Opinion
2012 KA 1812
06-11-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. WILLARD HALL
Walter P. Reed, District Attorney Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee, State of Louisiana Lewis V. Murray, III, ADA Franklinton, Louisiana Kathryn Landry, Special Appeals Counsel Baton Rouge, Louisiana Gwendolyn Brown Baton Rouge, Louisiana Robert C. Stern New Orleans, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendant/ Appellant, Willard Hall
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
On Appeal from the
22nd Judicial District Court,
In and for the Parish of Washington,
State of Louisiana
Criminal Docket No. 11 CR8 111954, Division G
The Honorable William J. Crain, Judge Presiding
Walter P. Reed, District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellee,
State of Louisiana
Lewis V. Murray, III, ADA
Franklinton, Louisiana
Kathryn Landry, Special Appeals Counsel
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Gwendolyn Brown
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Robert C. Stern
New Orleans, Louisiana
Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant, Willard Hall
BEFORE: PARRO, WELCH, AND DRAKE, JJ.
DRAKE , J.
The defendant, Willard Hall, was charged by bill of information with two counts of attempted first degree murder, a violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30 and 14:27. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty of the responsive offenses of aggravated battery (count 1) and attempted manslaughter (count 2), violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:34, 14:31, and 14:27. He filed a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for new trial, both of which were denied. He was then sentenced to eight years at hard labor for count 1 and fifteen years at hard labor for count 2, both sentences to run concurrently. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentences are excessive. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.
FACTS
On November 12, 2010, around midnight, Sergeant Randy Revere with the Washington Parish Sheriff's Office ("WPSO") received a call from the defendant's wife, Deborah Hall, wherein she stated that the defendant had locked her out of their house. She was in the front yard of the house, but was unable to enter the house for the second consecutive night. She requested the assistance of the police officers rather than "getting cussed out again" by the defendant. Sergeant Revere contacted Sergeant Roy Lee and Deputy Timothy Evans to respond to the call.
The defendant and Mrs. Hall divorced in August 2011. There is no indication from the record whether the residence at issue was Mr. Hall's separate property or a community asset. Mr. Hall's trial counsel was not permitted to question Mrs. Hall on the issue.
Upon arrival, the officers met with Mrs. Hall, and she asked them to assist her in getting inside the house. Deputy Evans slightly opened the storm door that was in front of a wooden door and knocked on the wooden door. He announced his presence and that he was with the WPSO. After the first or second knock, the defendant stated, "I don't give a f** who you are, get off my property." When the defendant opened the wooden door, he was standing there naked and holding a gun at his side. At this point, the wooden door was open and the storm door was closed. Deputy Evans told the defendant to drop his weapon at least two times, and the defendant did not comply. Sergeant Lee told the defendant that if he did not drop his weapon, he would be tased. Collectively, the officers ordered the defendant to drop his weapon around four or five times. The defendant appeared agitated and irate, was cursing, and told the officers to get off of his property. Sergeant Lee thought the defendant was preparing to shoot because he appeared "jittery." With both doors open, Sergeant Lee deployed his taser. The defendant closed the wooden door, which broke the leads to the taser. When the second door was closed, Deputy Evans heard a loud bang, saw the glass in the storm door shatter, and felt a burn in his right thigh. He discovered that a round came through his pants, made a rash on his skin, and nicked his magazine pouch. Approximately thirty-five seconds later, Sergeant Lee heard a second shot and realized the defendant was shooting. Almost immediately after hearing the second shot, Sergeant Lee's middle finger on his right hand was "grazed" by a bullet and went completely numb. Both officers retreated to their units to take cover and call for additional units.
The defendant's gun was a .357 magnum single action revolver.
The defendant called 9-1-1 and stated that officers "shot" him with a taser. He demanded that state troopers report to the scene. The defendant also spoke with Sergeant Revere over the phone, and Sergeant Revere convinced him to go outside without his firearm and talk to Sergeant Lee and Deputy Evans.
Detective Glen McClendon reported to the scene to investigate. The defendant was in custody at the time of his arrival. During his investigation, Detective McClendon discovered two bullet holes in the wooden door. He also spoke with both officers, took photographs, and took a taped statement from Mrs. Hall.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In three related assignments of error, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, he contends that the shots fired "were the involuntary muscle reactions or instinct of a 60-year-old man awakened from sleep, subject to a situation he did not create, tased, scared and defending himself from inside his home."
The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. La. Code Crim. P. art. 821. In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, which states in part, "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict," every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438; State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So. 2d 485, 486, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So. 2d 1157, and 00-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So. 2d 732.
The defendant was found guilty of aggravated battery and attempted manslaughter. Aggravated battery is defined as "a battery committed with a dangerous weapon." La. R.S. 14:34. Manslaughter is defined as "[a] homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection." La. R.S. 14:31A(1).
According to Louisiana Revised Statute 14:20A(1), a homicide is justifiable "[w]hen committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger." However, "[a] person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict." La. R.S. 14:21.
In a non-homicide situation, a claim of self-defense requires a dual inquiry: first, an objective inquiry into whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances, and, second, a subjective inquiry into whether the force used was apparently necessary. In a homicide case, the state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the homicide was not perpetrated in self-defense. However, Louisiana law is unclear as to who has the burden of proving self-defense in a non-homicide case. In previous cases dealing with this issue, the court has analyzed the evidence under both standards of review, that is, whether the defendant proved self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence or whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Nonetheless, we need not decide in this case who has the burden of proving (or disproving) self-defense, because under either standard, the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant did not act in self-defense. See State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So. 2d 929, 931.
In State v. Freeman, 427 So. 2d 1161, 1162-63 (La. 1983), the Louisiana Supreme Court, without resolving the issue, suggested that the defendant in a non-homicide case may have the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Barnes, 590 So. 2d 1298, 1300-01 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991).
The defendant testified at trial that he did not point his gun at the officers and that it went off as he fell down to the floor after being tased. He originally thought the officers were shooting at him when he heard the gunshot. However, he also testified that he never saw either officer with a firearm drawn. According to the defendant's testimony, after telling the officers that his wife could now enter the house, he began to turn around and walk away from them. He testified that the officer tased him as he turned around. The defendant stated that he had two holes in his skin with scabs and bruises from the taser and that his skin was raised for six months in the area where he was tased. The defendant's testimony that he was tased as he turned around to walk away from the officers was not confirmed by Mrs. Hall or the officers.
Mrs. Hall testified that she was standing near the driver's side of her truck, which was lined up with the front door of the house, when these events transpired. She stated that the defendant slammed the wooden door when the officer tased him, breaking the leads of the taser and causing them to roll up outside. Mrs. Hall heard two gunshots and saw bullets come through the door. One bullet went through the front bumper of her truck and the other hit Sergeant Lee in the hand. She testified that approximately thirty-five seconds elapsed between both shots.
Mrs. Hall testified that she thought the defendant was trying to kill both of the officers and her. However, the defendant was only charged with two counts of attempted first degree murder of the two officers,
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Deputy Evans testified that he drew his duty revolver when the door closed and broke the leads of the taser. Until that point, Deputy Evans never took the revolver off safety or put it in a position to shoot. According to the deputy, the defendant appeared belligerent, and he thought the defendant was trying to kill him.
Sergeant Lee testified that he did not think the defendant had been tased because the probes of the taser did not make contact with the defendant due to his shutting of the door. He stated that if one of the leads is broken, the taser cannot administer a charge. He also testified that he felt that he was in danger because several requests to put the weapon down had been made. He stated that he was trying to calm the situation and that he thought the defendant was trying to shoot and possibly kill them.
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, where there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. An appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. Taylor, 721 So. 2d at 932. An appellate court is constitutionally precluded from acting as a "thirteenth juror" in assessing what weight to give evidence in criminal cases. State v. Mitchell, 99-3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So. 2d 78, 83.
When a case involves circumstantial evidence, and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defendant's own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So. 2d 676, 680 (La. 1984). Based on our review of the evidence, we conclude that the jury reasonably rejected the defendant's hypothesis of innocence, namely, that the shots fired were "involuntary muscle reactions" and that he was acting in self-defense in shooting at the officers. See State v. Ordodi, 06-0207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So. 2d 654, 662. Furthermore, an appellate court errs by substituting its appreciation of the evidence and credibility of witnesses for that of the fact finder and thereby overturning a verdict on the basis of an exculpatory hypothesis of innocence presented to, and rationally rejected by, the trier of fact. See State v. Calloway, 07-2306 (La. 1/21/09), 1 So. 3d 417, 418 (per curiam). It is unclear whether the defendant was actually tased. If he had been tased, the first shot that he fired could arguably have been the result of an involuntary reaction. However, even if the first shot was the result of an involuntary reaction, it is clear that the second shot was deliberately fired. Approximately thirty-five seconds elapsed between the shots, and the gun used by the defendant had to be manually cocked each time before being fired. Therefore, after a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence supports the jury's verdicts. We are convinced that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, that the defendant did not shoot Deputy Evans and Sergeant Lee in self-defense and, as such, was guilty of aggravated battery and attempted manslaughter. These assignments of error lack merit. Excessive Sentences
In two related assignments of error, the defendant argues that the sentences imposed by the district court are excessive and that the district court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of sentence.
Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence may be within statutory limits, it may violate a defendant's constitutional right against excessive punishment and is subject to appellate review. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). Generally, a sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime or is nothing more than the needless imposition of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm to society, it is so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of justice. State v. Reed, 409 So. 2d 266, 267 (La. 1982).
A trial judge is given wide discretion in the imposition of sentences within statutory limits, and the sentence imposed should not be set aside as excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Lanclos, 419 So. 2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors for the district court to consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of Article 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect that the district court adequately considered the criteria. State v. Brown, 02-2231 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So. 2d 566, 569.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:34B provides, in pertinent part: "[w]hoever commits an aggravated battery shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than ten years, or both." La. R.S. 14:31B provides, in pertinent part: "[w]hoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years." The maximum sentence for attempted manslaughter is one-half of the longest term of imprisonment for manslaughter, or twenty years. See La. R.S. 14:31B and La. R.S. 14:27D(3). In this matter, the district court sentenced the defendant to eight years at hard labor for his aggravated battery conviction (count 1) and fifteen years at hard labor for his attempted manslaughter conviction (count 2) and ordered that both sentences run concurrently. The defendant contends that these sentences are excessive because he is sixty years old, a first felony offender, and there is a minimal risk that he will re-offend.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court indicated that it reviewed a presentence investigation report ("PSI") detailing the defendant's personal and criminal history. The PSI recommended the maximum sentence for both counts. The court also stated that it considered the Article 894.1 factors, as well as letters written by the defendant's friends and family. It noted that the defendant was almost sixty years old at the time of sentencing and had no prior felony convictions. However, the court pointed out that the defendant committed a violent crime against two officers in the line of duty and used a dangerous weapon to do so. According to the court, any lesser sentences would deprecate the seriousness of the crimes. It stated that even the defendant acknowledged that he had an opportunity to drop the gun when ordered to do so and that at least one shot fired by the defendant was deliberate. The defendant could have refused to open the door and ignore the officers, but instead, he chose to open the door, thereby signifying his consent to speak with them. The officers had been called there by the defendant's wife, and as a result, had permission to be there from a co-occupant of the home. State v. Price, 476 So. 2d 989, 991 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
Regardless of that consent, these officers did not enter nor did they plan to enter the home, as they only wanted to speak with the defendant. When a door is opened in response to a knock, it is a consent of the occupant to confront the caller, and there is no compulsion, force, or coercion involved. State v. Sanders, 374 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (La. 1979). It was the defendant who escalated this situation by holding a firearm when he opened the door, then by refusing to put down the weapon when requested. Domestic disputes often involve high emotions and can quickly escalate to violence. United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2010). In a split second, the officers had to assess the situation for the safety of themselves and Mrs. Hall. Here, the defendant was holding a gun and was non-compliant with the officers' requests to put it down. The officers' requests were reasonable, and they were legally outside the residence.
It is clear that the district court considered the mitigating circumstances urged by the defendant and carefully reviewed the information provided in the PSI and letters from the defendant's friends and family prior to sentencing. Considering the circumstances of the case and given the fact that the defendant was sentenced to one-half of a possible thirty-year total sentence, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court. Accordingly, the sentences imposed by the district court are not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offenses and, therefore, are not excessive. Thus, the district court correctly denied the motion to reconsider sentence. These assignments of error lack merit. Testimony Concerning Intent
Though not set out as a specific assignment of error, the defendant argues in his brief that the district court erred in allowing Deputy Evans, Sergeant Lee, and Mrs. Hall to testify with regard to their perception of the defendant's intent. As noted above, Evans and Lee both testified that they thought the defendant was trying to kill them. Mrs. Hall also testified that she thought the defendant was trying to kill "us." The defendant claims that this testimony was prejudicial because intent was the primary issue before the jury.
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 701 allows opinion testimony by lay witnesses in the form of opinions or inferences when they are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue. It was not error for the district court to allow the witnesses to testify, based on their perception, as to the intent of the defendant, including the basis for their belief that he intended to kill them. See State v. Steward, 95-1693 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/27/96), 681 So. 2d 1007, 1011-12. This assignment of error lacks merit.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.