Opinion
I.D. No. 9905011124.
Submitted: May 9, 2008.
Decided: May 20, 2008.
Upon consideration of Defendant's Third Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief.
DeniedThis 20th day of May, 2008, it appears to the Court that:
1. Defendant Gregory A. Denston ("Denston") was charged with Attempted Murder in the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony on January 5, 1998 after he beat his wife with a baseball bat on November 29, 1997, almost killing her and inflicting severe and permanent injuries. Defendant pleaded guilty to both charges but subsequently sought to withdraw his plea. The Court denied the request, and Denston was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment on January 8, 1999. His Motion for Modification of Sentence was denied on June 3, 1999. The Court subsequently denied his Motion for Postconviction Relief on February 28, 2002.
2. On May 19, 1999, while incarcerated, Denston was subsequently charged with one count of Attempted Murder in the First Degree and two counts of Criminal Solicitation in the First Degree. The State offered evidence that Denston, while serving his thirty-year term, made contact with another inmate, James Trump ("Trump"), and solicited him between November 1, 1998 and May 10, 1999 in a plan to murder his wife. Trump informed the prison officials of Denston's plan. The officials then arranged for Trump to give Denston a telephone number of an undercover police officer posing as a "hitman." Denston spoke with the undercover officer about hiring him to murder his wife.
3. On September 5, 2001, Denston pleaded guilty to two counts of Criminal Solicitation in the First Degree in exchange for the State agreeing to nolle prosse the one count of Attempted Murder in the First Degree. Denston was then sentenced to ten years of mandatory incarceration at Level V. He did not appeal his conviction.
4. Denston filed his first pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief on March 24, 2003. After receiving a response to Denston's motion from both the State and Denston's prior counsel, the Court denied his motion. The Court found that: (1) Denston entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently; (2) Denston's counsel did not fail to investigate and interview witnesses; (3) counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to file a motion to suppress; and (4) counsel was not ineffective in failing to assert Denston's right to a speedy trial. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision.
State v. Denston, 2003 WL 22293651 (Del.Super.Ct. Oct. 3, 2003).
Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7-10.
Denston v. State, 846 A.2d 238, 2004 WL 344316 (Del. Feb. 17, 2004) (Table).
5. On June 8, 2006, Denston filed his second pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief which was denied by the Superior Court. The Supreme Court again affirmed the decision and concluded that Denston's motion was procedurally time-barred and repetitive.
Denston v. State, No. No. 356, 2006 (Del. Oct. 2, 2006).
6. Denston filed this, his third pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief, on May 8, 2008. In his motion, Denston argues that the recorded conversation he had with the undercover officer should have been suppressed and not used to convict him of the two counts of Criminal Solicitation. He contends that the communication was unlawfully intercepted and that the interception of his phone call with the undercover officer was not made with proper authorization.
7. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). If the procedural requirements of Rule 61 are not met, in order to protect the integrity of the procedural rules, the Court should not consider the merits of a postconviction claim.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). See also Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del.Super.Ct. 1991).
State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *2 (Del.Super.Ct. Dec. 28, 1995) (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 554).
8. Rule 61(i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in any prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules unless the movant shows prejudice to his rights or cause for relief; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. The bars to relief under (1), (2), and (3), however, do not apply "to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction." Moreover, the procedural bars of (2) and (4) may be overcome if "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice."
If the final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, the motion must be filed within three years. If the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005, however, the motion must be filed within one year. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (July 1, 2005) (amending Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (May 1, 1996)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).
Id. R. 61(i)(4).
9. In this case, Denston's claim is procedurally barred. Rule 61(i)(1) bars his claim because this motion was filed approximately six years and nine months after he pleaded guilty. Rules 61(i)(2) and (4) also bars his motion because the Court already considered and rejected his claim that his statements should be suppressed. Thus, the Court can only consider his motion if he can overcome the procedural bars by demonstrating that this court lacked jurisdiction, that there was a miscarriage of justice related to a constitutional violation, or that reconsideration is warranted in the interests of justice.
See Denston, 2003 WL 22293651 at *6.
10. Denston has failed to overcome the procedural bars. Despite his argument that the State used the allegedly improperly recorded statements to convict him, which would have been admissible in any event, Denston's guilty plea obviated any need for the State to offer any evidence. Thus, contrary to his claim, Denston's decision to plead guilty rendered any statements he gave to the police irrelevant. Moreover, his decision to enter a guilty plea precludes him from arguing that any statements should have been suppressed. As a result, he has demonstrated neither a miscarriage of justice nor that reconsideration is warranted in the interests of justice.
See id. ("Defendant's Miranda rights are not at issue and any purported motion to suppress would have failed.").
Id. ("Moreover, because the case was resolved via a guilty plea, no statements were ever offered.").
See Hall v. State, 937 A.2d 139, 2007 WL 3170467 (Del. Nov. 15, 2007) (Table) ("Under Delaware law, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of any alleged errors or defects occurring prior to the entry of the plea.").
11. For all of the foregoing, Denston's Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.