Opinion
No. 1-885 / 00-1686.
Filed January 9, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, PATRICK J. MADDEN, JAMES R. HAVERCAMP, and GARY D. McKENRICK, Judges.
Napoleon Hartsfield appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his guilty plea to third-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, Kelley G. Cunningham and Jerald Feuerbach, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
Napoleon Hartsfield appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his guilty plea to third-degree theft. He contends the district erred in allowing him to proceed pro se without determining whether he made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of assistance of counsel. Hartsfield also contends his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. On May 4, 2000, Hartsfield was charged by trial information with burglary in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 703.1, 713.1 and 713.6A (1999). On June 13, 2000, his court-appointed attorney, Robert Phelps, moved to withdraw and have substituted counsel appointed after Hartsfield claimed Phelps was not working in his best interest. The district court granted the motion to withdraw and appointed Patrick Kelly to represent Hartsfield. On July 10, 2000, Kelly moved to withdraw and have substitute counsel appointed for Hartsfield. At the hearing on the motion Hartsfield expressed his dissatisfaction with his counsel's representation and his desire to represent himself. The district court denied the motion, but the court informed Hartsfield that if he wanted to represent himself, he would need to file a motion. Another hearing was held on July 19, 2000, at which Hartsfield alleged "a severe breakdown in attorney/client communication." He again stated he wanted to represent himself. The court granted the renewed motion to withdraw and appointed Murray Bell to represent Hartsfield.
Bell moved to withdraw on July 28, 2000, citing a conflict of interest. The district court granted the request and appointed Eugene Van Driel to represent Hartsfield. Van Driel requested a competency hearing and a psychiatric evaluation for his client. A competency hearing was held on August 23, 2000, at which Hartsfield expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney for requesting a competency hearing and again expressed his desire to represent himself. The next day the district court held a detailed hearing on his waiver of counsel. The court determined Hartsfield was competent, granted his request to represent himself, and appointed Patricia Zamora as standby counsel. On September 19, 2000, Hartsfield submitted a written plea of guilty to the offense of theft in the third degree as well as a waiver of his right to file a motion in arrest of judgment. Hartsfield was sentenced to an indeterminate two-year term of incarceration. Hartsfield appeals.
On the same day, pursuant to the plea agreement, the State amended the trial information from third-degree burglary to third-degree theft.
Standard of Review. We review Hartsfield's constitutional issues de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001); State v. Cooley, 608 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 2000).
Waiver of Counsel. Hartsfield contends the district erred in allowing him to proceed pro se without determining whether he made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of assistance of counsel. The State responds by claiming that Hartsfield's guilty plea waives any challenge to his waiver of counsel. We acknowledge "the entry of a guilty plea pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(2)(b) waives all defenses and objections which are not intrinsic to the plea itself." Speed v. State, 616 N.W.2d 158, 159 (Iowa 2000). However, our supreme court has not yet addressed the issue of whether entry of a guilty plea waives a challenge that a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. We will address the issue without deciding if it was preserved for appellate review.
Our supreme court has previously recognized five challenges which are not waived by a plea of guilty: (1) insufficient trial information or facial constitutional vagueness of the statute which defendant was convicted under; (2) plea was uninformed or involuntary; (3) claim of double jeopardy; (4) challenges to the sentencing statute; and (5) claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which calls into question the voluntariness of the defendant's plea. See State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa 2000).
A defendant has a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to self-representation under the United States Constitution. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975); Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 14. In accordance with this right, a criminal defendant may opt to proceed without an attorney and to conduct his or her own defense. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d at 572. However, before a trial court honors an accused's request to waive the right to counsel, it must satisfy itself the defendant's election is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Id. at 835-36, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582; Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 14. "In making this determination courts are required to engage the accused in a colloquy sufficient to apprise a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages inherent in self-representation." State v. Stephenson, 608 N.W.2d 778, 782 (Iowa 2000).
The degree of inquiry necessary to assure a valid waiver varies with the nature of the offense and the ability of the accused to understand the process. Id. Our supreme court has recently stated:
To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered. . . . A waiver is made knowingly when the accused is apprised of the factors delineated above, admonished as to the usefulness of an attorney at that particular proceeding, and made cognizant of the danger in continuing without counsel.Cooley, 608 N.W.2d at 14 (citations omitted).
The record in this case shows the district court did engage in the type of colloquy contemplated by Faretta. The court held a lengthy dialogue in two separate hearings with Hartsfield to inquire further into his decision to proceed pro se. The record is clear the court carefully followed the inquiry that our supreme court recommended when faced with a defendant who wishes to proceed pro se. See State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 450 (Iowa 2000) (citing the Iowa Bench Book, 5-37 to 5-41 (1999) as an excellent model). For example, the court inquired into Hartsfield's desire to proceed pro se, his understanding of the elements and punishment for the crimes for which he was charged, and warned of the ramifications of self-representation. Specifically, the court warned him that it would be unwise to represent himself and that the court did not think he should try to represent himself. Hartsfield indicated he clearly understood but wished to proceed pro se. The court also inquired into his professed familiarity with the justice system and how that experience prepared him to represent himself. We find the court made sufficient inquiries to determine that Hartsfield's waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Accordingly, we conclude the court's colloquy was sufficient to ensure a valid waiver of Hartsfield's right to counsel.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Hartsfield also contends his trial counsel was ineffective in several respects. The State responds by claiming that Hartsfield's guilty plea waives any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree.
Following a valid guilty plea only those challenges that are fundamental to the plea itself still remain available to the defendant. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d at 397. Our supreme court has recently held that "if the undercurrent of the ineffective assistance claim is an issue designed to question the validity of the conviction, it, too, is waived." Id. (citing Speed, 616 N.W.2d at 159). In Speed, our supreme court held we would not hear ineffective assistance claims that did not "bear on the knowing and voluntary nature of a plea." Speed, 616 N.W.2d at 159
We hold that Hartsfield's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fall within the Speed rationale. None of Hartsfield's claims imply his plea was uninformed or involuntary. The record before us reveals thorough compliance by the district court with the plea colloquy requirements of rule 8(2)(b). A defendant cannot knowingly and intelligently elect to proceed pro se and then seek reversal of the conviction on appeal through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Hutchison, 341 N.W.2d 33, 42-43 (Iowa 1983). "The defendant is not entitled to have it both ways." Id. at 42. Accordingly, we hold that Hartsfield waived his ineffective assistance claims upon pleading guilty.
AFFIRMED.