Opinion
No. 3-617 / 02-1619
Filed November 17, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sylvia A. Lewis, Judge.
Ann Marie Giovanazzi appeals from her conviction, following jury trial, for operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense. AFFIRMED.
Ann Marie Giovanazzi, Grandview, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean C. Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Jo McCarty, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Ann Marie Giovanazzi appeals her conviction, following jury trial, for operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). She contends the court erred in overruling her motion to dismiss because the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on December 21, 2001 Iowa City police sergeant Troy Kelsay was in an Iowa City parking ramp when he observed Giovanazzi sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle with the engine running, the lights on, and the turn signal on. He also observed a pool of vomit outside of the car door. Officer Kelsay testified at trial that he had the opportunity to observe Giovanazzi both in the parking ramp and at the police station. He testified that he observed Giovanazzi exhibit poor coordination and balance, she had vomited inside and outside the car and had urinated on herself, her eyes were bloodshot and watery, her speech was very slurred, she smelled strongly of alcohol, and she admitted she had been drinking. He also saw Giovanazzi become confrontational and belligerent with the officers, use profanity, and refuse to submit to a chemical test for intoxication.
The State charged Giovanazzi with OWI, second offense, in violation of section 321J.2. Giovanazzi filed a pro se motion to dismiss the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging section 321J.2 had not been properly enacted. At the arraignment hearing the district court overruled the motion and entered a plea of not guilty on Giovanazzi's behalf because she refused to enter one for herself.
At a pretrial conference Giovanazzi waived her right to counsel and renewed her challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court again ruled it had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant and the case, and found that section 321J.2 had been properly enacted. Giovanazzi filed additional documents challenging subject matter jurisdiction, including another "Sworn Motion to Dismiss for Want of Subject Matter Jurisdiction" and a document entitled "Sworn Motion to Dismiss for Want of Constitutional or Statutory Authority of the Instant Court to Adjudicate in the Instate Case." The district court filed a written ruling again denying Giovanazzi's motions, again finding that pursuant to section 602.6306 the court had jurisdiction over the case. At the final pretrial conference the court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Giovanazzi to ensure she understood the consequences of her waiver of the right to counsel and again ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction based on the nature of the charge and section 602.6306.
The case proceeded to jury trial, with Giovanazzi representing herself. The jury found her guilty of OWI and, in a special verdict, also found it was her second OWI offense. The district court entered judgment and sentenced Giovanazzi to a term of sixty days, with fifty-three days suspended, two years probation, fifty hours of community service, and a $1500 fine. Giovanazzi appeals from the district court's judgment and sentence.
Giovanazzi also filed an application for discretionary review of the district court's jurisdictional order prior to judgment and sentence, which was denied by the Iowa Supreme Court on July 16, 2002.
Although Giovanazzi refers to both section 321J.2 and section 719.1, in the case in which she appeals she was only charged with and found guilty under section 321J.2. Therefore, we need not address any issues with respect to section 719.1, as it is irrelevant to this appeal.
Although Giovanazzi sets forth her claims in several separate divisions in her appellate brief, from our reading of her claims we believe she is in fact asserting only two separate issues which we must address on appeal. First, she contends the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because section 321J.2 is not a properly enacted statute. Second, although Giovanazzi presents the argument as part of her first issue she also argues the Iowa Constitution does not expressly give the legislature authority to create the Iowa Department of Transportation or the Department of Public Safety, and even if it did, those agencies can only act upon directives issued by the legislature because they are only ministerial. She implicitly argues they do not act upon such directives.
The Iowa Constitution provides that the laws passed by the general assembly must contain the enacting clause, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Iowa." Iowa Const. art. III,§ 1. The Code of Iowa is the official compilation of the acts of the general assembly. Iowa Code § 2B.12, .17. The acts establishing the Iowa Code as the official compilation contain the enacting clause mandated by the Iowa Constitution. See, e.g., 1996 Iowa Acts ch. 1099, §§ 3, 4; 1991 Iowa Acts ch. 258, § 14; 1982 Iowa Acts ch. 1061, § 5. The provisions of section 321J.2 are derived from a number of acts passed by the general assembly and found in the Iowa Acts. The specific acts from which this, and all Iowa Code sections, are derived are referenced chronologically at the end of each section in the Iowa Code and are thus readily available to any citizen of Iowa who wishes to ascertain the acts from which any particular provision of the Iowa Code is derived. Again, each one of these acts from which section 321J.2 is derived contains the enacting clause required by the Iowa Constitution.
The legislative enactments which make up section 321J.2 (2001) are as follows: 2000 Iowa Acts ch. 1135, § 1; 2000 Iowa Acts, ch. 1118, § 1; 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 96 § 36; 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1138, §§ 2, 3, 11-13, 37; 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1100, § 50; 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1073, § 9; 1997 Iowa Acts ch. 177, §§ 4, 5; 1990 Iowa Acts ch. 1251, § 33; 1990 Iowa Acts ch. 1233, § 20; 1987 Iowa Acts ch. 215, § 46; 1987 Iowa Acts ch. 118, § 4; 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1220, § 2.
Therefore, we conclude that section 321J.2 derives from several acts of the Iowa General Assembly each of which contain the enacting clause prescribed by the Iowa Constitution, the general assembly properly authorized the compilation of these acts into the Iowa Code, and each statute in the Iowa Code provides the acts from which that section was derived so as to allow the public to readily verify that the statutes are proper expressions of the authority of the general assembly, duly enacted by that body.
Furthermore, the Iowa Constitution provides: "The district court shall be a court of law and equity, which shall be distinct and separate jurisdictions, and have jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters arising in their respective districts, in such manner as shall be prescribed by law." Iowa Const. art. V,§ 6. The case at hand is a criminal matter arising under Iowa Code section 321J.2 which prohibits operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and sets forth the penalties for doing so. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction over this criminal matter.
In addition, as pointed out by the district court, section 602.6306 provides that district associate judges have jurisdiction over aggravated misdemeanors such as the charge at hand.
Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in determining the provisions of section 321J.2 were properly enacted and that it thus had subject matter jurisdiction.
Giovanazzi also challenges the legislature's authority to administer and enforce its traffic regulatory power through the Departments of Transportation and Public Safety. She contends the Iowa Constitution does not expressly authorize the legislature to create those agencies and, even if it did, they could act only upon directives issued by the legislature because such agencies are only ministerial offices.
"The claim of unconstitutional delegation is based on a familiar principle. A legislative function may be delegated to another branch of government only if adequate guidelines for its exercise accompany the delegation." Warren County v. Judges of the Fifth Judicial District, 243 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Iowa 1976) (citing Elk Run Tel. Co. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 160 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1968)). The test to be applied in determining the propriety of a legislative delegation is
[W]hether such delegation is a reasonable one permitting the administrative body only to "fill in the details" to accomplish a general purpose or policy announced by the legislature itself or whether it abdicates to the administrative body the right to legislate.
The legislative practice of vesting considerable discretion in administrative agencies is viewed as a necessity given the complexity and range of modern governmental functions. The intricacies of the modern problems the legislature seeks to solve have dictated the use of general rather than detailed standards in enactments aimed at resolving those problems. We, then, will not find an unconstitutional delegation if the purpose of the legislation is clearly set forth and the functions left to the agency are administrative details.
Elliot v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 377 N.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Iowa Ct.App. 1985) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The question here then is whether the delegation is accompanied by adequate standards or guidelines. Elk Run Tel. Co. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 160 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1968). However, our decisions have confirmed that the standards set up need not be exact or precise if the general policy is defined. Id. Our supreme court has previously stated
It is a well-settled principle that statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Additonally, Iowa is among the states which have relaxed the formerly strict requirements of delegation.
The test — not always easy to apply — is whether such delegation is a reasonable one permitting the administrative body only to "fill in the details" to accomplish a general purpose or policy announced by the legislature itself or whether it abdicates to the administrative body the right to legislate.
. . . .
. . . [T]he presence or absence of procedural safeguards is important in determining whether this delegation is reasonable.
Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 273-74 (Iowa 1983) (citation omitted) (quoting Elk Run, 160 N.W.2d at 316-17).
The legislature has provided that members of the Iowa Department of Safety, when authorized by the commissioner of public safety, "shall have and exercise all the powers of any peace officer of the state." Iowa Code § 80.9. In addition, the legislature created the Department of Public Safety, in part, to "enforce all state laws" and "enforce all laws relating to traffic on the public highways of the state, including those relating to the safe and legal operation of passenger cars. . . ." Iowa Code § 80.9(2)(a), (b). The legislature created the Department of Transportation to "be responsible for the planning, development, regulation and improvement of transportation in the state as provided by law." Iowa Code § 307.2. This department is also specifically charged with administering the provisions of section 321J relating to the implied consent law. Iowa Code § 307.27(5).
Furthermore, the delegation of authority to these agencies cannot be viewed in isolation. The presence or absence of procedural safeguards is important in determining whether a delegation is reasonable. See Elliot, 377 N.W.2d at 253; Elk Run, 160 N.W.2d at 317. As state administrative agencies, their actions are governed by the procedural safeguards of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. As noted in Elliott, one such safeguard is the requirement in Iowa Code section 17A.3(1)(b) that each agency adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures before it. Giovanazzi makes no claim or showing the agencies have not done so, and in fact does not even identify the legislation she claims unconstitutionally delegates authority to either agency.
We conclude Giovanazzi has not met her burden to overcome the presumption that the legislature's delegations of authority to the Departments of Transportation and Public Safety are accompanied by adequate standards or guidelines which, in conjunction with the procedural safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act, allow these administrative agencies to accomplish a general purpose and public policy of the legislature without abdicating to them the right to legislate.
Giovanazzi also attempts to argue that no judicial proceeding commenced upon the issuance of the complaint issued by the police officer here. However, the State filed a trial information formally charging Giovanazzi with OWI second in violation of section 321J.2. Such procedure is authorized under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5 for the prosecution of indictable offenses and we find all of the requirements under this rule to have been complied with here. Thus, the formal judicial proceeding against Giovanazzi commenced with the filing of the trial information, and the fact it did not commence upon issuance of the complaint is of no consequence.
For all of the reasons set forth above, we conclude the district court did not err in finding it had subject matter jurisdiction and denying Giovanazzi's motion to dismiss.