Opinion
Cr. A. Nos. IN98-02-0048R2 through 0051R2 Cr. A. Nos. IN98-02-1465R2 and 1467R2 Cr. I.D. No. 9801009579
Submitted: July 22, 2002
Decided: September 9, 2002
ORDER
On this 9th day of September 2002, upon consideration of defendant's second pro se motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears that:
(1) Defendant was indicted on two counts of Robbery in the First Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and two counts of Wearing a Disguise. A nolle prosequi order was entered as to the Wearing a Disguise counts. Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of all remaining charges.
(2) The defendant appealed his conviction. He asserted three issues on appeal: (1) the Superior Court committed reversible error by denying a motion for severance of his trials for each separate incident; (2) the Superior Court erred in denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal on the firearm offense related to the first robbery; and (3) the Superior Court erroneously admitted a gun into evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the final judgments of the Superior Court. In so doing, the Supreme Court held that the admission of the gun into evidence was harmless error.
Fortt v. State, 767 A.2d 799, 804-05 (Del. 2001).
(3) The defendant filed a postconviction relief motion asserting two grounds for relief: abuse of discretion in denying his motion for severance and admitting the gun into evidence; and failure to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal.
The motion was denied because it was procedurally barred under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4). That rule provides:
Fortt v. State, 2001 WL 1398597 (Del.Super.Ct. Oct. 19, 2001); Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice. (emphasis added).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
The motion for postconviction relief raised the same grounds for relief as those adjudicated in the earlier appeal to the Supreme Court.
(4) In the case at bar, the defendant filed a postconviction relief motion asserting one ground for relief: the Court violated his due process rights by admitting the weapon in to evidence.
(5) The defendant asserts the same ground for relief in this motion that was adjudicated in his appeal to the Supreme Court and his first postconviction relief motion. Thus, the defendant's motion is barred under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) "unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." To trigger that exception, the "movant must show that subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial court lacked authority to convict or punish him." The defendant has not met this narrowly construed exception. He only states that this Court admitted the "weapon in to evidence without satisfying the nexus requirement as a predicate to admissibility." He argues a point he raised on his appeal and first postconviction relief motion. He has not shown a subsequent legal development that revealed that this Court lacked authority to convict or punish him. Accordingly, the motion for postconviction relief is DENIED. The defendant is cautioned that repeated frivolous filings will result in adverse consequences.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990).
IT IS SO ORDERED.