Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0093-PR
06-26-2014
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER ANGELO AMADO, Petitioner.
Bradley D. Beauchamp, Gila County Attorney By June Ava Florescue, Deputy Gila County Attorney, Globe Counsel for Respondent Christopher Angelo Amado, Florence In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Gila County
No. CR20080240
The Honorable Peter J. Cahill, Judge
REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
COUNSEL
Bradley D. Beauchamp, Gila County Attorney
By June Ava Florescue, Deputy Gila County Attorney, Globe
Counsel for Respondent
Christopher Angelo Amado, Florence
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Judge Espinosa and Judge Eckerstrom concurred. KELLY, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Petitioner Christopher Amado seeks review of the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We grant review and, for the following reasons, we deny relief.
¶2 Amado was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of misconduct involving weapons and one count of possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms, the longest of which was ten years. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Amado, No. 2 CA-CR 2009-0267, ¶ 16 (memorandum decision filed Apr. 20, 2010).
¶3 Amado then filed a notice of post-conviction relief and, after appointed counsel notified the court she had "found no claims which could be raised under Rule 32," Amado filed a pro se petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Specifically, he alleged counsel had failed to inform him of a favorable plea offer from the state that he would have accepted rather than face trial.
Although his arguments were not entirely clear, Amado appears to have claimed counsel's performance was deficient in other respects, stating, for example, that counsel "refused to allow [Amado] to speak on the stand." Amado has not raised these claims on review, however, and therefore has abandoned them. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1) ("Failure to raise any issue that could be raised in the petition . . . for review shall constitute waiver of appellate review of that issue.").
¶4 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. The court concluded Amado's counsel had performed deficiently by failing to respond to electronic mail ("e-mail") in which the prosecutor had asked, "If [Amado] were offered a concurrent deal now would he take it?" But the court also found the state's inquiry "was not an 'offer'"; instead, it was intended only to open a discussion "to find out . . . Amado's position." Based on testimony at the hearing, the court found Amado had failed to show any reasonable probability the state would have offered or entered into a plea agreement that required Amado's sentences to run concurrently with those imposed in another county, even if Amado's counsel had responded appropriately to the state's inquiry. Accordingly, the court denied relief on the ground Amado had failed to establish the prejudice required to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 398, 694 P.2d 222, 228 (1985) (defendant claiming ineffective assistance must prove "counsel acted unreasonably" and "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different'"), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). This petition for review followed.
Both Amado's counsel and the prosecutor testified at the hearing that they understood "concurrent deal" to refer to an agreement that provided for sentences in this case to be served concurrently with sentences imposed for charges in another county.
¶5 On review, Amado argues that, had he "been apprised of [the] concurrent term offer" in the prosecutor's e-mail to his attorney, he "would have accepted [it] immediately." But he does not address the trial court's findings that no offer had been made and that, "[a]t best, the State's email was an invitation to negotiate." Nor does he address the court's conclusion that Amado failed to show any likelihood the state actually would have made such an offer or that, had it been made, the court would have accepted it.
¶6 Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶ 4, 166 P.3d 945, 948 (App. 2007). And, when the court has held an evidentiary hearing, we defer to the court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Sasak, 178 Ariz. 182, 186, 871 P.2d 729, 733 (App. 1993). ¶7 In its ruling, the trial court clearly identified and thoroughly addressed each aspect of Amado's claim and resolved the issues in a manner sufficient to permit this or any other court to conduct a meaningful review. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993). Ample evidence supported the court's findings, and no purpose would be served by repeating the court's full analysis here. See id. Based on the record before us, the applicable law, and the court's assessment of the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, it did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on Amado's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶8 Accordingly, although we grant review, we deny relief.