Opinion
1D22-489
04-19-2023
State of Florida, Appellant, v. J. J., Appellee.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, and Eric Trombley, Assistant State General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Emmalyn Dalton, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County. Tiffany M. Baker-Carper, Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney General, and Eric Trombley, Assistant State General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Emmalyn Dalton, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
WINOKUR, J.
We have for review a disposition order that imposed a lower restrictiveness level than the one recommended by the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ"). Because the trial court failed to provide sufficient reasons to support its decision to disregard DJJ's recommended disposition, we reverse.
I
J.J. entered a plea of no contest to possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. He also admitted to violating his probation by committing the new law offenses of resisting an officer without violence and possession of a weapon by a delinquent.
The predisposition report recounted J.J.'s extensive criminal history, which began in 2018 with an unsuccessful discharge from Teen Court. J.J. was later placed on probation several times before being committed to a non-secure residential program that he successfully completed. J.J. was then placed on post-commitment probation. In 2021, J.J. was again placed on probation. The PDR also recognized that J.J. recently enrolled in community college to pursue his GED and that J.J. has a good relationship with his family. J.J. scored a "High" risk of re-offending. As a result, DJJ recommended that J.J. be committed to a high-risk residential program.
At a disposition hearing, J.J.'s therapist testified that he has shown remorse for his actions and that he has not been able to take full advantage of the services offered to him. J.J. stated that he would "do better" because he now has a support system, which consists of his therapists and his family. The State presented contrary evidence that DJJ had "exhausted [its] toolbox" with J.J. The State also noted that J.J. would still have access to his therapist in the high-risk program.
After hearing all of the evidence, the juvenile court committed J.J. to a non-secure residential program, followed by six months of post-commitment probation and 150 hours of community service. The court also directed J.J. to obtain his GED and pay various courts costs and fees.
The State objected, arguing that the court needed to provide reasons for disregarding DJJ's recommended restrictiveness level. The juvenile court insisted that it was not required to provide reasons for committing J.J. at a restrictiveness level lower than DJJ's recommendation but provided some justification for its disposition. In support of deviation, the court explained that J.J. was "making progress" and complying with court orders, including counseling; that J.J. is not a "bad person;" that J.J. is "honestly trying to earn money and make a living" to support himself and his family; and that J.J. is pursuing his GED. The juvenile court further stated, in general terms, that it understood the difference between the high-risk program that was recommended and the non-secure residential program that it imposed. The State appealed.
II
The State contends that the juvenile court must provide reasons for any deviation from DJJ's recommended disposition and that the reasons provided in support of the deviated disposition at issue in this case were insufficient under E.A.R. v. State, 4 So.3d 614, 624 (Fla. 2009). With regard to the first issue, this Court applies de novo review to issues of statutory interpretation. See Hopkins v. State, 105 So.3d 470, 472 (Fla. 2012); see also T.S. v. State, 227 So.3d 229, 230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ("Whether the trial court complied with the legal standard set forth in E.A.R. is reviewed de novo."). As for the second issue, this Court reviews a juvenile court's disposition order for an abuse of discretion. See B.L.R. v. State, 74 So.3d 173, 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
When a court determines that a juvenile has committed a delinquent act, it must commit the juvenile to DJJ. § 985.433(7), Fla. Stat. When this occurs, DJJ is required to "identify[] the restrictiveness level most appropriate for the child" and recommend this level to the judge. § 985.433(7)(a), Fla. Stat. The court may order placement at a different restrictiveness level than that recommended by DJJ, but if it does it must "state for the record the reasons that establish by a preponderance of the evidence why the court is disregarding the assessment of the child and the restrictiveness level recommended by" DJJ. § 985.433(7)(b), Fla. Stat.
The Florida Supreme Court added more detail to this latter requirement in E.A.R. In E.A.R. the Court ruled that in order for a juvenile court to properly explain why one restrictiveness level is more appropriate than the one recommended, it must do the following:
(1) Articulate an understanding of the respective characteristics of the opposing restrictiveness levels . . . including (but not limited to) the type of child that each restrictiveness level is designed to serve, the potential "lengths of stay" associated with each level, and the divergent treatment programs and services available to the juvenile at these levels (the DJJ possesses the expertise to provide this information); and
(2) Then logically and persuasively explain why, in light of these differing characteristics, one level is better suited to serving both the rehabilitative needs of the juvenile-in the least restrictive setting-and maintaining the ability of the State to protect the public from further acts of delinquency.Id. at 633.
J.J. suggests that E.A.R. was intended to keep the juvenile courts in line. J.J. also contends that E.A.R. suggests that the juvenile court fulfills an "overarching duty" simply by imposing a less restrictive disposition than the one recommended by DJJ. We disagree. E.A.R. recognized that the Legislature's carefully crafted juvenile justice scheme requires the juvenile court and the DJJ to "work together to ensure that the child's disposition provides the 'most appropriate' placement and dispositional services with the 'least' or 'minimum' restrictiveness level necessary to protect public safety." Id. at 624, 631-32. "The Florida Legislature did not enact a comprehensive statutory scheme and create a conscientious agency with recognized professional expertise to simply have the scheme and this expertise disregarded at the whim of the judicial branch without a thoughtful, substantive explanation." Id. at 634. With this unified approach in mind, the supreme court explained that the juvenile court's duty to provide "reasons" for disregarding DJJ's recommended disposition must be interpreted in light of its "overarching duty to determine 'the most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting.'" Id. at 632 (emphasis omitted) (quoting § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat.). What the supreme court did not address was DJJ's parallel duty: When a predisposition report is ordered, DJJ must evaluate the child's needs and risks, and provide to the juvenile court a recommendation of "the most appropriate placement setting to meet the child's needs with the minimum program security that reasonably ensures public safety." § 985.43(1)(a), Fla. Stat. While E.A.R. acknowledges the DJJ's professional expertise, the opinion does not fully set forth the complementary role that DJJ plays in the juvenile disposition process. See 4 So.3d at 633-35.
After reviewing the legislative history and purpose of section 985.433(7), Florida Statutes, E.A.R. discussed these statutory requirements. To form a "legally sufficient foundation" for deviating from DJJ's recommended disposition under E.A.R., the juvenile court must, as stated above (1) articulate its "understanding of the respective characteristics of the opposing restrictiveness levels," and then (2) "logically and persuasively explain why, in light of these differing characteristics, one level is" more appropriate. 4 So.3d at 633; see also M.H. v. State, 69 So.3d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ("In order to deviate lawfully, the trial court must do more than place generalized reasons on the record; it must engage in a well-reasoned and complete analysis of the PDR and the type of facility to which the trial court intends to send the child."). To satisfy the second prong, the court must identify "significant information that DJJ has overlooked, failed to sufficiently consider, or misconstrued with regard to the child's programmatic, rehabilitative needs along with the risks that the unrehabilitated child poses to the public." E.A.R., 4 So.3d at 634. Logically speaking, the juvenile court cannot provide "reasons" for "disregarding" DJJ's recommended disposition and evaluation of the child's risks and needs while simultaneously "relying upon the very information disclosed by these supposedly 'disregarded' sources." Id. at 633 n.32 (emphasis omitted).[*]
III
Even if we were to consider the statute alone without resort to E.A.R., we would still reverse the disposition order on appeal. But before we explain why, we address whether the State is permitted to appeal a disposition order that imposed a lower restrictiveness level than DJJ recommended.
First, we note that section 985.433(7)(b), Florida Statutes, allows "[a]ny party" to "appeal the court's findings resulting in a modified level of restrictiveness." See Statjuvenilee v. I.D., 219 So.3d 249, 250 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017); State v. A.C., 44 So.3d 1240, 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
Section 985.433(7) sets out the procedure for committing a child who has been adjudicated delinquent to DJJ. Notably, the subsection does not differentiate between orders imposing a higher restrictiveness level than DJJ recommends and orders that impose a lower restrictiveness level. Instead, the provision states that a juvenile court "may order placement at a different restrictiveness level" and requires the court to state why it is "disregarding" DJJ's recommendation. § 985.433(7)(b), Fla. Stat. The provision also specifically permits an appeal of "the court's findings resulting in a modified level of restrictiveness" by "[a]ny party." By allowing an appeal by either party, we conclude that the statute permits the State to appeal a "modified," or lower, level of restrictiveness when not accompanied by the requisite reasons in the record. As discussed below, the plain language of section 985.433(7) indicates that the juvenile court must provide reasons for deviating without regard to whether the deviation calls for a higher or lower restrictiveness level. Thus, the State is permitted to appeal a lower restrictiveness level.
IV
Even if the State is permitted to appeal a disposition deviating from the DJJ recommendation, J.J. further argues that the juvenile court need not comply with requirements of E.A.R. or provide "reasons" for disregarding DJJ's recommendation when it imposes a lower restrictiveness level than recommended. He asserts that the juvenile court carries out its overarching duty of determining the most appropriate disposition in the least restrictive available setting by virtue of the fact that it imposed a less restrictive commitment than recommended. J.J.'s argument focuses on the requirement that the court determine the "most appropriate dispositional services in the least restrictive available setting," § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. We see two problems with this approach. First, "least restrictive available setting" does not mean that less restrictive is always preferred; the court is required to also consider the "most appropriate dispositional services." Second, this argument ignores the fact that DJJ has a similar duty, see § 985.145(4), Fla. Stat. Either way, J.J.'s public policy arguments cannot overcome the statute's plain language.
Section 985.433(7)(b), Florida Statutes, mandates that the juvenile court provide "reasons" for disregarding DJJ's recommendation and ordering commitment at a "modified" restrictiveness level. The statute does not limit the court's duty to upward deviations, higher levels of restrictiveness, or harsher sentences. We will not read such limitation into the statute.
V
Determining that the juvenile court must provide reasons for deviating downward from DJJ's recommended disposition, we next turn to whether reasons provided by the juvenile court were sufficient.
"Trial courts do not have unlimited discretion in ordering dispositions for juveniles." Dep't of Juv. Just. v. K.B., 784 So.2d 556, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Under section 985.433(7), DJJ must provide a recommendation of the most appropriate placement and treatment plan, including the restrictiveness level that is most appropriate for the child if commitment is recommended. See § 985.433(7)(a), Fla. Stat. "The court shall commit the child to the department at the restrictiveness level identified or may order placement at a different restrictiveness level." § 985.433(7)(b), Fla. Stat. If the court decides to deviate from DJJ's recommended disposition, then the court must "state for the record the reasons that establish by a preponderance of the evidence why the court is disregarding the assessment of the child and the restrictiveness level recommended by the department." Id.
In support of the deviated disposition, the juvenile court stated that J.J. was "making progress" and complying with court orders, including counseling; J.J. is not a "bad person;" and that J.J. indicated his intent to obtain his GED. However, the PDR reflects that J.J. enrolled in community college to pursue his GED. DJJ also acknowledged that J.J. had been engaging in his counseling sessions and that he had taken some responsibility for his actions. Despite these observations, DJJ recommended commitment to a high-risk program.
To support a deviation, the juvenile court must state why it is choosing to disregard DJJ's analysis and recommendation. It may not rely on the same facts that formed the basis for DJJ's recommendation without explaining why those facts support a modified level of restrictiveness. See B.L.R., 74 So.3d at 176 ("[T]he [juvenile] court must do more than 'parrot' and 'regurgitate' the information in the PDR to support a departure disposition." (quoting E.A.R., 4 So.3d at 633, 638)). The juvenile court thus erred by relying on factors that DJJ considered in making its recommendation. See C.C. v. State, 276 So.3d 14, 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).
VI
Because the juvenile court must provide reasons to support a deviation from DJJ's recommended disposition and the reasons offered in support of the deviation in J.J.'s case were insufficient under the statute, the disposition order on appeal is REVERSED and REMANDED. On remand, the juvenile court may provide sufficient reasons for deviating from DJJ's recommended disposition or impose DJJ's recommendation. See M.H., 69 So.3d at 328; C.M.H., 25 So.3d at 680.
ROWE, C.J., and NORDBY, J., concur.
[*] We recognize that one could conclude that E.A.R. imposes requirements that go beyond the statutory requirements. See E.A.R., 4 So.3d at 640 (Canady, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Canady noted that the text of section 985.433(7)(b) grants substantial discretion to the juvenile court. See E.A.R., 4 So.3d at 640-41 (Canady, J., dissenting). "When the trial court decides not to adopt the DJJ's recommended disposition, the statute simply requires that the trial court articulate reasons for that decision." Id. at 640. Justice Canady criticized the majority opinion in E.A.R. for adopting a standard that goes "beyond what is warranted by the statute." Id. at 641; cf. C.M.H. v. State, 25 So.3d 678, 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (recognizing that the E.A.R. decision "announced a new, more rigorous analysis" for the juvenile court to conduct before deviating from DJJ's recommendation). The statute does not require that the juvenile court articulate an understanding of the various restrictiveness levels or explain why one restrictiveness level is better suited than the other levels. So long as the juvenile court provides "reasons" for disregarding DJJ's recommendation, reversal and remand for entry of additional findings that are unwarranted by section 985.433(7)(b) should not be necessary. See E.A.R., 4 So.3d at 64142 (Canady, J., dissenting) ("The detailed, complex, and strict standard adopted by the majority might be justifiable as a matter of policy. But it is not within the province of this Court to make the policy determinations on which such a standard is based. That is the responsibility of the Legislature.").