Opinion
F078105
10-11-2019
STANISLAUS COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Appellant, v. D.G., Respondent.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Linda M. Gonzalez and Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 08CEFL04382)
OPINION
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Samuel John Dalesandro, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Linda M. Gonzalez and Ricardo Enriquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
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FACTS
On February 4, 2009, Fresno County Superior Court ordered D.G. (respondent) to pay child support to the mother of his child in the amount of $363 per month. The order applied retroactively to October 1, 2008.
Respondent admitted at some point after the 2009 child support order, he began to use drugs, lost his job, and missed or underpaid several child support payments. In March 2016, Kings County Superior Court ordered respondent to enter a drug treatment program. Respondent participated in the program from March 30, 2016, to March 30, 2017.
For reasons that are not immediately clear from the record, the local child support agency changed from Fresno County Department of Child Support Services to Stanislaus County Department of Child Support Services (appellant) in 2012.
On December 12, 2017, respondent filed a motion to modify child support. A hearing was held on January 25, 2018. By this time, respondent had accumulated a child support arrearage of $15,606.56. The court ordered respondent's child support modified to $266 per month, retroactively effective on January 1, 2018.
On May 8, 2018, respondent requested that the Fresno County Superior Court reduce his arrearage balance due to his involuntary institutionalization in the drug treatment program from March 2016, to March 2017. Respondent said he was unable to work or seek modification of his child support order while institutionalized. He requested the court reduce $4,356 in arrears that accrued during his institutionalization "along with any interest that accrued" on the $4,356. Appellant opposed the request, saying that the relevant statute (Fam. Code, § 4007.5) only applies to support orders entered or modified after the statute's effective date of October 8, 2015.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
On July 19, 2018, Fresno County Superior Court granted respondent's motion and reduced his arrearages by $363 per month from April 1, 2016, through March 31, 2017. The court reasoned that because respondent's child support order was modified on January 25, 2018—which was after section 4007.5's effective date of October 8, 2015—respondent was entitled to relief under the statute.
Stanislaus County Department of Child Support Services appeals. Respondent has not appeared in this appeal.
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order granting respondent's motion.
DISCUSSION
Generally, a child "support order may not be modified or terminated as to an amount that accrued before the date of the filing of the notice of motion or order to show cause to modify or terminate." (§ 3651, subd. (c)(1).)
However, section 4007.5, subdivision (a) provides that, with exceptions not applicable here, every child support order "shall be suspended, by operation of law, for any period exceeding 90 consecutive days in which the person ordered to pay support is incarcerated or involuntarily institutionalized." (§ 4007.5, subd. (a).)
Section 4007.5 applies to "every ... child support order issued or modified on or after the enactment of this section." (§ 4007.5, subd. (f).) The section was enacted effective October 8, 2015. Therefore, the statute "applies only to child support orders 'issued or modified' on or after October 8, 2015." (County of San Diego Department of Child Support Services v. C.P. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (C.P.).)
Former section 4007.5, subdivision (g) (Stats. 2010, ch. 495, § 1, p. 2354) applied to child support orders and modifications issued on or after July 1, 2011. Former section 4007.5, subdivision (i) (Stats. 2010, ch. 495, § 1, p. 2354) included a sunset provision automatically repealing the statute on July 1, 2015.
Here, the February 4, 2009 child support order was in effect while respondent was institutionalized in 2016 and 2017. Because that order was issued well before the effective date of section 4007.5, the statute cannot provide any relief to respondent. (See § 4007.5, subd. (f).)
Because the statute's inapplicability is clear from its plain language, we need not consult legislative history to resolve the issue. (Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 997; The TJX Companies, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 80, 89 [reviewing courts need not resort to extrinsic aids like legislative history if plain meaning of statute can be derived from its text].)
It is true, as the lower court noted, that the 2009 child support order was modified in 2018. But respondent was institutionalized in 2016 and 2017. He could not have accrued any relevant arrears under the 2018 child support order, which was issued after he was released.
Meaning, arrears that accumulated while he was institutionalized.
In sum, respondent is not entitled to relief under section 4007.5 because (1) the statute does not apply to the 2009 child support order, and (2) while the statute would apply to the 2018 order, respondent did not accrue any relevant arrears under that order. (Cf. C.P., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 8 [section 4007.5 did not apply to 2013 order and respondent did not accrue arrears under 2016 order].)
The trial judge in this case made a reasoned and thoughtful decision. While it can certainly be contended that there is a legitimate rationale for the trial court's action, a close reading of the facts and the provisions of this legislation leads us to the conclusion that, in this case, the respondent is not entitled to relief under section 4007.5.
DISPOSITION
The July 19, 2018 order granting respondent's motion to reduce arrears is reversed. The superior court is directed to enter a new order denying the motion.
Respondent did not appear in this appeal, appellant shall bear its own costs on appeal. (See C.P., supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 13; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
/s/_________
HILL, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
POOCHIGIAN, J. /s/_________
FRANSON, J.