Opinion
No. 56785-3-I.
June 12, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-1-12080-9, Brian D. Gain, J., entered August 2, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Washington Appellate Project, Attorney at Law, 1511 Third Avenue, Suite 701, Seattle, WA 98101.
Jason Brett Saunders, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave Ste 701, Seattle, WA 98101-3635.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Prosecuting Atty King County, King Co Pros/App Unit Supervisor, W554 King County Courthouse, 516 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 98104.
Charles K II Sergis, King County Prosecutors Office, 516 3rd Ave, Seattle, WA 98104-2390.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Becker, J., concurred in by Baker and Dwyer, JJ.
When ordering restitution for medical costs incurred by a crime victim, a trial court need not find that the specific costs incurred were foreseeable by the defendant. In this case, the victim's hospital treatment for a broken ankle was the direct result of the assault committed by the appellant. Though the victim was somewhat uncooperative with her treatment, the causal link between Bizzell's conduct and the cost of the hospital treatment was adequately shown. The order of restitution is affirmed.
Jimmy Bizzell pled guilty to one count of second degree assault and one count of third degree rape. As part of the plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution in full to his victims in an amount to be determined. At the restitution hearing on August 2, 2005, the prosecutor asked for restitution to the Department of Social and Health Services for medical costs incurred by one of the victims, whose ankle had been broken in the course of Bizzell's assault. The total amount requested included some $40,000 for medical and hospital bills and $13,000 for a stay in a nursing care facility.
Bizzell accepted responsibility for the costs of surgery and treatment of the ankle injury. He denied responsibility for the hospital and medical costs incurred after the date of the surgery. He objected that the State had not proven that this treatment was necessary and causally related to the assault. Based on his review of her medical records, he claimed that the further treatment she received during the several days she remained in the hospital was the result of her own insistence on trying to put weight on her ankle despite doctor's orders not to do so.
The trial court denied restitution for the nursing home stay because the evidence showed that the Department had placed her in the nursing home only because she would have otherwise been homeless. But the court ordered restitution for the entire cost of the victim's treatment at the hospital, approximately $40,000. Bizzell appeals from this order.
The imposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 679, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). Restitution is governed by statute and is generally required when an offense causes personal injury. RCW 9.9A.753(5). The statute directs the court to base its restitution order on `actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons', not on pain and suffering or other intangible losses. RCW 9.94A.753(3). There must be a causal relationship between the crime and the damage. State v. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d 560, 565,115 P.3d 274 (2005).
Bizzell asserts that the victim, after receiving medical care for injuries caused by the assault, `caused further injury to her ankle due to her noncompliance with hospital orders so that she could find illegal narcotics and satisfy her addiction.' The record does not support this assertion. The medical records describe the victim as affected by drug and alcohol abuse; as mentally and physically ill; and as experiencing severe pain. They state that toward the end of her hospital stay she was `impulsive, agitated, angry and not cooperating. . . . found three times up out of bed ambulating.' They reflect that upon discharge she was recommended for a hard cast because of her noncompliance with instructions not to put weight on the ankle. It is also undisputed that she tested positive for cocaine when she checked into the hospital. But the record does not support Bizzell's argument that the victim obtained illegal drugs by walking around or that she exacerbated her injuries by refusing to comply with the instructions of her medical providers.
Brief of Appellant at 14.
Exhibit 1.
Not only is Bizzell's argument factually unsupported, it is also based on an incorrect understanding of the law of restitution. Citing a collection of federal tort cases and outdated Court of Appeals cases involving property damage, he argues that restitution damages must be foreseeable by the defendant and that intervening causes will relieve a defendant of liability for damage even though it would not have occurred but for his criminal conduct. Our courts have generally resisted similar attempts to import common law negligence principles into what is a wholly statutory proceeding.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the statute is clear and `cannot be read to allow an individual to avoid paying restitution on the basis that he or she did not foresee the harmful consequences of his or her conduct.' State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d 675, 680, 974 P.2d 828 (1999). The facts in Enstone are similar to those in the present case. Defendant Enstone pled guilty to second degree assault for pushing a woman out of his front door and down the cement stairs. The woman, who was intoxicated, landed on her head. Enstone picked her up, threw her down again, and kicked her until she was unconscious. The trial court ordered him to pay restitution for her medical treatment. On appeal, Enstone contended that restitution is inappropriate where the specific injuries suffered were not a foreseeable consequence of the criminal conduct. Affirming, the Court stated that a trial court `need find only that a victim's injuries were casually connected to a defendant's crime before ordering a defendant to pay restitution for the expenses which resulted. Foreseeability is not an element'. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d at 682.
The Court also commented that in any event, it was `difficult to accept' the argument that the victim's injuries were not a foreseeable consequence of the criminal conduct. While the victim's severe intoxication `may have contributed to her inability to repel the assault one takes their victim as they find them.' Enstone, 137 Wn.2d at 682. The same is true in this case. The victim's substance abuse does not make her unworthy of restitution for actual damages caused by Bizzell's criminal assault.
As to the concept of an intervening act that will break the causal chain, Bizzell relies on State v. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d 560, 115 P.3d 274 (2005). In that case, after two juveniles jumped from a stolen car, the driver crashed into a truck and a storefront. The juveniles who jumped, along with the driver and a passenger who remained in the car, were ordered to pay restitution for damages due to the crash. On appeal the juveniles challenged the order, arguing that the damages were not causally linked to their conduct because they were no longer riding in the car when the damage occurred. Affirming, our Supreme Court applied a `but for' test to determine the causal link between the crime and the property damage. The Court mentioned in dicta that the causal link may be broken under some circumstances:
Without deciding whether principles of proximate cause or the superseding cause apply in the criminal restitution context, we note that an intervening act must be unforeseeable in order for it to break the causal chain. While there might be some set of factual circumstances which would break the causal chain, we cannot say that it was unforeseeable that a person guilty of taking a motor vehicle would steal personal property in the vehicle, attempt to elude the police, or cause an accident.
State v. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d at 566 (citations omitted). This is consistent with Enstone:
Although we recognize that there may be instances where the injury that a crime victim suffers is so remotely connected to the crime that it does not justify the imposition of restitution, we observe that the statute accords discretion to the trial court to refuse to order restitution if it concludes that `extraordinary circumstances exist which make restitution inapropriate.' RCW 9.94A.142(2).
State v. Enstone, 137 Wn.2d at 682.
Here, Bizzell has not demonstrated that the victim's somewhat uncooperative attitude toward her medical treatment was enough to break the causal chain. But for Bizzell's criminal conduct, the victim would not have been in the hospital. The costs she incurred by staying there were directly connected to the crime. There was no finding of extraordinary circumstances that make restitution inappropriate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution for the medical care provided during the entire hospital stay.
Affirmed.
DWYER and BAKER, JJ., concur.