Opinion
No. COA15-878
05-10-2016
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT LEE EARL JOE
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Matthew L. Boyatt, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel L. Spiegel, for defendant-appellant.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Forsyth County, Nos. 12 CRS 61062-63, 13 CRS 7165, 13 CRS 54259-61, 14 CRS 9 Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 November 2014 by Judge William Z. Wood in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 January 2016. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Matthew L. Boyatt, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel L. Spiegel, for defendant-appellant. McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Robert Lee Earl Joe ("defendant") appeals by petition for writ of certiorari from judgment entered upon his guilty plea to various felony and misdemeanor drug offenses, resisting a public officer, malicious conduct by a prisoner, reckless driving, and having an open container of alcohol in a vehicle. For the following reasons, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
On 28 October 2013, a Forsyth County Grand Jury indicted defendant on various offenses stemming from separate incidents occurring 1 November 2012 and 3 May 2013. In connection with the 1 November 2012 incident, the Grand Jury indicted defendant in file number 12 CRS 61062 on one count of possession with intent to sell and deliver ("PWISD") alprazolam (a schedule IV controlled substance) in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1), one count of possession of marijuana up to one-half ounce (a schedule VI controlled substance) in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(3), and one count of driving while license revoked in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-28(a); and in file number 12 CRS 61063 on one count of possession of an open container of spirituous liquor in the passenger area of a motor vehicle in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-401(a), one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, i.e., cigar blunt and pill bottle, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.22(a), and one count of reckless driving with wanton disregard in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-140(a). In connection with the 3 May 2013 incident, the Grand Jury indicted defendant in file number 13 CRS 54259 on one count of malicious conduct by a prisoner in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-258.4(a) and one count of resisting a public officer in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223; in file number 13 CRS 54260 on one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, i.e., a digital scale, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.22(a); in file number 13 CRS 54261 on one count of PWISD morphine (a schedule II controlled substance) in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90- 95(a)(1) and one count of PWISD cocaine (a schedule II controlled substance) in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1); and in file number 13 CRS 7165 for attaining habitual felon status in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1. Separately on 23 June 2014, a Forsyth County Grand Jury additionally indicted defendant in file number 14 CRS 9 for attaining habitual felon status in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.1 in connection with the 1 November 2012 incident. In total, defendant was indicted on thirteen charges.
After defendant allegedly rejected plea offers from the State, the case came on for trial in Forsyth County Superior Court before the Honorable William Z. Wood on 17 November 2014. The State indicated it would first proceed on the charges related to the 1 November 2012 incident.
During pre-trial arguments on motions by defendant to continue the matter and to represent himself, defendant indicated he had not seen any of the State's plea offers. At that time, the trial judge asked the prosecutor to explain the State's offers. The prosecutor responded that, per the policy of the District Attorney's Office, there was no longer an offer on the table because the case was on the trial calendar. Nevertheless, at the trial judge's request, the prosecutor described the State's prior offer to consolidate all of defendant's charges under malicious conduct by a prisoner and to sentence defendant as a habitual felon to a term in the mitigated range. Upon further explanation of the previous offer and the possible sentences if defendant was found guilty in separate trials and received two consecutive sentences as a habitual felon, defendant seemed to contemplate the offer. At that time, the trial judge inquired whether the District Attorney's Office would renew the plea offer. After a brief recess, the prosecutor reiterated that the plea offer was no longer available. Although defendant indicated he would have accepted the plea offer, defendant would not plead guilty "straight up" and take his chances in sentencing. The case then proceeded to trial.
Later that day during a break in the presentation of the State's evidence, the prosecutor informed the court that the District Attorney's Office would renew its plea offer. The trial judge then allowed defendant to consult with counsel, his mother, and consider the offer overnight.
The following morning, defendant accepted the State's plea offer in open court, pleading guilty as part of an arrangement whereby the State agreed to consolidate all of the charges under the malicious conduct by a prisoner offense and to sentence defendant as a habitual felon to a term at the bottom of the mitigated range. At the time of defendant's offenses, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c) provided that the minimum sentence at the bottom of the mitigated range for a class C felony by an offender with a prior record level V was 76 months imprisonment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c) (2011). The corresponding maximum sentence was 104 months. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(e) (2011). The written transcript of the plea provided the following summary of the plea arrangement:
In exchange for the defendant's guilty plea the State agrees to consolidate all charges into one Class C habitual felony for sentencing and for the defendant to receive a minimum sentence of 76 months.Despite the fact that defendant was charged with thirteen offenses, the written transcript of the plea listed only ten offenses, including the two habitual felon charges, and the maximum sentences for those offenses. The total possible maximum sentence for the listed offenses was recorded on the written transcript of the plea as 1,116 months plus 300 days. The offenses omitted from the written transcript of the plea were driving while license revoked, resisting a public officer, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The written transcript of the plea also omitted PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54261, but included PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259, for which there was no indictment.
Although the written transcript of the plea included only ten offenses, the trial judge inquired about thirteen offenses during a colloquy with defendant's counsel in open court. Defendant's counsel responded that defendant was pleading guilty to each of the thirteen offenses. In the course of making individual inquiries for each of the thirteen offenses, the trial judge omitted driving while license revoked and included a second count of PWISD cocaine.
Defendant was then called and affirmed. During a colloquy between the trial judge and defendant, the trial judge went over the ten offenses and maximum sentences listed in the written transcript of the plea and inquired whether defendant understood his guilty pleas. Defendant indicated he understood he was pleading guilty to each of the ten offenses. Based on the written transcript of the plea, the trial judge then informed defendant that he was facing a total possible maximum punishment for the charges of 1,116 months plus 300 days and a mandatory minimum sentence of 76 months.
Following the State's presentation of evidence to support the plea, on 18 November 2014, the trial judge accepted defendant's plea and entered judgment in the case. The trial judge consolidated the thirteen offenses that were discussed in the colloquy with defendant's counsel, including the second count of PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259 for which defendant was never indicted; the trial judge omitted driving while license revoked in file number 12 CRS 61062. Defendant was then sentenced for malicious conduct by a prisoner as a habitual felon to a term of 76 to 104 months imprisonment in accordance with the terms of the plea arrangement, a term at the bottom of the mitigated range for a Class C offense by an offender with a prior record level V.
Defendant filed notice of appeal pro se and appellate counsel was later assigned. On 9 October 2015, defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari that was referred to this panel by 17 November 2015 order of this Court.
II. Discussion
As an initial matter, we address the appealability of defendant's guilty plea and defendant's petition for writ of certiorari.
As this Court has recognized, right to appeal is statutory. See State v. Poore, 172 N.C. App. 839, 841, 616 S.E.2d 639, 640 (2005); State v. Flint, 199 N.C. App. 709, 724, 682 S.E.2d 443, 451 (2009). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444 governs when a defendant may appeal and provides, in pertinent parts, as follows:
(e) Except as provided in subsections (a1) and (a2) of this section and G.S. 15A-979, and except when a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest has been denied, the defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a criminal charge in the superior court, but he may petition the appellate division for review by writ of certiorari. If an indigent defendant petitions the appellate division for a writ of certiorari, the presiding superior court judge may in his discretion order the preparation of the record and transcript of the proceedings at the expense of the State.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444 (2015). The exceptions referenced in subsection (e) provide rights of appeal to a defendant who has entered a guilty plea as follows:
(a1) A defendant who has . . . entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a felony[] is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether his or her sentence is supported by evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing hearing only if the minimum sentence of imprisonment does not fall
within the presumptive range for the defendant's prior record or conviction level and class of offense. . . .
(a2) A defendant who has entered a plea of guilty or no contest to a felony or misdemeanor in superior court is entitled to appeal as a matter of right the issue of whether the sentence imposed:
Id. In the present case, it is clear defendant is not entitled to appellate review as a matter of right. Nevertheless, the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide as follows:(1) Results from an incorrect finding of the defendant's prior record level under G.S. 15A-1340.14 or the defendant's prior conviction level under G.S. 15A-1340.21;
(2) Contains a type of sentence disposition that is not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant's class of offense and prior record or conviction level; or
(3) Contains a term of imprisonment that is for a duration not authorized by G.S. 15A-1340.17 or G.S. 15A-1340.23 for the defendant's class of offense and prior record or conviction level.
The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action, or when no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists, or for review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of the trial court ruling on a motion for appropriate relief.N.C. R. App. P. Rule 21(a)(1) (2016). Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e) contemplates an appeal by petition from writ of certiorari, this Court recently held over a dissent that its ability to grant petitions for writ of certiorari is limited to those three circumstances identified in Rule 21. State v. Biddix, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 780 S.E.2d 863, 866-67 (2015). Yet, this Court also recognized that our appellate courts have, on other occasions, issued the writ of certiorari to review issues pertaining to a defendant's guilty plea without addressing the three grounds set forth in Rule 21. Id. at ___, 780 S.E.2d at 867 (discussing cases in which a writ of certiorari was issued); see also Poore, 172 N.C. App. at 841, 616 S.E.2d at 640 (treating appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court allowed). Regardless of whether Rule 21 limits the issuance of a writ of certiorari to the grounds stated in the rule, this Court acknowledged in Biddix that it may invoke Rule 2 to suspend the requirements of Rule 21 and grant certiorari in order to prevent manifest injustice to a party. Id. at ___, 780 S.E.2d at 868; see also N.C. R. App. P. Rule 2 (2016). It simply declined to do so in that case. Id. at ___, 780 S.E.2d at 870-71.
Recognizing the inconsistencies in the issuance of the writ of certiorari by our courts in similar circumstances and the likelihood that our Supreme Court will need to settle the issue, we invoke Rule 2, suspend the requirements of Rule 21, and allow defendant's petition for writ of certiorari in this case.
Factual Basis to Support Plea in 13 CRS 54260
In the first issue on appeal, defendant argues his guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia in file number 13 CRS 54260 was not supported by a sufficient factual basis. Upon review of the record, we agree.
Article 58 of the Criminal Procedures Act, Chapter 15A of the N.C. General Statutes, provides the procedures for guilty pleas in superior court. Pertinent to this first issue on appeal, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(c), provides as follows:
The judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea. This determination may be based upon information including but not limited to:
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(c) (2015). Addressing subsection (c), this Court has explained that,(1) A statement of the facts by the prosecutor.
(2) A written statement of the defendant.
(3) An examination of the presentence report.
(4) Sworn testimony, which may include reliable hearsay.
(5) A statement of facts by the defense counsel.
[t]he five sources listed in the statute are not exclusive, and therefore [t]he trial judge may consider any information properly brought to his attention in determining whether there is a factual basis for a plea of guilty[.] Nonetheless, such information must appear in the record, so that an appellate court can determine whether the plea has been properly accepted. Further, in enumerating these five sources, the statute contemplate[s] that some substantive material independent of the plea itself appear of record which tends to show that defendant is, in fact, guilty.Flint, 199 N.C. App. at 724-25, 682 S.E.2d at 452 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "A defendant's bare admission of guilt contained in the transcript of a plea does not provide the factual basis for that plea." State v. Ross, 173 N.C. App. 569, 573, 620 S.E.2d 33, 36 (2005), affirmed, 360 N.C. 355, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006).
In file number 13 CRS 54260, defendant was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-113.22 as follows: "[D]efendant . . . unlawfully and willfully did knowingly possess with intent to use drug paraphernalia, to wit: A DIGITAL SCALE to process, prepare, test, analyze, package, and repackage a controlled substance which it would be unlawful to possess." Defendant now contends "[t]he record [is] devoid of substantive material showing possession of a digital scale as required to support [his] plea in 13 CRS 54260."
In this case, the prosecutor provided a statement of the facts to support defendant's plea. That statement recounted the facts from the point when the evidence at trial concerning the 1 November 2012 incident stopped prior to the entry of defendant's guilty plea. Concerning the 3 May 2013 incident, the basis of the possession of drug paraphernalia charge in file number 13 CRS 54260, the prosecutor explained the circumstances of the stop and stated that defendant possessed morphine pills, cocaine rocks, and pill bottles. The prosecutor never mentioned a digital scale in the statement of the facts.
Although the State acknowledges the prosecutor did not specifically state that defendant possessed a digital scale when he was stopped by police on 3 May 2013, the State asserts there was a sufficient factual basis in the record before the trial court to support defendant's plea to possession of drug paraphernalia in file number 13 CRS 54260 because there was more information than in State v. Agnew, 361 N.C. 333, 643 S.E.2d 581 (2007), in which the prosecutor did not make a presentation of the factual basis to support the defendant's plea and our Supreme Court held "the transcript [of the plea], defense counsel's stipulation, and the indictment taken together did not contain enough information for an independent judicial determination of [the] defendant's actual guilt[.]" Id. at 337, 643 S.E.2d at 584. Specifically, the State contends the prosecutor in this case "provided a factual presentation of [d]efendant's overall conduct on 3 May 2013" and the magistrate's order indicates defendant was found to be in possession of a digital scale. We are not persuaded.
In support of its holding in Agnew, the Court explained that
the [t]ranscript of [p]lea standing alone was inadequate. Similarly, defense counsel's stipulation to the existence of a factual basis was insufficient because the stipulation gave the trial court no additional substantive information about the case as required by statute. Likewise, the indictment simply stated the charge and did not provide any further factual description of defendant's particular alleged conduct.Id. Nothing in the present case provides any more substantive information to support defendant's plea in file number 13 CRS 54260. Although there was a presentation of facts concerning the 3 May 2013 incident, as noted above, there was no mention of a digital scale. Thus, we fail to see how the State's presentation as it relates specifically to file number 13 CRS 54260 distinguishes this case from Agnew. Additionally, while the magistrate's order did mention a digital scale, similar to the indictment in Agnew and the indictment in file number 13 CRS 54260 in this case, the order did not provide a factual description beyond the charge. Consequently, we hold the trial court erred in finding a sufficient factual basis to support defendant's plea to possession of drug paraphernalia in file number 13 CRS 54260. As in Agnew, the record "did not contain enough information for an independent judicial determination of [the] defendant's actual guilt[.]" Id. Furthermore, despite the State's argument to the contrary, the error was not harmless merely because the defendant's plea to possession of drug paraphernalia in 13 CRS 54260 was consolidated with other charges. As a result, we vacate defendant's guilty plea in file number 13 CRS 54260 and the judgment.
Maximum Possible Sentences
In the second issue raised on appeal, defendant contends the trial judge failed to correctly advise him of the maximum possible sentences as required by statute. Again, we agree.
Pertinent to this second issue on appeal, the procedures set forth for entry of a guilty plea in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022 further require a superior court judge to personally address a defendant before accepting the defendant's guilty plea and to inform the defendant "of the maximum possible sentence on the charge for the class of offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, including that possible from consecutive sentences, and of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a).
Defendant first contends the trial court failed to meet the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a) because the trial judge failed to advise him of the maximum sentences for PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54261, possession of drug paraphernalia in file number 12 CRS 61063, and resisting a public officer in file number 13 CRS 54259. Defendant also contends the trial judge incorrectly advised him of the maximum possible sentences for six of the offenses included in the written transcript of the plea that were discussed during the trial judge's colloquy with him in open court. The maximum possible sentences that defendant contends were incorrect are as follows: 60 days for possession of marijuana up to one-half ounce in file number 12 CRS 61062; 279 months for PWISD alprazolam (a schedule IV controlled substance) in file number 12 CRS 61062 as a habitual felon; 120 days for possession of an open container in a motor vehicle in file number 12 CRS 61063; 279 months for PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259 as a habitual felon; 279 months for malicious conduct by a prisoner in file number 13 CRS 54259 as a habitual felon; and 279 months for PWISD morphine (a schedule II controlled substance) in file number 13 CRS 54261 as a habitual felon. Based on defendant's claim that the maximum possible sentences for these six offenses were incorrect, defendant contends the total maximum sentence of 1,116 months plus 300 days was also incorrect. Lastly, defendant claims he was prejudiced by these errors because there is a reasonable possibility he would not have pleaded guilty.
Regarding defendant's first contention that the trial judge failed to inform him of any maximum possible sentences for the three charges identified by defendant, we agree. As described above in the background, the trial judge conducted a colloquy with defendant. In that colloquy, the judge informed defendant of the ten charges included in the written transcript of the plea and the maximum possible sentences for those charges. The charges identified by defendant for PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 5426, possession of drug paraphernalia in file number 12 CRS 61063, and resisting a public officer in file number 13 CRS 54259 were not included in the written transcript of the plea and the trial judge never explained those charges and the maximum possible sentences for those charges in his colloquy with defendant. Nevertheless, the trial judge accepted defendant's guilty plea and consolidated those charges when he entered judgment. By failing to inform defendant on all charges in his colloquy with defendant, the trial judge failed to meet the mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a).
As noted above, defendant was informed of the possible maximum sentence for PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259, for which there was no indictment. The charge of driving while license revoked in file number 12 CRS 61062 was not included in the written transcript of the plea and, therefore, the maximum sentence for driving while license revoked was not explained to defendant. The failure to inform defendant of the possible maximum sentence for driving while license revoked, however, is not at issue on appeal because the trial court omitted it from the judgment and instead included a second count of PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259.
We also agree the trial judge erred in instructing defendant as to the possible maximum sentences for the charges included in the written transcript of the plea. The maximum possible sentences for the six offenses identified by defendant were overstated.
First, possession of marijuana up to one-half ounce in file number 12 CRS 61062 and possession of an open container in a motor vehicle in file number 12 CRS 61063 are both class three misdemeanors. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(d)(4) (2011) (possession of marijuana); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 18B-401(a) (2011) (opened container). At the time of defendant's offenses, the maximum punishment for a class 3 misdemeanor was 20 days. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.23(c) (2011).
Second, and more substantial, the trial judge erred in informing defendant that the maximum possible sentence for a habitual felon for each felony offense listed in the written transcript of the plea was 279 months. Per N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17, at the time of defendant's offenses, 279 months was the maximum sentence for a Class C sex crime. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(f) (2011). In this case, however, none of the felony offenses listed in the written transcript of the plea were sex crimes. Consequently, the maximum possible sentence for each felony sentenced as a Class C felony would have been 231 months. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(e) (2011). But, what is more, not all of the felony offenses listed in the written transcript of the plea would have been elevated to Class C offenses by defendant's habitual felon status. North Carolina's habitual felon laws provide that a defendant sentenced as a habitual felon must "be sentenced at a felony class level that is four classes higher than the principal felony for which the person was convicted; but under no circumstances shall an habitual felon be sentenced at a level higher than a Class C felony." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-7.6 (2015). Accordingly, Class D, E, F, and G felonies are sentenced as Class C felonies, a Class H felony is sentenced as a Class D felony, and a Class I felony is sentenced as a Class E felony. Varying greatly from the 279 month maximum possible sentences that defendant was advised of, PWISD alprazolam (a schedule IV controlled substance) is a Class I felony, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(b)(2), and would therefore be sentenced as a Class E felony with a maximum possible sentence of 88 months; PWISD cocaine and PWISD morphine are both Class H felonies, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(b)(1); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-90(1)(d) and (a)(13) (classifying cocaine and morphine as schedule II controlled substances), and would be sentenced as Class D felonies with maximum possible sentences of 204 months each; and malicious conduct by a prisoner is a Class F felony, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-258.4, and would be sentenced as a Class C felony with a maximum possible sentence of 231 months.
When all the correct maximum possible sentences are totaled, including the maximum possible sentences for reckless driving (60 days) and possession of drug paraphernalia (120 days), of which defendant was correctly informed, the actual total maximum possible sentence of 727 months plus 220 days is considerably less than the 1,116 months plus 300 days defendant was informed was possible.
The State does not argue the maximum possible sentences explained to defendant in the trial judge's colloquy with defendant were not erroneous, but instead asserts "the record establishe[d] that the trial court did in fact accurately explain to . . . [d]efendant the appropriate sentencing ranges for two (2) consecutive habitual felon convictions[]" and "[d]efendant's trial counsel also explained to [d]efendant the sentencing ranges on both habitual felon charges." Thus, assuming arguendo the trial court failed to inform defendant of the correct maximum possible sentence for each offense, the State contends the trial judge's error does not invalidate defendant's plea and defendant cannot show how the error reasonably affected his decision to plead guilty. We disagree.
A review of the record shows the trial court did instruct defendant on the maximum possible sentences he could receive if he was found guilty of all charges in separate trials with the charges divided by date, and if the offenses were consolidated into two consecutive habitual felon convictions. However, the explanation referenced by the State occurred prior to the beginning of trial when defendant could not accept the State's plea offer because the State had indicated the plea offer was no longer available. We hold the trial court's explanation of the maximum possible sentences for two consecutive habitual felon convictions when the State's plea offer was not available to defendant, and before defendant had considered or indicated he would accept the offer, does not substitute for the process required in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a). Moreover, the trial court's explanation before the trial began did not inform defendant of the maximum possible sentences, "including that possible from consecutive sentences," as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022(a)(6).
Yet, "just because the trial court failed to comply with the strict statutory requirements does not entitle defendant to have his plea vacated. Defendant must still show that he was prejudiced as a result." State v. Hendricks, 138 N.C. App. 668, 670, 531 S.E.2d 896, 898 (2000). "[O]ur courts have refuse[d] to adopt a technical, ritualistic approach in the context of [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 15A-1022 violations. Instead, we must look to the totality of the circumstances and determine whether non-compliance with the statute either affected defendant's decision to plead or undermined the plea's validity." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Given the substantial errors by the trial court in accepting defendant's guilty plea in this case, including the trial judge's failure to explain all of the charges to defendant due to the omission of some charges from the written transcript of the plea and the failure to inform defendant of the correct maximum possible sentences for many of the offenses that were included in the written transcript of the plea, there is a reasonable possibility that defendant did not understand the consequences of his plea and may have made a different decision if he was properly informed. Thus, we hold the validity of defendant's guilty plea was undermined and the plea must be vacated.
Jurisdiction
In the third and final issue on appeal, defendant contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea to PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259 because there was no indictment for the offense. Because we have already held defendant's plea was invalid, we address this issue only briefly.
A valid bill of indictment is essential to the jurisdiction of the trial court. See State v. Barnett, 223 N.C. App. 65, 68, 733 S.E.2d 95, 97 (2012). In this case, there was no indictment for PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259. The only indictment for PWISD cocaine was in file number 13 CRS 54261. Nevertheless, the trial judge accepted defendant's guilty plea to PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259 and entered judgment. It is clear this error was not merely typographical, as the State asserts, because the trial judge included two counts of PWISD cocaine in the list of offenses that were consolidated for judgment. Because there was no indictment for PWISD cocaine in file number 13 CRS 54259, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to accept defendant's guilty plea for that offense.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed, defendant's guilty plea and the judgment are vacated. The case is remanded for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).