Opinion
March 15, 1932.
1. PENAL INSTITUTIONS: Controlled by Statutes. The power to control penal institutions is vested in the Legislature which by Chapter 44, Revised Statutes 1929, has created the Department of Penal Institutions under the management of a commission called the Prison Board.
2. ____: Automobile License Plates: Manufacture for Open Market. Section 8340, Revised Statutes 1929, provides that the Board may purchase machinery to manufacture articles to be disposed of "upon the open market," but in a proceeding by mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to let a contract for the manufacture of automobile license plates to the Prison Board it is not necessary to determine whether it is the duty of the Secretary of State and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to let the contract to the Prison Board where the relators are not seeking to manufacture for the open market but base their claim upon Section 7760, Revised Statutes 1929.
ATWOOD, C.J., dissenting, with whom RAGLAND and ELLISON, JJ., concur; the power of the Department of Penal Institutions to manufacture automobile license plates is vested by Section 8340, Revised Statutes 1929, which after directing the Board to provide for suitable plants and equipment etc., . . . for such industries as in the opinion of the Board will best occupy such persons (in penal institutions) provides that "said Board may purchase . . . such machinery as may be necessary for the manufacture and production of any other articles as may be disposed of on the open market." From the fact that the relators seek to compel the Secretary of State to contract with the Prison Board pursuant to the proviso in Section 7760, it does not follow that the Board's authority must appear in that section or that the articles are not such as may be "disposed of upon the open market" as provided in Section 8340.
3. ____: ____: Mandamus: Constitutional Question. In a proceeding by mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to cancel a contract for the manufacture of license plates and award such contract to the Prison Board, the contractor as a party may question the constitutionality of the statute under which the Prison Board proceeds.
4. PENAL INSTITUTIONS: Automobile License Plates: Mandamus. Section 28, Article 4, of the Constitution is liberally construed but this court has not hesitated to declare an act or a part of an act unconstitutional when the legislation was clearly outside the title. The title of the bill must express the subject of the act in such terms that the members of the Legislature and the people may not be left in doubt as to what matter is treated.
5. ____: ____: ____: Descending to Particulars. The title of the Motor Vehicle Act of 1921, descends to particulars, relating to a Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, registration, fees and display of number plates on motor vehicles. The proviso to Section 7760, enacted in 1927, enlarges the field to the employment of convicts which is a matter of public concern, always separately treated by the legislative branch of the government. Motor vehicles and employment of convicts are disconnected subjects, and cannot lawfully be incorporated in the same bill.
6. ____: ____: ____: Clear Expression in Title. Besides, the subject of the proviso, contracting with the Prison Board, is not clearly expressed in the title to the motor vehicle act.
7. ____: ____: ____: ____: Germane Matter. The subject of the proviso is not germane to the subject-matter of the title.
PEREMPTORY WRIT DENIED.
Stratton Shartel, Attorney-General, Edward G. Robison and Henry H. Stern, Assistant Attorney-Generals, for relators.
(1) The respondents attack the constitutionality of the provision of Sec. 7760, R.S. 1929, that provides: "The commissioner shall advertise for bids for the manufacture of number plates and chauffeurs' badges in at least two (2) daily papers published in the State and shall let the contract therefor to the lowest bidder; the commissioner may reserve the right to reject any and all bids: Provided, however, the commissioner shall contract with the Prison Board for the manufacture of such plates and badges whenever the Prison Board is equipped with the necessary machinery for the manufacture of such plates, provided the said Board will make the same at a cost equal or less than the best obtainable prices from other sources." The above section was first passed at the First Extra Session of the Legislature in 1921, page 76. It was amended in 1927, page 314, section 4. The amendment made in 1927 had nothing to do with the matter under consideration. It is mentioned for the reason that the respondents attacked the sufficiency of the title of the act of 1921 and 1927. (2) Every reasonable intendment should be made to sustain the legislative enactment. No act should be declared unconstitutional unless it appears very clearly so. State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076. (3) The title to the act of which Section 7760, supra, is a part is more definite than many acts that have been held good in this State. (4) The title contains a single subject which is clearly expressed in the title of the act. "The object and purpose of Section 28 of Article IV of the Missouri Constitution was to kill `log-rolling' and to prevent incongruous, disconnected matters which had no relation to each other from being joined in one bill. However, it has always been recognized that all matters that are germane to the principal subject might properly be incorporated in the same bill." State v. Brodnax, 228 Mo. 54; O'Connor v. Transit Co., 198 Mo. 633; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 498. "It is a fixed rule that where all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it then the subject is single, and if it is sufficiently expressed in the title, the statute is valid." Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 71; State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076. "The Supreme Court of Missouri has uniformly given a broad and liberal construction to said section of our Constitution relating to the subject-matter and title of an act." State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d 1076; Star Square Auto Supply Co. v. Gerk, 30 S.W.2d 453; State ex rel. v. Terte, 324 Mo. 405; State v. Mullinix, 301 Mo. 390; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 444. "The `subject' of an act, in the constitutional sense, is the matter to which the act relates and which forms the groundwork of the act." 25 R.C.L. sec. 90, p. 844; 25 R.C.L. sec. 88, p. 842; 36 Cyc. 1022; Lewis, Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2 Ed.) sec. 116; McNeely v. Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508, 62 L.R.A. 576. "The matter to which the act at bar relates and which forms the groundwork of said act is `Motor Vehicles,' and the act wholly relates to that one subject. Its provisions set up the complete machinery to carry it into effect among which is the duty of commissioner of motor vehicles. These matters are phases of the one general subject `motor vehicles.' This fact constitutes no constitutional objection to the act, when it as an entirety relates to but one subject." State ex rel. v. Miller, 33 S.W.2d 124; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 639; Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 204. "The requirement that the subject must be `clearly expressed' in the title of an act, does not mean that the subject must be specifically stated, but it is sufficient if the subject is stated in general terms, and the title fairly embraces the subject matter covered by the act." In re Burris, 66 Mo. 446; State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 29; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 445; State ex rel. v. Terte, 324 Mo. 406. "The courts, in determining what is the subject of an act, are bound to accept what either is expressly stated or is spelled out by the details expressed. The title is sufficient if the general subject can be inferred from the details set out therein. State v. Smith, 233 Mo. 255." (5) Sec. 7760, R.S. 1929, enacted at the First Extra Session, 1921, page 76, and re-enacted at the Session of 1927, page 314, expressly provides that the prison board shall have the right to manufacture said number plates and chauffeurs' badges whenever the prison board is equipped with the necessary machinery for the manufacture of such plates, provided the said board will make the same at a cost equal or less than the best obtainable price from other sources. By this later enactment the right to so manufacture said articles was expressly given to the prison board, and if not already conferred by Sec. 8340, it is expressly conferred by subsequent legislation and to that extent broadened the powers of Sec. 8340, if said section did not expressly give this right. This right given by subsequent legislation, if the same power did not already exist by Sec. 8340 (which the relators contend did exist), also broadened the exception as set forth in Sec. 8343 so as to permit the prison board to manufacture these articles. It is a general rule of statutory construction that where a statute passed at a later date is in conflict with a prior statute to the extent of such conflict, the prior statute is repealed by implication. State ex rel. v. Clayton, 226 Mo. 320; State ex rel. v. Shields, 230 Mo. 102; County v. Gordon, 241 Mo. 582. (6) The Legislature, in providing for the manufacture of auto license plates and chauffeurs' badges, acted within its powers, and said act does not conflict with any of the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Missouri or the Constitution of the United States. A State Constitution is not a grant but a limitation on legislative powers. The United States Constitution is a grant of power. This is the distinction between a State Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. The General Assembly of the State of Missouri can pass any law not forbidden by the Constitution of the State of Missouri or the Constitution of the United States to this extent. All of the residuary powers are vested in the Legislature of the State of Missouri. Wire Co. v. Wallbrick, 275 Mo. 350 (cases cited); 12 C.J. 742, sec. 156. The State of Missouri through its General Assembly has power to enact all laws not denied it by its Constitution or surrendered to and forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and the General Assembly needs no express constitutional authority to pass any law it sees fit. It need only inquire whether it is forbidden to pass it. Arnold v. Hanna, 295 S.W. 425 (par. 18). (7) The Department of Penal Institutions or the Prison Board is but an agency of the State composed of certain officials for the conduct and management of the state penitentiary. It is a legal entity created by the State, with all the power and obligations of a corporation, for the purpose of carrying out a public enterprise. State ex rel. Highway Commission v. Bates, 317 Mo. 704; Jove v. Urquhart, 136 S.W. 664. P.H. Cullen, Charles L. Moore and Conway Elder for respondent.
(1) Where the title of an act descends to particulars and details the act must conform to the title as thus limited by the particulars and details. State ex rel. v. Edwards, 241 S.W. 950; State ex rel. v. Hackmann, 292 Mo. 32; State v. Rawlings, 232 Mo. 558; State v. Sloan, 258 Mo. 314; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 23; Hardware Co. v. Fisher, 269 Mo. 278; State v. Crites, 277 Mo. 194. (2) The object of Sec. 28, Art. IV, of the Constitution of Missouri is to have the title of an act to indicate its general contents. State ex rel. v. Roach, 258 Mo. 541; St. Louis v. Wortman, 213 Mo. 131; State ex rel. v. Vandiver, 222 Mo. 206; State ex rel. v. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 449; State v. Mullinix, 301 Mo. 385; Bottling Co. v. Mosby, 289 Mo. 462. (3) The requirement of said Sec. 28 is that matters which are incongruous, disconnected and without natural relation to each other must not be joined in one bill, and the title must be a fair index of the matters in the bill. State ex rel. v. Hackmann, 292 Mo. 27; State v. Price, 229 Mo. 670; State ex inf. v. Borden, 164 Mo. 221; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439. (4) The provisions of said section relating to the subject-matter and the title of an act should be construed so as to prevent trickery, surprise, or fraud on the legislators. State ex inf. v. Imhoff, 291 Mo. 603; State ex rel. v. Hedrick, 294 Mo. 21; Asel v. City, 287 Mo. 195; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1; State ex rel. v. Guinotte, 275 Mo. 298; State ex rel. v. Thomas, 313 Mo. 160; Bottling Co. v. Mosby, 289 Mo. 462. (5) An amendment engrafting upon the original act matters not germane thereto requires specific mention of such purpose in the title of the act. State ex rel. v. Gideon, 277 Mo. 356; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 383; Vice v. Kirksville, 280 Mo. 348. (6) If a section is to be amended the title should give notice of the amendment, and if a new section is to be enacted in lieu of one to be repealed, the title should announce it. State v. McEniry, 269 Mo. 228; State ex rel. v. Court, 128 Mo. 427; State v. Campbell, 259 S.W. 430. Where the title to an act states the subjects to be prohibited and the body of the act purported to regulate such acts, the act is unconstitutional. Berry v. Milling Co., 284 Mo. 182; State v. Crites, 277 Mo. 194; State v. Burgdoefer, 107 Mo. 1. (7) The proviso in Sec. 7760, is unconstitutional and void for the reason that the manufacture of number plates and badges is foreign to, incongruous with, disconnected from, and without any natural relation to, any of the other subjects mentioned in the said title. State v. Price, 229 Mo. 678; State v. Hackmann, 292 Mo. 27, 237 S.W. 743; State v. Miller, 100 Mo. 444. (8) The said proviso is further unconstitutional and void as being in conflict with Sec. 55 of Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri in that: (a) The subject-matter of the proviso was not specially designated in the proclamation of the Governor by which the First Extra Session in 1921 of the Fifty-first General Assembly of the State of Missouri was called. Nor was the act containing said proviso validated by the subsequent approval of the Governor. Wells v. Railway Co., 110 Mo. 286; Stocke v. Edwards, 295 Mo. 402, 244 S.W. 802; State v. Edwards, 241 S.W. 945. (b) That the said constitutional provision being a limitation upon the powers of the General Assembly in extra session, the said Fifty-first General Assembly was without authority to enact the law of which the said proviso is a part. Ex parte Seward, 253 S.W. 357; Wells v. Railway Co., 110 Mo. 297. (9) The said proviso is further unconstitutional and void as being violative of Sec. 53, Subds. 24 and 26, Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, in that it attempts to grant to the individuals comprising the Prison Board a special and exclusive right and privilege, to-wit, that of manufacturing number plates and badges, at a cost equal or less than the best obtainable prices, and further attempts to regulate labor, trade and manufacturing, all of which is prohibited by said section and subdivisions mentioned. Carroll v. Campbell, 110 Mo. 557; State v. Walsh, 136 Mo. 400; State v. Baskowitz, 156 S.W. 945; State v. Thomas, 138 Mo. 95; In re Flukes, 157 Mo. 125; State v. Miksicek, 225 Mo. 561; St. Louis Gas Light Co. v. Gas Fuel Power Co., 16 Mo. App. 52. (10) The said proviso is further unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it embraces arbitrary and capricious legislation affecting the rights and privileges of citizens, and attempts to confer upon the Prison Board a right not possessed by a citizen in the transaction of lawful business, all in derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, providing that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges of citizens of the United States. Atchison, T. S.F.R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571; F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412; Ex parte French, 315 Mo. 75.
Original proceeding in mandamus. Relators, Department of Penal Institutions et al., seek cancellation of a contract awarded to respondent Adams Company by respondents, Secretary of State and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The contract is an agreement on the part of the Adams Company to manufacture and furnish the State with automobile license plates and chauffeurs' badges for the year 1932, as per bid and specifications. Relators further seek to compel respondents Secretary of State and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to award said contract to the Department of Penal Institutions, or Prison Board. The pleadings are not challenged.
Relators contend that under certain statutes the board was and is authorized to manufacture and furnish said articles to the State, and that under the facts in evidence it was and is the duty of respondents to award the contract to the board.
The principles of law governing penal institutions and the right of such institutions to manufacture and sell commodities are well settled. The power to control such institutions is vested in the legislative branch of the government and is provided for by statutes. [50 C.J. 332; 22 Amer. Eng. Ency. L. (2 Ed.) p. 1299, sec. 3.] Our General Assembly has enacted enabling statutes on the subject. [2 R.S. 1929, p. 2352, ch. 44, Penal Institutions.] This chapter contains nine articles, Sections 8316 to 8555, Revised Statutes 1929. It covers the subject. Of course, it provides for the creation of the Department of Penal Institutions or Prison Board. It also fixes the powers of the board, among which is the power given in Section 8340 to provide for the employment of persons confined in said institutions by leasing, purchasing or otherwise providing plants, machinery, equipment and material to manufacture articles as follows:
(1) Those needed in our penal or reformatory institutions.
(2) Those required in our public buildings and offices.
(3) Those used in the erection of building or other improvements in or connected with state institutions or properties.
(4) Those used in the construction or improvement of state or county highways.
(5) Lime and binding twine to be used for agricultural and other purposes in the State.
(6) The "board may purchase or lease upon reasonable terms such machinery as may be necessary for the manufacture and production of any other articles or products that may be disposed of upon the open market at a profit to the State, including shoes, clothing, flour, mats, mops, rugs, carpets and other articles of furniture, such as beds and bedding of all kinds; also desks, chairs, tables, farm implements, fertilizer, brick or any other articles agreed upon by the board."
The power of the board to provide for the employment of convicts is further limited by Section 8343, which follows:
"Except as in Section 8340, hereinabove provided, the leasing or contracting of convict labor in any form or manner, directly or indirectly is hereby prohibited."
Relators must point to the statute authorizing the Prison Board to manufacture license plates and chauffeurs' badges for the State. In other words, the board must be authorized to enter into the contract in question. In this behalf relators timidly suggest that such authority is granted in paragraph six (as above set forth) of Section 8340 in that the board is therein authorized to manufacture and sell upon the open market any article that may be agreed upon by the board. Respondents suggest that license plates and chauffeurs' badges are manufactured and sold as per specifications in a contract and are not articles sold on the open market. It will not be necessary to determine this question, for relators plead that as a matter of law it is the duty of respondents Secretary of State and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to award the contract to the board. In other words, they claim the contract under Section 7760, Revised Statutes 1929. Thus it appears that the board is not seeking to manufacture said articles for the open market.
Relators next contend that Section 7760 of the Motor Vehicle Act amended by implication Sections 8340 and 8343 of the Penal Institutions Act, and authorized the board to manufacture license plates and chauffeurs' badges for the State. The pertinent part of Section 7760 follows:
"The commissioner shall advertise for bids for the manufacture of number plates and chauffeurs' badges in at least two (2) daily papers published in the State and shall let the contract therefor to the lowest bidder; the commissioner may reserve the right to reject any and all bids; Provided, however, the commissioner shall contract with the prison board for the manufacture of such plates and badges whenever the prison board is equipped with the necessary machinery for the manufacture of such plates, provided the said board will make the same at a cost equal or less than the best obtainable prices from other sources."
Respondents concede the contention, if the last two provisos of Section 7760 are valid, but they plead that said provisos violate Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution of Missouri, which follows:
"No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
In this connection it should be stated that the right of respondent officers to question the constitutionality of said provisos need not be decided because the respondent Adams Company is an interested party, and as such authorized to raise the question.
The general rule by which the question must be determined is set forth in many decisions of this court. We are committed to a liberal construction of Section 28, Article IV of the Constitution. [State ex rel. v. Terte, 23 S.W.2d 120; Asel v. City of Jefferson, 287 Mo. 195, 229 S.W. 1046; State v. Price, 229 Mo. 670, 129 S.W. 650; State v. Ward, 40 S.W.2d l.c. 1076; Star Square Auto Supply Co. v. Gerk, 30 S.W.2d 447, l.c. 453; State v. Mullinix, 301 Mo. 385, l.c. 390, 257 S.W. 121; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, l.c. 444, 13 S.W. 677.]
On the other hand we have not hesitated to rule an act or part of an act unconstitutional when the legislation was clearly outside the title. [State ex inf. v. Borden, 164 Mo. 221, 64 S.W. 172; Vice v. Kirksville, 280 Mo. 348, 217 S.W. 77; State ex inf. Barrett v. Imhoff, 291 Mo. 603, 238 S.W. 122; State ex rel. v. Wiethaupt, 231 Mo. 449, 133 S.W. 329; State ex rel. v. Gordon, 233 Mo. 383, 135 S.W. 929; State v. McEniry, 269 Mo. 228, 190 S.W. 272; State ex rel. v. Gideon, 277 Mo. 356, 210 S.W. 358; Southard v. Short, 8 S.W.2d 903; State v. Hurley, 258 Mo. 275, 167 S.W. 965; State v. Sloan, 258 Mo. 305, 167 S.W. 500, 501, 502; St. Louis v. Wortman, 213 Mo. 131, 112 S.W. 520; State ex rel. Niedemeyer v. Hackman, 292 Mo. 27, 237 S.W. 742; Mayes v. United Garment Workers of America, 6 S.W.2d 333.]
The purpose of this provision of the Constitution is stated by a standard text as follows:
"First, to prevent hodge-podge or `log-rolling' legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire." [1 Cooley's Const. Lim. p. 296.]
And we have ruled as follows:
"The object of the constitutional provision was to require so clear an expression of the subject of the bill in the title, that it would at once apprise legislators and others interested of the precise subject of the proposed legislation." [City of Kansas v. Payne, 71 Mo. 159, l.c. 162.]
"The evident object of the provision of the organic law relative to the title of an act was to have the title like a guide board, indicate the general contents of the bill, and contain but one general subject which might be expressed in a few or a greater number of words. If those words only constitute one general subject; if they do not mislead as to what the bill contains; if they are not designed as a cover to vicious and incongruous legislation, then the title can stand on its own merits, is an honest title and does not impinge on constitutional prohibitions." [St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600, l.c. 616, 31 S.W. 1045.]
"The title (to the bill) must express the subject of the act in such terms that the members of the general assembly and the people may not be left in doubt as to what matter is treated of." [State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 30, 17 S.W. 646.]
"Adjudicated cases do not, as a general rule, afford us much assistance in passing upon questions of this character, other than in a general way, as each case must be adjudged according to its own peculiar facts and the directness or remoteness, as the case may be, of its provisions to matters in consonance with its title." [Witzmann v. The S. Ry. Co., 131 Mo. 612, l.c. 618-619, 33 S.W. 181.]
"No definite rule to test the sufficiency of titles of enactments has yet been formulated. Each case must be adjudicated upon the special facts it exhibits, having regard to the cogent reasons of public policy which led to the adoption of the constitutional provision. Those reasons are part of the history of legislation in this country (State ex rel. v. Ranson (1880), 73 Mo. 86), and, in discharging our duty of giving effect to the commands of the people, expressed in the Constitution, we cannot ignore them." [State ex rel. K.C. Park Dist. v. County Ct. of Jackson Co., 102 Mo. 531, l.c. 537, 15 S.W. 79.]
Having in mind the rule, we will consider the title. It descends to particulars. As such it contains eighteen items. We think the particulars are stated as the subject of the act. [State ex rel. v. Hackman, 292 Mo. 27, l.c. 32; 237 S.W. 742.] But whether the particulars or the general subject be considered the subject of the act is of no consequence, because the question is: Does the bill contain more than one subject? Only one item of the particulars may be said to cover plates and badges. Therefore, it will not be necessary to set forth all the items. They may be found in Laws of 1921, Extra Session, page 76. The pertinent part of the title follows:
"Motor Vehicles: Repealing Chapter 71, R.S. of Mo., 1919, Relating to Motor Vehicles and Enacting a New Chapter — Authorizing Appointment of a Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and Defining his Powers and Duties.
"An Act to repeal Chapter 71, Revised Statutes of Missouri of 1919, entitled `Motor Vehicles,' and to enact in lieu thereof a new chapter providing:
"For the registration of, fees to be charged and collected therefor, and the display of number plates on motor vehicles and trailers;"
The challenged provisos follow:
"Provided . . . the commissioner shall contract with the prison board for the manufacture of such plates and badges whenever the prison board is equipped with the necessary machinery for the manufacture of such plates, provided the said board will make the same at a cost equal or less than the best obtainable prices from other sources."
Relators insist that these provisos are covered by the title to the Motor Vehicle Act. It must be admitted that the sole purpose of the provisos was to enlarge the field of employment of convicts and thereby amend the Penal Institutions Act. In other words, the subject of the provisos is the manufacture of certain articles by convicts. The furnishing of said articles to the State is merely incidental to the subject of the employment of the convicts. The employment of persons confined in our penal institutions is a matter of public concern and has always been separately treated by the legislative branch of our government. Motor vehicles and the employment of convicts are clearly disconnected matters. They are different subjects and cannot lawfully be incorporated in the same bill.
But even if the two subjects could be lawfully incorporated in the same bill, the provisos are invalid because the subject (the employment of convicts) is not "clearly expressed in the title" to the Motor Vehicle Act. On this question relators rely on a liberal construction of said title. There is no ambiguity in the title and therefore nothing to construe. As stated by relators, "motor vehicles" form the groundwork of the act. Of course, all matters germane to this subject may be incorporated in the act. But the provision for the manufacture of plates and badges by convicts is not germane to the subject "motor vehicles." It has no natural connection with said subject, and there is no word in this title tending to even cause a suspicion that hidden away in one of the thirty-two sections of the bill are provisos providing for the manufacture of plates and badges by convicts. No member of the Legislature or the public could have been notified by this title, that the bill dealt with the employment of convicts. For the reasons stated, the provisos are unconstitutional and invalid.
The suggestion that the provisos are valid under the rule that the title need not recite provisos and exceptions appearing in the bill cannot be sustained for the reason these provisos are not germane to the subject. [25 R.C.L. 857.] Furthermore, the provisos inject into the bill a foreign subject. These conclusions make it unnecessary to rule the other questions presented.
The peremptory writ is denied and the alternative writ quashed. White, Frank and Henwood, JJ., concur; Atwood, C.J., dissents in separate opinion in which Ragland and Ellison, JJ., concur.
The decision reached in the majority opinion rides off on the holding that the Department of Penal Institutions has no power to manufacture license plates and chauffeurs' badges because the proviso in Section 7760, Revised Statutes 1929, as an enactment conferring such power, is ruled to be in violation of Section 28, Article IV of the Missouri Constitution. It is my view that such power is well vested in the commissioners of this department, frequently referred to as The Prison Board, not by anything appearing in Section 7760, but by the provisions of Section 8340, Revised Statutes 1929. If this position is well taken the constitutional objection, upon which the majority opinion rests, drops out of the case.
Section 8340, after directing the Board "to purchase, lease or otherwise provide suitable plants, machinery and equipment, and to purchase material, for the employment of all able-bodied persons in the Missouri state penitentiary, the Missouri reformatory, the industrial home for girls, the industrial home for negro girls, or any other penal or reformatory institutions hereafter created, for such industries as in the opinion of the board will best occupy such persons, with the view of manufacturing, so far as may be practicable, such articles agreed upon by said board as are needed in any of the institutions hereinabove in this section mentioned or referred to, also such as are required by the State or political subdivisions thereof, in the buildings and offices of the institutions owned, managed or controlled by the State or political subdivision thereof, also including articles and material to be used in the erection of buildings or other improvements upon, in, or in connection with, any state institutions or state properties, or in the construction, improvement or repairs of any state highways or county highways, including bridges and culverts; including lime to be used for agricultural and other purposes in this State; also including binding twine for use of farmers and others in this State;" further provides that "said board may purchase or lease upon reasonable terms such machinery as may be necessary for the manufacture and production of any other articles or products that may be disposed of upon the open market at a profit to the State, including shoes, clothing, floor mats, mops, rugs, carpets and other articles of furniture, such as beds and bedding of all kinds; also desks, chairs, tables, farm implements, fertilizer, brick or any other articles agreed upon by the board."
Respondents' brief casually disposes of the foregoing provisions with the observation that "license plates are not `articles or products sold on the open market,' and hence are not embraced within the language of said Section 8340." The majority opinion treats of them as follows: "Respondents suggest that license plates and chauffeurs' badges are manufactured and sold as per specifications in a contract and are not articles sold on the open market. It will not be necessary to determine this question, for relators plead that as a matter of law it is the duty of respondents Secretary of State and Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to award the contract to the board. In other words, they claim the contract under Section 7760, Revised Statutes 1929. Thus it appears that the board is not seeking to manufacture said articles for the open market. The suggestion of the Prison Board is overruled."
The expression, non sequitur, so familiar in logic, fairly applies to the above course of reasoning and conclusion reached. From the mere fact that relators here seek to compel the Secretary of State and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to contract with the prison board for this particular lot of plates and badges pursuant to the proviso in said Section 7760, it by no means follows that the board's authority to manufacture license plates and chauffeurs' badges must appear in Section 7760, or that these articles are not such "articles or products that may be disposed of upon the open market at a profit to the State," which under the provisions of Section 8340, supra, the prison board is authorized to manufacture and produce. I think the very question thus suggested by respondents must be determined, and the plain meaning of Section 8340 requires that it be ruled contrary to respondents' contention.
No reason is suggested, and I can think of none, why the prison board may not dispose of license plates and chauffeurs' badges on a competitive or open market to any state, municipality or person willing and able to buy. It is a matter of common knowledge that such articles are usually bought and sold in open, public, unrestricted competition. The record here shows that the contract now sought by relators is the result of unrestricted competition, or an effort to sell on the open market, and that performance by the prison board would mean great profit and saving to the State. And yet, according to the majority opinion, respondents claim that the board is not authorized to produce these articles because they "are manufactured and sold as per specifications in a contract and are not articles sold on the open market." So are shoes, clothing and other articles named in the last above quoted clause of Section 8340 "sold as per specifications in a contract," frequently in large quantities to be manufactured for a particular customer and for a particular purpose and subject to all the details, specifications and regulations that commonly attend competitive bidding, just as was done in this instance.
The evident purpose of Section 8340 is to help effectuate a sound, humane public policy with reference to employment of inmates of penal institutions, and its provisions should be liberally construed. Our approval of respondents' narrow and unwarranted interpretation of this statute can but give rise to confusion and doubt as to the prison board's power, heretofore unquestioned, to engage in other lines of manufacture and production upon the successful continuance of which great public interest depends. Such approval should not be given, and for reasons herein stated I respectfully dissent. Ragland and Ellison, JJ., concur.