Opinion
L-22-1205
11-14-2022
Angelo Bobby Acosta, Pro se.
Angelo Bobby Acosta, Pro se.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on a petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus filed by relator, Angelo B. Acosta, against respondent, Hon. Dean Mandros in his capacity of Lucas County Court of Common Pleas Judge. In his petition, relator seeks an order prohibiting respondent from proceeding in a civil forfeiture action in case No. CR0201902038, and mandating that respondent release to relator the personal property subject to the forfeiture action. Because we find that relator has a remedy in the ordinary course of law, we sua sponte dismiss relator's petition.
Relator also cites case No. CR0201902703, but that case is not part of the forfeiture proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On June 14, 2019, relator was indicted in case No. CR0201902038 on one count of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(e), a felony of the first degree, and one count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(d), a felony of the second degree.
{¶ 3} On June 25, 2019, the state of Ohio initiated a civil forfeiture proceeding against relator in case No. CI0201902884. Pursuant to R.C. 2981.05, the complaint sought to forfeit $4,500 in U.S. currency that was used in or derived from the commission of a felony drug offense. On July 11, 2019, case No. CI0201902884 was transferred from the civil docket of Judge Ian English to the criminal docket of respondent, and was consolidated with criminal case No. 0201902038. The July 11, 2019 order then dismissed case No. CI0201902884 without prejudice. No further filings have been made in CI0201902884.
{¶ 4} The July 11, 2019 order was also entered on the docket in case No. CR0201902038. The order stated,
Upon review of the case designation sheet submitted with the Civil Forfeiture Complaint in Case No. [CI0201902884], and pursuant to Local Rule 5.02(B)(2), the Court finds that the procedural transfer and consolidation of Case No. [CI0201902884] in to Case No. [CR0201902038] shall be GRANTED. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, pursuant to Civ.R. 42(A), that Case No. [CI0201902884] is ORDERED transferred from the civil docket of Judge IAN B ENGLISH to the criminal docket of Judge DEAN P MANDROS, and consolidated with Case No. [CR0201902038]. It is further ORDERED that Case No. [CI0201902884] is dismissed without prejudice. Costs assessed to the Plaintiff in Case No. [CI0201902884] are ORDERED waived. Remaining costs are ORDERED transferred to [CR0201902038].
{¶ 5} On September 27, 2019, relator filed a "Motion for Leave to File Answer Instanter" in case No. CR0201902038. The motion requested leave to file an answer to the state's forfeiture complaint. The trial court did not rule on relator's motion, and no answer was ever filed.
{¶ 6} Thereafter, on February 14, 2020, in case No. CR0201902038, relator withdrew his previous plea of not guilty, and entered a plea of guilty to the amended count of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(e), a felony of the second degree. The trial court sentenced appellant to serve a prison term of six years, to be served concurrently to a sentence imposed in a separate case. Relator appealed his judgment of conviction. On March 12, 2021, this court affirmed relator's conviction.
{¶ 7} On July 23, 2021, in case No. CR0201902038 relator filed a pro se "Motion to Release Property and Return Back to the Defendant Along with $4500.00 of U.S. Currency." Relator argued that the indictment did not contain a forfeiture specification, that the trial court did not conduct a forfeiture hearing, and that the sentencing entry did not contain an order of forfeiture. Relator sought the return of $4,500.00 in U.S. Currency, several phones, and all paper and mail documents bearing his name that were seized. Notably, relator's motion contained a "Certificate of Service," but the certificate of service was not separately signed by relator.
{¶ 8} On August 18, 2021, the trial court granted relator's motion in case No. CR0201902083, noting that the state did not file an objection to the motion.
{¶ 9} On August 19, 2021, relator filed a pro se amended motion for release of property, which included a signed certificate of service.
{¶ 10} On September 8, 2021, the state of Ohio filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Release Property." In its motion, the state requested that the trial court reconsider the August 18, 2021 judgment, and deny relator's motion for release of property, only as it pertains to the $4,500.00 in U.S. currency. The state argued that it filed a civil forfeiture action pursuant to R.C. 2981.05(C) in case No. CI0201902884, that the civil forfeiture action was consolidated with the criminal action, and that the civil forfeiture action was stayed pending relator's criminal proceedings and appeal. The state concluded that the civil forfeiture action was still pending before the court, and requested that the trial court move forward with that action. Relator opposed the state's motion on September 22, 2021.
{¶ 11} On October 14, 2021, the trial court granted the state's "Motion for Reconsideration." The court initially recognized that its consideration of relator's July 23, 2021 motion was improper because relator's motion did not contain a completed proof of service, citing Civ.R. 5(B)(4) ("Documents filed with the court shall not be considered until proof of service is endorsed thereon or separately filed."). The court then construed the state's "Motion for Reconsideration" as a timely motion for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5). The court found that the state had presented a meritorious argument in that a further hearing was required for the court to adjudicate the forfeiture action to finality. Therefore, the court found the state's motion well-taken, "whether construed as one for relief, or for reconsideration of the Court's August 18, 2021 Judgement Entry." The court then reconsidered the August 18, 2021 judgment entry, and denied relator's July 23, 2021 motion for release of property and relator's August 19, 2021 amended motion for release of property. The court set the matter for a hearing on the forfeiture action.
{¶ 12} Although a hearing on the forfeiture action was scheduled, it was not held because in the interim, on November 30, 2021, relator appealed a judgment from the trial court denying his motion requesting the court to order BCI to provide relator all information regarding the drug analysis in his cases.
{¶ 13} After the notice of appeal was filed, relator filed another pro se "Motion to Release Property" on December 13, 2021, in which he argued that the court should release the $4,500.00, and should not have granted the state's motion for reconsideration. Relator again filed a pro se "Motion for Release of Property" on March 2, 2022.
{¶ 14} On March 10, 2022, at the request of relator, this court dismissed relator's appeal of the order denying his request to compel BCI to provide him with all information regarding the drug analysis.
{¶ 15} Thereafter, on March 24, 2022, the trial court appointed defense counsel for relator. On May 12, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on relator's motions to release the property. The court ordered relator's defense counsel to file a forfeiture brief by July 1, 2022.
{¶ 16} On May 23, 2022, relator moved to remove his defense counsel, and to be permitted to proceed pro se. The trial court granted relator's motion on June 13, 2022.
{¶ 17} After requesting an extension of time, relator filed his forfeiture brief on July 15, 2022, and later filed an amended forfeiture brief on July 22, 2022.
{¶ 18} On September 8, 2022, relator filed the present petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus.
{¶ 19} Subsequent to the filing of relator's original action, the state filed its opposition to relator's forfeiture brief on September 20, 2022. In addition, on October 31, 2022, the trial court denied relator's March 2, 2022 "Motion for Release of Property." At this time, the matter remains pending in the trial court on the state's forfeiture complaint.
II. Analysis
{¶ 20} In his petition, relator seeks a writ of prohibition preventing the trial court from proceeding in the forfeiture action, and a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to release the property.
{¶ 21} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, relator must establish that (1) Judge Mandros is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Smith v. Hall, 145 Ohio St.3d 473, 2016-Ohio-1052, 50 N.E.3d 524, ¶ 7, citing State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18.
{¶ 22} Likewise, to be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relator must establish that "(1) he has a clear legal right to the relief requested, (2) the judge has a clear legal duty to perform the requested act, and (3) [he] has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." State ex rel. Davis v. Janas, 160 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-1462, 155 N.E.3d 822, ¶ 9.
{¶ 23} "Neither prohibition nor mandamus will lie where relator possesses an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 393, 678 N.E.2d 549 (1997). "Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging the court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal." Id. "But where a lower court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause, prohibition and mandamus will issue to prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions, notwithstanding the availability of appeal." Id.
{¶ 24} In this case, we find that the trial court does not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over the forfeiture matter. Rather, we find that the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction in this matter is quite murky. Here, a civil forfeiture proceeding was filed in accordance with R.C. 2981.05. That matter was then consolidated with the criminal proceedings pursuant to Civ.R. 42(A)(1)(b) ("If actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: * * * (b) consolidate the actions."). The civil forfeiture case was then dismissed. Nonetheless, relator sought to file an answer to the civil forfeiture action in the criminal proceedings, and later sought to recover his property in the criminal proceedings. The trial court granted relator's motion to release the property, but then reconsidered its decision and denied relator's motion. The forfeiture action has since proceeded apace in the criminal proceedings. Through the court's actions, we find that the trial court has clearly determined that it has jurisdiction over the forfeiture issue in this case.
We have previously expressed skepticism regarding the process pursued in this matter. In State v. Thomas, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1108, 2021-Ohio-151, ¶ 4, fn. 1, we remarked:
We note the potential procedural quagmire created by the trial court in dismissing the forfeiture proceedings, sua sponte, prior to adjudicating that separate matter in the consolidated proceedings. Despite the consolidation of the criminal proceedings with the civil forfeiture proceedings, this dismissal ended the forfeiture case. After consolidation, each case retains its original identity, as the matters are not merged into a single case. See Transcon Builders, Inc. v. City of Lorain, 49 Ohio App.2d 145, 359 N.E.2d 715 (9th Dist.1976), at the syllabus; see also Lucas County Gen.R. 5.02(A) and (B) (referencing consolidated proceedings, and requiring transfer of a civil forfeiture case to the judge presiding over a related criminal proceeding, with no provision for "merger" of the two, separate cases that are consolidated). As a practical matter, once the trial court dismissed the forfeiture proceeding, there was no longer a pending matter in which to intervene.
{¶ 25} Extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus are to be issued with caution and restraint. State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998) ("[A] writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy which is customarily granted with caution and restraint, and is issued only in cases of necessity arising from the inadequacy of other remedies." (Internal quotation omitted.)); State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh, 142 Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 18 ("Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to be issued with great caution and discretion and only when the way is clear." (Internal quotation omitted.)). Here, we find that relator has an adequate remedy by way of appeal from the imminent decision on the forfeiture issue, and that the appeal will have the added benefit of more properly aligning the parties to their respective positions than would this original action.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 26} "A court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint 'is frivolous or the claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.'" State ex rel. Kerr v. Pollex, 159 Ohio St.3d 317, 2020-Ohio-411, 150 N.E.3d 907, ¶ 5, quoting State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14. "Such a dismissal is appropriate only if, after presuming the truth of all material factual allegations of the petition and making all reasonable inferences in the claimant's favor, it appears beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief." Id. In this case, relator has an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an appeal from the trial court's ultimate forfeiture decision.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, upon due consideration, relator's petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus is not well-taken, and is hereby dismissed. The costs of this action are assessed to relator.
{¶ 28} The clerk is directed to serve upon the parties, within three days, a copy of this decision in a manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B).
Writ Denied.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. Gene A. Zmuda, J. Myron C. Duhart, P.J. CONCUR.