Opinion
No. 54375-0-I
Filed: August 1, 2005 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal from Superior Court of King County. Docket No: 03-8-04064-1. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 05/28/2004. Judge signing: Hon. Harry J. McCarthy.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, 1511 Third Avenue, Suite 701, Seattle, WA 98101.
Joseph Tro Leapai (info Only) (Appearing Pro Se), 351 N 103 St Seattle, WA 98133.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Amy R. Holt, King County Prosecutor's Office, 516 3rd Ave Ste W554, Seattle, WA 98104-2390.
Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
J.L. challenges on appeal his juvenile convictions for obstruction of a law enforcement officer and being a minor in possession of intoxicants. His contention that he was entitled to a jury trial is resolved by State v. Tai N. ___ Wn. App. ___, 113 P.3d 19 (2005). The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of July 31, 2003, J.L. and his older brother had attended choir practice at their church, which ended at about 8 p.m. Witnesses who saw J.L. at church noticed nothing unusual about his behavior and did not see him consume alcohol. At about 9:30 p.m., police were called after motorists encountered two young men in a roadway near a church in Burien. When the police arrived, they found the men by the side of the road. One of them, J.L., appeared to be extremely angry, with his fists clenched, arms at his sides, chest thrust outward. Deputy Ignacio Yanez began asking questions to determine whether a crime had occurred; the young man who was with J.L., his older brother, answered the questions and J.L. remained silent.
While Deputy Yanez was running the names of the young men to see if there were outstanding warrants, J.L. began to threaten other officers on the scene. He told one of the officers that if he weren't armed, he would `kick his ass.' Report of Proceedings (RP) (Jan. 9, 2004) at 15. J.L. did not comply when Deputy Yanez told him to step back and calm down. Because he continued to approach Deputy Calabrese, Deputy Yanez tased J.L. As the deputy placed J.L. in handcuffs, he smelled alcohol on J.L.'s breath, and noted that he spoke repetitively, with slurred speech. Deputy Yanez testified that if he had simply been able to establish that no crime had occurred before he arrived, the whole call could have taken 10 minutes. Because he had to tase J.L., a crowd gathered and back-up and a supervisor were called and the event took about one and a half hours.
The juvenile court found Deputy Yanez to be credible as to his observations of J.L., and noted that about one and a half hours had passed since the end of choir practice. He found J.L. guilty of both obstruction of a law enforcement officer and being a minor in possession of intoxicants. This appeal follows.
DECISION
J.L. contends that under the Sixth Amendment and the Washington Constitution, juveniles charged with offenses are entitled to trial by jury. Like the juvenile in State v. Tai N., J.L. argues that even though a long line of cases has rejected this contention, these cases have been undermined by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 150 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004). This court in Tai N. held that these and other recent decisions cited by J.L. do not compel a change to well-established precedent holding that non-jury trials for juvenile offenders are constitutionally sound. Tai N., 113 P.3d at 23.
J.L. also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Evidence is sufficient if, after viewing it in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Credibility determinations are for the trial court. State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 38, 941 P.2d 1102 (1997).
J.L. contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly delayed a law enforcement officer. J.L. focuses on the trial court's finding that his refusal to answer questions at the time of the deputy's initial contact with him delayed the investigation of the original complaint. Merely refusing to answer an officer's questions cannot form the basis of an obstruction charge. State v. Turner, 103 Wn. App. 515, 13 P.3d 234 (2000). But J.L. did more than simply refuse to talk with the deputy. The trial court also found that J.L. delayed the officers by threatening and aggressively approaching another deputy, leading him to be tased. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to prove that J.L. delayed the deputies' investigation of the original 911 call by more than an hour.
The elements of obstruction are: (1) that the action of inaction in fact hinders, delays, or obstructs; (2) that the hindrance, delay or obstruction be of a public servant in the midst of discharging his official powers or duties; (3) knowledge by the defendant that the public servant is discharging his duties; and (4) that the action or inaction be done knowingly by the obstructer, i.e., with the intent to hinder. Sunnyside v. Wendt, 51 Wn. App. 846, 851-52, 755 P.2d 847 (1988).
J.L. also contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted willfully because he was not warned by the officers that he was interfering with their work. He relies on State v. Ware, 111 Wn. App. 738, 46 P.3d 280 (2002), in which the defendant ignored repeated warnings not to interfere in an arrest; Ware points out that acting `willfully' is the equivalent of acting with knowledge. Id. at 743. Here, J.L. was warned to calm down and step back from Deputy Calabrese, but he ignored the warning. While the warnings were not repeated, J.L. was doing more than interfering in the arrest of a friend he was threatening an officer. As the State argues, any rational person would be ware that if he threatened an officer and approached him aggressively, ignoring a command to step back, the result would likely be hindrance and delay, at a minimum. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that J.L. acted willfully to hinder or delay the officers.
Finally, J.L. contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he exhibited the effects of having consumed liquor `by speech, manner, appearance, behavior, lack of coordination, or otherwise.' RCW 66.44.270(2)(b)(ii). He notes that Deputy Yanez did not notice that he was slurring his words until after he had been tased. Witnesses who sang with J.L. in the choir did not notice that his speech was slurred; they also testified that J.L. did not have the opportunity to drink before encountering the police. The determination of credibility is the province of the trial court, and here the trial court found credible the officer's testimony about the signs of alcohol consumption exhibited by J.L.J.L.'s behavior, in addition to the odor of alcohol on his breath and his slurred speech, supports the trial court's conclusion that J.L. was exhibiting the effects of having consumed intoxicants. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to prove that J.L. was a minor in possession of liquor.
We affirm.
COLEMAN, AGID and BAKER, JJ.