Opinion
No. 41955.
June 13, 1950. Rehearing Denied, July 10, 1950.
In a mandamus action the state auditor is directed to register the bonds of relator, a consolidated school district formed under Laws 1947, Vol. II, p. 370. The constitutionality of the Act is upheld against contentions that it contains more than one subject, has an insufficient title, contains an illegal delegation of legislative power, is a local or special law, deprives voters of their voting rights, is too indefinite in its election provisions and changes the existing organization of counties. Bonds may be issued under the general school laws of the state, and the bonds of relator were validly issued.
1. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Constitutional Law: Statutes: Reorganized School District Act: Only One Subject. The Reorganized School District Act (Laws 1947, Vol. II, p. 370) has only one subject.
2. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Constitutional Law: Statutes: Reorganized School District Act: Title Sufficient. The title of the Reorganized School District Act was a general title which was sufficient.
3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Constitutional Law: Reorganized School District Act: No Illegal Delegation of Legislative Powers. The Reorganized School District Act does not contain an illegal delegation of legislative power. Such delegations of legislative power as are made to the State Board of Education, the county boards of education and the voters of the district are not prohibited by Article II of the Constitution.
4. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Constitutional Law: Statutes: Reorganized School District Act: Not Local or Special Law. The Reorganized School District Act is not a local or special law because it provides for state aid in the erection of buildings in districts formed under its terms.
5. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Constitutional Law: Elections: Reorganized School District Act: Rights of Voters Not Violated. Constitutional rights of voters are not violated by the Reorganized School District Act because there may be only one voting place where a district is located in two counties.
6. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Statutes: Elections: Reorganized School District Act: Provisions for Election Not Too Indefinite. The Reorganized School District Act is not too indefinite in its election provisions. The section dealing with notices of an election is susceptible of construction, and the Act provides that the election of directors shall be governed by the laws applicable to six-director school districts.
7. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS: Constitutional Law: Counties: Reorganized School District Act: No Change of County Organization. The Reorganized School District Act is not illegal as a change in the existing organization of counties in violation of Sec. 2, Art. VI of the Constitution.
8. MANDAMUS: Schools and School Districts: Bonds: Reorganized School District Act: Authority to Issue Bonds: State Auditor Directed to Register Bonds. While the Reorganized School District Act does not contain express authority for a reorganized district to issue bonds, there is authority under the general school laws of the state for such a district to issue bonds. Relator school district had authority to issue its bonds and respondent is directed to register and certify such bonds.
PEREMPTORY WRIT ISSUED.
W.A. Hire, Robert B. Fizzell and Stinson, Mag, Thomson, McEvers Fizzell for relator.
(1) The 1947 act under which relator has been organized is not invalid on the ground that the act and the title thereto violate Art. III, sec. 23, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, which provides that no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title. The act relates to but one subject, namely, reorganized school districts. State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, 170 S.W. 892; State ex rel. Transport Mfg. Equipment Co. v. Bates, 224 S.W.2d 996; Edwards v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64. (2) The title of the bill is sufficient. It is not necessary that mere matters of detail be stated in the title. Edwards v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 340 Mo. 1133, 104 S.W.2d 385; Grossman v. Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 1, 339 Mo. 344, 96 S.W.2d 701; Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543; Star Square Auto Supply Co. v. Gerk, 325 Mo. 968, 30 S.W.2d 447; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439. (3) The title of this act contains no details restricting the general purpose of the act as contained in the title. Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543. (4) The 1947 act is an amendatory statute and it was not necessary that its title state the contents of the act. The title of the original act is the title of the amendatory law. State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 358 Mo. 23, 213 S.W.2d 210; Downey v. Schrader, 353 Mo. 40, 182 S.W.2d 320; Sherrill v. Brantley, 334 Mo. 497, 66 S.W.2d 529; State v. Ward, 328 Mo. 658, 40 S.W.2d 1074; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 3 v. Miller, 326 Mo. 830, 33 S.W.2d 122; State v. Mulinix, 301 Mo. 385, 257 S.W. 121; State ex rel. Dickason v. County Court of Marion County, 128 Mo. 427, 30 S.W. 103, 31 S.W. 23. (5) The title of the 1931 school law amended by the 1947 act is sufficient to cover the amendatory act whether such title be the title appearing in the 1931 Session Laws or whether it be "1931 School Law," being the title of Art. 4, Chap. 72, R.S. 1939. The words "1931 School Law" constitute the official title of the article and said words became the title of the law amended by the 1947 act. State ex rel. Harmony Drainage Dist. v. Hackmann, 305 Mo. 685, 267 S.W. 608; Burge v. Wabash Railroad Co., 244 Mo. 76, 148 S.W. 925; State v. Doerring, 194 Mo. 398, 92 S.W. 489; State ex rel. Attorney General v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78. (6) The 1947 act is not invalid on the ground that it delegates legislative power to the county boards of education or to the State Board of Education in violation of Article II, section 1 of Article III, and section 1, Article IX, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. The constitutional provisions concerning the division of powers have always received a practical and liberal construction. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977; State ex inf. McKittrick v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 163 S.W.2d 990. (7) The formation of school districts is primarily a matter of local concern and the General Assembly may vest in local bodies and officers a large amount of discretion in forming school districts and in fixing or changing their boundaries. State ex rel. School Dist. v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 116 S.W. 561; State ex rel. Carnahan v. Jones, 266 Mo. 191, 181 S.W. 50; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. v. Thompson, 325 Mo. 1170, 30 S.W.2d 603; 1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, (8th Ed.), pp. 385-386, 389-390. (8) Insofar as the 1947 act vests authority in the State Board of Education, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of power because the Constitution expressly provides that the State Board of Education shall have such powers and duties as may be prescribed by law. Mo. Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 2. (9) The great weight of authority is to the effect that the act of 1947 does not involve any unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Wheeler School Dist. v. Hawley, 18 Wn.2d 37, 137 P.2d 1010; State ex rel. Horton v. Brechler, 185 Wis. 599, 202 N.W. 144; School Dist. v. Callahan, 237 Wis. 560, 297 N.W. 407, 135 A.L.R. 1081; Gardner v. Ginther, 232 A.D. 296, 250 N.Y.S. 176, affirmed without opinion 257 N.Y. 578, 178 N.E. 802; Common School Dist. v. Stuttgart Special School Dist., 187 Ark. 119, 58 S.W.2d 680; Board of Education of Burke County v. Hudson, 164 Ga. 401, 138 S.E. 792; State ex rel. School Dist. v. Lensman, 108 Mont. 118, 88 P.2d 63; Dowell v. Board of Education, 185 Okla. 342, 91 P.2d 771; Bailey v. State Board of Public Affairs, 194 Okla. 495, 153 P.2d 235; Evans v. Hurlburt, 117 Or. 274, 243 P. 553; County Board of School Trustees v. Mayfield School Dist., 140 S.W.2d 956; Wise Common School Dist. v. Castro County School Trustees, 141 S.W.2d 1028. (10) The recent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court and the earlier decisions by the Supreme Court of Illinois involve statutes differing widely from the Missouri act of 1947. State ex rel. Donaldson v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 P.2d 865; Kenyon v. Moore, 287 Ill. 233, 122 N.E. 548; excessive authority vested in county superintendent of schools; Jackson v. Blair, 298 Ill. 605, 132 N.E. 221, excessive authority vested in the state superintendent of schools; North v. Board of Education, 313 Ill. 422, 145 N.E. 158, power illegally vested in the circuit court to pass on the boundaries of a community high school district; People ex rel. Bensenville Community High School Dist. v. Rathje, 333 Ill. 304, 164 N.E. 696, power to change school boundaries illegally delegated to an ex officio board composed of the chairman of the county board of supervisors, the county judge and the county clerk. (11) The recent Illinois cases sustain statutory provisions giving local officials and the voters wide discretion in forming school districts and changing their boundaries. People ex rel. Board of Education v. Board of Education, 380 Ill. 311, 43 N.E.2d 1012, statute giving boards of trustees of school districts power to change boundaries with appeal to county superintendent held not to involve delegation of legislative or judicial power and valid; Husser v. Fouth, 386 Ill. 188, 53 N.E.2d 949, statutes giving county superintendent wide powers in changing the boundary lines of school districts held valid; People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 81 N.E.2d 581. (12) The 1947 act is not invalid on the ground that it violates Art. III, sec. 40, and particularly paragraphs (20), (21), (24), and (30) of said Sec. 40 of the Constitution of Missouri prohibiting any local or special law affecting school districts. State ex inf. Wright v. Morgan, 268 Mo. 265, 187 S.W. 54; State ex inf. Crain v. Moore, 339 Mo. 492, 99 S.W.2d 17. (13) The 1947 act does not violate Art. I., Sec. 10 of the Constitution of Missouri providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Consolidated School District v. Smith, 343 Mo. 288, 121 S.W.2d 160; State ex rel. Richart v. Stouffer, 197 S.W. 248; State ex rel. Bilby v. Brooks, 249 S.W. 73. (14) The 1947 act is not invalid on the ground that it is incomplete and unworkable. State ex rel. City of Fulton v. Smith, 355 Mo. 27, 194 S.W.2d 302; State ex rel. Gilpin v. Smith, 339 Mo. 194, 96 S.W.2d 40; State ex rel. Clark County v. Hackmann, 280 Mo. 686, 218 S.W. 318; State ex rel. Miller v. M.K. T. Railroad Co., 164 Mo. 208, 64 S.W. 187. (15) The 1947 act does not violate Art. VIII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution of Missouri. State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. City of North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762; Barnes v. Kansas City, 222 S.W.2d 756; Schildnecht v. City of Joplin, 226 Mo. App. 47, 41 S.W.2d 590. (16) The act of 1947 is not invalid because of the provision for state aid to reorganized school districts contained in sec. 13 of the act. State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, 170 S.W. 892. (17) The act of 1947 is not invalid on the ground that it violates the rights of existing counties and existing county boundaries. School Dist. of Oakland v. School Dist. of Joplin, 340 Mo. 779, 102 S.W.2d 909; State ex rel. Fry v. Lee, 314 Mo. 486, 284 S.W. 129. (18) The relator school district is authorized to issue the bonds presented to the respondent for registration and certification by Sec. 10328, R.S. 1939, and by Art. VI, Sec. 26 (B) Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Const. Mo., 1945, Art. VI, Sec. 26(b); State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, 170 S.W. 892; State ex rel. Clark County v. Hackmann, 280 Mo. 686, 218 S.W. 318; State ex rel. Gilpin v. Smith, 339 Mo. 194, 96 S.W.2d 40. (19) The court will presume that the act of 1947 is constitutional. State ex rel. Fire District of Lemay v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807, 184 S.W.2d 593; Poole Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 125 S.W.2d 23; Ward v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 341 Mo. 227, 108 S.W.2d 136; State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, 170 S.W. 892.
J.E. Taylor, Attorney General, Waldo P. Johnson and Richard F. Thompson, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent.
(1) The subject of Senate Bill No. 307 is not clearly expressed in the title and said bill embraces more than one subject. Sec. 23, Art. III, Const. of Mo., 1945; Sec. 28, Art. IV, Const. of Mo., 1875; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 166, p. 145, sec. 169, p. 149; Edwards v. Business Men's Assur. Co., 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82; State v. Becker, 329 Mo. 1041, 47 S.W.2d 781; Laws 1947, p. 370; Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 13A, 13B, 14, 15, R.S. 1939; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 183, p. 162, sec. 208, p. 189; State ex rel. Wells v. Walker, 326 Mo. 1233, 34 S.W.2d 124; State ex rel. Neidermeyer v. Hackmann, 292 Mo. 27, 237 S.W. 742; State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Gordon, 268 Mo. 713, 188 S.W. 160; State ex rel. City of Chillicothe v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 383, 135 S.W. 929; State ex rel. Barker v. Assurance Co. of America, 251 Mo. 278, 158 S.W. 640; Secs. 10447, 10448, R.S. 1939. (2) Senate Bill No. 307 is unconstitutional because it illegally delegates legislative power to county boards of education and the State Board of Education, in violation of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, and Section 1 of Article IX, Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Art. II, Const. of Mo., 1945; sec. 1, Art. III, Const. of Mo., 1945; sec. 1, Art. IX, Const. of Mo., 1945; State ex rel. Field v. Smith, 329 Mo. 1019, 49 S.W.2d 74; State ex rel. Donaldson v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 909 P.2d 865; Kenyon v. Moore, 287 Ill. 233, 122 N.E. 548; Jackson v. Blair, 298 Ill. 605, 132 N.E. 221; North v. Board of Education, 313 Ill. 422, 145 N.E. 158; People ex rel. Bensenville High School Dist. v. Rathje, 333 Ill. 304, 164 N.E. 696. (3) Senate Bill No. 307 is invalid because it violates Article III, Section 40, and particularly paragraphs 21, 24 and 30, of the Constitution, prohibiting the passage of local or special laws. Reals v. Courson, 349 Mo. 1193, 164 S.W.2d 306; State ex inf. Barrett ex rel. Bradshaw v. Hedrick, 294 Mo. 21, 241 S.W. 420; Colley v. Jasper County, 337 Mo. 503, 85 S.W.2d 57; Rose v. Smiley, 296 S.W. 815; State ex inf. Gentry v. Armstrong, 315 Mo. 298, 286 S.W. 705, 708. (4) Senate Bill No. 307 is unconstitutional because it permits persons to vote at an election in a county other than the county in which they reside, being in violation of Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Sec. 2, Art. VIII, Const. of Mo., 1945; Sec. 2, Art. VIII, Const. of 1875; Laws 1943, p. 555, sec. 1; Sec. 11469, Mo. R.S.A.; Barrett v. Parks, 352 Mo. 974, 180 S.W.2d 665; Hall v. Schoenecke, 128 Mo. 661, 31 S.W. 97; Straughan v. Meyers, 268 Mo. 580, 187 S.W. 1159; Purple Truck Garage Co. v. Campbell, 119 Or. 484, 250 P. 213; Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 204 P.2d 854; M M Woodworking Co. v. State Industrial Comm., 176 Or. 35, 155 P.2d 933; Bell v. State Industrial Accident Comm., 157 Or. 653, 74 P.2d 55. (5) Senate Bill No. 307 is unconstitutional because it denies certain persons rights without due process of law, in violation of Section 10, Article I of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Sec. 2, Art. VIII, Const. of Mo., 1945; Sec. 10, Art. I, Const. of Mo., 1945. (6) Senate Bill No. 307 is invalid and illegal because it is not complete and workable and is not sufficiently definite. Diemer v. Weiss, 343 Mo. 626, 122 S.W.2d 922; Vallat v. Radium Dial Co., 360 Ill. 407, 196 N.E. 485; Hernandez v. Frohmiller, 68 Ariz. 242, 204 P.2d 854. (7) Senate Bill No. 307 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article VI of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Sec. 2, Art. VI, Const. of Mo., 1945.
D.D. Thomas, Jr., and W.A. Franken, amici curiae.
(1) The 1947 act under which relator has been organized is invalid on the ground that the act violates Article III, Section 23, of the Constitution of Missouri, which provides that "no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in the title." The purpose of the title to an act of the General Assembly is to give the members of the Legislature and people a fair summary of the contents of the act. Graff v. Priest, 356 Mo. 401, 201 S.W.2d 945; State ex rel. v. Revelle, 257 Mo. 529, 165 S.W. 1084. (2) The first point made by relator in his brief is that the act has but one subject, namely, the reorganization of school districts. Assuming this is correct, then nothing in regard to the reorganization of school districts is mentioned in the title. The whole title refers to county reorganization boards or county boards of education. The title is misleading. State ex rel. School District v. Hackmann, 237 S.W. 742, 292 Mo. 27; State v. Great Western Coffee Tea Co., 71 S.W. 1011, 171 Mo. l.c. 643; State ex inf. v. Borden, 64 S.W. 172, 164 Mo. 221; State v. Thomas, 256 S.W. 1028, 301 Mo. 603; State v. Beckman, 353 Mo. 1015, 185 S.W.2d 810. (3) The title to the act enters into particulars and designates what it contains, and, under the circumstances, nothing is valid in the act beyond the things enumerated. Hence the provisions authorizing the reorganization of school districts under Senate Bill 307 are invalid because they go beyond the scope of the title. State ex rel. Fire District of Lemay v. Smith, 353 Mo. 804, 184 S.W.2d 593; Fidelity Adjustment Co. v. Cook, 339 Mo. 45, 95 S.W.2d 1162. (4) While Senate Bill 307 is not an amendatory statute, but a repealing statute, the title, by its terms, refers only to county reorganization boards, and hence the principle that where a repealing act is passed, the title to the original act becomes the title to the amendatory act, has no application. The title to Senate Bill 307 purports to be complete within itself. State ex rel. Niedermeyer v. Hackmann, 237 S.W. 742, 292 Mo. 27.
Theodore Beezley, amicus curiae.
The 1947 act under which relator has been organized is not invalid on the ground that the act and the title thereto violate Art. III, Sec. 23 of the Constitution of Missouri 1945, which provides that no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be expressed clearly in its title. Young v. Greene County, 342 Mo. 1105, 119 S.W.2d 369.
Stanley P. Clay, amicus curiae.
(1) Senate Bill No. 307, under which relator has been organized, is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional because said bill and the title thereof violate Section 23 of Article III of the Constitution of Missouri which provides that no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title. The bill contains more than one subject and the subject matter of said bill is not clearly expressed in the title. S.B. 307 enacted by the Sixty-fourth General Assembly, Laws 1947, pp. 370-377, Mo. R.S.A., secs. 10449.1-10449.15; Chap. 72. Art. IV, Mo. R.A. 1939; 1931 School Law enacted by the Fifty-sixth General Assembly, Laws 1937, p. 334; Art. III, sec. 23, Const. of Mo. (2) The act cannot go beyond the title, said title cannot leave people in doubt as to the matter treated in the act and the question of the consolidation being adopted by a majority of the votes cast at the election was not mentioned in the title. Hunt v. Armour Co., 345 Mo. 677, 136 S.W.2d 312; Fidelity Adjustment Co. v. Cook, 339 Mo. 45, 95 S.W.2d 1162; Ex parte Hunn, Ex parte Le Van, 207 S.W.2d 468. (3) Where the title of an act descends to particulars and details, the act must conform to the title as thus limited. State v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807, 184 S.W.2d 593; Hunt v. Armour and Co., 345 Mo. 677, 136 S.W.2d 312; Ex parte Hunn, Ex parte Le Van, 207 S.W.2d 468. (4) Senate Bill No. 307 was a new legislative act and was amendatory of nothing. (5) Senate Bill No. 307 is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional because said bill provides for the redelegation of duties imposed by statute upon the County Board of Education. Sec. 6, Senate Bill 307; 56 C.J., sec. 50, p. 205. (6) Senate Bill No. 307 is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional because said act is not complete and workable. Secs. 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, Senate Bill 307. (7) Said Senate Bill No. 307 is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional and violates Article II and Section 1 of Article III and Section 1 of Article IX of the Constitution of Missouri in that said bill delegates legislative power and authority to the county boards of education therein referred to and to the State Board of Education. (8) Said Senate Bill No. 307 is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional and violates Section 40 of Article III of the Constitution of Missouri and particularly subparagraphs (20), (21), (24), and (30) of said Section 40 prohibiting local or special legislation and particularly special legislation relating to school districts in that said bill authorizes and permits and will result in the formation of reorganized school districts in certain parts of a county and of the state while other parts of the county or of the state in which identical conditions prevail will not be reorganized under the provisions of said bill. (9) Said Senate Bill No. 307 is invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional and violates Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Missouri providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law in that said bill permits a reorganized school district to be formed and to elect a board of directors without requiring and providing for due notice to and a proper opportunity to be heard by the voters, patrons and taxpayers of the school districts affected. (10) Said Senate Bill No. 307 does not authorize a reorganized school district formed thereunder to incur indebtedness or to vote and issue bonds and the relator school district was and is without power to vote and issue its bonds tendered to the respondent for registration and certification. Lauf Bond, H.P. Lauf and John O. Bond, amici curiae.
(1) The entire 1947 act is unconstitutional because its title violates Article 3, Section 23, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, because the title to said act misrepresents the nature of the statutes it repeals; because it conceals the true purpose found in the body of the act, which is the manner and means, authority and power for enlarging school districts; because said title conceals the broad arbitrary powers granted to the State Board of Education; because said title is misleading and confusing in that from the title a reasonable person could only assume that the body of the act provided for a county board of education which would be a plan-making or advisory board only. State ex rel. Niedermeyer v. Hackmann, 237 S.W. 742. (2) The purpose of the constitutional provision concerning the title to an act is well stated in the case of City of St. Louis v. Wortman, 112 S.W. 520. (3) This title descends into details by providing for the making of plans, providing for the free transportation of students, and by providing for state aid and construction of school buildings, and therefore cannot be aided by the general preceding statements. City of Columbia v. State Pub. Serv. Comm., 43 S.W.2d 813. (4) Where an act repeals certain sections of a former act and then enacts an entire new law, the title of the new law must meet the constitutional requirements without any aid from the act partly repealed. State v. Beckman, 185 S.W.2d 810. (5) The notice of a special school election is the very foundation for the legality of such an election, and since Section 8 of the 1947 Act fails to require any definite time for the posting of a notice of the election, said law is fatally defective. State ex inf. Burges, ex rel. Marbut v. Potter, 191 S.W. 57. (6) The 1947 Act is so uncertain of meaning, so confused that it is entirely unworkable because it wholly fails to provide any means for nominating the directors of the new enlarged districts; for the holding of any election to elect directors for the new district, and wholly fails to provide the giving of notice to the voters for such an election. Sec. 10, Senate Bill 307, Laws 1947, p. 370; Sec. 10483, R.S. 1939; Diemer v. Weiss, 122 S.W.2d 922; State ex rel. Crow v. West Side Street Railroad Co., 47 S.W. 959. (7) If Section 8 of the 1947 act is construed that the notice of consolidation election can be placed in any newspaper of the state, then the 1947 act is void, first, because such a notice would be a failure to give reasonable notice to the electors in the proposed district and would not constitute due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and within the meaning of Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, and, secondly, because said act is meaningless and vague in that it does not provide any rule whereby it may be determined that said newspaper is of "general circulation" in the county or counties affected. Sec. 8, Senate Bill 307, Laws 1947, p. 370; Regan v. Hughes, 182 N.W. 870. (8) The arbitrary power given to the State Board of Education to approve or disapprove a reorganization plan, to dictate the building plan where a new school building is proposed, and to arbitrarily determine whether a given school district shall be in a proposed district in one county or in a proposed district in an adjoining county, are all in violation of Article 2 and Section 1 of Article 3 of the Missouri Constitution of 1945, because such powers constitute an arbitrary delegation of legislative powers to be exercised in accordance with the whim or caprice of the State Board of Education without providing any standard upon which said State Board of Education is required to act. People ex rel. Bensenville High School v. Rathje, 164 N.E. 696; State ex rel. v. Hines, 182 P.2d 865. (9) As the 1947 Act now stands the whole procedure of nominating and electing school directors of enlarged districts has been left to the whim and caprice of the County Superintendent of Schools or the State Board of Education, thus this law is void because it delegates legislative power to these officials without setting up any standard by which they shall be guided. State ex rel. v. Hines, 182 P.2d 865. (10) The broad powers given by this act to the State Board of Education are all invalid because no where in the title of the 1947 act nor in the title to the 1931 school law is it suggested that the State Board of Education shall have any powers, and the granting of these powers are concealed and omitted in the title of the 1947 act, which is in violation of Article III, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri of 1945. Fidelity Adjustment Co. v. Cook, 95 S.W.2d 1163; State ex rel. Niedermeyer v. Hackmann, 237 S.W. 742; City of St. Louis v. Wortman, 112 S.W. 520; City of Columbia v. State Pub. Serv. Comm., 43 S.W.2d 813.
Sebree, Shook, Hardy Hunter, Edgar Shook and Elmo B. Hunter, amicus curiae.
(1) The 1947 act Senate Bill No. 307 under which relator School District was organized does not violate Article III, Section 23, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, which provides that no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title. Senate Bill No. 307 does not contain more than one subject, namely, reorganized school districts, which is clearly expressed in its title. State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 17 S.W. 646; Nalley v. Home Ins. Co., 250 Mo. 452, 157 S.W. 769; O'Connor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 Mo. 622, 97 S.W. 150; State v. Brodnax, 228 Mo. 25, 128 S.W. 177; State ex rel. Sekyra v. Schmoll, 313 Mo. 693, 282 S.W. 702; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 166, p. 145; sec. 168, p. 147; sec. 170, p. 149; sec. 171, p. 152; sec. 181, p. 159; sec. 189, p. 168; sec. 191, p. 172; sec. 193, p. 173; sec. 195, p. 176; sec. 196, p. 177. (2) Senate Bill No. 307 is an amendatory statute, and, if necessary or helpful to sustain its validity, the title of the original act is considered the title of the amendatory law. 50 Am. Jur., sec. 204, pp. 184-187; Ibid. sec. 206, p. 187; sec. 172, p. 152; State ex rel. Sekyra v. Schmoll, 313 Mo. 693, 282 S.W. 702; State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1, 17 S.W. 646. (3) Senate Bill No. 307 does not unlawfully delegate legislative power to the county boards of education or to the State Board of Education in violation of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, and Section 1 of Article IX, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 116 S.W. 561; State ex inf. McKittrick v. Kirby, 349 Mo. 988, 162 S.W.2d 990; 65 A.L.R. 1623; 135 A.L.R. 1096. (4) Senate Bill No. 307 is not invalid on the ground that it violates Article III, Section 40, and particularly Paragraphs (20), (21), (24), and (30), of said Section 40 of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, prohibiting any local or special law affecting school districts. State v. Smith, 343 Mo. 288, 121 S.W.2d 160; State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 116 S.W. 561; State ex Inf. Crain v. Moore, 339 Mo. 492, 99 S.W. 17; State ex Inf. Wright v. Morgan, 268 Mo. 265, 187 S.W. 54; State of Mo. ex rel. Dome v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458. (5) Senate Bill No. 307 does not violate Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Barnes v. Kansas City, 359 Mo. 519, 222 S.W.2d 756; State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 213 S.W.2d 210; State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 8 of Pemiscot County v. Smith, 343 Mo. 288, 121 S.W.2d 160; State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 116 S.W. 561. (6) Senate Bill No. 307 is not unconstitutional because it permits persons to vote at a polling place located in a county other than the particular county in which they reside, contrary to Article VIII, Section 2, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. Barnes v. Kansas City, 359 Mo. 519, 222 S.W.2d 756; Armantrout v. Bohon, 349 Mo. 667, 162 S.W.2d 867. (7) Senate Bill No. 307 does not violate Article VI, Section 2, of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945. State ex rel. Consolidated School Dist. No. 8 of Pemiscot County v. Smith, 121 S.W.2d 160, 343 Mo. 288; Schildnecht v. City of Joplin, 226 Mo. App. 47, 41 S.W. 590; State ex rel. School Dist. No. 1 v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 116 S.W. 561; School Dist. of Oakland v. School Dist. of Joplin, 340 Mo. 779, 102 S.W.2d 909. (8) Senate Bill No. 307 is workable, definite and sufficiently complete. 29 C.J.S., Elections, sec. 72, p. 95; Ibid., Sec. 77, p. 102; People ex rel. Anderson v. Czarnecki, 312 Ill. 271, 143 N.E. 840; 119 A.L.R. 106; State v. Dugan, 110 Mo. 138, 19 S.W. 195; State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 358 Mo. 23, 213 S.W.2d 210. (9) Conclusion. State ex rel. Dome v. Wilcox, 45 Mo. 458.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus wherein the relator seeks to compel the respondent, as State Auditor of Missouri, to register and certify, under Section 3306, R.S. Mo., 1939, an issue of relator's bonds in the amount of $212,000.
The relator is a reorganized school district formed under the provisions of a statute enacted in 1947. This statute is commonly known as Senate Bill 307 and throughout this opinion it will be referred to as S.B. 307. (Laws of 1947, Vol. 2, pp. 370-377, Mo. R.S.A., Secs. 10449.1-10449.15.) The respondent's return raises several reasons why the statute under which the relator was organized is unconstitutional, and further states that S.B. 307 does not authorize a reorganized school district formed thereunder to incur indebtedness or to vote and issue bonds. For these reasons respondent contends that he has rightfully refused to register and certify these bonds.
The first contention of respondent is that S.B. 307 violates Art. III, Sec. 23 of our 1945 Constitution, which provides that "no bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title * * *."
The title to S.B. 307 is as follows:
"AN ACT to repeal Sections 10442, 10444, 10445, 10446, 10447, 10448 and 10449 of Article 4, Chapter 72, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1939, and to repeal Section 10443 of an Act of the Sixty-third General Assembly found in Laws of Missouri, 1945, Page 1658, approved February 2, 1946, all relating to county reorganization boards, and to enact in lieu thereof a new act creating county boards of education and defining their powers and duties, and providing for the making of plans for the reorganization of school districts, authorizing state aid in construction of school buildings, and providing for free transportation of students under certain circumstances."
The respondent contends in his return that S.B. 307 "embraces more than one subject in that it contains legislation pertaining to the following separate and distinct subjects:
"(1) The creation of county boards of education and prescribing their powers and duties;
"(2) The preparation of a proposition for reorganization by the county board and the submission and approval of the same by the State Board of Education;
"(3) The submission of such proposition at an election;
"(4) The granting of state aid to the reorganized school district."
We think the outline of S.B. 307 just quoted from the respondent's return shows that this act relates to but one subject, namely, reorganized school districts. We have uniformly ruled that where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection [188] with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single. Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Edwards v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82; State ex rel. Transport Mfg. Equipment Co. v. Bates, 359 Mo. 1002, 224 S.W.2d 996.
The respondent also contends the subject of S.B. 307 is not clearly expressed in its title as required by Art. III, Sec. 23, supra.
It is the respondent's contention that the title to the act pertains only to the plans of reorganization of school districts while the act also pertains to the actual reorganization of school districts and, therefore, the title of the act is less comprehensive than the act itself.
In support of this contention the respondent cites State ex rel. City of Chillicothe v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 383, 135 S.W. 929; and State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Gordon, 268 Mo. 713, 188 S.W. 160. The State ex rel. Chillicothe case involved the issuance of bonds for an electric light plant under the provisions of Sec. 3 of an act of the General Assembly, found in the Laws of 1897, page 49. The title to that act purported to specifically enumerate all the powers intended to be granted, and as the words, "to maintain and operate," were not in the title we held that those powers were by necessary implication excluded and that that part of the act that purported to grant power to issue bonds to maintain and operate an electric light plant was unconstitutional because the subject of the act was not clearly expressed in the title of the act. In other words, the title descended into details and particularity and did not refer to the maintenance and operation of the electric light plant.
In the State ex rel. St. Louis County case, supra, a law dealing with county roads passed in 1907, found in Laws of 1907, page 411, was before this Court. The title to the act also descended into details and particularity. "It refers in short only to the manner of getting the money, not the manner of expending same when gotten." 188 S.W. l.c. 163. While Secs. 4 and 5 dealt in detail with the making of the contract, the building of roads and bridges, the appointment of a special engineer and road builder, designated his duties, etc., we held that the title did not include these items and, therefore, the title to the act was not clearly expressed and that these sections were void.
In State ex rel. Fire District of Lemay v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807, 184 S.W.2d 593, l.c. 596, we said:
"Where the title of an act descends to particulars, the particulars stated ordinarily become the subject of the act and the act must conform to the title as expressed by the particulars. Where the title goes into such detail as would reasonably lead to the belief that nothing was included except that which is specified then any matter not specified is not within the title. Any such matter beyond the title is void because of Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution. Hunt v. Armour Co., 345 Mo. 677, 136 S.W.2d 312; Fidelity Adjustment Co. v. Cook, 339 Mo. 45, 95 S.W.2d 1162; Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543."
However, we are of the opinion that the cases just discussed are not controlling because the title to the act under consideration does not descend to particulars within the scope of the rule announced in these cases.
"In adopting a title the legislature may select its own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act; mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title." State ex rel. Attorney General v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, l.c. 445-446. If the title is a fair index to all that is embraced in the statute, then it complies with the constitutional mandate that the title clearly express the subject of the bill.
We think the title to the act is general and not particular. Excluding the repealing phrases, it reads, "* * * all relating to county, reorganization boards, and to enact in lieu thereof a new act creating county boards of education and defining their powers and duties, and providing for the making of plans for the reorganization [189] of school districts, authorizing state aid in construction of school buildings, and providing for free transportation of students under certain circumstances." We think it fairly embraces the subject matter of S.B. 307 which very briefly calls for preparation of a county-wide plan of reorganization, its submission to and approval by the State Board of Education, its submission to the voters of the reorganized districts, and other details mentioned in this bill. In other words, the title includes not only the plans of reorganization of school districts but also the actual reorganization of school districts.
If it can be said that the title does go into detail, they are not such details as would reasonably lead to the belief that nothing was included except that which is specified in the title, but these particulars, if any, "are merely descriptive of some of the instrumentalities or means to be employed in effectuating the general purpose of the bill as declared in its title, there is no constitutional barrier to the inclusion in the bill of provisions which are germane to and within the scope of the general purpose of the bill as declared in its title and which, although not set forth in the particulars expressed in the title, are not out of harmony with them." Graves v. Purcell, 337 Mo. 574, 85 S.W.2d 543, l.c. 548.
We hold the title to S.B. 307 does not contravene Art. III, Sec. 23 of our present Constitution.
The respondent contends that S.B. 307 is unconstitutional because it illegally delegates legislative power to county boards of education and the State Board of Education, in violation of Art. II, Sec. 1 of Art. III and Sec. 1 of Art. IX of our present Constitution.
To properly understand respondent's contention, we think it proper to briefly summarize the provisions of S.B. 307. The first four sections deal with the formation and organization of the county boards of education. Sec. 5 deals with the expenses of the members of county boards of education. Sec. 6 provides for a comprehensive study of each school district by the county board of education, and that "such study shall include
"(a) The assessed tax valuation of each existing district and the differences in such valuation under the proposed reorganization plan;
"(b) The size, geographical features and the boundaries of the proposed enlarged districts;
"(c) The number of pupils attending school, average daily attendance, and the population of the proposed enlarged districts;
"(d) The location and conditions of school buildings and their accessibility to the pupils;
"(e) The location and condition of roads, highways and natural barriers within the county;
"(f) The high school facilities of the county and recommendations for improvement of same;
"(g) The conditions affecting the welfare of the teachers and pupils;
"(h) Any other factors concerning adequate facilities for the pupils."
This section also provides for a specific plan of reorganization of the school districts of the county.
Sec. 7 provides that upon receipt of the plan of reorganization from the county board of education the State Board of Education shall, after an examination of the plan, either approve or disapprove the submitted plan. If the State Board of Education disapproves the plan, then the county board of education shall make a new plan of reorganization; and if the second plan is disapproved by the State Board of Education, then the county board of education is required to submit a plan to the voters of the proposed district without the approval of the State Board, but such proposed district must have an assessed evaluation of at least $500,000 or one hundred pupils in average daily attendance for the preceding year.
The other sections of the act deal with an election to determine whether the voters approve such plan of reorganization; if [190] approved, they provide for another election to elect six directors for each district, the delivery of all property, records, books and papers belonging to such component districts, and state aid for buildings and transportation of pupils.
The respondent does not contend a reorganization school plan law could not be enacted by the Legislature, provided the act prescribed definite standards to guide the county boards or restricted them in preparing plans for reorganization, and also did the same so far as the State Board of Education is concerned. But he does contend that S.B. 307 does not prescribe any standard or restriction either for the county boards in formulating the plans of reorganization or the State Board in approving or rejecting such proposed plans.
Respondent relies chiefly upon the case of State ex rel. Donaldson v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 P.2d 865. The statute under consideration by the Supreme Court of Kansas sought to reorganize the school districts of Kansas and that court ruled that the act delegated legislative powers to county school reorganization committees provided for by that statute, and declared the statute unconstitutional. But that decision is contrary to the decisions in the following cases: Wheeler School District v. Hawley, 18 Wn.2d 37, 137 P.2d 1010; School District v. Callahan, 237 Wis. 560, 297 N.W. 407, 135 A.L.R. 1081; and Gardner v. Ginther, 232 A.D. 296, 250 N.Y.S. 176, 257 N.Y. 578, 178 N.E. 802.
The above cases considered statutes similar to the statute now under consideration.
Sec. 1 of Art. VI of the Kansas Constitution provides: "The state superintendent of public instruction shall have the general supervision of the common-school funds and educational interests of the state, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law."
In the Donaldson case, supra, that court said (182 P.2d l.c. 869):
"In construing the above-quoted section of the constitution this court has held that the legislature can confer legislative power upon the state superintendent of public instruction because the constitution 'specifically authorized him "to perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law," without limiting those duties to such as might be classified as executive or administrative only.' See State ex rel. Rosenstahl v. Storey, supra."
Art. IX, Sec. 2 of our Constitution also provides that the State Board of Education "shall have such other powers and duties as may be prescribed by law," and if the duties conferred on the State Board of Education are legislative in character, then under the Donaldson case, supra, this is not an illegal delegation of legislative power to that Board.
Art. II of the present Constitution divides the power of government into the legislative, executive and judicial departments and provides that no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of power properly belonging to one of those departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, " except in the instances in this Constitution expressly directed or permitted." (Italics ours.) The legislative power is vested in a senate and house of representatives by Art. III. Sec. 1. Since the State Board of Education is a constitutional board with duties defined by the Constitution and "shall have other powers and duties as may be prescribed by law," it follows that the state legislature can confer on that board duties that are legislative in character as distinguished from those classified as executive or administrative only. Such duties would come within the exception of Art. II of the Constitution.
Under S.B. 307 no school district can be organized without first having the approval of the State Board of Education except when that board has previously twice disapproved the plan of reorganization, and then, in that instance, the act does set up a definite standard to guide the county board of education. That standard is that the proposed reorganized district shall have an assessed evaluation of at least $500,000 or one hundred pupils in average daily attendance for the preceding year.
[191] Art. IX, Sec. 1 of our Constitution says that "the general assembly shall establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state within ages not in excess of twenty-one years," but it does not require the General Assembly to divide the state into school districts. The manner of their formation is not regulated by the Constitution. "The fixing of boundaries of a school district is a local affair which may be left to the will of the people under a general law providing for the creation of school districts throughout the state." Consolidated School District v. Dacus, 189 Okla. 400, 117 P.2d 508. l.c. 510. "No one would contend that the Legislature should itself act directly in defining and changing the boundaries of each district in the State, without delegating this to local authorities * * *." State ex rel. School District v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, l.c. 631, 116 S.W. 561.
The Legislature has always, as a matter of policy, left to the resident voters the settlement of all questions involving the organization of school districts. The local voters act to determine such questions either through the mode of petitioned elections or by petitions to the appropriate public official or officials clothed by law with the power to annex or detach territory. The resident voters of the particular territory are the delegated agents of the Legislature to administer the enabling legislation, thereby implementing the legislative intent to obey the constitutional mandate of insuring the establishment and maintenance of free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons in this state within ages not in excess of twenty-one years. People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill, 25, 81 N.E.2d 581.
We hold that S.B. 307 is not an illegal delegation of legislative power within the meaning of Art. II of the Constitution. The county boards of education who devise the plans for reorganization, the State Board of Education, a constitutional body who must approve the plans and the voters of the district are delegated agents of the Legislature to administer this act. This act is not such an exclusive legislative function as may not be delegated to the State Board of Education, county boards of education and the voters of the proposed district. Wheeler School District v. Hawley, supra; Gardner v. Ginther, supra; School District v. Callahan, supra. "This is not deemed or considered a prohibited delegation of legislative powers." State ex rel. School District v. Andrae, supra, Mo. l.c. 630.
Respondent further contends that S.B. 307 is unconstitutional under Art. III, Sec. 40, particularly paragraphs 21, 24 and 30, which prohibits any local or special laws affecting school districts. His contention is based upon the fact that this act provides for state aid in the erection of buildings for enlarged school districts formed under its provisions but does not provide for such aid for other school districts similarly situated under some other law. This act applies to all counties and townships in the state, regardless of their population or assessed evaluation. A reorganized school district may be formed anywhere in the state if the terms and conditions prescribed by this act are followed. State ex inf. Wright, Prosecuting Attorney, v. Morgan, 268 Mo. 265, 187 S.W. 54. It is immaterial that school districts organized under other statutes are not given state aid in the construction of the districts' school buildings. Such a fact would not affect the act under review. Its constitutionality must stand or fall by its various provisions. This act does not regulate the building or repairing of the school houses, nor does it regulate the raising of money therefor. It merely grants state aid under the conditions specified in the act. There is no merit in this contention.
The next contention of respondent in his brief is that S.B. 307 violates Sec. 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution. This section provides that all citizens of the United States over the age of twenty-one who have resided in the state one year and in the county sixty days shall be entitled to vote at all elections.
S.B. 307 provides that a reorganized district may be composed of territory lying in two counties, and in that event there may be only one voting place. It is for this [192] reason that respondent contends Art. VIII, Sec. 2 is violated. It is to be noted that this section does not require that the voter have a polling place at which he can vote in the county of his residence. It deals only with the qualifications of the voter and not the place he may cast his vote.
Under this act, a resident of a proposed reorganized school district who has resided in the county of his residence for the period of time prescribed by the Constitution is entitled to vote on the formation of the reorganized school district whether the voting place is located in the county of his residence or in an adjoining county. Under these conditions, neither is such a voter denied due process of law.
Respondent contends S.B. 307 is not complete and workable, and is not sufficiently definite.
"'When the language of an act appears on its face to have a meaning, but it is impossible to give it any precise or intelligible application in the circumstances under which it was intended to operate, it is simply void; for if no judicial certainty can be settled upon as to its meaning, courts are not at liberty to supply the deficiency or make the statute certain. But legislation cannot be nullified on the ground of uncertainty, if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support it.' 26 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 2d Ed., 656." Diemer v. Weiss, 343 Mo. 626, 122 S.W.2d 922, l.c. 923.
It is upon this principle of law that respondent contends that S.B. 307 is void. He states that the county board of education must call an election within the proposed enlarged school district to vote on a plan of reorganization and post notices of election, yet there is nothing in the law stating for what length of time the notices are to be posted.
Section 8 of S.B. 307 provides:
"The notices of such election shall be by written or printed notices, signed by the president and secretary of the county board of education. Such notices shall be posted in at least three public places within each school district affected by the proposal and shall also be published at least two times in at least one newspaper of general circulation in the county or counties affected by said proposed enlarged district, the last published notice not less than six days prior to the date of election."
It is true the act does not state how long prior to the election the notices must be posted but it does say that they must be published at least two times in a newspaper within the county or counties affected by the proposed reorganization and that the last publication shall be not less than six days before the date of election. So this section is reasonably susceptible of the construction that the notices must be posted at least as long as it takes two notices to be published in a newspaper. Therefore, this part of S.B. 307 does not come within the rule announced in the Diemer case, supra.
He also says that this act imposes a duty on the county boards of education to call elections for the purpose of electing directors in the enlarged school districts, yet the act makes no provision for electing directors in the enlarged school districts; nor does it provide any method for nominating candidates for the office and it fails to provide for any notice whatever of the election of directors. The act does provide as to notices of election and as to how the elections shall be held by the incorporation of the methods cited in Art. V, Chap. 72, R.S. Mo., 1939. Secs. 10466-10503, entitled "Laws Applicable to City, Town and Consolidated Schools." This for the reason that Sec. 10 of S.B. 307 provides, "The directors above provided shall be governed by the laws applicable to six-director school districts," and Art. V, Chap. 72, supra, governs six-director districts.
We have already discussed the method for voting when the district lies in two counties and will not repeat it under this point.
This contention of respondent is without merit.
Respondent further contends that S.B. 307 violates Art. VI, Sec. 2, which reads: "The existing organization of counties shall continue until further provisions applicable thereto shall be provided, as authorized in this Constitution."
[193] The respondent contends that this section applies to a school district as it is a part of the existing organization of the county. This act relates to school districts and not counties. School districts are separate legal entities. School District of Oakland v. School District of Joplin, 340 Mo. 779, 102 S.W.2d 909. Moreover, the school law of 1913 permitted school districts to be formed with territory lying in two counties. Art. VI, Sec. 2, was not in the 1875 Constitution. It is a new section. Even if it be considered as a county under this provision of the Constitution, it would not violate this section because school districts were permitted to be formed in two counties when this Constitution went into effect.
Respondent's final contention is that S.B. 307 does not authorize issuance of the bonds voted by the relator. It is true that this act does not specifically make any such authorization.
This exact point was before us in the case of State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 631, l.c. 646, 170 S.W. 892, wherein we said:
"It is finally insisted that the Act of 1913 does not confer authority upon consolidated school districts organized thereunder to issue any bonds whatsoever.
"Literally speaking this insistence is true, but when we take into consideration the fact that the Legislature was dealing with the general education of its citizens and authorized this higher class of instruction, it is apparent that it intended that the general school laws of the State, in so far as applicable, should be read in connection with this class of schools, in order to carry out the general design and intention of the legislative body."
That being true, we must look at the general school laws of the state regarding this subject and read them in connection with this act; and by doing so we find that Sec. 10328, R.S. Mo., 1939, provides for the issuance of bonds for the purpose for which those in controversy are issued.
Under authority of the case of State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, supra, we hold that relator had authority to issue the bonds in question.
From what we have said, it follows that the peremptory writ of mandamus prayed for should issue. It is so ordered. All concur.