Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11250 Trial Court No. 1SI-07-195 CI t/w 1SI-03-338 CR No. 6060
06-18-2014
DENNI ROSE STARR, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: David K. Allen, Sechelt, British Columbia, for the Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Sitka, David V. George, Judge.
Appearances: David K. Allen, Sechelt, British Columbia, for the Appellant. Kenneth M. Rosenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Hanley, District Court Judge.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Judge HANLEY.
Denni Starr was convicted of second-degree murder for stabbing her domestic partner, Richard "Buddy" George Jr., to death with a knife. She was also convicted of reckless endangerment for endangering their child, who was in George's arms when she stabbed him. This Court affirmed her convictions.
AS 11.41.110.
Starr v. State, 2007 WL 293072, at *1 (Alaska App. Jan 31, 2007) (unpublished).
AS 11.41.250.
Starr, 2007 WL 293072, at *1.
Starr filed an application for post-conviction relief. She asserted that the attorney who initially represented her prior to trial provided ineffective representation by failing to investigate her claim that she had suffered a head injury and concussion before she stabbed George. Starr claimed that if the jury had heard evidence of her head injury and concussion, there was a reasonable possibility that the jury would have found that she had not acted with the mental state necessary to be found guilty of the charges against her.
Starr supported her application with an affidavit from her second attorney, who began representing Starr after the first attorney withdrew from the case. He stated the first attorney had left no indication in Starr's case file about Starr sustaining a concussion and he only learned about this possible defense during trial. Starr also submitted an affidavit from a neuropsychologist who opined that Starr's behavior surrounding the stabbing was consistent with her having suffered a concussion.
Superior Court Judge David V. George concluded that Starr had pleaded a prima facie claim for relief. Based on the agreement of the parties, the judge bifurcated the evidentiary hearing on Starr's claim. The first hearing was to address whether the first attorney had been incompetent for failing to investigate whether Starr had suffered a concussion prior to stabbing George. If Starr proved this claim, a second hearing would be held to determine whether Starr was prejudiced by the incompetence. This inquiry would include medical testimony to determine whether Starr had actually suffered a concussion, and how it might have impacted her state of mind.
At the first hearing, the superior court heard conflicting testimony about what information the first attorney was aware of regarding Starr's possible concussion. Consistent with the agreed-upon bifurcated format, Starr did not present any medical testimony to establish that she had in fact suffered a concussion or that it affected her mental state.
The parties then presented argument to the court regarding whether the first attorney acted incompetently by not investigating Starr's claim of a concussion. The court told the parties it would take the matter under advisement. If the court decided Starr had established that her first attorney was incompetent, then a second hearing would be scheduled to determine whether Starr had been prejudiced by her attorney's incompetence.
Several months later the court issued a written order. The court found that Starr had failed to prove that she had suffered a head injury or concussion immediately before stabbing George. On this basis, the court denied her post-conviction relief application.
On appeal, Starr claims that the superior court did not follow the bifurcated procedure it had ordered, resulting in a denial of her post-conviction claim without due process. We agree.
The issue for the superior court to decide in the first hearing was whether Starr's first attorney had sufficient information to put him on notice that he should have investigated whether Starr had suffered a concussion before the stabbing, and how it might have impacted her state of mind. The issue before the court at that time was not whether Starr had actually suffered a concussion, nor whether her concussion would have formed the basis for a defense.
In its written order, the superior court did not make factual findings regarding whether the attorney had been incompetent for failing to investigate Starr's concussion claim. Instead, the court skipped the issue and made findings on the second issue, which had not been litigated. That is, the court found that Starr failed to prove that she had actually suffered a concussion.
Due process requires an opportunity for a party to "be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." The purpose of this requirement is to allow a party "the opportunity to present his case and have its merits fairly judged." When the superior court skipped Starr's failure-to-investigate claim, it failed to rule on the only issue that had been litigated. It also deprived Starr of the opportunity to establish that she had actually suffered a concussion and that the concussion had impacted her culpability, prior to the court ruling on those issues.
Zok v. Estate of Collins, 84 P.3d 1005, 1008 (Alaska 2004) (citations omitted).
Id.
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Because the court erroneously denied Starr's post-conviction relief claim, we REVERSE the superior court's judgment.