Opinion
Def. ID# 0106013189A
June 7, 2002
Motion for Postconviction Relief
Paula Ryan, Esquire, Department of Justice.
Ronald D. Phillips, Jr., Esquire.
Memorandum Opinion
Dear Mr. Duhadaway and Counsel:
This is my decision on defendant Henry Duhadaway's motion for postconviction relief. Duhadaway was charged by Indictment on September 17, 2001 with 12 counts of Rape in the First Degree and one count each of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child, Providing Obscenity to a Minor, Possession of Firearm Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, Possession of a Hypodermic Needle, Resisting Arrest, and Unlawful Dealing in Child Pornography. Duhadaway pled nolo contendre on February 22, 2002 to Rape in the Second Degree, a lesser-included offense of Rape in the First Degree, and Unlawful Dealing in Child Pornography. I immediately sentenced Duhadaway to 20 years at Level V, with credit for time served of 249 days, suspended after 15 years at Level V for five years at Level III on the charge of Rape in the Second Degree, and five years at Level V, suspended for five years at Level II on the charge of Unlawful Dealing in Child Pornography. The State nolle prosed the remaining charges.
Duhadaway filed his motion for postconviction relief on March 20, 2002. Duhadaway took no direct appeal to the Supreme Court. This is Duhadaway's first motion for postconviction relief and it was filed in a timely manner. Therefore, there are no procedural bars to Duhadaway's motion for postconviction relief.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Duhadaway's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires a defendant to show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel's actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Duhadaway has made five separate arguments in support of his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
466 U.S. 688, 1045 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
One, Duhadaway argues that his attorney was displeased because I would not let him withdraw as Duhadaway's counsel. Duhadaway wrote a letter to me dated November 5, 2001, requesting me to appoint another attorney for him because, in his view, Mr. Phillips had pre-judged the case, had a conflict of interest because Mr. Phillips was a friend of Detective Garland, was arrogant to Duhadaway's insights and information critical to the case, all of which combined to produce a poor attorney-client relationship. In response to Duhadaway's letter, Mr. Phillips filed a Motion to Withdraw. I denied this motion because I was satisfied that Mr. Phillips could still effectively represent Duhadaway. Regarding Duhadaway's present claim, Phillips admitted that he was apprehensive about his continued representation of Duhadaway because he felt that, regardless of the outcome of the case, Duhadaway would be dissatisfied and allege that he was not effectively represented. While Phillips may have been apprehensive about his continued relationship with Duhadaway, Duhadaway has not pointed out any deficiencies in Phillips' representation caused by this. Without particularized allegations, there is little I can do.
Two, Duhadaway alleges that Phillips was a close friend of Delaware State Police Detective R. Scott Garland. Phillips acknowledges this, but stated that it did not affect his representation of Duhadaway. Detective Garland was going to be called as an expert witness, along with Delaware State Police Detective Dan Willey, regarding the forensic computer examination that was done on Duhadaway's computer. Apparently, Duhadaway believed that Detective Garland had tampered with Duhadaway's computer. Phillips believed that Garland had no motive to do such a thing and in order to disprove it, he advised Duhadaway to retain a forensic computer expert. Despite this concern, Duhadaway declined. If he genuinely believed that Detective Garland was going to tamper with the computer, then he would have retained his own expert to check it. Since he did not, his allegations are unfounded.
Three, Duhadaway alleges that "Counsels constant insidious trend in attorney/client relationship." This allegation is largely unintelligible. I assume it relates to a deteriorating relationship between Duhadaway and his attorney apparently because of their differing views of the case. Duhadaway was entitled to effective legal representation. This does not require a necessarily amicable relationship with his lawyer. (Case Cite)
Four, Duhadaway argues that Phillips did not inform me of Duhadaway's mental condition and medication that he was taking at the time Duhadaway entered his plea. Phillips response to this allegation is that he was unaware of any mental problems affecting Duhadaway. Phillips' response is supported by Duhadaway's answer to the applicable questions on the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form. When asked if he had ever been a patient in a mental hospital, Duhadaway answered "no." When asked if he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, Duhadaway answered "no." In his motion for postconviction relief, Duhadaway has not identified either his mental problems or medication. I can only conclude that his allegations in this regard are without merit.
Five, Duhadaway argues that Phillips failed to produce witnesses and evidence and instead insisted on plea negotiations. Phillips and a private investigator interviewed eight witnesses and investigated thirteen other individuals. Phillips readily acknowledges that he believed that plea negotiations were preferable to a trial because of the enormous amount of evidence against Duhadaway. Duhadaway has not identified any witnesses or evidence that would be helpful to his case. Once again, this is yet another unsupported allegation.
Due Process Violation
Duhadaway alleges that his due process rights were violated in ___ ways, some of which I have already dealt with. One, Duhadaway argues that his attorney attempted to withdraw, but was ordered by the Court to remain. I have addressed this argument before and concluded that it was without merit. Two, Duhadaway argues that I denied Phillips' motion to withdraw without bringing Duhadaway to Court to question him about it. This is true, but I was already aware of Duhadaway's position on this matter. As I stated previously in my decision, Duhadaway sent me a letter, dated November 5, 2001, setting forth his concerns about Phillips. I considered those concerns then and I have reconsidered them now. On both occasions, I found them to be unwarranted and without merit. Since that time, despite having the opportunity to do so, Duhadaway has not offered any additional details to support his allegation. When Duhadaway entered his plea, we had the following discussion regarding this displeasure with Phillips:
The Court: Can you point to anything in particular other than your displeasure — — anything in particular that you are displeased with Mr. Phillips about? Do you think he tried hard enough for you? Do you think he worked enough on this case for you? Do you think he investigated it thoroughly?
The Defendant: I don't know.
The Court: But you can't point to anything?
The Defendant: Can't point to anything.
Duhadaway has no more than unsubstantiated complaints.
Three, Duhadaway argues that his attorney did not seek to suppress evidence. However, Duhadaway has not set forth what evidence was allegedly taken in violation of his constitutional rights. Thus, there is nothing for me to consider.
Four, Duhadaway argues that Phillips never met with all the witnesses. Phillips has listed for me the witnesses that either he or an investigator met with, as well as other potential witnesses that he investigated. Duhadaway has not identified the witnesses that should have been interviewed or explained what their testimony would have been and how it would have been helpful to his case. Once again, Duhadaway has offered nothing of substance for consideration.
Five, Duhadaway makes reference to the "equal defence [sic] clause" due to denial of due process. This argument is unintelligible and, as such, I cannot respond to it.
Speedy Trial and Bail Reductions
Duhadaway argues that his right to a speedy trial and a reduction in bail were denied by his attorney. Duhadaway, by entering a plea of nolo contendre, waived these matters. Duhadaway also argues, within this context, that he was under extreme emotional shock. However, Duhadaway showed no signs of this when he entered his plea. During the plea colloquy, I asked Duhadaway on a number of occasions if he was sure that he wanted to enter the plea or go to trial. Each time he told me that he wanted to enter the plea. I saw nothing in Duhadaway's demeanor to indicate in any way that he was in "shock." I have no doubt that he was not pleased about his predicament and the choices that he was facing, but he was by no means at all "shocked" or overwhelmed by the situation.
Arrest Warrant
Duhadaway argues that he was not shown the arrest warrant when he was arrested.
Search Warrant
Duhadaway argues that he was not shown the search warrant.
Conflict of Intent
Duhadaway argues that Phillips had a conflict of interest because he has known Detective Garland for 10 years and that he did not think that Detective Garland would tamper with Duhadaway's computer. I have already addressed this argument before.
For the reasons set forth herein, I have concluded that the Duhadaway's Motion for Postconviction Relief is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.