Summary
denying temporary total disability compensation because incarceration was "voluntary" act removing claimant from work force
Summary of this case from King v. Industrial Com'n of UtahOpinion
No. 86-602
Decided December 16, 1987.
Mandamus — To compel Industrial Commission to grant temporary total disability benefits during incarceration — Incarceration constitutes a factor which, independently of previously recognized work-related injury, precludes receipt of temporary total disability compensation.
IN MANDAMUS.
On February 28, 1978, relator, Nelson C. Ashcraft, was injured while working within the scope of his employment as a welder for respondent Marion Power Shovel Division of Dresser Industries, Inc. Relator timely filed an application for workers' compensation benefits and the claim was allowed for conditions affecting his right leg. Relator received temporary total disability compensation from March 1, 1978 to September 14, 1980.
Thereafter, relator was incarcerated in West Virginia on a felony charge. Relator was subsequently convicted and imprisoned for first degree murder. On April 6, 1981, while still incarcerated in West Virginia, relator filed a motion with the commission seeking temporary total disability compensation from September 14, 1980 through March 23, 1981. Relator's motion was heard before a district hearing officer who, relying upon Ohio Industrial Commission Resolution No. R. 80-7-57, ordered relator's motion suspended until such time as relator was released from incarceration. This resolution precluded a claimant's receipt of any temporary total compensation while incarcerated. The order of the district hearing officer was affirmed by the Cleveland Regional Board of Review and a subsequent appeal to the Industrial Commission was refused.
On May 18, 1983, relator filed an application for a writ of mandamus with the Franklin County Court of Appeals seeking an order compelling the commission to hear the application for temporary total disability compensation. On March 15, 1984, the appellate court granted the requested writ on the grounds that Industrial Commission Resolution No. R. 80-7-57 did not apply to an out-of-state prisoner such as relator. This decision was appealed to this court.
On December 31, 1984, this court affirmed the appellate court's issuance of the writ of mandamus on grounds other than that relied upon by the reviewing appellate court. State, ex rel. Ashcraft, v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 126, 15 OBR 276, 472 N.E.2d 1077. This court held that the Industrial Commission was without the statutory authority to promulgate Resolution No. R. 80-7-57; hence, any action taken thereunder was a nullity. As a result, this court ordered the commission to consider relator's pending application.
Pursuant to this decision, relator's application was heard before a district hearing officer on May 9, 1985. At the time of this hearing, relator's file contained the reports of Drs. Robert R. Weiler and Eric L. David, both of which were supportive of the finding that relator was temporarily and totally disabled and unable to perform the duties of his former position. On June 13, 1985, the district hearing officer issued an order which granted relator's request to change physicians and the employer's request to have relator examined by a physician of its choice on the issue of the extent of the disability. Further, the employer was ordered to pay relator temporary total disability compensation from the last date of payment through October 22, 1984. Respondent appealed this order to the Cleveland Regional Board of Review. On October 22, 1985, the board affirmed that part of the district hearing officer's order granting relator's requested change of physician and the employer's request to have the claimant examined by a physician of its choice on the issue of the extent of disability. However, the board ordered that the issue of the extent of the disability be held in abeyance pending the submission of the report of the medical expert selected by the employer.
On September 25, 1985, relator was examined by Dr. David C. Shamblin who found that relator was totally disabled as a result of his knee injury. Dr. Shamblin assessed this condition to be permanent and recommended that relator be evaluated for a permanent disability rating.
Relator appealed the October 22, 1985 decision of the regional board of review to the Industrial Commission. On February 5, 1986, the commission denied relator's request for receipt of temporary disability compensation while incarcerated on the grounds that the relator's incarceration amounted to an abandonment of his former position of employment.
Relator has instituted this action in mandamus to challenge the commission's determination in this matter.
Jeffries Monteleone Co., L.P.A., and J. Michael Monteleone, for relator.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., attorney general, and Gerald H. Waterman, for respondent Industrial Commission.
Vorys, Sater, Seymour Pease, Robert A. Minor and Janice A. Judge, for respondent Marion Power Shovel Division of Dresser Industries, Inc.
At the outset, this court takes notice of the fact that effective August 22, 1986, the legislature amended R.C. 4123.54 to prohibit a claimant's receipt of workers' compensation or benefits while confined in a penal institution in this or any state for conviction of violation of the criminal law of this or any other state. Hence, the resolution of this matter will only concern workers' compensation applications filed before August 22, 1986.
The Industrial Commission based its February 5, 1986 order on the decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals in State, ex rel. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., v. Indus. Comm. (1985), 29 Ohio App.3d 145, 29 OBR 162, 504 N.E.2d 451. The issue before the court in that case was whether a claimant's voluntary retirement from the workplace precluded an award of temporary total disability benefits, even though the claimant may otherwise be eligible therefor. In resolving this question, the appellate court looked to this court's decision in State, ex rel. Ramirez, v. Indus. Comm. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 630, 23 O.O. 3d 518, 433 N.E.2d 586, which defined a temporary total disability as a disability which prevents a worker from returning to his former position of employment. The appellate court interpreted this definition as not only requiring that the injury render the claimant unable to perform the functions of the former position, but that the injury also prevented him from returning to that position. The court reasoned:
"A worker is prevented by an industrial injury from returning to his former position of employment where, but for the industrial injury, he would return to such former position of employment. However, where the employee has taken action that would preclude his returning to his former position of employment, even if he were able to do so, he is not entitled to continue temporary total disability benefits since it is his own action, rather than the industrial injury, which prevents his returning to such former position of employment." Jones Laughlin, supra, at the syllabus.
Relator challenges the commission's reliance on this decision on the grounds that, unlike the claimant in Jones Laughlin, relator has not indicated that he has no intention of ever returning to the job market. Moreover, it is contended that in Jones Laughlin, there was a disagreement between the doctors as to whether the claimant was temporarily and totally disabled. In the case at bar, relator alleges that the doctors are unanimous in their view that relator remains unable to perform the duties of his former position of employment.
A review of the Jones Laughlin decision demonstrates that neither of these allegedly distinguishing factors was essential to the court's reasoning. The crux of this decision was the court's recognition of the two-part test to determine whether an injury qualified for temporary total disability compensation. The first part of this test focuses upon the disabling aspects of the injury, whereas the latter part determines if there are any factors, other than the injury, which would prevent the claimant from returning to his former position. The secondary consideration is a reflection of the underlying purpose of temporary total compensation: to compensate an injured employee for the loss of earnings which he incurs while the injury heals. State, ex rel. Ramirez, supra; State, ex rel. Bunch, v. Indus. Comm. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 423, 427, 16 O.O. 3d 449, 451, 406 N.E.2d 815, 818; State, ex rel. Rubin, v. Indus. Comm. (1938), 134 Ohio St. 12, 16, 11 O.O. 382, 383, 15 N.E.2d 541, 542. When a claimant has voluntarily removed himself from the work force, he no longer incurs a loss of earnings because he is no longer in a position to return to work. This logic would apply whether the claimant's abandonment of his position is temporary or permanent.
This brings the court to the final consideration on the merits: whether the Industrial Commission was justified in viewing relator's incarceration as a voluntary abandonment of his former position of employment. Relator contends that this court implicitly rejected this proposition during its previous review of this case.
Relator's reliance on this court's initial review of this case is misplaced. This court limited its initial review of this cause to the question of whether the commission had the authority to promulgate a resolution which precluded a claimant's receipt of temporary benefits while incarcerated. We ultimately concluded that by adopting and enforcing this resolution, the commission exceeded its statutory powers. However, this court made no comment as to the propriety of the commission's position when based upon grounds other than the invalidated resolution.
While a prisoner's incarceration would not normally be considered a "voluntary" act, one may be presumed to tacitly accept the consequences of his voluntary acts. When a person chooses to violate the law, he, by his own action, subjects himself to the punishment which the state has prescribed for that act.
Based on the foregoing, we find that relator's incarceration constitutes a factor which, independently of his previously recognized work-related injury, would preclude his receipt of temporary total disability compensation.
Accordingly, the writ of mandamus is denied.
Writ denied.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
H. BROWN, J., not participating.