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State v. Blanton

Court of Appeals of Minnesota
May 10, 2022
No. A21-0613 (Minn. Ct. App. May. 10, 2022)

Opinion

A21-0613

05-10-2022

State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Derrick Dewayne Blanton, Appellant.


Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-19-20478

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary, Judge. [*]

ORDER OPINION

Jeanne M. Cochran Judge

BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:

1. In this appeal from his conviction of first-degree heat-of-passion (HOP) manslaughter under Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1) (2018), appellant Derrick Blanton argues that his conviction must be reversed because the district court's plainly erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find him guilty of an intentional crime for an unintentional killing. The state concedes that the district court's jury instruction was plainly erroneous and that the appropriate remedy is reversal and a remand for a new trial. Based on our independent review under the applicable law, we agree. 1

Because we agree that the district court's jury instruction was plainly erroneous and that Blanton is entitled to a new trial, we do not address the issues that Blanton raises in the alternative.

2. Respondent State of Minnesota charged Blanton with second-degree intentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2018) (count one), and second-degree unintentional murder, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2018) (count two) in connection with the death of I.S. The complaint alleged that Blanton admitted to shooting I.S. several times after a physical altercation with him.

3. The case proceeded to a jury trial, at the end of which the defense requested a jury instruction on HOP manslaughter as an included offense. The district court crafted jury instructions that added HOP manslaughter language to the definition section of each count and incorporated as an element of both murder counts that the defendant did not act in the heat of passion. The parties approved the jury instructions for both counts.

4. To instruct the jury on count one, the district court stated the definition of second-degree intentional murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1)-"a person intentionally causing the death of another person, but without premeditation"-and then defined first-degree HOP manslaughter as follows: "[A] person intentionally causing the death of another person while acting in the heat of passion is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree rather than murder." (Emphasis added.) The district court then listed the elements of second-degree intentional murder.

5. To instruct the jury on count two, the district court stated the definition of second-degree felony murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1)-"causing the death of another person without intent to cause the death of any person while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense"-and then again defined first-degree HOP manslaughter. But, when defining first-degree HOP manslaughter for count two, the 2 district court omitted the word "intentionally." The district court defined first-degree HOP manslaughter as follows: "[A] person causing the death of another person while acting in the heat of passion is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree rather than murder." (Emphasis added.) The district court then listed the elements of second-degree felony murder: (1) the death of I.S.; (2) the defendant caused the death; (3) at the time of causing the death, the defendant was committing or attempting to commit second-degree assault; (4) the defendant did not act in the heat of passion; and (5) the defendant's act took place in the relevant jurisdiction. The district court emphasized that "[i]t is not necessary for the State to prove the Defendant had an intent to kill [I.S.], but it must prove Defendant committed or attempted to commit the underlying felony"-second-degree assault. The district court also listed the elements of second-degree assault.

6. Though initially unable to reach a unanimous decision, the jury ultimately found Blanton "not guilty" on count one and "not guilty of murder in the second degree, but it found him guilty of the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree" on count two.

7. During trial, Blanton did not object to the jury instructions for first-degree HOP manslaughter for count two-the crime of which he was convicted. Because Blanton did not object at trial but challenges the instructions on appeal, we review the district court's jury instructions for plain error. State v. Hayes, 831 N.W.2d 546, 555 (Minn. 2013). An error is plain if it "contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct." Id. (quotation omitted). A defendant may obtain "review and relief from plain errors affecting 3 substantial rights if those errors had the effect of depriving the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2002).

8. District courts have "considerable latitude" in selecting jury instruction language, but "jury instructions must fairly and adequately explain the law of the case and not materially misstate the law." State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Minn. 2016). We review jury instructions as a whole to determine if they fairly and adequately explain the law. Id. A district court commits plain error if it fails to properly instruct the jury on all the elements of a charged offense. Id.

9. Here, considering the jury instructions as a whole, the district court did not properly instruct the jury and materially misstated the law with regard to first-degree HOP manslaughter during the instruction on count two. The legislature has provided that a person is guilty of first-degree HOP manslaughter when they "intentionally cause[] the death of another person in the heat of passion." Minn. Stat. § 609.20(1) (emphasis added). But, when instructing the jury on count two, the district court defined first-degree manslaughter as "causing the death of another person while acting in the heat of passion," omitting the word "intentionally." By omitting the intent element, the district court materially misstated the law. And, because the instruction may have led the jury to find Blanton guilty of first-degree manslaughter without finding the necessary element of intent, we conclude that the error was plain. See, e.g., State v. Watkins, 840 N.W.2d 21, 27-28 (Minn. 2013) (holding that an unobjected-to jury instruction that omitted the "knowingly" element of the charged offense constituted plain error). 4

10. The plainly erroneous instruction given at Blanton's trial substantially affected Blanton's rights. An erroneous jury instruction affects an appellant's substantial rights if there is "a reasonable likelihood" that giving the instruction significantly affected the jury's verdict. State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 143 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). Omitting an element of a crime from jury instructions "has a significant effect on the verdict when the defendant submits evidence that tends to negate that element, and there is a reasonable likelihood that a properly instructed jury could have accepted the defendant's version of events." State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Minn.App. 2012) (quotation omitted). In deciding whether an omission likely affected a jury's verdict, we consider all relevant factors, including: (1) whether the defendant "contested the omitted element[] at trial and submitted evidence to support a contrary finding"; (2) whether the state presented "overwhelming evidence" to prove that element; and (3) whether the jury's other verdicts "encompassed a finding" on the omitted element. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 800.

11. Blanton argues that several factors support the conclusion that the erroneous instruction here affected the jury's verdict and his substantial rights. First, the jury returned no other verdict that included a finding that Blanton committed an intentional killing, and the jury actually acquitted him of intentional murder on count one. Second, the fact that the jury initially deadlocked and ultimately acquitted Blanton on count one "refutes any suggestion that the state's evidence of an intentional killing was so overwhelming that the jury would have found Blanton committed an intentional killing had it been properly instructed." Finally, as Blanton argues, the two verdicts together establish that "the jury 5 determined [that] Blanton did not act with the intent to kill and instead convicted Blanton of HOP manslaughter because [of] the erroneous instruction."

12. We agree with Blanton that the erroneous jury instruction significantly affected the verdict. By acquitting Blanton of intentional murder on count one (and the included intentional offense of HOP manslaughter) but finding him guilty of first-degree HOP manslaughter as an included offense of unintentional felony murder on count two, the jury must have found Blanton guilty of first-degree HOP manslaughter for committing an unintentional killing. Thus, there is more than a "reasonable likelihood" that the erroneous jury instruction affected the jury's verdict. On that basis, we conclude that the district court's erroneous jury instruction on count two affected Blanton's substantial rights.

13. Next, we consider whether reversal is required to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. See Hayes, 831 N.W.2d at 555. The fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings are called into question by erroneous jury instructions and a verdict based on those instructions when the jury may not have considered a contested element of the charged offense. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d at 163. That standard is met in this case because, as explained above, the jury may not have considered the intent element of first-degree HOP manslaughter. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Blanton's conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded. 6

2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 7

[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.


Summaries of

State v. Blanton

Court of Appeals of Minnesota
May 10, 2022
No. A21-0613 (Minn. Ct. App. May. 10, 2022)
Case details for

State v. Blanton

Case Details

Full title:State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Derrick Dewayne Blanton, Appellant.

Court:Court of Appeals of Minnesota

Date published: May 10, 2022

Citations

No. A21-0613 (Minn. Ct. App. May. 10, 2022)