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State v. Coleman

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jan 31, 2006
No. 05-05-00480-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 31, 2006)

Opinion

No. 05-05-00480-CR

Opinion issued January 31, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F03-00521-VL. Affirmed.

Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and MAZZANT.


OPINION


The State of Texas appeals the trial court's order granting Patrick Tessie Coleman's motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial. In a single issue, the State contends the trial court erred by granting appellee's motion because appellee contributed to the delay, did not timely assert his right to a speedy trial, and failed to show prejudice. We affirm the trial court's order.

Background

Appellee was indicted for the state jail felony offense of possession of fraudulent identification on April 11, 2003. On April 15, 2003, a warrant was forwarded to Collin County where appellee was incarcerated on another charge. The warrant does not appear to have been executed as the return section is not filled out and appellee was not returned to Dallas County. On August 22, 2003, appellee's attorney on the other matter filed a letter with an attached bench warrant prepared by appellee, requesting to be returned to Dallas County so he could answer the indictment in this case. Thereafter, a bench warrant dated September 10, 2003 issued. However, the return section is blank and it does not appear to have been executed. On October 15, 2003, appellee filed a sworn pro se request for "immediate resolution" of this case and to have counsel appointed to represent him in this matter. In his motion, appellee notified the court he had been transferred from the Collin County Jail to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) in Huntsville and gave his contact information. Appellee averred he was suffering prejudice from the delay because it:
negatively affect[ed] his classification, ability to participate in certain rehabilitation programs, ability to obtain witnesses and/or evidence favorable to [him and] the lengthy delay will cause unnecessary anxiety, worry, stress, and [his] wife is suffering terminally ill cancer. A key witness for [him], if trial is had.
On October 20, 2003, another bench warrant directed to Collin County was issued, but again it was not executed. On November 10, 2003, a bench warrant, likewise not executed, was issued directed to the Warden at TDCJ. On December 22, 2003, appellee was transferred to federal custody. Thereafter, appellee pleaded guilty to bank fraud and was sentenced to thirty-seven months confinement, to be served concurrently with a probation revocation pending in Dallas County. On December 13, 2004, appellee filed a pro se motion to dismiss, claiming his right to a speedy trial had been violated. On March 3, 2005 a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was issued, directed to the Warden at the Seagoville federal prison. Appellee was present, but did not testify, at the March 17, 2005 hearing on his motion to dismiss.

Discussion

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees every person the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This constitutional right is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). We determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated using the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the Supreme Court outlined a four-factor balancing test to determine whether an accused has been denied the right to a speedy trial. Id. at 530-33. The factors we consider include, but are not limited to: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Id. None of the four factors alone is a necessary or sufficient condition to finding a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. Id. at 533. The factors are all related and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. Id. We review the trial court's decision using a bifurcated standard of review: we review factual components of the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion; however, we conduct Barker's balancing test de novo. See Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); State v. Jones, 168 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd).

Length of the Delay

The length of delay is actually a double inquiry. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from "presumptively prejudicial" delay. Id. at 652. If the accused makes this showing, we must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. Id. This latter inquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis because the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time. Id. Although no specific length of time is a per se violation of the right to a speedy trial, generally any delay of eight months or longer is presumptively unreasonable and triggers a speedy trial analysis. See Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). In this case, appellee was indicted on April 11, 2003 and the case was dismissed on March 18, 2005, a delay of twenty-three months. Thus, the delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial and further analysis under the Barker test is necessary.

Reason for the Delay

The primary burden is on the prosecutor and the courts to insure that a defendant is speedily brought to trial. Thus, the State has the initial burden of justifying a lengthy delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. And, different weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay. For example, a deliberate attempt to delay trial in order to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the State. Id. at 531. However, a more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts is weighted less heavily. Id. At the hearing on appellee's motion, the State argued the reason for the delay "was that [appellee] was in the custody of other agencies. This Court issued two bench warrants for him. There's really not much else that we could have done to get him back." However, the record shows the trial court issued four bench warrants, not two. Moreover, the State did not explain why it was unable to have four bench warrants executed when it was aware that appellee was confined just a short distance away. Nor did the State offer an explanation for the delay in appointing counsel for almost seventeen months after appellee was indicted. When, as here, a defendant's location is known, the State must exert due diligence in obtaining his presence for trial. See Jones, 168 S.W.3d at 348. Indeed, if a prosecutor seeks the presence of a defendant by capias, he is "obliged by [his] own assigned responsibility to exercise due diligence to follow through in the endeavor to obtain the presence of an accused for trial." Id. Although there is no evidence that the State deliberately attempted to delay the trial, the fact that the State failed to have numerous warrants executed despite knowing appellee was in custody a short distance away was negligent. See id. Further, the constitutional right to a speedy trial governs the entire criminal justice process. Id. With respect to the delay between December 3, 2004 and March 18, 2005, the record shows appellee passed or agreed to pass the case several times. However, the purported reason for four of the passes was for the purpose of the pending speedy trial motion. Three passes were for investigation but the record is not clear who requested the resets. The State did not offer any explanation for this period of the delay. In sum, the majority of the delay is attributable to the State's failure to have a warrant executed despite being aware of appellee's location, with the remainder appearing to be a delay in having appellee's motion heard and ruled upon. Thus, we conclude this factor weighs against the State. See Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 650-51.

Assertion of the Right

We next consider appellee's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. The nature of the speedy trial right "makes it impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the process when the right must be asserted or waived, but that fact does not argue for placing the burden of protecting that right solely on defendants." Barker, 407 U.S. at 527; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 651. Although the defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, the defendant does have a responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 651. Whether and how a defendant asserts his speedy trial right is closely related to the other three factors because the strength of his efforts will be shaped by them. Id. Therefore, the defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. Id. The State maintains that appellee waited twenty-three months before asserting his right to a speedy trial in a motion to dismiss and this "excessive" delay indicates appellee's "disinterest in attaining a speedy trial and undercuts his claim of prejudice." The record, however, belies the State's claim. Our review of the record shows that, contrary to the State's contention that appellee waited twenty-three months to assert his right and first asserted it with a request to dismiss, appellee first asserted his desire for a speedy trial four months after being indicted. At that time, appellee applied for a bench warrant to be issued to "further the proceedings" and to return him to Dallas County because his presence was necessary to "bring this cause to a final adjudication." In October 2003, appellee again sought "immediate resolution" of the case, and asked that counsel be appointed. He also requested in the alternative for the Court "to grant mercy by dismissing said charge." He then sought to have his case dismissed for violation of his right to a speedy trial in December 2004, and again in March 2005, after counsel was appointed. We fail to see how appellee's early and repeated assertions of his right to a speedy trial constitutes an "excessive" delay or evidences his "disinterest" in having his case resolved. We conclude this factor weighs against the State.

Prejudice

Finally, we must determine whether appellee suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Prejudice should be assessed in light of the interests a speedy trial is designed to protect, i.e., (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) guarding against impairing the accused's defense by loss of exculpatory evidence and dimming memories. Id. Because appellee did not testify or otherwise put on evidence at the hearing on his motion to dismiss, he failed to make a direct showing of prejudice. Appellee asks us to presume prejudice due to the length of the delay. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656; Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 315 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 654. Consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable, and, affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. Both Doggett and Barker explicitly recognize that impairment of one's defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove "because time's erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can rarely be shown." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655; Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Thus, we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656. Although presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. Id. If the presumptive prejudice is "neither extenuated, as by the defendant's acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to relief." Id. at 658. Here, although not as excessive a delay as in Doggett or Pierce, nonetheless, the delay between appellee's indictment and the dismissal is almost two years. Further, this is a straight forward possession of fraudulent identification case. Therefore, the amount of delay that can be tolerated is considerably less than the time that would be tolerated for a more complex case. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Additionally, appellee's sworn motion for appointment of counsel and request for a speedy trial indicates appellee suffered some anxiety and concern and that his defense was impaired, and the record implies the delay in resolving the charges in this case may have prevented appellee from serving any sentence in this case concurrently with his federal sentence. Finally, appellee asserted his right to a speedy trial early and throughout the twenty-three month delay. Therefore, we conclude there is a presumption, however slight, of prejudice in this case. The State attempted to rebut this presumption of prejudice by stating appellee "gave a full confession to the police. I mean, that obviously hasn't prejudiced him, as far as defending the case, which is what the whole speedy trial issue comes down to. It's not that it's going to affect you somewhere else. It's going to be, have you been harmed in defending yourself? In this case, he has not." The State did not, however, introduce a copy of appellee's statement, nor did the State attempt to provide any details of the circumstances surrounding appellee's statement. Without more, we cannot conclude appellee's alleged statement effectively rebuts any prejudice to appellee's defense. Further, the State did not attempt in any way to rebut the presumption of prejudice with respect to minimizing appellee's anxiety and concern, another of the three interests a speedy trial is designed to protect. After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude the State controverted the presumption of prejudice. Thus, we conclude this factor weighs slightly in favor of appellee. We conclude all four factors weigh in favor of appellee. Thus, we agree with the trial court that appellee was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and conclude the trial court properly granted appellee's motion to dismiss. We overrule the State's sole issue. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.


Summaries of

State v. Coleman

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas
Jan 31, 2006
No. 05-05-00480-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 31, 2006)
Case details for

State v. Coleman

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. PATRICK TESSIE COLEMAN, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fifth District, Dallas

Date published: Jan 31, 2006

Citations

No. 05-05-00480-CR (Tex. App. Jan. 31, 2006)