Opinion
Court of Appeals No. WD-19-083
09-11-2020
State of Ohio Appellee v. Megan Floyd Appellant
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.
Trial Court No. 2018CR0330 DECISION AND JUDGMENT Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and David T. Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. Autumn D. Adams, for appellant. MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Megan Floyd, appeals the September 30, 2019 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to 17 months in prison following her violation of previously imposed community control conditions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Background
{¶ 2} On July 12, 2018, Floyd was indicted on one count of illegal conveyance of weapons, drugs of abuse, or intoxicating liquor onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility in violation of R.C. 2921.36(C) and (G)(1); a third-degree felony. Floyd was arraigned on July 20, 2018 and entered a not guilty plea. She was also determined to be indigent and was appointed counsel.
{¶ 3} On October 4, 2018, Floyd filed a motion for intervention in lieu of conviction. At the November 9, 2018 hearing on Floyd's motion, the trial court granted the state's oral motion to amend the single count in Floyd's indictment to attempted illegal conveyance of weapons, drugs of abuse, or intoxicating liquor onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility in violation of R.C. 2923.02, 2921.36(C) and (G)(1); a felony of the fourth degree. Floyd then withdrew her not guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to the amended charge. The trial court accepted Floyd's plea but withheld finding her guilty. Instead, the trial court found that Floyd qualified for intervention in lieu of conviction pursuant to R.C. 2951.041.
{¶ 4} The trial court placed Floyd in the intervention in lieu of conviction program under the supervision of the Wood County Adult Probation Department for one year. Through the course of the program, Floyd was required to abide by all general terms of community control as well as an additional 18 conditions imposed by the trial court. The trial court stayed all proceedings pending Floyd's completion of the intervention program.
{¶ 5} On January 25, 2019, the state filed a petition to revoke Floyd's intervention in lieu of conviction alleging she failed a required drug screening and ingested the prescription drug suboxone. Floyd admitted to the violations at a February 8, 2019 hearing. The trial court ordered that Floyd's intervention in lieu of conviction be extended to two years under the same conditions. The trial court also ordered as an additional condition that Floyd complete the "Correctional Treatment Facility Program, Community Based Correctional Facility."
{¶ 6} The state filed its second petition to revoke Floyd's intervention in lieu of conviction on March 19, 2019. The state alleged that Floyd violated the Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA") while undergoing the previously ordered treatment. As a result, Floyd was terminated from the treatment program. At a March 22, 2019 hearing, Floyd admitted that her ejection from the treatment program was a violation of the conditions of her intervention program. The trial court revoked her intervention and, pursuant to R.C. 2951.041, found Floyd guilty on the amended indictment based on her previous guilty plea. The trial court sentenced Floyd to community control for a period of four years and notified her that violation of her community control conditions could lead to a prison term of up to 18 months. The trial court ordered Floyd to abide by the general terms of community control and to complete an inpatient drug treatment program as conditions of her community control.
The state's petition does not provide any details regarding Floyd's violation of the PREA. --------
{¶ 7} On September 20, 2019, Floyd appeared before the trial court for a hearing on a community control violation following a failed drug test. Floyd stipulated to the violation. The trial court accepted the stipulated violation, revoked Floyd's community control, and imposed a 17-month prison sentence. Floyd appealed and asserts a single assignment of error:
Appellant's sentence should be vacated due to the trial court's failure to comply with the directives of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} We review felony sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Goings, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-13-1103, 2014-Ohio-2322, ¶ 20. We may increase, modify, or vacate and remand a judgment only if we clearly and convincingly find either of the following: "(a) the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant" or "(b) the sentence is otherwise contrary to law." State v. Yeager, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-15-025, 2016-Ohio-4759, ¶ 7, citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶ 9} Despite her assignment of error disputing the trial court's consideration of the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, Floyd only argues that her sentence was contrary to law because the trial court misapplied the mitigating factors identified in R.C. 2929.12. We therefore limit our analysis to determining whether Floyd identified clear and convincing evidence that the trial court's application of the R.C. 2929.12 factors was improper and, therefore, contrary to law.
{¶ 10} A trial court has discretion in determining the appropriate felony sentence. State v. Williams, 6th Dis. Lucas No. L-13-1083, 2014-Ohio-3624, ¶ 8; R.C. 2929.12. Prior to imposing a sentence, however, it must consider the R.C. 2929.12 seriousness and recidivism factors. Id. at ¶ 8; R.C. 2929.12. A sentencing court's failure to consider the R.C. 2929.12 factors does indeed render a sentence contrary to law. State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, 960 N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.). Floyd bears the burden of identifying clear and convincing evidence that the sentence imposed was contrary to law. Williams at ¶ 7-11, 16, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). We may only vacate or modify Floyd's sentence if we determine "by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes[.]" State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1.
{¶ 11} Floyd argues that while her conviction was the result of drug abuse, her participation in drug treatment programs shows that she has recognized and admitted to the "magnitude" of her addiction. Floyd also argues that she showed remorse for her conviction and subsequent community control violations. In addition, Floyd argues that she made a good faith effort to comply with the conditions of her community control while suffering from mental health and addiction issues. Floyd claims that these factors weigh in her favor under R.C. 2929.12(D)(4), 2929.12(D)(5), and 2929.12(E)(5) and should have resulted in the imposition of her desired sentence—the continuation of community control. Since the trial court imposed a prison term, she continues, the trial court gave these factors insufficient weight.
{¶ 12} The trial court, however, has the sole discretion to determine the weight afforded to any particular statutory factor when imposing a felony sentence. State v. Stubbs, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-810, 2014-Ohio-3696, ¶ 16. Further, the trial court was not required to provide any recitation as to how it weighed these factors. Id. Floyd's failure to receive the desired result does not mean the factors were not properly considered and weighed by the trial court.
{¶ 13} The trial court's statement that it considered R.C. 2929.12 in determining Floyd's sentence is sufficient to show it did, in fact, consider the various R.C. 2929.12 factors when imposing her sentence. Brimacombe at ¶ 11. Floyd's identification of factors that she believes weigh in her favor does not clearly and convincingly show that the trial court improperly weighed those factors. Therefore, the sentence imposed was not contrary to law and the trial court did not err in imposing appellant's 17-month prison sentence.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 14} We find appellant's assignment of error not well-taken. The trial court properly considered the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and Floyd presented no clear and convincing evidence that the sentence was contrary to law. We affirm the September 30, 2019 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas. Floyd is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J.
Christine E. Mayle, J.
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J.
CONCUR. /s/_________
JUDGE /s/_________
JUDGE /s/_________
JUDGE