Opinion
22-1260
10-23-2023
STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HUNTER NOEL CASTO, Defendant-Appellant
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.
Hunter Casto appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction for sexual abuse in the second degree.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Danilson, S.J. [*]
DANILSON, SENIOR JUDGE.
Hunter Casto appeals the sentence imposed following his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse, contending the district court failed to exercise its discretion in certain respects and failed to provide sufficient reasoning for imposing a term of imprisonment. We vacate Casto's sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In 2019, Casto, then seventeen years old, traveled to Iowa to spend time with his father's side of his family. Casto and his father had met for the first time two years prior and were working on building their relationship. While staying with his father, Casto began to fixate on one of his father's younger children. The father and the father's wife became uncomfortable with Casto staying in their home and ended his visit early. Once Casto left, the child disclosed that Casto pressed his penis against the child while in a swimming pool, exposed his penis to the child, groped the child's genitals through clothing, and snuck into the child's bedroom and digitally penetrated the child's genitals.
The State charged Casto with sexual abuse in the second degree in violation of Iowa Code section 709.3(1)(b) (2019). The matter proceeded to a bench trial, and the district court found him guilty. At sentencing, the court sentenced Casto to a twenty-five-year term of imprisonment and imposed a special sentence pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1. Casto appeals, arguing the court failed to exercise its discretion in imposing the special sentence and erred by failing to provide reasoning for imposing a term of incarceration.
II. Standard of Review
"We will not reverse a sentence unless there is 'an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.'" State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). Because the sentence imposed by the court was within the statutory limits, we review Casto's claims for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 592 (Iowa 1983). An abuse of discretion occurs "when the court exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Evans, 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003). A district court's selected sentence "is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor." State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). However, we will reverse if the district court was unaware it had discretion to make a specific sentencing determination. State v. Davison, 973 N.W.2d 276, 289 (Iowa 2022).
III. Discussion
We first address Casto's claim that the district court failed to exercise its discretion when it imposed the special sentence, pursuant to section 903B.1, because it mistakenly believed it did not have discretion to suspend the special sentence. The State concedes that the district court had discretion to suspend imposition of the special sentence because Casto was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. See Iowa Code § 901.5(13); State v. Hess, 983 N.W.2d 283, 282 (Iowa 2022). It also concedes the district court was not aware of its discretion. Because the district court was not aware it had discretion to impose or suspend the special sentence, the court failed to exercise its discretion, and we must remand for resentencing on this issue. See Hess, 983 N.W.2d at 282.
With respect to the remainder of the sentence imposed, Casto argues the court failed to provide individualized reasoning for imposition of its selected sentence. "[T]he district court must 'weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant's age, character, and propensities or chances for reform.'" State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Johnson, 476 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa 1991)). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires the sentencing court to "state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence." A sentencing explanation is sufficient, "even if terse and succinct," when it provides enough detail to allow appellate review of the district court's sentencing rationale. State v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 838 (Iowa 2010). However, use of nonspecific, boilerplate language as a sentencing explanation is insufficient to satisfy rule 2.23(3)(d) because it "tells us nothing about how the district court arrived at a particular sentence in a particular case." Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at 410.
We refer to the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure in effect at the time of sentencing.
Here, we agree with Casto that the district court failed to provide sufficient rationale for its sentencing determination. The sentencing order included a boilerplate list of permissible sentencing factors with corresponding checkboxes. The district court simply checked all of the pertinent boxes without any elaboration. So we know what factors the court considered but not how they came together when the court reached its sentencing determination.
The district court did not check the box indicating it considered the terms of a plea agreement because there was no plea agreement in this case.
The district court's oral pronouncement at sentencing provided no greater or individualized detail. The court noted the factors it considered, stating:
The court has considered the factors and circumstances surrounding the offense for which the court found defendant guilty after a bench trial.
The court has carefully considered the statements and recommendations of counsel for plaintiff and counsel for Mr. Casto as well as his statement to the court in this matter.
The court has also reviewed and considered the appropriate portions of the [presentence investigation (PSI) report] for Mr. Casto pursuant to agreement of the parties and afforded counsel for the State and counsel for Mr. Casto the opportunity to review the PSI report and offer additions, deletions, corrections, and there were none.
Finally, the court carefully read the letters in support received by the court for Mr. Casto.
Mr. Casto, in addition, as I've already noted, was given the opportunity to speak in mitigation of sentence.
The court went on to list additional sentencing factors it considered, which mirrored the boilerplate list of sentencing factors included on the written sentencing order. As to any specific reasoning for selecting the sentence imposed, the district court merely stated, "The court determines the sentence set forth will provide maximum opportunity for defendant's rehabilitation and protection of the community from further offenses."
What is absent is an individualized reason or reasons why the sentencing factors led the court to believe the sentence imposed would provide Casto with the best chance at rehabilitation while also protecting the community. In other words, the district court did not provide Casto with an individualized sentencing determination and instead only provided him with boilerplate sentencing that does not inform him of the court's rationale. See id. at 410 (concluding a sentencing explanation must be comprised of more than boilerplate language provided in all cases); State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304-05 (Iowa 2001) (concluding it would be insufficient for the court to give only the following as an explanation for the sentence imposed: "The Court has determined that this sentence will provide reasonable protection of the public. Probation is denied because it is unwarranted"). The lack of a statement of reasons also fails to "provide a record sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review." Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at 409.
As a result, we must vacate Casto's entire sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.
SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
[*] Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2023).