Opinion
Cr. A. No. 1412006167
08-31-2015
STATE OF DELAWARE v. SONIA L. BEATTIE, Defendant.
Christopher Marques, Esquire Deputy Attorney General 820 North French Street, 7th Floor Wilmington, DE 19801 Alicea A. Brown, Esquire Assistant Public Defender 900 N. King Street, 2nd Floor Wilmington, DE 19801 Counsel for Defendant
Christopher Marques, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General
820 North French Street, 7th Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801 Alicea A. Brown, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
900 N. King Street, 2nd Floor
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Defendant DECISION ON STATE'S MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
This matter comes before the Court on the State's Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence imposed upon Defendant Sonia L. Beattie ("Defendant"), pursuant to Court of Common Pleas Criminal Rule 35(a). This is the Court's opinion on the relief sought by the State.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On December 11, 2014, Defendant was arrested and charged with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol ("DUI"), in violation of 21 Del. C. § 4177(a), Failure to have a License in Possession, in violation of 21 Del. C. § 2721(b), and Failure to have Insurance Identification in Possession, in violation of 21 Del. C. § 2118(p)(1). On February 3, 2015, Defendant was arraigned. She pled not guilty, waived her right to jury trial, and was scheduled for a DUI Case Review on February 25, 2015.
At the DUI Case Review, the State extended a plea agreement to Defendant, which proposed that she plead guilty to DUI as a first offender. In return, the State agreed to drop the remaining charges. Defendant agreed to the plea, and it was entered and accepted by the Court.
See State's Ex. A.
Almost immediately after entering the plea agreement, the State discovered that Defendant had two prior alcohol-related convictions in the State of Pennsylvania, and as such may be subject to the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by 21 Del. C. §4177(d)(2) if the conviction in Pennsylvania was under a statute similar to Delaware. Accordingly, On February 27, 2015 the State filed the instant motion alleging that it has no prosecutorial discretion to charge Defendant as a first offender, and requesting that the illegal sentence be corrected.
See State's Ex. B. Defendant's prior DUIs occurred on February 23, 2013 and February 27, 2014. Both offenses were resolved with guilty pleas entered on November 19, 2014. Although the instant DUI conviction constitutes Defendant's third DUI conviction, in an attempt to exercise prosecutorial discretion, the State seeks to sentence her as a second offender.
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS
The State argues that as illustrated in the Court's ruling in State v. Hatcher , it does not have prosecutorial discretion to offer a plea to a third-time DUI offender as a first or second offender, and that the interests of justice require the Court to correct the illegal sentence.
2010 WL 5551306 (Del. Com. Pl. Dec. 20, 2010).
In her response to the motion, Defendant contends that the State's reliance upon Hatcher is misplaced, as Hatcher addresses whether the State can prosecute a DUI as a misdemeanor when it is actually a felony. Defendant argues that Hatcher merely addresses the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, and that the main issue of this case centers upon the State's authority to offer a plea in a DUI prosecution. Defendant further argues that the State — if seeking an enhanced sentence — has the burden of offering evidence of a prior DUI conviction at the time of sentencing before the Court is obligated to impose the enhanced sentence. Here, Defendant argues that the State made no such showing, and pursuant to State v. Stewart , the Court is not required to impose the enhanced sentence.
2004 WL 1965986 (Del. Super. Aug. 31, 2004).
Finally, Defendant contends that a correction of the sentence triggers double jeopardy concerns. Specifically, Defendant argues that the plea agreement, when accepted by the Court, concluded the prosecution of the instant offense. Defendant posits that the legislature, in drafting and passing 11 Del. C. § 207(3) , Delaware's double jeopardy statute, took care to exclude from the statute judgments or verdicts that have been reversed, vacated, or set aside; yet no such provision was made for plea agreements once accepted by the Court. Accordingly, Defendant asserts that the Court should deny the State's motion.
11 Del. C. § 207(3) provides:
When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory provisions and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(3) The former prosecution resulted in a conviction. There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction which has not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty which has not been set aside and which is capable of supporting a judgment or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court.
See 11 Del. C. § 207.
In the State's reply to Defendant's response to the motion, the State counters that Defendant's analysis of Hatcher ignores the underlying reasoning of the case. The State contends that in Hatcher, the Court was required to examine what was later discovered to be a third DUI offense, when it was presented as a second offense at trial. The State continues that although Hatcher was ultimately denied on jurisdictional grounds, the underlying reasoning "applies with equal vigor" to the Court's instant review of a third DUI offense charged as a first offense. Additionally, the State argues that it is not barred by double jeopardy when a plea is withdrawn. According to Palmer v. State , "when a defendant repudiates a plea bargain, there is no double jeopardy bar 'to restoring the relationship between Defendant and State as it existed prior to the defunct bargain.'"
On this point, the State concedes that the February 25, 2015 plea agreement was not knowing and intelligent, and expects a plea withdrawal.
703 A.2d 644 (Del. 1997) (TABLE).
Id. (internal citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Rule 35(a) permits the Court of Common Pleas to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." The "narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence." "A proceeding under Rule 35 presupposes a valid conviction." Relief under Rule 35(a) is available "when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits, [or] violates the Double Jeopardy Clause." A sentence is also unlawful if it "is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize."
CCP Crim. R. 35(a).
Hill v. U.S., 368 U.S. 424, 430, (1962).
Whitfield v. U.S., 401 F.2d 480, 483 (9th Cir.1968).
U. S. v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Cir. 1992).
U.S. v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997).
As the Court noted in State v. Hatcher:
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas is defined by statute. The Court's subject matter jurisdiction over criminal matters is expressly limited to misdemeanors and violations in which jurisdiction is not vested exclusively in another court... Therefore, the Court of Common Pleas has subject matter jurisdiction over first and second offense DUI charges. [However,] [t]he Court of Common Pleas does not have subject matter jurisdiction over third and subsequent offense DUI charges. Section 4177(d)(12) specifically states that "[t]he Court of Common pleas ... shall not have jurisdiction over...convictions which must be sentenced as a felony.
Hatcher, 2010 WL 5551306, at * 4 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover, while Delaware courts have long recognized that the decision whether or not to prosecute and what charge to file or bring rests entirely in the AG's discretion, the Court also acknowledges that "the General Assembly has limited the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General with respect to DUI offenses."
Id. at *4 (citing U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4513029, at *5 (Del. Super. Nov. 1, 2010).
Id. (citing 21 Del. C. § 4177(d)(9)). --------
The critical issue in these proceedings is that if the State is to rely upon prior convictions, those convictions must be under statutes statutorily similar to those of the State of Delaware. Here, the State merely refers to uncertified criminal dockets with no underlying analysis. A review of the docket refers to convictions for DUI or Controlled Substance on November 19, 2014 where fines and three (3) days was imposed in County Prison. Secondly, the State refers to a second conviction on August 5, 2014 for the offense of DUI or Control Substance where only fines were imposed. Thirdly, the State refers to a conviction DUI or Control Substance August 5, 2014 where County Prison of 3 days to 6 months was imposed. The statute charged is similar for November 19, 2014 and the first August 5, 2014 conviction, but not for the second August 5, 2014 conviction.
The State in offering the plea could have reasonably concluded that the statutes in Pennsylvania are not statutorily similar to that of Delaware and offered the plea. The Prosecutor has the authority to determine the charge that a a plea is offered and absent any basis for impropriety, the Court should not interfere. The plea on its face is within the State's discretion and the argument in the motion does not support a basis for the Court to invalidate the plea.
Accordingly, the motion is Denied.
SO ORDERED
/s/_________
Alex J. Smalls,
Chief Judge Beattie-OP (LR) Aug 2015