Opinion
NO. 2015 KA 0202
09-18-2015
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. RONNIE LYNN JONES
Hillar C. Moore, III District Attorney Melanie S. Fields Dylan C. Alge Assistant District Attorneys Baton Rouge, LA Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, State of Louisiana Cynthia K. Meyer New Orleans, LA Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Ronnie Lynn Jones
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 01-12-0621
Honorable Donald R. Johnson, Judge Presiding Hillar C. Moore, III
District Attorney
Melanie S. Fields
Dylan C. Alge
Assistant District Attorneys
Baton Rouge, LA
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee,
State of Louisiana
Cynthia K. Meyer
New Orleans, LA
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant,
Ronnie Lynn Jones
BEFORE: PETTIGREW, HIGGINBOTHAM, AND CRAIN, JJ. HIGGINBOTHAM, J.
The defendant, Ronnie Lynn Jones, was charged by bill of information with aggravated second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.7. He entered a plea of not guilty. After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of the responsive offense of second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. The trial court denied the defendant's counseled and pro se motions for new trial and his motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal. Additionally, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information. After a hearing, the defendant was adjudicated a third-felony habitual offender and sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. See La. R.S. 15:529.1(A)(3)(b). The defendant now appeals, assigning error to the trial court's issuance of a material witness arrest warrant and to the sufficiency of the evidence.
The defendant's habitual offender adjudication is based on a 1985 conviction of simple robbery and a 1987 conviction of armed robbery. The defendant was previously adjudicated a habitual offender in 1988 and sentenced to seventy-five years at hard labor, which was subsequently reduced to fifty years imprisonment at hard labor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 15, 2011, Missouri Marie Boston (the victim) called 911 after being physically attacked by the defendant, her boyfriend with whom she resided in a Baton Rouge apartment complex. During the recorded 911 call, the victim stated that the defendant had badly beaten her. She indicated that he had broken her arm, "split" her ear, "bust" her head, and bruised her. The 911 recording continued as officers of the Baton Rouge Police Department responded to the scene. Upon arrival, the police immediately detained the defendant (he was handcuffed and placed in the police car), and police then made contact with the victim. Emergency Medical Services (EMS) also arrived on the scene, and the victim received medical care. The EMS report confirmed that the victim sustained facial trauma, and her left forearm was bruised, swollen, deformed, and dislocated/fractured. Additionally, the victim's head was bruised with soft tissue swelling.
Throughout the record, the victim's first name is spelled two different ways, sometimes misspelled as "Missiuri."
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury on the victim. The defendant argues that the evidence presents conflicting stories about the events of the night in question. Referencing the victim's 911 call and a letter she wrote to the defendant's attorney before the trial, the defendant specifically contends that the victim gave accounts of the incident before the trial that were inconsistent with her trial testimony. The defendant notes that despite the victim's claim during the 911 call that the defendant had a gun, police did not locate a gun on the defendant or during a search of the residence. Additionally, the defendant points out that the investigating police officer never saw a stool in the residence, even though the victim claimed the defendant beat her with a stool. Further, while the victim had indicated that she was bleeding everywhere, the defendant observes that police found no blood in the residence. Finally, the defendant notes that the victim was untruthful regarding her criminal record, specifically noting that she denied being arrested for battery until she was presented with her rap sheet showing a 2005 conviction for aggravated second degree battery.
When issues are raised on appeal, both as to the sufficiency of the evidence and as to one or more trial errors, the reviewing court should first determine the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731, 734 (La. 1992). The reason for reviewing sufficiency first is that the accused may be entitled to an acquittal under Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43, 101 S.Ct. 970, 972, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), if a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in accordance with Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not reasonably conclude that all of the elements of the offense have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); Hearold, 603 So.2d at 734 (La. 1992). Thus, we will first consider the defendant's claim that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to support his conviction for second degree battery.
A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; La. Const, art. I, § 2. The Jackson standard of review incorporated in Article 821 is an objective standard for testing the overall evidence, both direct and circumstantial, for reasonable doubt. State v. Davis, 2000-2685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 11/9/01), 818 So.2d 76, 79. When analyzing circumstantial evidence, La. R.S. 15:438 provides that the fact finder must be satisfied that the overall evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Patorno, 2001-2585 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 141, 144.
A battery is defined in pertinent part by La. R.S. 14:33 as "the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another." In this case, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34, but was found guilty of the responsive offense of second degree battery, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.1. Second degree battery is defined, in pertinent part, by La. R.S. 14:34.1(A) as a battery committed "when the offender intentionally inflicts serious bodily injury." The statute defines "serious bodily injury" as "bodily injury which involves unconsciousness, extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or a substantial risk of death." La. R.S. 14:34.1(B)(3).
Second degree battery is a crime requiring specific criminal intent. See State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306, 310 (La. 1982). Specific criminal intent is that "state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). Such state of mind can be formed in an instant. State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La. 11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, 390. Specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of defendant. State v. Graham, 420 So.2d 1126, 1127 (La. 1982). The intent to inflict serious bodily injury may be inferred from the extent and severity of the victim's injuries. State v. Strickland, 2011-715 (La. App. 5th Cir. 3/27/12), 91 So.3d 411, 416. See also Fuller, 414 So.2d at 310. The existence of specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the trier of fact. State v. McCue, 484 So.2d 889, 892 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
The victim testified that she and the defendant dated for about a year, and they were living together at the time of the offense. On the day in question, the victim stated that she worked from 5:30 a.m. to about 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. When she arrived home, the victim saw the defendant standing on the street corner. She assumed that the defendant had been consuming alcohol. Although the victim told the defendant that she was tired and wanted to lay down, the defendant insisted that the victim stay outside with him for a while. In compliance, the victim sat outside with the defendant for about thirty to forty minutes. During that time period, the victim drank a beer and the defendant was consuming gin and beer. The defendant remained outside when the victim went inside and fell asleep.
The victim testified that she woke up when she heard the defendant banging on the door because he did not have a key. After the victim opened the door for the defendant, he asked what she was doing in the house and she told him she had been sleeping. The victim stated that as she turned around, the defendant struck her in the eye with a closed fist. When she turned toward him to ask why he hit her, the victim stated that he punched her again. The victim further testified, "[T]hat's when we just got, like, an altercation and . . . then, that's when he picked the stool up and just started hitting me, so I just got on the bed and I just balled up and he just kept hitting me over and over."
The victim described the stool as a small, arm-length white stool made of hard plastic and screws. She stated that the defendant was "pounding" her with the stool over and over, on her back, arm, and head. The victim further testified about her injuries, "I had a broken arm and he just bust my head and split my ear, ... I had multiple bruises." She further noted that the defendant shook her after he stopped beating her, and that she did not initially move. She also stated that she was bleeding everywhere, mostly due to her head injury. When the defendant walked out of the room, the victim was able to grab her cell phone and call 911. The victim testified that after she relayed the incident to the 91.1 operator, she dropped her cell phone between the bed and the headboard, because the defendant came back in the bedroom. Thus, the recording continued, but there was no further communication with the operator.
During the recorded 911 call, the victim indicated that the defendant had beaten her and speaking in a low tone, she noted that the defendant had stepped outside but she was afraid that he would come back in and attack her again. She also stated that the defendant had a gun* The 911 operator continued recording the victim's call until the police arrived on the scene. At trial, the victim identified the defendant's voice on the recorded 911 call, where a male voice can be heard in the background loudly insulting, cursing, and threatening to kill the victim. The recording continued as the police arrived on the scene, and discontinued as the police began questioning the victim. Before the recording ended however, the victim informed the police that the defendant was jealous and mad after they went to a party.
The victim testified that after the incident, she went to the Baton Rouge General Hospital where her arm and head injuries were treated. As to the treatment, she specifically stated that she received two stiches, her arm was wrapped, and her head was bandaged before she was allowed to go home. The victim testified that she suffered a lot of pain, and that both of her eyes were blackened and swollen. She noted that the swelling to her eyes lasted for about two weeks, that her arm was splinted for three weeks, and that she continued use of antibiotics and cream during that time period. The victim stated that she could not return to work for over a week due to her injuries, particularly to her eye and arm, and that she lost her job as a result of her absence.
The victim further testified that she moved away from Baton Rouge after the incident and noted that she was arrested due to an unrelated incident. The victim testified that while she was in the Port Allen jail, she saw one of the defendant's relatives and that she received a letter from the defendant about a week later. She stated that after she received the defendant's letter, she was afraid. The victim confirmed that she subsequently executed and provided the defendant's attorney with a handwritten letter indicating that she did not want to testify or see the defendant go to prison. Additionally, the victim told the assistant district attorney that she was not coming to court. The letter further included an account of the incident wherein the victim indicated that the defendant did not hit her, and that she was drunk that night, fell, and hit her head. The victim testified that she wrote the letter because of the defendant's letter suggesting that he would not harm her if she wrote the letter, and because she was "scared." When asked at trial if her letter was a lie or truthful, she testified, "It was a lie."
The victim's letter along with the addressed envelope was admitted into evidence. The envelope was addressed to one of the assistant public defenders noted in the record as appearing on behalf of the defendant before trial.
During cross-examination, the victim noted that in the letter that she received from the defendant while she was incarcerated, the defendant indicated that he would be released from jail, reiterating that he said he would not hurt her again if she wrote the letter to his attorney. The victim testified that she no longer possessed the letter written by the defendant, noting that she did not retrieve all of her belongings when she was released from jail. Regarding the reason for her arrest and her criminal record, the victim stated that she was arrested for bench warrants for misdemeanor offenses like theft or fighting. When asked if she was ever arrested for second degree battery or aggravated second degree battery, she initially stated, "Not that I know of," but she later acknowledged a 2005 arrest for aggravated second degree battery that arose from a family dispute.
The victim was also questioned on cross-examination regarding her claim during the 911 call that the defendant had a gun. She testified that the defendant had a gun, but that she did not know whether he had it in his possession at the time of the attack. She noted that she was hysterical that night and felt that the defendant would probably get his gun. She stated that she was not seeing someone else at the time of the attack, though the defendant was often jealous and would think she was with someone else when she worked late. When asked if she fought the defendant that night, she stated that although she tried, she could not fight because he caught her off guard. The victim recalled telling the police officer that she had drank a beer that night, but stated that she and the defendant had not been at a party and that she did not recall telling the police about a party. On redirect examination, the victim confirmed that other people were on the corner when she sat outside with the defendant and drank beer before going inside to go to sleep. Regarding her criminal record, she stated that she did not recall ever being convicted, only arrests and bench warrants. She confirmed that the defendant gave her his attorney's address.
Officer James Moncrief of the Baton Rouge Police Department testified that upon arriving at the residence, the defendant was immediately handcuffed and locked into the rear of the police car. He further testified that he checked the defendant for weapons before placing him in the police car, because the 911 caller had indicated that the defendant had a gun. However, Officer Moncrief did not find a gun at the scene or with the defendant. Officer Moncrief also noted that the victim had multiple bruises, lacerations, knots on her head, and an eye that was swollen and almost closed. He added that the victim looked like she had been in a struggle or fight, noting that she was breathing heavily, she appeared frantic and afraid, her hair was messed up, and she was crying and upset. He further stated that the victim may have had a busted lip. Officer Moncrief testified that the victim told him that she and the defendant had been at a party at a friend's house drinking alcohol, and that the defendant attacked her that night after she got home. He stated that the victim reported that the defendant punched her and hit her with a chair and other "things." Officer Moncrief stayed with the victim until EMS arrived. Officer Moncrief did not photograph the scene or look for any specific chair, noting that the apartment was in disarray and a chair was knocked over. He testified that due to the victim's injuries, particularly her swollen and possibly broken arm, lacerations, bruises, and facial and eye injuries, the defendant was arrested for second degree battery.
After EMS arrived, Officer Moncrief advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and began questioning him as he was detained in the back of the police car. He noted that the defendant was sweating, and also appeared as though he had been in a struggle. Officer Moncrief smelled a strong odor of alcohol, thus he knew the defendant had been drinking. The defendant did not have any visible marks or blood on him. Officer Moncrief testified that after being read his rights, the defendant acknowledged that the victim had been attacked, but he denied that he was the perpetrator, stating that the police had the "wrong guy."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1631, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). --------
On cross-examination, Officer Moncrief stated that it was apparent that the victim had consumed alcohol that night as she seemed intoxicated, subsequently stating that he could smell alcohol on the victim's breath. The officer further confirmed that he searched the residence and checked around the property and did not find a firearm. He specifically noted that the residence contained more than one "chair or stool" and that he was uncertain which stool may have been used by the defendant to hit the victim. Officer Moncrief initially confirmed that he noticed blood in the bedroom, living room, and hallway of the residence, but later apologized and denied seeing any blood. Also, though he initially indicated that he saw chairs or stools at the scene, as the cross-examination continued, Officer Moncrief stated, "Not that I recall" when asked if he saw a stool that was broken or had blood on it to indicate that someone had been hit with it. Similarly, he replied, "not to my recollection" when he was later asked whether he saw a stool. Additionally, Officer Moncrief testified that the victim did not mention being at work on that night.
On redirect examination, after it was noted that the offense took place December 15, 2011, nearly two years before his trial testimony on October 22, 2013, Officer Moncrief confirmed that he responded to thousands of other calls with other officers during that interim period. He noted that his recollection of some of the details of the incidents were vague but that he tried his best to remember as many details as possible. He confirmed that his memory of the night in question was mainly based on what he wrote in his incident report. After being allowed to review his report, Officer Moncrief confirmed that he noted the defendant's charge as "aggravated" second degree battery as opposed to second degree battery. He further stated that the charge was based on the condition of the victim's arm and her statement that the defendant hit her with a stool. Officer Moncrief again indicated that there actually were stools and chairs in the apartment and confirmed that he misspoke as to the charge earlier in his testimony. He confirmed that he specifically recalled the disfigurement of the victim's arm.
Chris Landry, the paramedic unit commander with the East Baton Rouge EMS who arrived on the scene, testified at trial. Landry noted that the victim was obviously distraught and in pain, her face was visibly swollen, and the disfigurement of her arm was readily apparent. Landry further noted that the victim was obviously injured and needed medical care, but that she refused the offer to be transported to the hospital and elected to ride in her personal vehicle with family members. The summary of events in Landry's Prehospital Care Report specifically notes that the victim "stated that she was assaulted by boyfriend. He punched her in the face and hit her with stool in left arm. ... obvious deformity to left arm." The injuries to the victim's upper extremities were detailed as follows: "Deformity, Dislocation/Fracture, Pain/tenderness, Soft Tissue Swelling/Bruising left forearm." The injuries to her head were detailed as follows: "Pain/tenderness, Soft Tissue Swelling/Bruising head." When asked on cross-examination if the victim's injuries were fresh, though he could not confirm the timing of the injury, Landry testified that they appeared related since they were not in different stages. He did not recall blood on the scene. On redirect examination, Landry stated that he could not recall whether the victim was treated inside or outside of the home.
The trier of fact is free to accept, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. The testimony of a victim may present sufficient evidence to establish that the victim sustained serious bodily injury, without the testimony of any expert. State v. Odom, 2003-1772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/2/04), 878 So.2d 582, 588, writ denied, 2004-1105 (La. 10/8/04), 883 So.2d 1026. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the trier of fact reasonably rejects a hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Moten, 510 So.2d 55, 61 (La. App. 1 st Cir.), writ denied, 514 So.2d 126 (La. 1987). In the absence of internal contradiction or irreconcilable conflict with physical evidence, one witness's testimony, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient support for a requisite factual conclusion. State v. Thomas, 2005-2210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 168, 174, writ denied, 2006-2403 (La. 4/27/07), 955 So.2d 683. On appeal, this Court will not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Creel, 540 So.2d 511, 514 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 546 So.2d 169 (La. 1989).
Herein, both the victim's fear and the defendant's rage were readily apparent based on the 911 recording. While a gun was not found at the scene or on the defendant when the police arrived, the jury could have reasonably accepted the victim's explanation that the defendant had access to a gun, and that at the time of her 911 call, she frantically feared that he might retrieve the gun. Regarding the victim's handwritten letter recanting the allegations, the jury apparently accepted the victim's testimony that she wrote the letter out of fear of the defendant. Considering the victim's statements during the 911 call and the trial, Officer Moncrief s trial testimony, and the EMS report, the victim clearly sustained serious bodily injury including a disfigured arm, head trauma, and extreme physical pain. Officer Moncrief testified that the physical altercation was evidenced by the condition of the victim and the defendant, and the disarray of the apartment upon the officer's arrival. The evidence was sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific criminal intent required under La. R.S. 14:34.1.
Thus, in reviewing the evidence, we cannot say the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them. See State v. Ordodi, 2006-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 662. An appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the jury. State v. Calloway, 2007-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So.3d 417, 418 (per curiam). We are convinced that the State's evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to convince a rational jury that all of the elements of La. R.S. 14:34.1 were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that all reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded. The assignment of error lacks merit.
MATERIAL WITNESS ARREST WARRANT
We next consider the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion for the arrest of a material witness, i.e., the victim. The defendant argues that the State's motion did not include an affidavit as required by La. R.S. 15:257, and therefore should not have been granted. The defendant notes that the motion indicated that the State believed that the victim was "purposely hiding from service" and "not likely to cooperate" if located. The defendant further notes that the State, inconsistent with the claims in the motion for arrest of material witness, acknowledged in its opposition to the defendant's motion for postverdict judgment of acquittal that the victim did not hide or avoid the State and further indicated that the victim assured she would cooperate. The defendant concludes that his conviction should be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial.
At the outset, we note that based on the record before us, the defendant failed to file a motion to quash the material witness warrant before trial and failed to contemporaneously object to the witness's testimony at trial. "An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless it was objected to at the time of occurrence." La. Code Crim. P. art. 841(A). Because there was no contemporaneous objection at trial, any error was not preserved for review.
Moreover, even if we were to review the trial court's ruling, we find no abuse of discretion in the granting of the motion. La. R.S. 15:257 provides as follows:
Whenever it shall appear, upon motion of the district attorney or upon motion of a defendant supported by his affidavit, that the testimony of any witness is essential to the prosecution or the defense, as the case may be, and it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judge, as defined in Article 931 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the witness. The witness shall be arrested and held in the parish jail, or such other suitable place as shall be designated by the court, until he gives an appearance bond as provided for defendantsWe note that based on the plain wording of the statute, the State (unlike a defendant who files a motion pursuant to the statute) is not required to support the motion by affidavit.
when admitted to bail, or until his testimony shall have been given in the cause or dispensed with.
Herein, as reflected in the record, on June 20, 2013, the State filed a motion for the arrest of a material witness, requesting that the trial court issue a warrant to have the victim arrested. As reasons in support of the request for the victim's arrest, the motion notes that the victim was contacted by the assistant district attorney and victim assistance coordinator for the Domestic Violence Unit, and informed them that she was afraid to cooperate with the prosecution, due to fear of the defendant. The motion also notes that the victim wrote a letter to the defendant's attorney, recanting the battery. As further stated in the motion, investigators of the District Attorney's Office attempted to locate and subpoena the victim at her last known address and place of employment, to no avail. The motion notes the State's belief that the witness "is not likely to cooperate with the State even if located due to her expressed fear of the defendant." Finally, the motion notes that the victim is an essential witness and that it was impractical to secure her presence by subpoena.
During her trial testimony, the victim confirmed that when she was contacted by the assistant district attorney about testifying, she stated that she was scared. The victim also testified that while she was in the Port Allen jail for an unrelated incident, she received a letter from the defendant, which made her fearful. The victim subsequently wrote the letter recanting her previous allegations against the defendant and stating that she informed the assistant district attorney that she was not going to testify. After the victim was released from jail, she went back to Baton Rouge and stayed with her sister for a brief period, and then she left again. She confirmed that when law enforcement found her, she told the assistant district attorney that she would cooperate.
During cross-examination at the trial, the victim confirmed that she was still wearing an ankle bracelet due to being compelled to testify. She stated that she would have come on her own free will, but was unaware of the fact that she had to go to court. The victim verified that she talked to the assistant district attorney before being arrested on the State's warrant to appear in court, and stated that two other people came to her residence, but that she did not talk to them. She stated that after her arrest related to the warrant to appear, she informed the district attorney's office that she did not want to come to court because she was scared. She also confirmed that as far back as 2011, she told the district attorney's office that she was scared and did not want to testify. When a witness is detained pursuant to La. R.S. 15:257, and the witness subsequently admits to the truth of the allegations surrounding the detention, the detention is not unlawful as a matter of law. State v. Gatewood, 2012-281 (La. App. 5th Cir. 10/30/12), 103 So.3d 627, 634; State v. Garrett, 38,069 (La. App. 2d Cir. 12/19/03), 862 So.2d 1207, 1210, writ denied, 2004-0475 (La. 6/25/04), 876 So.2d 833; Cooks v. Rodenbeck, 97-1389 (La. App. 3d Cir. 04/29/98), 711 So.2d 444, 448.
In his appeal brief, the defendant cites State v. Gaddis, 36,661 (La. App. 2d Cir. 3/14/03), 839 So.2d 1258, 1268, writ denied, 2003-1275 (La. 5/14/04), 872 So.2d 519, wherein the appellate court upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to place material witness under bond. However, as the appellate court noted in that case, not only did the defendant therein fail to include an affidavit as required by La. R.S. 15:257, he also failed to allege that the prospective witness would depart or be taken from the jurisdiction of the court. Herein, as alleged by the State, the probability of it being impracticable to secure the presence of the victim by subpoena was shown. Under the circumstances presented in the instant case, we find that the State's actions in obtaining a material witness warrant for the victim was in accordance with law and was appropriately motivated. We find no prosecutorial misconduct or trial error in granting the State's motion for a material witness warrant. Further, even if the warrant was wrongly obtained, it resulted in no harm. See Gatewood, 103 So.3d at 634; Garrett, 862 So.2d at 1210. The State elicited testimony that the victim was an unwilling witness compelled to testify. The defendant's counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of the victim in front of the jury. Considering the foregoing, we find no merit in this assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, we affirm the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and sentence.
CONVICTION, HABITUAL OFFENDER ADJUDICATION, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED. CRAIN, J., concurring.
The defendant failed to properly preserve his right to seek appellate review of the trial court's granting of the motion for arrest of a material witness, making the alternative analysis that addresses the merits of the defendant's contention dicta.