Opinion
Civil Action No. 7:05-cv-79 (HL).
March 28, 2006
ORDER
Before this Court are a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 3) and a Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 15) filed by pro se plaintiff Bobby T. Stanford ("Stanford"). Also presently pending is the Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. # 28) regarding Stanford's two motions. The Court has read and considered this Recommendation, as well as the objections to the Recommendation filed by Stanford (Doc. # 30) and the response to objections filed by Defendants (Doc. # 31). For the reasons set forth below, the Recommendation is rejected in part and adopted in part. The portion of the Recommendation that deals with Stanford's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 3) is rejected, and that motion is denied as moot. The portion of the Recommendation addressing Stanford's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 15) is adopted, and that motion is denied accordingly.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2005, Stanford filed a § 1983 action (Doc. # 1), in which he alleged a number of claims against Defendants, and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 3). The United States Magistrate Judge, after conducting a frivolity review, issued an Order (Doc. # 4) on October 26, 2005, allowing Stanford's claims against Defendants to proceed and ordering Defendants be served. Stanford then filed a Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 15) on January 6, 2006. A request for personal service to the United States Marshals by the Clerk of Court was not filed until January 9, 2006, and Defendants filed their answer to the complaint on January 10, 2006 (Doc. # 20). The United States Magistrate Judge filed his Recommendation (Doc. # 28) on February 16, 2006, Stanford filed objections to the Recommendation (Doc. # 30) on March 8, 2006 and Defendants filed a response to those objections (Doc. # 31) on March 9, 2006. When these motions were filed, and as this case has proceeded, Stanford was an inmate at the Lowndes County Jail in Valdosta, Georgia. However, the Court has subsequently learned that plaintiff died on March 23, 2006.
Stanford's death initially came to the Court's attention through a newspaper article. Kelli Hernandez, Lowndes County Inmate Dies in Jail, The Valdosta Daily Times, Mar. 24, 2006, at A1. The Court has subsequently confirmed through conversation with defense counsel that Stanford has died.
II. MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
As a result of Stanford's death, his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction is moot, as his death necessarily extinguishes this claim for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Motion (Doc. # 3) is denied as moot.
In denying Stanford's Motion (Doc. # 3) as moot due to his death, the Court must also reject the Recommendation as it relates to this motion. The Court does so without expressing any opinion as to the merits of the conclusion reached by the United States Magistrate Judge therein, as it is neither adopting nor denying that portion of the Recommendation. However, the Court does note that Defendants had provided the United States Magistrate Judge with documentation that Stanford had received all of his prescribed heart medications from the date of his transfer to Valdosta State Prison.
III. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Stanford's death does not extinguish his motion for default judgment, and therefore this motion is not denied as moot. To the extent that it deals with this motion, the Recommendation is hereby accepted and made the Order of the Court. Stanford's motion (Doc. # 15) is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Recommendation (Doc. # 28) is rejected in part and adopted in part. The portion of the Recommendation that deals with Stanford's Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. # 3) is rejected, and that motion is denied as moot. The portion of the Recommendation addressing Stanford's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. # 15) is adopted, and that motion is denied accordingly.
The Court notes that no Suggestion of Death has yet been filed in this case. Therefore, the Court has not considered, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a), whether the entire claim has been extinguished, nor does it find the ninety-day period for a motion of substitution has begun.
SO ORDERED.