Opinion
2013-04-11
Hauser & Associates, PC, New York (Seth A. Hauser of counsel), for appellant. Schechter & Brucker, P.C., New York (Kenneth H. Amorello of counsel), for respondents.
Hauser & Associates, PC, New York (Seth A. Hauser of counsel), for appellant. Schechter & Brucker, P.C., New York (Kenneth H. Amorello of counsel), for respondents.
TOM, J.P., SWEENY, DeGRASSE, MANZANET–DANIELS, CLARK, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul Wooten, J.), entered January 27, 2012, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, to deny the motion with respect to the causes of action for trespass and unjust enrichment, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Defendants' submissions show that the western wall of defendant Chelsea's building was leased to a nonparty for the purpose of posting an advertising sign, which protruded into plaintiff's airspace without plaintiff's consent or permission. While the encroachment of the four-inch bolts and the advertising sign is small, it remains a trespass where defendants are liable for the use of plaintiff's property rights ( cf. Sakele Bros. v. Safdie, 302 A.D.2d 20, 27, 752 N.Y.S.2d 626 [1st Dept. 2002]; Salesian Soc., Inc. v. Village of Ellenville, 121 A.D.2d 823, 824, 505 N.Y.S.2d 197 [3d Dept. 1986] ). We reject defendants' contention that dismissal of the trespass claim was warranted because the encroachment of four inches was minimal. An invasion of another's property or airspace need not be more than de minimis in order to constitute a trespass ( cf. Hoffmann Invs. Corp. v. Yuval, 33 A.D.3d 511, 512, 823 N.Y.S.2d 51 [1st Dept. 2006]; Wing Ming Props. (U.S.A.) v. Mott Operating Corp., 172 A.D.2d 301, 568 N.Y.S.2d 605 [1st Dept. 1991], affd. 79 N.Y.2d 1021, 584 N.Y.S.2d 427, 594 N.E.2d 921 [1992] ).
The motion court properly dismissed the portion of plaintiff's claim based on the temporary use of airspace to hang scaffolding while installing signs in the past as de minimis. Defendants could have sought a license for the use of airspace during the installation of each sign (see RPAPL § 881). At that time, if appropriate, plaintiff could have requested injunctive relief. Notwithstanding, the relief of an injunction is a drastic remedy “granted [only] in a clear case, reasonably free from doubt” ( 116 East 57th Street Inc. v. Gould, 273 A.D. 1000, 79 N.Y.S.2d 243 [1st Dept. 1948], lv. denied274 A.D. 782, 81 N.Y.S.2d 189 [1948] ), and plaintiff has not asserted damage to its property interest that required injunctive relief.
Issues of fact exist as to plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim since plaintiff alleged that defendants earned income through the use of its airspace rights, for which it should be compensated. Moreover, defendants have not shown that the unjust enrichment claim is time-barred. The lease defendants submitted in support of their motion shows that plaintiff commenced the action well within the six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [1] ). Further, defendants have not submitted any other leases or evidence showing that the claim is time-barred.