit a crime in the residence and was guilty of burglary. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether "`any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" We assume the truth of the prosecution's evidence and all inferences that the trier of fact could reasonably draw from it. We defer to the trier of fact to resolve any conflicts in testimony, to weigh the persuasiveness of evidence, and to assess the credibility of the witnesses.
State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979)).
State v. Wilson, 71 Wn. App. 880, 891, 863 P.2d 116 (1993), rev'd in part on other grounds, 125 Wn.2d 212, 883 P.2d 320 (1994).
State v. Boot, 89 Wn. App. 780, 791, 950 P.2d 964, review denied, 135 Wn.2d 1015 (1998).
A person is guilty of the crime of residential burglary if "with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle." Here, the trial court found that J.T. intended to commit the crime of malicious mischief. A person commits malicious mischief by knowingly and maliciously causing physical damage to another person's property.
RCW 9A.48.100(1) defines "physical damage" as used in the malicious mischief statute and states that "in addition to its ordinary meaning," physical damage also includes "any diminution in the value of any property as the consequence of an act." Our courts have held that the ordinary meaning of damages "includes the reasonable cost of repairs to restore injured property to its former condition."
State v. Gilbert, 79 Wn. App. 383, 385, 902 P.2d 182 (1995).
J.T. contends that the State failed to prove that he caused physical damage to the pillowcase because it was only soiled and capable of being cleaned. He cites no Washington law to support his position and relies instead on a Michigan case where the court concluded that an item which required cleaning was not in need of repair and therefore not damaged. But he also acknowledges that at least one other court disagrees with this analysis: in Miller v. Geels, the Indiana court rejected this argument, concluding that because a landlord incurred the expense of having to clean a soiled rental unit, the unit had been damaged and cleaning was required to restore it to its prior condition.
See Smolen v. Dahlmann Apartments, Ltd., 127 Mich. App. 108, 116, 338 N.W.2d 892 (1983).
643 N.E.2d 922, 927 n. 9 (Ind.App. 1994).
Applying the ordinary meaning of "physical damage" recognized under Washington law, we hold that J.T. damaged the pillowcase by staining it with his semen. This act unquestionably diminished the pillowcase's value to Obbink, and she incurred a cost to restore it to its former condition. Not only was it stained, it was considered a biohazard by the police because it was contaminated by a bodily fluid. Thus, to restore the pillowcase to its former condition, she had to have it cleaned or most likely replaced, due to potential contamination. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support the trial court's finding that J.T. physically damaged Obbink's property while unlawfully in her house. We affirm the trial court's order finding him guilty of residential burglary.
WE CONCUR: