Opinion
C.A. No. N10A-04-004 PLA.
Submitted: August 2, 2010.
Decided: November 1, 2010.
ON APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.
REVERSED.
Paul R. Wallace, Esquire, and Susan Dwyer Riley, Esquire, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Wilmington, DE, Attorneys for Petitioner-Below/Appellant.
Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Respondent-Below/Appellee.
I. Introduction
In this appeal, the State of Delaware challenges the sua sponte decision of the Court of Common Pleas to excuse Appellee Valerie I. Anderson ("Anderson") from habitual driving offender status shortly after it had declared that she met the qualifying criteria. The lower court acted in an attempt to remedy a perceived inequity in the State's conduct of habitual offender proceedings over the course of a day's hearing calendar. Upon review of the record and applicable law, the Court finds that this well-intentioned demonstration of sympathy constituted an abuse of discretion.
The State initially filed an habitual driving offender petition against Anderson pursuant to Chapter 28 of Title 21 of the Delaware Code on August 10, 2009, after she had accumulated three qualifying convictions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court of Common Pleas declared Anderson an habitual offender and revoked her driver's license for a period of five years. Several hours after entering this order, the Court of Common Pleas revisited the case. Following a review of other habitual driving offender petitions that were continued or withdrawn on the same date, the Court of Common Pleas found that the State's exercise of prosecutorial judgment had been inconsistent and issued an order vacating its earlier judgment declaring Anderson an habitual offender. The State filed a motion requesting that the Court of Common Pleas vacate this order and reinstate its declaration of Anderson as an habitual offender. This motion was denied by opinion dated February 5, 2010. The State subsequently appealed to this Court.
The State contends that the Court of Common Pleas improperly initiated its own review of the enforcement decisions of the Office of the Attorney General and had no legitimate basis to vacate its original order declaring Anderson an habitual offender. In response, Anderson argues that the Court of Common Pleas properly exercised its inherent and statutory authority in vacating her habitual offender status in the interests of fairness, and that the State made misrepresentations during September 25, 2009 revocation hearings that tainted the initial declaration.
After reviewing the record, this Court agrees with the State that the Court of Common Pleas erred in vacating its declaration of Anderson's habitual offender status. Accordingly, for the reasons explained herein, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas must be REVERSED and the judgment declaring Anderson an habitual offender reinstated.
II. Factual and Procedural Background A. First Habitual Driving Offender Petition
On October 27 2007, Anderson appeared in the Court of Common Pleas to contest an habitual driving offender petition. Although the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) had already certified her driving record to the Attorney General's office as eligible for habitual offender status on two previous occasions, this was the first time that the State had followed up on the DMV's certifications by filing a petition against her. The petition listed three qualifying offenses: Driving Under the Influence (convicted February 16, 2005); Failure to Reinstate (convicted February 16, 2005); and Driving While Suspended (convicted August 28, 2006).
When Anderson appeared pro se at the hearing, the Court of Common Please granted a four-month continuance to permit her to obtain counsel. The hearing was thus postponed until February 29, 2008. This was not unusual, as the State routinely offers four-month continuances and six-month continuances to respondents. A four-month continuance is usually granted when a respondent is unrepresented and wishes to seek counsel. A six-month continuance, commonly referred to as a "standard continuance," may be offered to give a first-time respondent the opportunity to demonstrate good behavior in exchange for withdrawal of the petition at the rescheduled hearing date.
At Anderson's rescheduled hearing on February 29, 2008, the State elected to withdraw the petition against her. Anderson later applied to have her driver's license reinstated. Upon paying $200.00 to the DMV, Anderson received a valid license in April 2009.
The docket reflects that Anderson was present at this hearing, and that "after review of [the] petition and record," a deputy attorney general withdrew the petition. State v. Anderson, C.A. No. U406-12-156 (Del. Com. Pl. Feb. 29, 2008).
B. Second Habitual Driving Offender Petition
On August 10, 2009, a second habitual offender petition was filed against Anderson in response to a fourth certification by the DMV. In its petition, the State cited the Driving While Suspended conviction listed in the prior petition and two more recent convictions for Driving Without a Valid License (convicted February 27, 2008) and Failure to Reinstate (convicted May 26, 2009).Anderson appeared in the Court of Common Pleas on September 25, 2009, to address the August 2009 petition. During the hearing, Anderson did not dispute that the three convictions in the petition qualified her as an habitual offender under 21 Del. C. § 2802. While Anderson thus did not contest the validity of the petition, she mentioned that she had been to court before regarding an habitual offender petition. When the Court of Common Pleas asked the Deputy Attorney General (DAG) attending that day's calendar whether the first habitual offender petition filed against Anderson had been withdrawn with or without prejudice, the DAG responded, "I can only assume, because I have no particular knowledge of this case, that the State looked at it and said we are not going to proceed with it because of the previous convictions. We decided to exercise our discretion."
From the time she was convicted of her third qualifying offense in May until the September 2009 revocation hearing, Anderson also committed three additional moving violations, and convictions on two of those offenses were entered prior to the hearing. On June 25, 2009, she was cited for driving at an unreasonable speed (convicted October 21); on July 5, she was cited for not stopping at a signal lamp (convicted August 17); and on August 23, she was cited for exceeding the posted speed (convicted on October 21).
State v. Anderson, C.A. No. CPU4-09-006133, at 7 (Del. Com. Pl. Sept. 25, 2010) (TRANSCRIPT).
The Court of Common Pleas explained to Anderson that it was sympathetic to her desire to keep her license in order to drive to work and provide transportation for her grandchildren, but that "there is no discretion" in an habitual offender proceeding, and that "[i]t would be entirely inappropriate for me to act otherwise; I really don't have a choice, but to declare you [an] Habitual Offender under these circumstances." Therefore, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court below granted the State's petition and declared Anderson an habitual offender pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2807.
Id. at 9-10.
C. Vacation of Anderson's Habitual Offender Status
The Court of Common Pleas heard several other habitual offender petitions during the same calendar, including one immediately following Anderson's hearing in which the State moved to have the hearing continued for six months. After granting the continuance, the Court of Common Pleas requested a sidebar conference with the DAG, during which the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: So the lady with the three kids and a job, and the grandkids [ i.e., Anderson]; you couldn't do that for her?
DAG: No.
THE COURT: What's the difference?
DAG: Because we did it once for her.
THE COURT: Oh, you already did it once.
DAG: That's correct. The thing was submitted.
THE COURT: Got it.
During the calendar, the Court of Common Pleas accepted five requests for continuances and two withdrawals of petitions against individuals who had already been granted six-month continuances.
App. to Appellee's Answering Br. A-14-15.
At the conclusion of the habitual driving offender calendar on September 25, 2009, the Court of Common Pleas conducted its own review of the driving records of Anderson and other respondents whose hearings were continued by the State. The court declared that "based on a review of other Petitions that were continued and/or withdrawn" on the day's calendar, the prosecutorial judgment exercised by the State in Anderson's case was unfair and inconsistent. The court was troubled by the DAG's statement that Anderson could be distinguished from other respondents who were offered standard continuances, because in the court's opinion, Anderson's driving record "could not be distinguished from other persons who were offered the opportunity to continue the hearing for six (6) months to avoid new traffic charges." On this basis, the Court of Common Pleas vacated its judgment declaring Anderson an habitual offender.
State v. Anderson, C.A. No. CPU-4-09-006133, at 2 (Del. Com. Pl. Sept. 25, 2009) (ORDER).
Id.; see also State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 1006558, at *4 (Del. Com. Pl. Feb. 26, 2010).
D. State's Motion to Vacate Order Granting Relief From Judgment
On October 2, 2009, the State filed a motion requesting that the Court of Common Pleas vacate its September 25, 2009 order and reinstate its original judgment declaring Anderson an habitual offender. After briefing from both Anderson and the State, the court denied the State's motion by opinion dated February 26, 2010. The Court of Common Pleas concluded that it possessed both inherent authority and express authority under Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 60(b) to vacate its order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, and also held that the State had misrepresented factual matters before the court by stating that Anderson had been given the same opportunity for a standard continuance that was offered to other respondents on the calendar. The Court of Common Pleas concluded that the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to Anderson violated principles of justice, because "it was patently unfair for the DOJ to offer `standard' continuances to other respondents whose drivers' records were worse than Anderson's record." The State then filed the instant appeal.III. Parties' Contentions
The State appeals on the basis that the court below overstepped its bounds when it reviewed the enforcement decisions of the Office of the Attorney General and vacated the habitual offender declaration against Anderson. The State argues that when the Attorney General's Office files a proper petition seeking that a driver be declared an habitual offender, the Court of Common Pleas has discretion to review only whether the petition has been filed against the correct person and whether that person has been convicted of the listed offenses. The State further contends that absent proof of a factual error or constitutional violation, the Court of Common Pleas lacks the discretionary authority to reject a duly-filed petition.In response, Anderson argues that the Court of Common Pleas relied upon inaccurate misrepresentations by the DAG when it issued its first order, and that notions of "basic fairness" and "the proper administration of justice" support the lower court's decision to vacate the habitual offender declaration. Anderson further contends that Delaware Supreme Court precedent permits the Court of Common Pleas to suspend or modify civil penalties, including habitual driving offender penalties, if the interests of justice so require. In the alternative, Anderson argues that the State should be estopped from revoking her driver's license because she paid $200.00 to have her license reinstated and therefore detrimentally changed her position in reliance upon the State's withdrawal of the first petition filed against her.
Appellee's Answering Br. 3.
IV. Standard and Scope of Review
As an intermediate appellate court, the function of this Court in its review of appeals from the Court of Common Pleas mirrors that of the Supreme Court. As such, the Court has an obligation to correct errors of law and to review findings of fact "to determine if they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process." Questions of law receive de novo review, whereas questions of fact are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. The trial court's findings must be supported by substantial evidence, or in other words, such evidence as a "reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion." The decision to relieve a party from a final judgment or order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. An abuse of discretion arises when a court exceeds the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances or so ignores recognized rules of law or practice as to produce injustice.
See, e.g., Baker v. Connell, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 1985).
See, e.g., J.S.F. Props., LLC v. McCann, 2009 WL 1163494, at *1 (Del. Super. Apr. 30, 2009) (quoting Disabatino v. State, 808 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Del. Super. 2002)).
Id.
Trader v. Wilson, 2002 WL 499888, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 1, 2002), aff'd, 804 A.2d 1067, 2002 WL 1924649 (Del. 2002) (TABLE).
See, e.g., Battaglia v. Wilm. Sav. Fund Soc'y, 379 A.2d 1132, 1134 (Del. 1977).
Christiana Care Health Servs. v. Crist, 956 A.2d 622, 625 (Del. 2007).
V. Discussion
Upon review of the record and applicable law, this Court finds that the Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion by vacating Anderson's habitual driving offender order. The Court of Common Pleas misinterpreted the interaction between prosecutorial and judicial discretion, and its final ruling exceeded the scope of its inherent and express authority.A. Habitual Offender Petitions
In the State of Delaware, the Division of Motor Vehicles is entrusted with responsibility for monitoring driving records to identify those individuals who can be classified as "habitual offenders" pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2802. An habitual offender is an individual who has violated a requisite number of certain traffic laws within a specified period of time. Pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2803, "[t]he Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles shall certify the conviction record . . . of any person whose record brings that person within the definition of an habitual offender . . . to the Attorney General of the State." Upon receipt of such record, § 2804 directs that the Attorney General "shall forthwith file a petition against the person named therein in the Court of Common Pleas." Section 2807 sets forth the procedure to be followed in the Court of Common Pleas:
See 21 Del. C. § 2802 ("An `habitual offender' shall be any person, resident or nonresident, whose driving record, as maintained in the office of the Division of Motor Vehicles, shows that such person has accumulated convictions for separate and distinct offenses described in paragraph (1) of this section during a 5-year period or paragraph (2) of this section during a 3-year period, provided, that where more than 1 included offense shall be committed within a 24hour period, such multiple offenses shall be treated for the purposes of this chapter as 1 offense[.]").
If the Court finds that the person is the same person named in the abstract and that the person is an habitual offender, the Court shall by appropriate judgment direct that such person not drive or operate a motor vehicle on the highways of this State and to surrender to the Court all licenses or permits to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this State.
License revocation proceedings under the habitual offender statute are civil administrative actions, although their connection to the State's police powers clearly implicates issues of prosecutorial discretion. While sections 2804 and 2807 contain apparently mandatory language, both earlier case law and the events at issue here illustrate that the Office of the Attorney General has not pursued full enforcement of the habitual offender statute. In essence, Anderson's case raises the question of what role the judicial branch may take in shaping that enforcement policy.
Villa v. State, 456 A.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Del. 1983).
B. Prosecutorial Discretion
Delaware courts have long recognized broad prosecutorial discretion in both criminal and civil contexts. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts presume that prosecutors have properly discharged their official duties. In Delaware, there are two situations in which a court may find that a prosecutor has abused his or her discretion over enforcement: (1) selective prosecution, which constitutes a denial of equal protection, or (2) vindictive prosecution, which constitutes a violation of due process. Therefore, unless a respondent presents a colorable due process or equal protection claim, the Attorney General's charging decisions are not subject to judicial oversight, even if the Attorney General handles similar cases differently. So long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," the conscious exercise of selectivity in enforcement is not a constitutional violation.
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 61 n. 13 (Del. 1988).
Sandra V. Anderson v. State, 2010 WL 3103400, at *1 (Del. Super. June 3, 2010).
State v. Wharton, 1991 WL 138417, at *3 (Del. Super. June 3, 1991) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364-65 (1978)).
Delaware courts' deference in reviewing prosecutorial enforcement decisions extends to decisions regarding whom to prosecute as an habitual offender and how such prosecutions proceed. Despite concern regarding broad and unchecked prosecutorial discretion voiced in the Court of Common Pleas' opinion, prosecutors have broad discretion whether to commence legal action against a driver identified by the DMV, and "the Attorney General's charging decisions are not subject to judicial oversight" unless they violate equal protection or due process principles. In the absence of a constitutional violation, "the Court of Common Pleas cannot rely on the Attorney General's charging decisions in other cases as a basis for rejecting a proper petition."
Anderson, 2010 WL 1006558, at *5.
Sandra V. Anderson, 2010 WL 3103400, at *1.
Id. at *2. The Court of Common Pleas's position that limiting judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion is unwarranted in light of the habitual offender statute's provision for a hearing is also unfounded. The habitual offender statute expressly limits judicial discretion to whether "the person appearing is the individual named in the abstract" and whether the "person is an habitual offender." 21 Del. C. § 2807. at the hearing, the Court may inquire only whether the person appearing is the individual named in the abstract, and whether that person has been convicted of the offenses listed in the petition. State v. Kamalski, 429 A.2d 1315, 1317 (Del. Super. 1981); Villa, 456 A.2d at 1231 ("Upon a hearing, the court is limited to an inquiry whether the person cited to appear is the one named in the conviction record and that he was actually convicted of the offenses listed."). It is well established that if the Court answers these questions in the affirmative, it has no choice but to enter judgment against the respondent. State v. Smoke, 1995 WL 656844, at *2 (Del. Super. Oct. 13, 1995); Kamalski, 429 A.2d at 1317; Villa, 456 A.2d at 1231.
The rationale for this policy is two-fold. First, the judiciary defers to executive officers' enforcement decisions based in part upon "an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and the courts." The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review," as factors such as "the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." Second, the judicial branch should be reluctant under the separation of powers doctrine to infringe upon or impair a core executive constitutional function. As the Supreme Court has observed, the "presumption that a prosecutor has legitimate grounds for the action he takes is one we do not lightly discard, given our position that judicial intrusion into executive discretion . . . should be minimal." Simply put, broad prosecutorial discretion does not necessitate equally extensive judicial oversight and review.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263 (2006).
In the instant case, the State properly exercised its prosecutorial discretion in the habitual offender enforcement actions that took place on September 25, 2009. Unless a respondent raises an equal protection or due process claim, decisions of the Attorney General Office's with regard to instituting and withdrawing valid habitual offender petitions are not subject to judicial oversight. This is true even if other cases are handled differently; the Attorney General is not obliged to treat similarly situated respondents alike.
Sandra V. Anderson, 2010 WL 3103400, at *1.
Id.
See Ward v. State, 414 A.2d 499, 500 (Del. 1980).
As neither the Court of Common Pleas' order nor Anderson's briefing argue that the DAG's actions constituted discrimination on the basis of a constitutionally impermissible factor (such as race, age, or gender), this Court can find nothing in the record that would substantiate an equal protection claim. The record is similarly devoid of any basis for the Court to infer that Anderson seeks to raise a vindictive prosecution claim.
Even if the State offered no explanation for allegedly "singling out" Anderson, this omission would not constitute an equal protection violation under Delaware law. Id. at 500.
Anderson's due process rights were protected by the hearing process itself. A hearing pursuant to Chapter 28 satisfies the requirement of procedural due process as long as the Department of Justice presents evidence that the respondent is the driver identified in the DMV's abstract and that the qualifying convictions have been entered. Anderson had a proper Chapter 28 hearing, and has not contested either of these factual predicates. Although the Court of Common Pleas implied during the hearing calendar that the State's conduct was particularly questionable because Anderson had "three kids and a job, and the grandkids," which would make revocation of her driving privileges a hardship, due process does not require a court to consider the effect of revocation on a respondent's livelihood. Consequently, the State's use of prosecutorial discretion in Anderson's case and throughout the September 25, 2009 habitual offender calendar did not violate Anderson's equal protection or due process rights. The Court of Common Pleas thus erred in concluding that the State exercised its prosecutorial discretion in a manner that infringed Anderson's rights.
Kamalski, 429 A.2d at 1319.
Id. at 1318.
C. Judicial Discretion
Having concluded that the DAG did not act improperly in proceeding with the petition against Anderson, this Court now turns to the propriety of the Court of Common Pleas' decision to vacate its order declaring Anderson an habitual offender under Section 2802 of the Delaware Code. Although Delaware courts have considerable express and inherent authority to vacate final orders or judgments, this discretion is not without limit. In the instant case, the Court of Common Pleas abused its discretion by vacating its prior judgment declaring Anderson an habitual offender.
1. Inherent Authority
Unless the General Assembly provides otherwise, Delaware courts have inherent authority to suspend penalties if the interest of justice so requires. While this power has traditionally been recognized in criminal matters, the Delaware Supreme Court has also held that a trial judge possesses inherent discretionary authority to suspend a civil penalty if such action is required to accomplish justice for the parties and public. However, the Court's exercise of this authority should be consistent with the public policy behind the statutory scheme.
See e.g., 11 Del. C. § 4205(d), 16 Del. C. § 4751(d), 21 Del. C. § 4177(d).
See DNREC v. Front Street Props., 808 A.2d 1204, 2002 WL 31432384 (Del. 2002) (TABLE).
Id. at *2.
For example, in DNREC v. Front Street Properties, the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control sought damages for an environmental violation under 7 Del. C. § 7411(e), which provides that "any person who violates a provision of this chapter . . . shall be liable for a civil penalty or not less than $1000, nor more than $25,000 for each day of violation." The Superior Court imposed the minimum penalty but also suspended a portion of this amount, and both parties appealed. In reviewing the lower court's opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Superior Court judge properly exercised its discretion in suspending a portion of the statutory penalty. The trial judge began with the premise that when the General Assembly wants to limit a court's authority to suspend a sentence, it employs explicit statutory language precluding judicial discretion. Next, the trial judge determined that interpreting the statute consistently with the court's traditional power to suspend sentences and fines under criminal statutes reduced "the risk of unjust and anomalous results." Furthermore, the judge concluded that even if courts suspended a portion of the statutory fine, the $1,000 per day minimum set forth in the statute would weigh in favor of attaching strong conditions to any modified penalty. Finally, and crucially, the trial court emphasized that the defendants lacked any prior history of violations and that "their actions caused no demonstrable environmental harm." Based upon this "coherent and persuasive rationale," the Supreme Court was able to conclude from the record that the trial judge had properly exercised his discretion in assessing an "appropriate" and just modified penalty that served both the parties and the policies underlying the statute.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
In this case, the court below relied on State v. Sloman for the proposition that a judge has inherent authority to modify civil penalties. In Sloman, the Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's decision to modify a defendant's criminal sentence based upon a request from a Treatment Access Center (TASC) counselor. In Sloman, the trial court's inherent authority stemmed from the fact that the original sentencing order implicitly reserved its right to modify the sentence, and from the Court's "power to amend [its sentence] to ensure the proper functioning of the TASC program and the administration of justice in [the] particular circumstances" of Sloman's case. The challenged modification resolved an ambiguity in the original sentence that TASC reasonably interpreted as directing a TASC evaluation, thereby leading TASC personnel to seek a modification "earlier than the original sentencing judge would have preferred." As in DNREC, the Supreme Court relied upon the trial judge's "entirely plausible and reasonable" rationale in affirming the existence of inherent authority for a court to modify, vacate, or set aside penalties or sentences in the interests of justice.
Anderson, 2010 WL 1006558, at *4 (citing State v. Sloman, 886 A.2d 1257, 1265 (Del. 2005)).
Sloman, 886 A.2d at 1265.
Id. at 1263-65.
Id.
Even if the Court of Common Pleas' vacation of Anderson's habitual offender status is viewed as a suspension of a penalty, the decision below differs from those at issue in DNREC and Sloman because it does not further the considerations of "fundamental fairness" and "proper administration of justice" that it purported to advance. As previously discussed, the interests of justice did not require the court to reign in the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this case. In attempting to impose judicial oversight, the Court of Common Pleas in fact risked setting a dangerous precedent for future habitual offenders, who could use its decision to claim entitlement to a judicially-created standard continuance in all but the most egregious cases.
The opinion below suggests that if the DAG had offered Anderson a "standard continuance" for the six months preceding the hearing, the Court of Common Pleas would not have vacated its declaration.
In vacating the declaration of Anderson's habitual offender status, the Court of Common Pleas disregarded the principles behind the habitual offender statute. The habitual driving offender statute was enacted to ensure "maximum safety for all persons who travel or otherwise use the public highways" of the State, to "[d]iscourage the repetition of criminal acts against the peace and dignity" of the State, and to "[d]eny the privilege of operating motor vehicles on [State] highways to persons who by their conduct and record have demonstrated their indifference to the safety and welfare of others and their disrespect for the laws of this State, the orders of its courts and the statutorily required acts of its administrative agencies." Anderson received fifteen convictions for motor vehicle-related offenses within the ten years prior to the petition at issue, including three moving violations and one conviction for Driving Under the Influence. The petition under dispute resulted from the fourth certification of her record by the DMV. Significantly, the Court of Common Pleas' order vacating Anderson's habitual offender status incorrectly stated that Anderson had no new driving charges since September 12, 2008. In fact, even after Anderson was convicted of her third qualifying offense in May 2008, she committed three additional moving violations. While Anderson was given a chance to avoid future violations after the first petition against her was withdrawn, she was unable to maintain a clean driving record. Thus, the Court of Common Pleas' decision, which temporarily immunizes Anderson from habitual offender status, not only disregards the clear meaning of the statute, but also exceeds the bounds of reason in light of Anderson's driving record.
21 Del. C. § 2801.
State v. Anderson, C.A. No. CPU4-09-006133 (September 25, 2009) (ORDER).
See supra note 3 (detailing dates of Anderson's convictions for driving at an unreasonable rate of speed, failing to stop at a signal lamp, and exceeding the posted speed limit).
In addition, following the Supreme Court's reasoning in DNREC that civil penalties may be modified or suspended absent a legislative intent to impose mandatory penalties, it appears that the General Assembly has channeled and restricted the exercise of judicial discretion in habitual offender proceedings. A close reading of the habitual offender statute illustrates this point. Section 2807 of the statute limits the issues to be addressed at an habitual offender hearing to whether "the person appearing is the individual named in the abstract" and whether the "person is an habitual offender" as defined by the statute. By contrast, § 2809 expressly authorizes the exercise of judicial discretion in license restoration proceedings: at the expiration of the suspension period applicable to the offender's record, and provided certain other requirements are met, the Court of Common Pleas may "at its discretion, restore[] . . . the privilege to operate a motor vehicle . . . upon such terms and conditions as the Court may prescribe." This statutory language suggests that the General Assembly intended judicial discretion to be exercised during license restoration proceedings. By implication, the Court of Common Pleas lacks discretion to reach a counterfactual judgment at the petition stage.
Specifically, the habitual driving offender statute provides the following procedures for restoration:
No license to operate a motor vehicle in this State shall be issued to an habitual offender nor shall a nonresident habitual offender operate a motor vehicle in this State:
(1) For a period of 5 years from the date of the order of the Court finding such person to be an habitual offender as defined in § 2802(1) of this title and for a period of 3 years from the date of the order of the Court finding such person to be an habitual offender as defined in § 2802(2) of this title;
(2) Until such time as financial responsibility requirements are met; and
(3) Until, upon petition and for good cause shown, the Court, at its discretion, restores to such person the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State upon such terms and conditions as the Court may prescribe, subject to other provisions of law relating to the issuance of operators' licenses.
(4) Unless the Attorney General moves the Court for restoration of the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State of any person declared to be an habitual offender as defined in § 2802(1) of this title after 3 years from the date of the order of the Court declaring the person to be a habitual offender. In the event of such a motion by the Attorney General, the Court may in its discretion restore the driving privileges of the person in whole or in part only if the person also meets the obligation set forth in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this section.
21 Del. C. § 2809 (emphasis added).
Moreover, there is a distinction between vacating a declaration of habitual offender status, as the Court of Common Pleas did in Anderson's case, and reducing or suspending a penalty. By determining that an individual who satisfied all statutory elements was not an habitual offender despite a valid petition against her, the Court of Common Pleas rendered the statute meaningless by redefining what constitutes an "habitual offender" under 21 Del. C. § 2802. To permit trial judges to vacate factually and legally uncontested declarations would be to authorize the Court of Common Pleas to override the statutory scheme crafted by the General Assembly. In essence, the court did not modify Anderson's penalty, but rather made a factual determination that she did not satisfy the statutory elements of habitual offender status. On the record before this Court, this conclusion is patently incorrect: the DAG presented undisputed evidence establishing Anderson's habitual offender status, and to hold that she is not an habitual offender would be to contradict the plain meaning of the habitual offender statute itself. The General Assembly surely would not have intended this result.
2. Statutory Authority
The Court of Common Pleas also exceeded the scope of its authority when it relied on Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 60(b) to authorize the vacation of Anderson's habitual offender status. The court below not only misconstrued the meaning of "misrepresentation" under Rule 60(b) and abused its discretion by declaring that Anderson's driving record could not be distinguished from other offenders, but also committed legal error by incorrectly applying Rule 60(b) to the facts of Anderson's case.
Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 60(b) provides that,
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (3) [M]isrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; . . . or any (6) other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Delaware's interpretation of Rule 60(b) is guided by interpretations of its federal counterpart provision.
See, e.g., Hoffman v. Cohen, 538 A.2d 1096, 1097-98 (Del. 1987).
In MCA, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the Delaware Supreme Court held that a Rule 60(b)(3) motion is reserved for situations where a party has engaged in fraud or misrepresentation that prevents the moving party from fairly and adequately presenting his or her case. In other words, the misrepresentation must involve the "most egregious conduct" and a "corruption of the judicial process itself." Other Delaware Courts have clarified that relief under Rule 60(b)(3) can only be granted where a non-moving party has acted in bad faith, and that new evidence presented under Rule 60(b)(3) must be "of such a material nature that it would convince the court that it would probably change its decision had it known of the transgressions or improprieties committed during the proceedings."
785 A.2d 625, 639 (Del. 2001).
Id. at 638.
Ponzo v. Ponzo, 1998 WL 665504, at *3 (Del. Fam. Apr. 9, 1998).
Glinert v. Wickes Cos., Inc., 1992 WL 165153, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1992).
The record does not establish that the DAG's sidebar conference statements amounted to an "affirmative misrepresentation" under Rule 60(b)(3). When the court below inquired, "So the lady with the three kids and a job, and the grandkids; you couldn't do that for her?" after granting a six-month continuance to another respondent, the DAG responded, "No." After the court pressed for the DAG to distinguish Anderson's case from that of other respondents granted a continuance during the day's calendar, the DAG replied, "Because we did it once for her." As this conversation was recounted by the Court of Common Pleas in its opinion, ostensibly explanatory bracketed alterations implied that the DAG assured the court below that Anderson had already been offered a six-month standard continuance:
THE COURT: So the lady with the three kids and a job, and the grandkids; you couldn't [offer a "standard" continuance] for her?
DAG: No.
THE COURT: What's the difference?
DAG: Because we did it once for her.
THE COURT: Oh, you already [granted her a "standard" continuance] once?
Anderson, 2010 WL 1006558, at *2-3.
The bracketed language used in the opinion below suggests that the Court of Common Pleas saw a deliberate misrepresentation where the record reveals an innocent misunderstanding. The actual record does not support a conclusion that the Deputy Attorney General intended to mislead the court. When the Court of Common Pleas asked why the Deputy Attorney General "couldn't do that" for Anderson, it is uncertain whether "that" referred specifically to granting a six-month continuance on the pending petition against Anderson. It would have been reasonable for the attorney to infer that the court was asking more generally why he could not demonstrate leniency towards Anderson by offering her a chance to avoid the revocation of her license. In fact, the State had given Anderson a second chance already in dismissing the first habitual offender petition altogether. Anderson was thereby provided an opportunity to avoid additional violations following the dismissal in February 2008, and she failed to do so. The dialogue between the court and the DAG never explicitly referred to standard continuances, and the DAG's responses are accurate if the exchange is viewed as a discussion of Anderson's having been provided the opportunity to avoid revocation after a valid petition was instituted against her. Thus, the record falls short of establishing that the DAG's response to the judge's sidebar questions constituted a deliberate misrepresentation of a material fact. Rather, it appears from the record that the DAG and the trial judge had a simple misunderstanding, and that the DAG provided forthright responses that addressed the spirit of the court's concerns, albeit with some confusion regarding the procedural details.
Even if the DAG incorrectly believed that Anderson had already received a standard continuance and misstated that fact to the Court of Common Pleas, there is no evidence suggesting that his misstatement was intentional. Rather, the DAG's prior concession that he had "no particular knowledge of this case" demonstrates good faith. Furthermore, it certainly cannot be said that the DAG's conduct at the sidebar conference was so egregious as to undermine the judicial process itself, as Anderson was afforded a fair opportunity to present the facts of her case. Finally, had the Court of Common Pleas and the DAG clarified their respective understandings of Anderson's situation, it is likely the court would not have vacated its judgment declaring Anderson an habitual offender. The prior petition against Anderson had been dismissed entirely, whereas the other respondents on the September 25, 2009 calendar who were used as comparative examples by the Court of Common Pleas had merely received continuances. The State's exercise of discretion towards Anderson, when viewed in full context, was more lenient than towards other respondents identified by the court below.
This Court cannot conclude from the record that the DAG affirmatively misrepresented or omitted material facts to the Court of Common Pleas. To the extent the DAG might have misspoken at the sidebar conference, the inaccurate statement would not constitute a "misrepresentation" as our courts have defined the term under Rule 60(b). Anderson had a fair and adequate opportunity to present the facts of her case, and there is no evidence in the record suggesting that the DAG acted in bad faith or that his conduct should be deemed egregious. The Court of Common Pleas therefore committed legal error when it relied on Rule 60(b)(3) to vacate its prior judgment.
While the Court of Common Pleas did not reference any other source of authority for its decision, it further substantiated its position by stating that "[j]ustice demands fairness, including a consistent application of prosecutorial discretion," and reasoning that prosecutorial discretion as applied to Anderson was unfair and inconsistent. The only other authority that would support vacation of an order on these principles is Rule 60(b)(6), which provides that the Court of Common Pleas may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment."
Id. at *5.
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that Rule 60(b)(6) implicates a different standard for granting relief than the other subdivisions of Rule 60(b), particularly 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(3). The standard test for a relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is a showing of extraordinary circumstances. Delaware courts have found that extraordinary circumstances exist when the facts establish that the moving party possesses no other recourse for righting a wrong. Generally speaking, the extraordinary circumstances test has not been subject to definition, but rather is illustrated by way of particular factual scenarios.
Jewell v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 401 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. 1979).
Id.
For example, the Delaware Supreme Court in Jewell v. Division of Social Services reopened a judgment where it was shown that the Division of Social Services had frustrated the terms of a stipulated dismissal that had given the petitioner a reasonable hope of regaining custody of his children. Id. at 89. Justice required a reopening of the judgment because the petitioner, having abandoned his right to appeal based on the promise of the stipulation, had no standing to oppose the Division's termination of his parental rights. Since petitioner had no recourse whatsoever, the Court concluded that vacating the judgment necessary in the interests of justice. Id. at 90.
Christina Bd. Of Educ. v. 322 Chapel St., 1995 WL 163509, at *7 (Del Super. Feb. 9, 1995).
While the unconstitutional exercise of prosecutorial discretion could in a proper case constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying Rule 60(b)(6) relief, this Court has already determined that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion towards Anderson was proper. Anderson had the opportunity to dispute the underlying charges against her prior to her convictions, and was afforded adequate procedural protection during her habitual offender proceeding under § 2807. Therefore, neither due process nor equal protection considerations justify the application of Rule 60(b).
Furthermore, the Court of Common Pleas' comparison of habitual offender driving records did not reveal "extraordinary circumstances" that would warrant the vacation of Anderson's habitual offender status. Upon reviewing all habitual driving offender petitions that were heard on September 25, 2009, the Court of Common Pleas found that Anderson's driving record was no worse than the records of other drivers who had been granted standard continuances. This Court finds the Court of Common Pleas' methodology to be questionable and its conclusion unsubstantiated; it is virtually impossible for one habitual offender's driving record and circumstances to be "indistinguishable" from the next. And even if it were possible to draw meaningful comparisons between habitual offender respondents, limiting a review of prosecutorial decision-making to one calendar date is insufficient and improper, especially when the court did not consider drivers who were actually declared habitual offenders on that same day. Moreover, the Court of Common Pleas' conclusion that Anderson's driving record was "indistinguishable" from the records of Kenneth Barnes or Lucian Chandler, two other drivers on the calendar, is factually incorrect. Therefore, this Court cannot find any "extraordinary circumstances" in the record that would merit the Court of Common Pleas' vacation of its initial habitual offender order under the auspices of Rule 60(b)(6).
The Court of Common Pleas concluded that because Barnes was granted a continuance despite having convictions on his record for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol Reckless Driving, the State must have taken Barnes personal hardship into account when making its recommendation. Anderson, 2010 WL 1006558, at *2 n. 3. While a prosecutor may make enforcement decisions based upon any constitutionally permissible criteria, the court's determination of habitual offender status in a revocation proceeding does not take into account the respondent's lifestyle or potential hardship. Kamalski, 429 A.2d at 1318. Therefore, the fact that hardship arguments may have influenced the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as to Barnes but not as to Anderson is immaterial. In addition, while it is true that Barnes's counsel requested a three-month continuance so that Barnes, a Marine being deployed to Afghanistan in February 2010, could complete the college semester before shipping out, the State only agreed to such arrangement after defense counsel acknowledged at the rescheduled hearing that his client would not be contesting the matter. Therefore, Barnes was neither awarded a six-month standard continuance nor given an opportunity to display good behavior. The lower court's conclusion that Anderson's and Barnes's cases were "indistinguishable" is clearly erroneous in light of the record before this Court. The Court of Common Pleas' comparison between Anderson and Lucian Chandler is similarly flawed. Unlike Anderson, Chandler was facing his first habitual offender petition at the September 2009 hearing. This fact alone materially distinguishes the two cases.
D. Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 11
Anderson has also argued in her answering brief that the Court of Common Pleas' decision was warranted under Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 11, which permits a court to impose sanctions including dismissal if a party or counsel makes a bad faith or unreasonable representation to the court. In this case, Anderson did not file a motion for sanctions in the court below in compliance with Rule 11(c)(1)(A), nor did the Court of Common Pleas enter an order to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B). Even assuming that the Court of Common Pleas complied with the procedural requisites of Rule 11, this Court has already determined that the DAG's statements were neither unreasonable nor made in bad faith in light of the ambiguous questions posed by the court below at the sidebar conference. The Court therefore cannot conclude that vacation of Anderson's habitual offender declaration can be considered a validly-imposed Rule 11 sanction.
Whether initiated by a party or the court, Rule 11(c) provides that sanctions may only be imposed "after notice, and a reasonable opportunity to respond."
E. Equitable Estoppel
Finally, Anderson has argued that her license should not be revoked "under a theory analogous to equitable estoppel." Anderson claims that she was unaware that the State intended to bring a second habitual offender petition against her, and that had she known this, she would not have paid a fee of $200.00 to have her license reinstated in April 2009.Although the Court of Common Pleas did not consider the argument, this Court will review de novo Anderson's equitable estoppel claim against the undisputed facts contained in the record. Equitable estoppel applies when "a party by his conduct intentionally or unintentionally leads another, in reliance upon that conduct, to change position to his detriment." The party claiming estoppel must be able to establish that she lacked knowledge of the truth of the facts in question, that she relied on the conduct of the party against whom estoppel is claimed, and that her reliance caused her to suffer a prejudicial change of position. The proponent of an equitable estoppel must show that her reliance w "reasonable and justified under the circumstances."
Waggoner v. Laster, 581 A.2d 1127, 1136 (Del. 1990) ( quoting Wilson v. Am. Ins. Co., 209 A.2d 902, 903-04 (Del. 1965)).
Id.
Monterey Invs., Inc. v. Healthcare Props., L.P., 1997 WL 367038, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 20, 1997) ( quoting Two S. Corp. v. City of Wilmington, 1989 WL 76291, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 18, 1989)).
Equitable estoppel does not apply in this case, as there is no evidence that Anderson reasonably relied on State action to her detriment. An estoppel argument might gain some traction had the State dismissed the first petition against Anderson and then instituted a second petition based on identical charges, but that is not the sequence of events at issue. The State's second petition against Anderson included two offenses not included in its initial petition. Anderson also chose to renew her driving privileges on April 6, 2009, despite knowing that an additional charge was pending against her at the time. Even though she was convicted of this offense in May 2009, she was a legal driver in Delaware for a full six weeks. The DMV had no way of knowing whether Anderson's third offense would result in a conviction or an acquittal. Anderson, already a respondent in an habitual offender proceeding, should reasonably have known that she was "on thin ice" after the first petition filed against her was dismissed; one subsequent offense would support a second habitual offender petition. Because Anderson cannot establish reasonable reliance, and because she received the benefit of her reinstated license, equitable estoppel does not support the Court of Common Pas' decision to vacate her habitual offender status.
VI. Conclusion
In vacating its order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, the Court of Common Pleas conflated prosecutorial and judicial discretion, and exceeded its inherent authority to modify civil penalties. The lower court also erred by misconstruing the DAG's statements as "misrepresentations" within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(3). Furthermore, Anderson has not demonstrated that "extraordinary circumstances" warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6), as the Court of Common Pleas' comparison of habitual offender driving records was both factually and methodologically incorrect. Finally, Anderson cannot establish equitable estoppel on the facts of this case.
Accordingly, the Court of Common Pleas' order vacating habitual offender status is REVERSED, and the order declaring Anderson an habitual offender REINSTATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.