Opinion
No. 4-874 / 04-0694
Filed January 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, David L. Christensen, Judge.
Joseph Bloom appeals from his convictions and sentences for manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of an offensive weapon, homicide by vehicle, and serious injury by vehicle. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, and Timothy R. Kenyon, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Joseph Bloom appeals from his convictions and sentences for manufacturing less than five grams of methamphetamine as an habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(c)(6), 902.9(4), and 902.9(3) (2003) (Count I), possession of an offensive weapon as an habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 724.1, 724.3, and 902.9(3) (Count III), homicide by vehicle as an habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.6A(2), 902.8, and 902.9(3) (Count V), and serious injury by vehicle as an habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.6A(4), 902.8, and 902.9(3) (Count VI). We affirm.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Bloom was charged with multiple drug offenses, traffic offenses, and vehicular homicide following a fatal traffic accident near Creston on August 22, 2003. Accident investigators who searched the van Bloom was driving found a .410 shotgun; a barrel to a .22 caliber rifle; a white plastic bag containing a whitish brown substance; a jar appearing to contain more than five grams of methamphetamine; a jar containing used coffee filters and sludge; a jar containing unused coffee filters; a measuring cup containing a white powder; and Tupperware containing a white powder. Bloom told officers he knew the guns were in the van, and that he handled them several days earlier. He also admitted that the jar in the white bag was his and that he had been cooking methamphetamine since 1996 for personal use. Bloom further stated he believed he probably had some methamphetamine in his system on the day of the accident and smoked two bowls of marijuana at noon the day before.
Bloom pled guilty to the earlier recited offenses. In return, the State agreed to dismiss charges for: possession of a precursor of a controlled substance while in the possession of an offensive weapon in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(4)(b) and 124.401(1)(f) (Count II); being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Iowa Code section 724.26 (Count IV); leaving the scene of an accident in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.261(1) and 321.261(3) (Counts VII and VIII); and driving while under suspension in violation of Iowa Code section 321.218 (Count IX). The State further amended Count I from manufacturing more than five grams of methamphetamine while in possession of a firearm, to manufacturing less than five grams of methamphetamine as an habitual offender; and amended Count III to charge Bloom with possession of an offensive weapon as an habitual offender.
The court accepted Bloom's guilty pleas and sentenced him to four consecutive indeterminate fifteen-year prison sentences, with each carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of three years. The court further suspended Bloom's fines, ordered him to pay $150,000 in restitution to the victim's estate, and revoked his license for 180 days on Count I. Bloom appeals.
On appeal Bloom raises the following issues for review:
I. THE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO PLEAD GUILTY TO MANUFACTURING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, AND IN FAILING TO FILE A MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE REASONS FOR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The gist of Bloom's challenge to the validity of his guilty plea to manufacturing a controlled substance is stated in his brief as follows:
Defendant contends that his plea to manufacturing a controlled substance was not knowing and voluntary as the trial information and the trial court informed him that the elements of his offense were the elements which would support a conspiracy conviction, not manufacturing. Furthermore, no records are contained in the minutes or in the court file which identify any substance which was actually manufactured.
Generally, we review a claim of error in a guilty plea proceeding for legal error. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. However, "when we consider a challenge to a guilty plea proceeding involving constitutional safeguards, we make an independent evaluation of the circumstances as shown by the entire record, which we review de novo." State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Iowa 1997) (citation omitted). We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 820 (Iowa 1999).
We will not ordinarily consider a challenge to the validity of a defendant's guilty plea unless error is preserved for appellate review by filing a motion in arrest of judgment. State v. Brooks, 555 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1996). This omission will not bar such a challenge if the failure to file the required motion in arrest of judgment resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. Ordinarily, we preserve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal for postconviction proceedings to allow for full development of the facts surrounding counsel's conduct. State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 833 (Iowa 1997). However, we will resolve ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal when the record is adequate to decide the issue. State v. Arne, 579 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Iowa 1998). "Preserving ineffective assistance of counsel claims that can be resolved on direct appeal wastes time and resources." State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 616 (Iowa 2004). We find the record adequate to address the issue on direct appeal.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Bloom has the burden to prove: (1) counsel failed in an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 at 142; State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999). In proving the first element, Bloom faces a strong presumption the performance of counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995). We will not second guess reasonable trial strategy. State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995). The second element is satisfied if a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Davis v. State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). Resolution of these issues requires us to assess the prospective merits of Bloom's challenge to the validity of his guilty plea.
A trial court shall not accept a defendant's guilty plea without first determining that the defendant's plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b). To ensure that a plea is made in accordance with this rule, the court must personally address the defendant to determine if the defendant understands the nature of the charges against him. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d at 195.
Bloom, citing the trial court's erroneous reference during the plea colloquy to conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance, contends he was misinformed concerning the required elements of proof for manufacturing less than five grams of methamphetamine. He states, "Had [he] understood the nature of the offense, based upon the lack of factual basis to support the conviction, he would not have pled guilty to the charge." We summarily reject Bloom's conclusory claim because it is facially insufficient to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty absent the trial court's mistaken reference to conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance. He cannot therefore establish the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 2002); see also Greene, 592 N.W.2d at 29.
A separate showing of prejudice, however, is not required when an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on a lack of a factual basis supporting a guilty plea. Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 579. "Where a factual basis for a charge does not exist, and trial counsel allows the defendant to plead guilty anyway, counsel has failed to perform an essential duty. Prejudice in such a case is inherent." State v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted).
In deciding whether there is a factual basis supporting a guilty plea, we consider the entire record before the trial court at the plea proceeding, including the defendant's statements, facts related by the prosecutor, the minutes of testimony, and the presentence report. Id. This record must disclose facts to satisfy the elements of the crime. State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001). The court "must only be satisfied that the facts support the crime, `not necessarily that the defendant is guilty.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Iowa Code section 124.401(1) states:
[I]t us unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance — or to act with, enter into a common scheme or design with, or conspire with one or more other persons to manufacture, deliver, or possess with the intent to deliver a controlled substance.
Manufacturing has been defined as "the production, preparation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance," and requires the actual production of the illegal material. State v. Corsi, 686 N.W.2d 215, 224 (Iowa 2004); see also Iowa Code 124.401(1)(c)(6) (requiring any quantity or detectable amount of methamphetamine). Bloom contends the State failed to establish that any methamphetamine was actually produced to support the factual basis for his guilty plea.
As noted earlier, officers found a white plastic bag containing a whitish brown substance, a jar appearing to contain more than five grams of methamphetamine, and a jar containing used coffee filters and sludge in the van Bloom was driving. Moreover, Bloom told officers that he probably had methamphetamine in his system on the day of the accident, he had been cooking methamphetamine since 1996, and admitted that the jar in the white bag was his. Contrary to Bloom's claims, these facts support his guilty plea to manufacturing less than five grams of methamphetamine as an habitual offender. Counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment. See Brooks, 555 N.W.2d at 448 (counsel had no duty to object where factual basis found within the record).
III. Consecutive Sentences
Bloom also claims the court gave insufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences in this case. We review sentencing challenges for errors at law. State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 815 (Iowa 2003). "A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors." Id. (citation omitted).
Under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)( d), a trial court must state on the record its reasons for selecting a particular sentence. State v. Oliver, 588 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 1998). A court must also give reasons for its decision to impose consecutive sentences. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). The reasons for imposing consecutive sentences may be apparent as part of an overall sentencing plan described in the sentencing colloquy. See State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). A statement may be sufficient, even if terse and succinct, as long as the brevity of the court's statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court's sentencing decision. Id.; State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Immediately before announcing Bloom's sentences, which included consecutive prison terms, the court stated:
Now, this Court has an obligation to look at all of the information available to it in determining a sentence. As I indicated, I've looked at the age of the defendant. I've reviewed his prior record of probations and imprisonments. He obviously has been unemployed since this incident, and has sporadic employment in the past, due in part perhaps because of his prior imprisonments. I've reviewed his family circumstances. I've reviewed the nature of the offenses committed and the harm to victims.
There was a weapon in the vehicle, which I've taken into account. I've taken into account the financial circumstances of the defendant. We have to think in terms of rehabilitation for the defendant and his potential for rehabilitation. Also the necessity of protecting the community from further offenses by this defendant is also a significant factor.
Having taken that into account, all of those various factors, and trying to quantify the harm done to the victims of this crime and the extended family, I find it's impossible to quantify that harm. There is no yardstick to measure the damage this young man's done.
We find the court's thorough review and recitation of the factors it considered undoubtedly shows the "court ordered [Bloom] to serve his sentences consecutively as part of an overall sentencing plan. . . ." See Johnson, 445 N.W.2d at 343. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.