Opinion
No. 3D18-754
12-18-2019
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Ariel AMAYA, Appellee.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Ima Ocasio-Yrady, for appellee.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Ima Ocasio-Yrady, for appellee.
Before LINDSEY, HENDON and GORDO, JJ.
GORDO, J.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court's order granting Ariel Amaya's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a traffic stop. Based on the trial court's own pronouncement of the uncontroverted evidence, we reverse and remand for findings consistent with an appropriate application of Florida law.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Amaya was stopped by City of Doral Detective Adam Andreozzi for making an improper left turn in the intersection of Northwest 58th Street and Northwest 79th Avenue in violation of section 316.151(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2019). After further investigation, Mr. Amaya was charged with unlawful conveyance of fuel, a third-degree felony. He moved to suppress evidence challenging the validity of the stop.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the detective testified that Mr. Amaya exited the Mobil gas station from the north side of the parking lot and made a right turn on Northwest 58th Street. Northwest 58th Street is a four-lane road consisting of a left turn lane, two through lanes, and a right turn lane. Mr. Amaya was travelling in an eastbound, through lane, from which he was not allowed to turn left. The detective then observed Mr. Amaya make an abrupt left turn to travel north on Northwest 79th Avenue from that through lane.
During the trial court's questioning of the detective, he simply recalled the turn was in violation of Chapter 316 and admitted he did not know the specific statute number as he did not issue a citation for the infraction. The transcript reveals this inquiry led to an extensive dialogue between the prosecutor and the court regarding the application of section 316.122, Florida Statutes (2019), which the State cited in its response to the motion to suppress. While the State argued that the facts amounted to a violation of section 316.122, the court disagreed. Nonetheless, the State maintained that turning left from a non-turning lane was a traffic infraction.
"We have quite clearly held that the validity of a stop is unaffected by the fact that the ultimate arrest and prosecution are for a different crime thereafter discovered, and it follows that a stop for a minor offense hardly becomes pretextual because an arrest or prosecution for that minor offense is aborted upon the discovery of a more serious violation of the law." State v. Cobbs, 411 So. 2d 212, 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (internal citations omitted).
On the record, the court acknowledged the unrefuted testimony that Mr. Amaya was travelling in a lane that was dedicated to eastbound travel, stating: "He is in a lane that doesn't make a left or right. I've got it." The court found "[t]hat it is uncontroverted what lane [Mr. Amaya] is in."
The court orally found that the facts presented during the evidentiary hearing did not constitute a traffic infraction in violation of section 316.122, given there was no evidence traffic was impacted by the turn. However, the State subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that Mr. Amaya's conduct violated section 316.151(1)(b). The court did not grant a hearing on the motion, but instead issued a written order denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the motion to suppress. In it, the court relied on the detective's testimony and applied section 316.151(1)(b) to its factual findings, concluding that no traffic violation occurred.
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left at any intersection shall approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle, and, after entering the intersection, the left turn shall be made so as to leave the intersection in a lane lawfully available to traffic moving in such direction upon the roadway being entered. A person riding a bicycle and intending to turn left in accordance with this section is entitled to the full use of the lane from which the turn may legally be made. Whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.
§ 316.151(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019).
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court's review of the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress involves a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct if competent, substantial evidence supports those findings. The trial court's application of law to those facts is reviewed de novo.
State v. Milewski, 194 So. 3d 376, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (internal citations omitted); see Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 866 (Fla. 2006).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
At issue here is the trial court's application of section 316.151(1)(b) to the facts presented. The plain language of "[s]ection 316.151(1)(b) requires a driver performing a left turn to make the turn from ‘the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle.’ This section does not condition the lawfulness of a left turn on whether the turn impacts traffic." State v. Y.Q.R., 50 So. 3d 751, 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
The Second District applied section 316.151(1)(b) to remarkably similar factual circumstances in Y.Q.R., holding:
[I]t is undisputed that the driver of the car in which Y.Q.R. was riding began his turn from the center, through-lane of traffic, not the extreme left-hand lane. In doing so, the driver committed a traffic infraction. Officer Bailey observed the infraction .... The trial court therefore erred in concluding Officer Bailey did not have a lawful basis to stop the vehicle in which Y.Q.R. was traveling.
Id.
Here, it is undisputed that Mr. Amaya began his turn from an eastbound, through lane of traffic, not the extreme left-hand lane. In doing so, he committed a traffic infraction giving Detective Andreozzi a lawful basis to stop his vehicle.
Further, we find the trial court's conclusion—that Mr. Amaya positioned his vehicle as far north as practicable so as to be able to turn left without impacting traffic—is unsupported by the detective's testimony. The trial court acknowledged on the record that Mr. Amaya was travelling in an eastbound lane before "[h]e changed his mind" and made a left turn in the middle of the intersection.
The detective was the only witness who testified during the evidentiary hearing.
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"Under search and seizure law, the stopping of a motorist is reasonable where a police officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred." Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ). "[T]he constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop is not dependent on the motivations of the individual officers involved ...." Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 1997) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 ).
The competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing shows that Mr. Amaya made an improper left turn in violation of section 316.151(1)(b). Accordingly, the stop was lawful and the motion to suppress should have been denied.
Reversed and remanded.