Opinion
Cr. A. Nos. IN98-02-0048R1 through 0051R1 Cr. A. Nos.IN98-02-1465R1 and 1467R1 Cr. I.D. No. 9801009579
Submitted: September 19, 2001
Decided: October 19, 2001
ORDER
On this 19th day of October 2001, upon consideration of Tschaka Fortt's pro se motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears that:
(1) Fortt was indicted on two counts of Robbery in the First Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and two counts of Wearing a Disguise. A nolle prosequi order was entered as to the Wearing a Disguise counts. Following a jury trial, Fortt was found guilty of all remaining charges.
(2) Fortt appealed his conviction. He asserted three issues on appeal; (1) the Superior Court committed reversible error by denying a motion for severance of his trials for each separate incident; (2) the Superior Court erred in denying a motion for a judgment of acquittal on the firearm offense related to the first robbery; and (3) the Superior Court erroneously admitted a gun into evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the final judgments of the Superior Court. In so doing, the Supreme Court held that the admission of the gun into evidence was harmless error.
Fortt v. State, Del. Supr., 767 A.2d 799, 804-05 (2001).
(3) In this motion, Fortt asserts two grounds for relief; (1) the Superior Court abused its discretion for denying Fortt's motion for severance and admitting the gun into evidence; and (2) the Superior Court failed to grant a motion for acquittal.
(4) Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) Former Adjudication states:
Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice. (emphasis added).
(5) In the case at bar, Fortt asserts the same grounds for relief in this motion that were already adjudicated in his appeal to the Supreme Court. Thus, Fortt's motion is barred under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) "unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." To trigger that exception, the "movant must show that subsequent legal developments have revealed that the trial court lacked authority to convict or punish him." Here, Fortt has not met this narrowly construed exception. Fortt argues points he raised on appeal and has not shown a subsequent legal development that revealed that the Superior Court lacked authority to convict or punish him. Accordingly, the motion for postconviction relief is DENIED.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 746 (1990).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Original to Prothonotary
xc: Tschaka Fortt, pro se, Delaware Correctional Center Maria T. Knoll, Deputy Attorney General John R. Williams, Deputy Attorney General