Opinion
A22-0164
02-13-2023
STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Deshawn Kejuan WOOLRIDGE CARTER, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijo, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lydia Villalva Lijo, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Patrick McDermott, Blue Earth County Attorney, Mankato, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Connolly, Judge.
OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
A Blue Earth County jury found Deshawn Kejuan Woolridge Carter guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Woolridge Carter used coercion in committing the offense. We also conclude that, at sentencing, the district court properly assigned Woolridge Carter one custody-status point because he committed the offense while on probation after pleading guilty to a felony in a previous case. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from an incident that occurred at a party in an apartment in the city of Mankato in late August 2019. K.O. was a guest at the party, along with her cousin A.O. and her roommate A.B., with whom K.O. lived in a different apartment in the same building.
When K.O., A.O., and A.B. first arrived at the party, at approximately 2:00 a.m., there were seven or eight other persons present, including Woolridge Carter. A.O. left the party after approximately two hours, and A.B. left shortly after A.O. Other guests left soon thereafter, and the resident hosts went to sleep in their bedrooms at approximately 4:00 a.m. The record suggests that, at that point, only K.O. and Woolridge Carter were present and awake in the apartment.
K.O. later testified at trial as follows. She had not previously met Woolridge Carter. As she was about to leave the party, Woolridge Carter started kissing her. She did not tell him to stop. Woolridge Carter led her into a bathroom, closed the door, and stood between her and the door. K.O. felt that she could not leave. Woolridge Carter removed her pants and underwear, touched her vaginal area with his hand, and then used his mouth to engage in cunnilingus. Initially, she did not object, but after approximately a minute, she told him to stop, said "no," and pushed him away. Woolridge Carter resumed kissing her and then picked her up and set her on the floor of the bathroom. She continued to tell him "no" and "stop." Woolridge Carter straddled K.O.’s body with his arms and legs, causing her to feel that she could not get away. Woolridge Carter inserted his penis into K.O.’s vagina as she continued to say "no" and "stop."
Eventually, Woolridge Carter removed his penis from K.O.’s vagina and told her "to help him finish." She initially refused but eventually used her hands and mouth to stimulate his penis because she "felt like [she] had no other option." During the entire incident, K.O. did not physically resist or yell for help because Woolridge Carter was larger than she and because she was afraid that he might physically harm her.
Woolridge Carter later backed away from K.O. so that he no longer was blocking the door. K.O. grabbed her clothes, quickly put them on, and left. She ran to her apartment and told A.B. what had happened. Later that day, K.O. went to a hospital, where a nurse performed a sexual-assault examination. K.O. later reported the incident to law enforcement, identifying Woolridge Carter by name.
At approximately 1:00 a.m. on the following night, police officers saw Woolridge Carter in downtown Mankato. The officers asked Woolridge Carter if he would be willing to answer questions, and he agreed to do so. An officer interviewed him at a police station. Woolridge Carter stated that he could not remember details about the prior evening because he had been intoxicated. He stated that he did not remember kissing K.O., being in a bathroom with her, or engaging in sexual contact or sexual penetration, but he stated that it was possible that he did so. Woolridge Carter voluntarily provided a DNA sample, which matched the profile of a DNA sample that was collected during K.O.’s sexual-assault examination.
In September 2019, the state charged Woolridge Carter with first-degree criminal sexual conduct by engaging in sexual penetration and causing personal injury while using force or coercion, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2018), and third-degree criminal sexual conduct by engaging in sexual penetration using force or coercion, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2018).
The case was tried on two days in September 2021. The state's first witness was K.O., who testified to the facts described above. The state called nine other witnesses: A.B., another roommate of K.O., three other persons who attended the party, the police officer who interviewed K.O. and Woolridge Carter, a detective, the nurse who performed the sexual-assault examination, and an employee of the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension who analyzed the DNA samples. The state also played for the jury a video-recording of the police officer's interview of Woolridge Carter. Woolridge Carter did not testify and did not present any other evidence. The jury found him guilty on both counts.
Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report and a sentencing worksheet, which stated that Woolridge Carter's first-degree offense is a severity-level-A offense and that he has no criminal-history points. The sentencing worksheet stated further that, with no criminal-history points, the presumptive sentence would be between 144 and 172 months of imprisonment. See Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 4.B (Supp. 2019).
Shortly after the PSI report and sentencing worksheet were prepared, the state filed a memorandum of law in which it argued that the district court should assign Woolridge Carter one custody-status point because he committed the offense while on probation after pleading guilty to a felony theft charge. The state argued further that the assignment of one custody-status point would result in a criminal-history score of one, which would yield a presumptive sentence of between 144 and 187 months of imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing in November 2021, Woolridge Carter argued that the district court should not assign one custody-status point because his prior guilty plea resulted in a stay of adjudication, not a conviction.
The district court resolved the issue in favor of the state and assigned one custody-status point, resulting in a criminal-history score of one. Accordingly, the district court determined that the presumptive sentencing range is between 144 and 187 months of imprisonment. See Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 4.B. The district court imposed an executed sentence of 156 months of imprisonment on the first-degree offense in count 1. The district court did not adjudicate Woolridge Carter guilty on the third-degree offense in count 2. Woolridge Carter appeals.
ISSUES
I. Is the evidence sufficient to prove that Woolridge Carter used force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration?
II. Did the district court err by assigning Woolridge Carter one custody-status point for committing the offense while on probation after pleading guilty to a felony theft charge and receiving a stay of adjudication?
ANALYSIS
I.
Woolridge Carter first argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in criminal sexual conduct. He does not challenge the evidence that he engaged in sexual penetration or that he caused personal injury to K.O. He argues only that the state did not introduce sufficient evidence of force or coercion.
Woolridge Carter requests that this court review the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to both the first-degree offense and the third-degree offense. But the district court did not adjudicate Woolridge Carter guilty of the third-degree offense on the ground that it is a lesser-included offense. See Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2018) ; State v. Pflepsen , 590 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999). In the absence of an adjudication, Woolridge Carter does not have a right to appellate review of the guilty verdict on the third-degree offense. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 2(1) ; State v. Hoelzel , 639 N.W.2d 605, 609-10 (Minn. 2002) ; State v. LaTourelle , 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984) ; State v. Ashland , 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979). Accordingly, we will confine our review to Woolridge Carter's first-degree offense.
In analyzing an argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, this court undertakes "a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient." State v. Jones , 977 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). We "carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the factfinder to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted." State v. Waiters , 929 N.W.2d 895, 900 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). "We assume that the jury believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary." State v. Friese , 959 N.W.2d 205, 214 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
To establish Woolridge Carter's guilt of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the state was required to prove, among other things, that he "engage[d] in sexual penetration with another person" and "use[d] force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration." Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1, 1(e)(i). The terms "force" and "coercion" are defined within the statutes governing criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3, 14 (2018) ; see also State v. Martin , 941 N.W.2d 119, 125 (Minn. 2020) (identifying various means of using force or coercion). The word "force" is defined to mean
This section and subdivision were amended in 2021, effective September 15, 2021. See 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 11, art. 4, § 16, at 2038-41. We apply the 2018 version of the statute, which was in effect at the time of Woolridge Carter's offense. See State v. Ward , 847 N.W.2d 29, 31 n.1 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2015).
the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction by the actor of bodily harm or commission or threat of any other crime by the actor against the complainant or another, which (a) causes the complainant to reasonably believe that the actor has the present ability to execute the threat and (b) if the actor does not have a significant relationship to the complainant, also causes the complainant to submit.
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3. The word "coercion" is defined to mean
This definition was amended in 2021, effective September 15, 2021. See 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 11, art. 4, § 6, at 2034. We apply the 2018 version of the definition, which was in effect at the time of Woolridge Carter's offense. See Ward , 847 N.W.2d at 31 n.1.
the use by the actor of words or circumstances that cause the complainant reasonably to fear that the actor will inflict bodily harm upon the complainant or another, or the use by the actor of confinement, or superior size or strength, against the complainant that causes the complainant to submit to sexual penetration or contact against the complainant's will.
Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 14. The statutory definition of "coercion" further states, "Proof of coercion does not require proof of a specific act or threat." Id.
This definition was amended in 2021, effective September 15, 2021. See 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 11, art. 4, § 10, at 2036. We apply the 2018 version of the definition, which was in effect at the time of Woolridge Carter's offense. See Ward , 847 N.W.2d at 31 n.1.
Because the applicable statute uses the disjunctive word "or" between the words "force" and "coercion," the state was required to prove only one, not both. See State v. Loge , 608 N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 2000). The state begins its responsive argument by emphasizing the evidence of coercion. Accordingly, we will first consider whether Woolridge Carter used coercion to accomplish sexual penetration.
Woolridge Carter contends that there is insufficient evidence of coercion because there is no evidence that he "said or did anything to cause [K.O.] to reasonably fear he would inflict bodily harm on her if she did not submit to sexual penetration," noting that he did not lock the bathroom door and that other people were present in the apartment. He also contends that he did not prevent K.O. from leaving the bathroom. He further contends that he did not use his larger size or strength to accomplish the criminal act.
Contrary to Woolridge Carter's arguments, the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of coercion. K.O. testified that Woolridge Carter led her into the bathroom, closed the door, and stood between her and the door, and she testified further that she felt that she could not leave. That evidence is sufficient to establish that Woolridge Carter used "confinement" to cause K.O. to submit to sexual penetration. See Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 14. In addition, K.O. testified that Woolridge Carter is larger than she and that he straddled her body before penetrating her, which made her feel that she could not get away. That evidence is sufficient to establish that Woolridge Carter used "superior size or strength" to cause K.O. to submit to sexual penetration. See id. Furthermore, K.O. testified that she did not physically resist or yell for help because she was afraid that Woolridge Carter might physically harm her. That evidence is sufficient to establish that Woolridge Carter used "words or circumstances" that caused K.O. "reasonably to fear that" he would "inflict bodily harm upon" her. See id.
The evidence in this case is similar to the evidence in State v. Solberg , 882 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 2016). In that case, the defendant pushed the victim onto a couch, "held her down," and "pulled down her pants and penetrated her while she continued telling him to stop." Id. at 621. The victim "was unable to push him off" because he "was much larger in physical size." Id. In affirming a presumptive sentence, the supreme court stated that "Solberg's use of his overwhelming physical size and strength to cause the victim to submit to penetration against her will fits squarely within the statute's prohibition of sexual assault by coercion." Id. at 627 (citing Minn. State §§ 609.341, subd. 14, 609.344, subd. 1(c) (2014) ). In addition, the evidence in this case is very similar to the evidence in State v. Gamez , 494 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 23, 1993). In that case, the defendant lured his sister-in-law into a bathroom, locked the door, and engaged in sexual penetration despite her quiet protests. Id. at 85, 87. The victim testified that she was frightened by the defendant and did not yell for help because she did not want her sister, who was sleeping nearby, to know about the incident. Id. at 86-87. In affirming the conviction based on that incident, this court reasoned that the defendant used coercion in part by "intentionally creat[ing] an atmosphere of fear." Id. at 87.
Thus, the evidence is sufficient to prove that Woolridge Carter used coercion to accomplish sexual penetration. In light of that conclusion, we need not consider whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that Woolridge Carter used force to accomplish sexual penetration. With or without evidence of force, the evidence is sufficient to support Woolridge Carter's conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to section 609.342, subdivision 1(e)(i).
II.
Woolridge Carter also argues that the district court erred by assigning him one custody-status point for committing the present offense while he was on probation after pleading guilty to a felony theft charge and receiving a stay of adjudication.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony offenses. Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.C (Supp. 2019). A defendant's presumptive sentence depends on two variables: the severity level of the present offense and the defendant's criminal-history score. Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2 (Supp. 2019). The presumptive sentence is determined by locating the appropriate cell on a sentencing grid at the intersection of the offense's severity level, which is reflected on the vertical axis, and the defendant's criminal-history score, which is reflected on the horizontal axis. See Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.C.1 (Supp. 2019).
A defendant's criminal-history score is the "sum of points" derived from the defendant's prior felony convictions, the defendant's "custody status at the time of the [present] offense," the defendant's "prior misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors," and the defendant's "prior juvenile adjudications." Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B (Supp. 2019). A defendant may be assigned either one-half, one, or two custody-status points. Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a-b (Supp. 2019). One custody-status point is assigned if "the conditions in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3)(ii) or (iii)" of section 2.B.2.a of the guidelines "are met." Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a. Those conditions are as follows:
(1) The offender was under one of the following custody statuses at the time the current offense was committed:
(i) probation ;
(ii) parole;
(iii) supervised release;
(iv) conditional release following release from an executed prison sentence (see conditional release terms listed in section 2.E.3);
(v) release pending sentencing;
(vi) confinement in a jail, workhouse, or prison pending or after sentencing; or
(vii) escape from confinement following an executed sentence.
(2) The offender was under one of the custody statuses in paragraph (1) after entry of a guilty plea , guilty verdict, or conviction.
(3) The offender was under one of the custody statuses in paragraph (1) for one of the following:
...
(ii) any other felony ;
(iii) any other EJJ conviction; ....
Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a (emphasis added).
To resolve Woolridge Carter's argument concerning the assignment of one custody-status point, we must interpret the sentencing guidelines. In doing so, "we apply the same principles of interpretation to the Guidelines as we apply to statutes." State v. Strobel , 932 N.W.2d 303, 306-07 (Minn. 2019). "If the Guidelines language is plain and unambiguous, it is presumed to manifest the intent of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission...." State v. Scovel , 916 N.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Minn. 2018). In that event, a court should apply the plain meaning of the guideline. See Strobel , 932 N.W.2d at 309-10 & n.9. A guideline is ambiguous only if it is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." Scovel , 916 N.W.2d at 555 (quotation omitted). In the event of an ambiguity, courts "look to other factors to determine the Commission's intent." Id. (quotation omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to a district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 544
As stated above, the district court assigned Woolridge Carter one custody-status point. The district court correctly interpreted and applied guideline 2.B.2.a in light of the undisputed facts. Guideline 2.B.2.a is unambiguous. Its plain language requires three conditions to be satisfied, and each condition has a clear meaning. We have italicized above the language in guideline 2.B.2.a that is most pertinent to indicate how each condition is satisfied in this case. First, Woolridge Carter was on "probation" "at the time the current offense was committed." Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a(1)(i). Second, Woolridge Carter was on probation "after entry of a guilty plea." Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2). Third, Woolridge Carter was on probation because he had pleaded guilty to a theft charge, which is within the broad category of "any other felony." Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a(3)(ii). Thus, the state proved that all three conditions are satisfied.
Woolridge Carter's argument focuses on the second condition. He contends that the second condition is not satisfied because, after he pleaded guilty to the felony theft charge, he received only a stay of adjudication, not a conviction. Woolridge Carter contends that guideline 2.B.2.a is ambiguous on the ground that there are two reasonable interpretations of the guideline, one of which is that paragraph (2) of the guideline applies only to convictions and does not apply to stays of adjudication. He urges the court to resolve the ambiguity by considering "other factors."
Guideline 2.B.2.a provides that the second condition may be satisfied by any one of three different means: "entry of a guilty plea, guilty verdict, or conviction. " Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a(2) (emphasis added). Only the third means requires a conviction. Id. The first and second means do not require a conviction because it is possible for a person to receive a stay of adjudication but not a conviction after either a guilty plea or a guilty verdict. See, e.g. , State v. Lee , 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005) ; State v. Greenough , 915 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Minn. App. 2018) ; State v. Martin , 849 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn. App. 2014).
In support of a contrary result, Woolridge Carter cites a comment to section 2.B.2 of the guidelines, which states, in relevant part: "The custodial statuses covered by this policy are those occurring after conviction of a felony, non-traffic gross misdemeanor, gross misdemeanor driving while impaired or refusal to submit to a chemical test, gross misdemeanor reckless driving, or misdemeanor on the targeted misdemeanor list provided in Minn. Stat. § 299C.10, subd. 1(e)." Minn. Sent'g Guidelines cmt. 2.B.205 (Supp. 2019) (emphasis added). Woolridge Carter points to the word "conviction" in the comment as an indication that the sentencing guidelines commission intended to require a prior conviction for every assignment of one full custody-status point under guideline 2.B.2.a.
As stated above, courts "look to other factors to determine the Commission's intent" only if a sentencing guideline is ambiguous. Scovel , 916 N.W.2d at 555 (quotation omitted). Paragraph (2) of guideline 2.B.2.a is unambiguous in stating that the second condition may be satisfied not only by a conviction but also by a guilty plea or a guilty verdict. Accordingly, we need not look beyond the plain language of the guideline. See id.
Even if we were to determine that guideline 2.B.2.a is ambiguous, we would not be compelled to adopt Woolridge Carter's argument because comments to the sentencing guidelines "are merely advisory, not binding." Id. ; see also Asfaha v. State , 665 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Minn. 2003). Consequently, "guideline comments cannot be relied upon to create an exception to ... a clear and unambiguous guideline provision." State v. Rouland , 685 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Minn. App. 2004) (citing State v. Notch , 446 N.W.2d 383, 385-86 (Minn. 1989) ). To interpret guideline 2.B.2.a to require a conviction in all prior cases would be inconsistent with the plain language of the guideline, which allows the assignment of one custody-status point if there was a guilty plea or a guilty verdict but not a conviction. Thus, the "after conviction of" language in the first sentence of comment 2.B.205 does not require a conviction in all prior cases that give rise to one custody-status point under guideline 2.B.2.a.
Woolridge Carter also relies on a prior opinion of this court in which we concluded that a district court erred by assigning one custody-status point to a defendant who had committed his offense while on probation after a stay of adjudication. See State v. Roloff , 562 N.W.2d 29, 30-32 (Minn. App. 1997). But our opinion in Roloff was based on a prior version of the sentencing guidelines, which provided:
The offender is assigned one point if he or she was on probation, parole, supervised release, conditional release, or confined in a jail, workhouse, or prison following conviction of a felony or gross misdemeanor or an extended jurisdiction juvenile conviction, or released pending sentencing at the time the felony was committed for which he or she is being sentenced.
Minn. Sent'g Guidelines II.B.2 (1996) (emphasis added). That guideline no longer is in effect; it has been replaced by a much longer and more complex guideline, some of which is quoted above. Compare Minn. Sent'g Guidelines II.B.2 (1996) with Minn. Sent'g Guidelines 2.B.2.a (Supp. 2019). Because the guideline underlying the Roloff opinion has been amended, the Roloff opinion has been superseded and, thus, no longer reflects current law.
Thus, guideline 2.B.2.a instructs a district court to assign one custody-status point to a defendant who committed the present offense while on probation after pleading guilty to another felony charge, even if the prior guilty plea resulted in a stay of adjudication rather than a conviction. Therefore, the district court did not err by assigning Woolridge Carter one custody-status point.
DECISION
The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Woolridge Carter is guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court did not err by assigning Woolridge Carter one custody-status point.