Opinion
I.D. No. 9804022026.
Submitted: February 23, 2000.
Decided: February 16, 2001.
Motion for Forfeiture and Motion for Return of Property — Motion for Forfeiture Denied — Motion for Return of Property Granted —
Appearances:
Stuart Sklut, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, 820 North French Street, 7th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801; Attorney for State of Delaware.
Joseph A. Hurley, Esq., 1215 King Street, Wilmington, DE 19801; Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION
The issue for decision in this case involves a motion for forfeiture by the State and a motion for return of property by the defendant.
I. FACTS
On September 17, 1998, the State filed a motion for forfeiture of property in connection with Defendant David H. Caulfield, Jr.'s then-upcoming trial for the death Michael Labeau during a boating tragedy on the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal that occurred in the summer of 1998. The State sought the forfeiture of Mr. Caulfield's 1987 Wellcraft Nova 23-foot boat.
On September 17, 1998, Mr. Caulfield filed a demand for a jury trial on the issue of forfeiture. On September 22, 1998, Mr. Caulfield filed a motion for return of property and opposition to forfeiture.
On April 27, 1999, Mr. Caulfield was found guilty of criminally negligent homicide in the death of Michael Labeau. The jury was dismissed, and the issue of forfeiture was not heard by the trial jury that convicted Mr. Caulfield of criminally negligent homicide.
Mr. Caulfield was sentenced to two years of incarceration at Level 5.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Article I, § 4 of the Delaware Constitution, a defendant is guaranteed the right of trial by jury "as heretofore". This includes the right to a jury trial in a forfeiture proceeding.
State v. Fossett, Del.Supr., 134 A.2d 272, 276 (1957).
Superior Court Criminal Rule 40 details the scheme for the forfeiture of vehicles pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 2324.
Rule 40(a) declares that a when the state seeks to forfeit the property of the accused, the state shall file a motion for forfeiture setting for the state's factual and legal basis not later than 20 days before trial of the criminal offense.
Superior Court Criminal Rule 40(a).
Rule 40(b) grants the defendant the right to a trial by jury on the issue of forfeiture, so long as the defendant asserts this right by serving a demand on the attorney general not later than 10 days before trial of the criminal offense. Failure of the defendant to timely serve demand constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury trial on the issue of forfeiture.
Superior Court Criminal Rule 40(b).
Rule 40(c) provides that if the defendant is found guilty of the offense charged, "the trier of fact shall decide the issue of whether the property is subject to forfeiture." In this proceeding, the state has the burden of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the forfeiture is warranted, and both parties may present evidence on the issue.
Superior Court Criminal Rule 40(c).
Rule 40(d) directs the jury to return "a special verdict as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any". Rule 40(e) directs the Court to enter a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
Superior Court Criminal Rule 40(d) and (e).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the State's motion for forfeiture should be denied because (1) the State failed to raise its motion for forfeiture before the jury was dismissed, thereby denying Mr. Caulfield his right to have the forfeiture issue decided by the same jury that heard his criminal case; and (2) forfeiture of his boat would qualify as "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.The State argues that Mr. Caulfield failed to properly assert his right to a jury trial on the issue of forfeiture before the jury was dismissed from service, and therefore Mr. Caulfield waived his right to have that particular jury decide the forfeiture issue. The State also contends that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to an instrumentality of the offense, and that because forfeiture actions are civil actions in rem, they are not personal to the defendant and do not implicate the protection against "cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment.
Because this case is decided upon the issue of the defendant's right to a jury trial on the forfeiture issue, the Eighth Amendment arguments will not be considered.
The right to a jury trial is fundamental in our jurisprudence. The waiver of such an important right must be clear and unequivocal. Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a) requires that "[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the state". The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that a "[a] defendant must affirmatively waive . . . the right to a trial by jury."
Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a).
Krewson v. State, Del.Supr., 552 A.2d 840, 842 (1988) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969)).
Regarding the jury trial of a forfeiture proceeding, the Supreme Court has stated the following guidelines:
[T]he Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction of both civil and criminal cases and the reasonable administration of justice requires that both be tried to the same jury. When forfeiture is sought the State should be obliged to file prior to trial (as part of the criminal action) an appropriate pleading or request so that notice and other procedural requirements of due process may be met. Thereafter, defendant should be accorded an opportunity to elect a trial by jury on the use issue; if he fails to demand such trial, he should be deemed to have waived it. When such demand has been made and a verdict of guilty has been returned by a jury, the jury should not be discharged immediately; additional evidence then may be received on the use issue, argument made and appropriate instructions given as to the same. The jury should then deliberate the use issue.
State v. Rossitto, Del.Supr., 331 A.2d 385, 388 (1974).
The Delaware Superior Court has held in forfeiture cases that:
Whereas 11 Del. C. § 2324 requires the Attorney General to proceed for condemnation and forfeiture by libel, which is by nature a civil action in rem, State v. Rossitto, Del.Supr. 331 A.2d 385 (1974), Rule 41.1 ties the trial on the issue of unlawful use to the criminal trial. The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that "the reasonable administration of justice requires that both [the criminal charge and the illegal use issue] be tried to the same jury".
In the Matter of One 1986 Cavalier Chevrolet Automobile, Del.Super., C.A. No. 89M-MR-7, 1989 WL 48620, at *2 (1989) (citing Rossitto, 331 A.2d at 388).
In sum, it is apparent from the from the statutory and decisional case law that a defendant is guaranteed a jury trial in a forfeiture proceeding by the same jury that decided the criminal charge; that the defendant must clearly and affirmatively waive such a right; that the State must move for forfeiture of a defendant's property and sustain its burden of proof in a forfeiture proceeding; and that the defendant must assert his right to a jury trial on the forfeiture issue by demand to the attorney general before trial on the criminal charge.
In this case, the State sought a taking of Mr. Caulfield's property. The State correctly filed its motion for forfeiture of said property. In response to the State's motion, the defendant answered in the form of a demand for a jury trial on the very issue that the State undertook to prove.
The Court is hard pressed to view the State's motion for forfeiture as an obligation on anyone but the State itself. The State gave notice of its intent to prove to the jury the basis for a lawful forfeiture of the defendant's boat following the State's case-in-chief. The defendant, by his written demand for a jury trial, timely, loudly, and clearly asserted his constitutional right to have the same individuals who would determine his criminal culpability later decide whether his boat should be confiscated.
Thus, it was incumbent upon the State to swiftly move forward with its own forfeiture trial upon the filing of its own motion to this Court. It strains credibility for the State to claim that the defendant should press the Court forward on a position that is antithetical to his own interests. The defendant had already asserted his rights and had agreed to be present in front of the jury when the State would prove by a preponderance the propriety of dispossessing the defendant of his property. Nothing more is required of him.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State's Motion for Forfeiture is DENIED, and the Defendant's Motion for Return of Property is GRANTED.