Opinion
Def. ID No. 0005011315
03-22-2016
RE: State of Delaware v. Robert W. Hassett
Robert W. Hassett SBI No. 337363 James T. Vaughn Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19777
RICHARD F. STOKES JUDGE Robert W. Hassett
SBI No. 337363
James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
1181 Paddock Road
Smyrna, DE 19777 Dear Mr. Hassett:
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Postconviction Relief which Defendant Robert W. Hassett ("Defendant") has filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). Defendant has also filed a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and a Motion for Transcripts.
On June 21, 2001, following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. He was sentenced on August 1, 2001. Defendant filed an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court on September 7, 2001. The Supreme Court affirmed this Court's decision and the judgment of conviction became final on June 5, 2002.
Nearly fourteen years later, on February 24, 2016, Defendant filed his third Motion for Postconviction Relief. In the instant Motion, Defendant claims, under a trilogy of United States Supreme Court decisions, his sentence violates the United State Constitution. Defendant also asserts a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant's first two motions for postconviction relief were filed on May 2, 2003 and March 25, 2010.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (holding that death penalty cannot be imposed upon juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75, (2010) (holding that life in prison without parole cannot be imposed upon juvenile offenders who did not commit homicides); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding that mandatory sentencing schemes imposing life in prison without parole on juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment).
Contrary to Defendant's assertion, Delaware's sentencing laws regarding juvenile offenders were modified in light of Miller v. Alabama. As a result, 11 Del. C. § 4209A was enacted to provide the penalty for First Degree Murder committed by juvenile offenders. Section 4209A states:
Any person who is convicted of first-degree murder for an offense that was convicted before the person has reached the person's eighteenth birthday shall be sentenced to a term of incarceration not less than 25 years to be served at Level V up to a term of imprisonment for the remainder of the person's natural life to be served at Level V without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction.Additionally, 11 Del. C. § 4204A was amended to address modification of sentences for those juveniles who were sentenced before their eighteenth birthday. Section 4204A(d)(2) states, in relevant part:
. . . any offender sentenced to a term of incarceration for Murder First Degree when said offense was committed prior to the offender's eighteenth birthday shall be eligible to petition the Superior Court for sentence modification after the offender has served 30 years of the originally imposed Level V sentence.Defendant was nineteen years old at the time he committed the offense. Therefore, pursuant to Delaware's statutory sentencing scheme, Defendant is ineligible for a sentence modification.
See Johnson v. State, 2015 WL 1880412, at *1 (Del. Apr. 21, 2015) (holding that offender was not under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense and was therefore not a juvenile); Desmond v. State, 2014 WL 3809683, at *2 (Del. Aug. 1, 2014) (holding that defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced as an adult so defendant's claims that his sentence was constitutionally disproportionate compared to a juvenile offender is frivolous).
With respect to Defendant's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Motion was not filed within a year of when the judgment of conviction was final, and therefore, it is time-barred. To avoid that bar, Defendant either must have:
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) ("Time limitation. A motion for postconviction relief may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final or, if it asserts a retroactively applicable right that is newly recognized after the judgment of conviction is final, more than one year after the right is first recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware or by the United States Supreme Court.").
(i) [pled] . . . with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which [she] was convicted; orDefendant has failed to make this showing and his requests for appointment of counsel and transcripts fail as well. Defendant's motion is time-barred, and consequently, is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
(ii) [pled] . . . with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant's case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (e)(4) ("For an indigent movant's second or subsequent postconviction motion, the judge may appoint counsel for an indigent movant only if the judge determines that the second or subsequent motion satisfies the pleading requirements of subparagraphs (2)(i) or (2)(ii) of subdivision (d) of this rule."); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4) ("The judge may order the preparation of a transcript of any part of the prior proceeding in the case needed to determine whether the movant may be entitled to relief.").
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Richard F. Stokes
Richard F. Stokes cc: Prothonotary's Office
Department of Justice
Melanie C. Withers, Esquire
Thomas D. Barnett, Esquire