Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5677-14T3
12-22-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALBERT J. FIELDS, JR., a/k/a ALBERT J. FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant.
Albert J. Fields, Jr., appellant pro se. John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Forte, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Sabatino and Currier. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 12-07-0423. Albert J. Fields, Jr., appellant pro se. John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Michael J. Forte, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this criminal matter, we address the issue of whether defendant Albert Fields should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea after a misstatement by this court in its opinion on defendant's direct appeal. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the misstatement was not determinative to the outcome of the direct appeal, and therefore, we affirm.
The facts concerning the events leading to the arrest and subsequent indictment of defendant are set forth in our prior opinion and their repetition is not necessary for our current review. State v. Fields, No. A-1397-12 (App. Div. April 11, 2014). Germane to this appeal is that defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, and after the trial court reviewed a transcript of the grand jury proceedings and considered defendant's contentions, the motion was denied.
Defendant then entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to a disorderly persons offense. On the plea form he reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. The judge presiding over the plea hearing also noted defendant had not waived his right to appeal that pre-trial motion.
In his direct appeal, defendant asserted alleged improprieties in the presentation of his case to the grand jury which required the dismissal of the indictment. In the letter brief filed in opposition to the appeal, the State wrote that "there is no indication or claim that [the guilty plea] was a conditional plea per R. 3:9-3(f)." The State asserted the position that defendant had waived his right to contest the grand jury presentation as a result of his guilty plea.
Despite its position in the prior appeal, the State concedes in its answering brief to this appeal that defendant entered a conditional guilty plea.
In our decision, we wrote that "defendant did not make his guilty plea conditional on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment" and stated that he had "waived his right to contest the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment." State v. Fields, supra, No. A-1397-12 (slip op. at 4-5). Nonetheless, we advised that we had considered the merits of defendant's argument, noting the thorough oral opinion rendered by the motion judge in which he had detailed the testimony presented to the grand jury and found the State had presented sufficient evidence "to establish a prima facie case" as charged in the indictment. Id. at 3. We found defendant's argument insufficient to merit further discussion in a written opinion. Id. at 5.
A different panel presided over the first appeal.
Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in July 2014 and a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in December 2014. The judge denied both motions in a written opinion and order of May 22, 2015. Although noting that defendant had entered a conditional plea, the judge stated: "[T]he Appellate Division also decided the issue on the merits. It reviewed the arguments regarding [defendant's] [m]otion to [d]ismiss and specifically rejected them and affirmed the trial court in its unpublished opinion." Defendant's motion to amend the court's findings was denied on July 8, 2015.
These motions were heard by the same judge who presided over the plea hearing.
On appeal defendant raises the following arguments:
I: The Court abused its discretion in denying defendant[']s motion to withdraw Plea agreement under the post-sentencing factors identified in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 158 (2009).
II: The Court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw plea after the State misrepresented the terms of the plea agreement to the Appellate Court.
III: The Court abused its discretion in denying Fields['s] motion to withdraw his plea, after fully complying in good faith with the demands of the prosecutor, Fields did not receive the benefit of his bargain.
Defendant seeks the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the State breached its obligations under the plea agreement when it made an incorrect statement in its appellate brief; as a result, the State's improper conduct impaired defendant's right to have the appellate panel properly evaluate his claims. He requests that the trial court be instructed to consider his motion under the factors set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). Because we are satisfied that the prior appellate panel considered defendant's arguments on its merits, and because we find a trial court's review of the Slater factors in this instance would be unavailing, we affirm.
Our statement in the direct appeal that defendant failed to preserve the right to appeal the denial of his pre-trial motion, and thus waived his right to an appeal was a mistake. Instead of bringing that mistake to the court's attention through a motion for reconsideration under Rule 2:11-6, defendant filed a petition for PCR and a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. We were not apprised of the mistake and not given the opportunity to correct the misstatement. Nevertheless, we find the prior misstatement to be harmless and not fatal to our prior decision.
We disagree with the judge's observation that defendant was obligated to have filed an application with the Supreme Court under Rules 2:2-1 or 2:12 instead of the motions he filed in the trial court.
In the direct appeal, we reviewed the record in considering defendant's arguments in his merits brief pertaining to the motion to dismiss the indictment. We noted that the judge had reviewed the transcript of the grand jury proceedings and provided a thorough oral opinion detailing the testimony presented by the police officer to the grand jury, finding the State had presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case to support the charge. We are satisfied now, as we were then, that there is no basis to overturn the judge's denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment.
We also have considered and rejected defendant's contention that the trial judge should have considered his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Slater. The Court, in Slater, outlined four factors for a trial judge to take into consideration in determining whether to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea. Defendant's withdrawal motion was made after sentencing, and therefore the judge may only grant the motion to "correct a manifest injustice." R. 3:21-1. "[A]fter sentencing, defendants must show their conviction was manifestly unjust in appealing to the court's broad discretion." Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 156.
A trial judge is to consider: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." Slater, supra, 198 N.J. at 157-58. --------
Defendant has not presented any "strong, compelling reasons" id. at 160, for withdrawal. To the contrary, defendant asserts in his brief that he "does not argue that the guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily, or that he failed to understand the uniqueness of his plea, or that there was an inadequate factual basis." He presents no claim of innocence. Instead, defendant contends that the State breached the agreement by "misrepresenting the character of the plea agreement which materially and prejudicially influenced the [a]ppellate [c]ourt."
As we have stated in our prior decision and reiterated here, defendant's arguments were fully reviewed on their merits and rejected by us. We are satisfied that Slater is inapplicable to this case and a review of its factors by the trial court would be unavailing.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION