Summary
adopting felony DUI instruction in accord with Rodriguez
Summary of this case from Harbaugh v. StateOpinion
No. 79320.
July 2, 1992.
Harry Lee Coe III, Chair, Committee on Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal), Tampa, for petitioner.
The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) has submitted recommended amendments to the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases. The explanatory portion of the report is quoted below:
REPORT (NO. 92-1) OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL)
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA:
Your Committee on Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) recommends that The Florida Bar be authorized to publish amendments to FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES. The proposed additional instructions and revised instructions are attached.
After the title of each instruction, a parenthetical description of the proposal is given. The proposal is described as "(Amended)," "(Revised)," or "(New)." "Amended" means that the wording is not substantially revised; the added words are underlined and the deleted words have strike-overs. "Revised" means that the language has changed substantially and that no attempt is made to show the changes with underlines and strike-overs. "New" means that the instruction is based on a statute for which no current instruction exists. Short explanations also follow each proposal.
Some of the proposed instructions were published on April 15, 1989. Those proposals along with many new proposals were published in the February 15, 1991, Bar News.
No responses were received to the first publication. Two letters in response to the second publication were received. The committee has considered the responses and has amended its proposals to conform substantially to the suggestions made.
A few of the committee's suggested changes have not been published in the Bar News. To allow all interested parties a final opportunity to review the proposals, the committee is asking The Florida Bar to publish a notice that amendments have been filed, that a copy of this report can be obtained at cost for review, and that comments should be submitted by March 15, 1992, to the court.
A copy of this report also is being sent to the presidents or chairs of the Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association, the Florida Public Defenders Association, the jury instructions subcommittee of the Criminal Law Section of The Florida Bar, and the Conference of Circuit Court Judges.
One of the committee's recommendations pertained to the instruction on excusable homicide. The so-called short-form instruction on this subject is found in the introduction to homicide on pages 61 and 62 of the manual, and the so-called long form is found on page 76 of the manual. The current instructions provide that the short form shall be read in all murder and manslaughter cases, and that the long form shall also be read whenever excusable homicide is an issue in the case. The committee concludes that the long form as last amended in State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1990), is incorrect because it requires under all three of the alternative circumstances that the killing be committed by accident and misfortune. The committee believes that a killing upon sudden combat without any dangerous weapon being used and not done in a cruel and unusual manner need not have occurred by accident and misfortune and has recommended an instruction to this effect. The committee suggests that its recommended instruction replace both the current short- and long-form instructions and that the new instruction not be given where there is no basis for it in the evidence. We respectfully disagree with the committee's recommendation on this subject.
Section 782.03, Florida Statutes (1991), reads as follows:
782.03 Excusable homicide. — Homicide is excusable when committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent, or by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, without any dangerous weapon being used and not done in a cruel or unusual manner.
We believe the most logical interpretation of this language is as follows:
Homicide is excusable when committed (1) by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent, or (2) by accident and misfortune
(a) in the heat of passion upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or
(b) upon a sudden combat without any dangerous weapon being used and not done in a cruel and unusual manner.
Thus, a killing which results from sudden combat must have been committed by accident and misfortune. This view is supported by logic as well as the language of the statute. We do not believe the legislature would have intended to always excuse a homicide that occurred during sudden combat so long as a dangerous weapon was not used and it was not done in a cruel or unusual manner. If this were so, anyone who became involved in a fight and later purposefully killed his opponent would be excused if he did not use a dangerous weapon and did not do the killing in a cruel and unusual manner. We interpret the sudden combat exception to protect a person who becomes involved in a fight which accidentally leads to the death of the other party.
Furthermore, we do not concur with the committee's suggestion that no portion of the excusable homicide instruction need be read when it has no basis in the evidence. We say this because Florida case law has consistently held that manslaughter is a residual offense which cannot be properly defined without an explanation that justifiable homicide and excusable homicide are excluded from the crime. Rojas v. State, 552 So.2d 914 (Fla. 1989); Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1965). Because a manslaughter instruction will have to be given in every homicide case, the instruction on excusable homicide will also have to be included. We do, however, concur with the committee's suggestion that only one instruction on excusable homicide need be given rather than both the current short and long forms.
Therefore, we hold that the following instruction on excusable homicide shall be given in every homicide case in place of the short form now found on pages 61 and 62 of the manual.
EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE
The killing of a human being is excusable and therefore lawful, under any one of the following three circumstances:
1. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent, or
2. When the killing occurs by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or
3. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune resulting from a sudden combat, if a dangerous weapon is not used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.
"Dangerous weapon" is any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
Because this instruction will adequately cover the subject even when excusable homicide is an issue in the case, the long-form instruction now found on page 76 of the manual need not be given and shall be eliminated. The new pages 61 and 62 are included in the appendix to this opinion as pages A-10 and A-11 in lieu of the amendment to the long-form instruction on excusable homicide proposed by the committee.
All of the other recommendations of the committee, which are included in the appendix to this opinion, are approved for publication. We caution all interested persons, however, that the notes and comments reflect only the opinion of the committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. We wish to express our appreciation to the committee for its dedication in presenting to the Court its comprehensive recommendations.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
2.04(c) DEFENDANT TESTIFYING Give if The defendant in this case has become a witness. You should defendant apply the same rules to consideration of [ his ] [her] testimony requests that you apply to the testimony of the other witnesses. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS 3.01 PRINCIPALS 777.011 If two or more persons help each other [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime and the defendant is one of them, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [ he ] [she] had done all of the things the other person or persons did if the defendant: 1. Knew what was going to happen, 2. Intended to participate actively or by sharing in an expected benefit and 3. Actually did something by which [ he ] [she] intended to help [commit] [attempt to commit] the crime. "Help" means to aid, plan or assist. See State v. To be a principal, the defendant does not have to be Dene, present when the crime is [committed] [or] [attempted]. 533 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1988) Note to Omit last sentence when felony murder is charged. Judge State v. Dene. 3.01(a) PRINCIPALS — WHEN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT HIRED BY DEFENDANT 777.011 If the defendant paid or promised to pay another person or persons to [commit] [attempt to commit] a crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if [ he ] [she] had done all of the things the person who received the money did if: 1. The defendant knew what was going to happen, 2. [ He ] [She] made or promised the payment in exchange for the commission or promise to commit the crime or to help commit the crime and 3. The [crime] [attempt] was committed by Note to Omit last sentence when felony murder is charged. Judge See State v. To be a principal, the defendant does not have to be Dene, present when the crime is [committed] [or] [attempted] . 533 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1988) State v. Dene. 3.04(e) JUSTIFIABLE USE OF NONDEADLY FORCE An issue in this case is whether the defendant acted in self-defense. It is a defense to the offense with which is charged if the [injury to] resulted from the justifiable use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm. would be justified in using force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm against if the 776.012 following two facts are proved: 1. must have reasonably believed that such conduct was necessary to defend ( [ himself ) ] , [herself] ( [ another ) ] , against imminent use of unlawful force against the [defendant] ( [ other person ) ] . 2. The use of unlawful force by must have appeared to ready to take place. would be justified in using force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm against if the 776.031 following three facts are proved: 1. must have been trespassing or otherwise wrongfully interfering with land or personal property. 2. The land or personal property must have lawfully been in possession, or in the possession of a member of [ his ] [her] immediate family or household, or in the possession of some person whose property [ he ] [she] was under a legal duty to protect. 3. must have reasonably believed that [ his ] [her] use of force was necessary to prevent or terminate wrongful behavior. The use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily 776.041 harm is not justifiable if you find: 1. was attempting to commit, committing or escaping after the commission of a 2. initially provoked the use of force against [ himself ] [herself] , unless: (a) The force asserted toward the defendant was so great that [ he ] [she] reasonably believed that [ he ] [she] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and had exhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger, other than using force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm to (b) In good faith, the defendant withdrew from physical contact with and indicated clearly to that [ he ] [she] wanted to withdraw and stop the use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm, but continued or resumed the use of force. A person is not justified in using force to resist an arrest by a law enforcement officer who is known, to be or reasonably appears to be a law enforcement officer. 776.051 776.012 However, if an officer uses excessive force to make an arrest, then a person is justified in the use of reasonable force Ivester to defend [ himself ] [herself] ( [ or another ) ] , but only to v. State, the extent [ he ] [she] reasonably believes such force 398 So.2d 926 is necessary. Jackson v. State, 463 So.2d 372 776.012 776.031 776.041 In deciding whether the defendant was justified in the use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm, you must judge [ him ] [her] by the circumstances by which [ he ] [she] was surrounded at the time the force was used. The danger facing the defendant need not have been actual; however, to justify the use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm, the appearance of danger must have been so real that a reasonably cautious and prudent person under the same circumstances would have believed that the danger could be avoided only through the use of that force. Based upon appearances, the defendant must have actually believed that the danger was real. Necessity to The defendant cannot justify his use of force not likely to avoid use of cause death or great bodily harm unless he used every deadly force reasonable means within his power and consistent with his own Read in all safety to avoid the danger before resorting to that force. cases If you find that had a reputation of being a violent and dangerous person and that [ his ] [her] reputation was known to the defendant, you may consider this fact in determining whether the actions of the defendant were those of a reasonable person in dealing with an individual of that reputation. In considering the issue of self-defense, you may take into account the relative physical abilities and capacities of the defendant and If in your consideration of the issue of self-defense you have a reasonable doubt on the question of whether or not the defendant was justified in the use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm, you should find the defendant not guilty. However, if from the evidence you are convinced that the defendant was not justified in the use of force not likely to cause death or great bodily harm , then you should find [ him ] [her] guilty if all the elements of the charge have been proved. Redondo v. State, 380 So.2d 1107 3.05(c) AGGRAVATION OF A FELONY BY COMMITTING AN AGGRAVATED BATTERY F.S. 775.087(1) If you find that committed 775.087 and you also find that during the commission of the crime the defendant committed an aggravated battery, you should find the defendant guilty of with an aggravated battery. "Aggravated battery" is legally defined as If you find only that defendant committed 775.087 but did not commit an aggravated battery, then you should find the defendant guilty only of 775.087 3.05(d) AGGRAVATION OF A FELONY BY POSSESSION OF A FIREARM OR DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE F.S. 775.087(2) If you find that committed 775.087 and you also find that during the commission of the crime the defendant possessed [a firearm] [a destructive device] [a semiautomatic firearm and its high-capacity detachable box magazine] [a machine gun], you should find the defendant guilty of with Give applicable definitions as contained in F.S. 790.001(4), F.S. 790.001(6), F.S. 775.087(2)(b), and F.S. 790.001(9). If you find only that defendant committed 775.087 but did not possess a then you should find the defendant guilty only of 775.087 INTRODUCTION TO HOMICIDE In this case is accused of Murder in the First Degree includes the lesser crimes of Murder in the Second Degree, Murder in the Third Degree and Manslaughter, all of which are unlawful. A killing that is excusable or was committed by the use of justifiable deadly force is lawful. If you find was killed by you will then consider the circumstances surrounding the killing in deciding if the killing was or was [Murder in the Second Degree] [Murder in the Third Degree] [Manslaughter], or whether the killing was excusable or resulted from justifiable use of deadly force. JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE 782.02 The killing of a human being is justifiable homicide and lawful if necessarily done while resisting an attempt to murder or commit a felony upon the defendant, or to commit a felony in any dwelling house in which the defendant was at the time of the killing. EXCUSABLE HOMICIDE 782.03 The killing of a human being is excusable, and therefore lawful, under any one of the following three circumstances: 1. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent, or 2. When the killing occurs by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or 3. When the killing results from a sudden combat, without any dangerous weapon being used and not done in a cruel and unusual manner. 3. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune resulting from a sudden combat, if a dangerous weapon is not used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Definition "Dangerous weapon" is any weapon that, taking into account the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm. I now instruct you on the circumstances that must be proved before may be found guilty of or any lesser included crime. and Excusable Homicide, [40, 44] and 76 respectively 40 and 44. FELONY MURDER — FIRST DEGREE F.S. 782.04(1)(a) Before you can find the defendant guilty of First Degree Felony Murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. is dead. Give 2a, 2b 2. a. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while or 2c as was engaged in the commission of applicable ] b. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while was attempting to commit ] c. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while or an accomplice, was escaping from the immediate scene of ] 3. a. [ was the person who actually killed ] b. [ was killed by a person other than ; who was involved in the commission or attempt to commit (crime but both and the person who killed (victim) was present and did knowingly aid, abet, counsel, hire or otherwise procure were principals in the commission of ] In order to convict of First Degree Felony Murder, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or intent to kill. If 3b is given, immediately give principal instruction (3.01 on page 32a). 4. State v. Dene, 533 So.2d 265 MURDER — THIRD DEGREE F.S. 782.04(4) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Third Degree Murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. is dead. 2. a. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while was engaged in the commission of ] b. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while was attempting to commit ] c. [The death occurred as a consequence of and while or an accomplice, was escaping from the immediate scene of ] 3. a. [ was the person who actually killed ] b. [ (Defendant) was not the person who actually killed (victim), but was present and did knowingly aid, abet, counsel, hire or otherwise procure the commission of (crime alleged) .] [(Victim) was killed by a person other than (defendant); but both (defendant) and the person who killed (victim) were principals in the commission of (crime alleged).] It is not necessary for the State to prove the killing was perpetrated with a design to effect death. 3. If 3b is given, immediately give principal instruction (3.01 on page 32a). State v. Dene, 533 So.2d 265 MANSLAUGHTER F.S. 782.07 Before you can find the defendant guilty of Manslaughter, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. is dead. 2. The death was caused by the (a) intentional act of (b) intentional procurement of (c) culpable negligence of However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide as I have previously explained those terms. as previously given Hedges v. State, 172 So.2d 824 To "procure" means to persuade, induce, prevail upon or cause a person to do something. I will now define "culpable negligence" for you. Each of us has a duty to act reasonably toward others. If there is a violation of that duty, without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is negligence. But culpable negligence is more than a failure to use ordinary care toward others. In order for negligence to be culpable, it must be gross and flagrant. Culpable negligence is a course of conduct showing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or such an entire want of care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or such an indifference to the rights of others as is equivalent to an intentional violation of such rights. The negligent act or omission must have been committed with an utter disregard for the safety of others. Culpable negligence is consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have known, or reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily injury. Taylor v. State, 444 So.2d 931 DUI MANSLAUGHTER F.S. 316.193 (3)(c)3 Before you can find the defendant guilty of DUI Manslaughter, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. operated a vehicle. See Magaw 2. by reason of such operation, caused or v. State, contributed to the cause of the death of 537 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1989) 3. At the time of such operation a. [was under the influence of [alcoholic beverages] [a chemical substance] [a controlled substance] to the extent that [ his ] [her] normal faculties were impaired.] b. [had a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher.] "Vehicle" is any device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. "Normal faculties" mean those faculties of a person, such as 316.003 the ability to see, hear, walk, talk, make judgments, and, in general, to normally perform the many mental and physical acts of our daily lives. is a chemical substance under Florida law. 877.111 is a controlled substance under Florida law. "Alcoholic beverages" are considered to be beer, wine, whiskey, and all other alcoholic beverages of any kind and description which are made for human consumption. 316.1934(2)(a), (2)(b), and (2)(c) See State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154 (Fla. 1990). Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564 FELONY DUI — PRIOR CONVICTIONS F.S. 316.193(2)(b) Before you can find the defendant guilty of DUI, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle. 2. While driving or in control of the vehicle, a. [was under the influence of [alcoholic beverages] [a chemical substance] [a controlled substance] to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired.] b. [had a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher.] "Vehicle" is any device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. "Normal faculties" mean those faculties of a person, such 316.003 as the ability to see, hear, walk, talk, make judgments, and, in general, to normally perform the many mental and physical acts of our daily lives. is a chemical substance under Florida law. 877.111 is a controlled substance under Florida law. 316.1934 State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154 316.193 State v. Rodriguez, 575 So.2d 1262 FELONY DUI — SERIOUS BODILY INJURY F.S. 316.193(3)(c)2 Before you can find the defendant guilty of DUI with serious bodily injury, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. drove or was in actual physical control of a vehicle. 2. While driving or in control of the vehicle, a. [was under the influence of [alcoholic beverages] [a chemical substance] [a controlled substance] to the extent that [his] [her] normal faculties were impaired.] b. [had a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher.] 3. As a result caused serious bodily injury to "Vehicle" is any device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. "Normal faculties" mean those faculties of a person, such 316.003 as the ability to see, hear, walk, talk, make judgments, and, in general, to normally perform the many mental and physical acts of our daily lives. is a chemical substance under Florida law. 877.111 is a controlled substance under Florida law. "Serious bodily injury" means a physical condition that 316.1933 creates a substantial risk of death, serious personal disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. 316.1934 State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154 316.193 PENALTY PROCEEDINGS — CAPITAL CASES F.S. 921.141 1. a. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the defendant has been found guilty of Consequently, you will not concern yourselves with the question of [ his ] [her] guilt. b. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have found the defendant guilty of 2. The punishment for this crime is either death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 25 years. Final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely with the judge of this court; however, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the court an advisory sentence as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant. Note to When the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional Judge officer, state attorney, assistant state attorney, justice, or judge, "eligibility for release" should be inserted in place of "possibility of parole for 25 years." See F.S. 775.0823. The State and the defendant may now present evidence relative to the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant. You are instructed that [this evidence when considered with the evidence you have already heard] [this evidence] is presented in order that you might determine, first, whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist that would justify the imposition of the death penalty and, second, whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, if any. At the conclusion of the taking of the evidence and after argument of counsel, you will be instructed on the factors in aggravation and mitigation that you may consider. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is now your duty to advise the court as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant for [ his ] [her] crime of As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of the judge; however, it is your duty to follow the law that will now be given you by the court and render to the court an advisory sentence based upon your determination as to whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist. Your advisory sentence should be based upon the evidence [that you have heard while trying the guilt or innocence of the defendant and evidence that has been presented to you in these proceedings] [that has been presented to you in these proceedings]. The aggravating circumstances that you may consider are 921.141 limited to any of the following that are established by the evidence: 1. The crime for which is to be sentenced was committed while [ he ] [she] [ was under sentence of imprisonment ] [or] [was placed on community control] ; 2. The defendant has been previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the [use] [threat] of violence to some person; a. The crime of is a capital felony; b. The crime of is a felony involving the [use] [threat] of violence to another person; 3. The defendant, in committing the crime for which [ he ] [she] is to be sentenced, knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; 4. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed while [ he ] [she] was [engaged] [an accomplice] in [the commission of] [an attempt to commit] [flight after committing or attempting to commit] the crime of [robbery] [sexual battery] [arson] [burglary] [kidnapping] [aircraft piracy] [the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb]; 5. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody; 6. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed for financial gain; 7. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws; 8. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. "Heinous" means extremely wicked or shockingly evil. "Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious, or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the victim. 9. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification. 10. The victim of the crime for which defendant is to be sentenced was a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of the officer's official duties. 11. The victim of the crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was an elected or appointed public official engaged in the performance of [ his ] [her] official duties and the crime was related, in whole or in part, to the victim's official capacity. If you find the aggravating circumstances do not justify the death penalty, your advisory sentence should be one of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years. Note to When the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional Judge officer, state attorney, assistant state attorney, justice, or judge, "eligibility for release" should be inserted in place of "possibility of parole for 25 years." See F.S. 775.0823. Should you find sufficient aggravating circumstances do 921.141 exist, it will then be your duty to determine whether mitigating circumstances exist that outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Among the mitigating circumstances you may consider, if established by the evidence, are: 1. has no significant history of prior criminal activity; Conviction of is not an aggravating circumstance to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on the defendant, but a conviction of that crime may be considered by the jury in determining whether the defendant has a significant history of prior criminal activity. 2. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed while [ he ] [she] was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 3. The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act; 4. The defendant was an accomplice in the offense for which [ he ] [she] is to be sentenced but the offense was committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor; 5. The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person; 6. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of [ his ] [her] conduct or to conform [ his ] [her] conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; 7. The age of the defendant at the time of the crime; 8. Any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, and any other circumstance of the offense. Each aggravating circumstance must be established beyond a reasonable doubt before it may be considered by you in arriving at your decision. If one or more aggravating circumstances are established, you should consider all the evidence tending to establish one or more mitigating circumstances and give that evidence such weight as you feel it should receive in reaching your conclusion as to the sentence that should be imposed. A mitigating circumstance need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the defendant. If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists, you may consider it as established. The sentence that you recommend to the court must be based upon the facts as you find them from the evidence and the law. You should weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances, and your advisory sentence must be based on these considerations. In these proceedings it is not necessary that the advisory sentence of the jury be unanimous. The fact that the determination of whether you recommend a sentence of death or sentence of life imprisonment in this case can be reached by a single ballot should not influence you to act hastily or without due regard to the gravity of these proceedings. Before you ballot you should carefully weigh, sift and consider the evidence, and all of it, realizing that human life is at stake, and bring to bear your best judgment in reaching your advisory sentence. If a majority of the jury determine that should be sentenced to death, your advisory sentence will be: A majority of the jury, by a vote of ______, advise and recommend to the court that it impose the death penalty upon On the other hand, if by six or more votes the jury determines that should not be sentenced to death, your advisory sentence will be: The jury advises and recommends to the court that it impose a sentence of life imprisonment upon without possibility of parole for 25 years. Note to When the victim is a law enforcement officer, correctional Judge officer, state attorney, assistant state attorney, justice, or judge, "eligibility for release" should be inserted in place of "possibility of parole for 25 years." See F.S. 775.0823. You will now retire to consider your recommendation. When you have reached an advisory sentence in conformity with these instructions, that form of recommendation should be signed by your fore man person and returned to the court. 775.0823 ASSAULT OF ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER F.S. 784.07 A (2)(a) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Assault on a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the State must prove the following six elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. intentionally and unlawfully threatened, either by word or act, to do violence to 2. At the time, appeared to have the ability to carry out the threat. 3. The act of created in the mind of a well-founded fear that the violence was about to take place. 4. was at the time a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 5. knew was a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 6. At the time of the assault was engaged in the lawful performance of [ his ] [her] duties. The court now instructs you that of is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. BATTERY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER F.S. 784.07 B (2)(b) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Battery of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. intentionally [touched or struck against [ his ] [her] will.] [caused bodily harm to .] 2. was a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 3. knew was a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 4. was engaged in the lawful performance of [ his ] [her] duties when the battery was committed. against him. The court now instructs you that of is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER F.S. 784.07(2)(c) Before you can find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the state must prove the following seven elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The first three elements define assault. 1. intentionally and unlawfully threatened, either by word or act, to do violence to 2. At the time, appeared to have the ability to carry out the threat. 3. The act of created in the mind of a well-founded fear that the violence was about to take place. 4. a. [The assault was made with a deadly weapon.] b. [The assault was made with a fully-formed, conscious intent to commit upon .] 5. was at the time a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 6. knew was a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 7. At the time of the assault was engaged in the lawful performance of [his] [her] duties. The court now instructs you that is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. It is not necessary for the state to prove that the defendant had an intent to kill. 784.07 AGGRAVATED BATTERY ON LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR FIREFIGHTER F.S. 784.07(2)(d) Before you can find the defendant guilty of aggravated battery of a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter], the state must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The first element is a definition of battery. 1. [intentionally touched or struck against [his] [her] will.] [intentionally caused bodily harm to .] 2. in committing the battery a. [intentionally or knowingly caused [great bodily harm to ].] [permanent disability to ].] [permanent disfigurement to ].] b. [used a deadly weapon.] 3. was a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 4. knew was a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. 5. was engaged in the lawful performance of [his] [her] duties when the battery was committed against [him] [her]. The court now instructs you that of is a [law enforcement officer] [firefighter]. A weapon is a "deadly weapon" if it is used or threatened to be used in a way likely to produce death or great bodily harm. 784.07 PERSONS ENGAGED IN CRIMINAL OFFENSE HAVING WEAPON F.S. 790.07(1) and (2) Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. a. [[displayed] [used] [threatened to use] [attempted to use] [a weapon].] [a firearm].] [an electric weapon or device].] b. [carried ] a [weapon] [firearm], which was concealed from the ordinary sight of another person. ] 2. [ He ] [She] did so while committing or attempting to commit the felony of and . or firearm 790.001 THROWING, MAKING, PLACING, PROJECTING, OR DISCHARGING DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE F.S. 790.161(1) Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following element beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. willfully and unlawfully [made] [possessed] [threw] [placed] [projected] [discharged] [attempted to [make] [possess] [throw] [place] [project] [discharge]] a destructive device. A "destructive device" is defined as 790.001 790.161 THROWING, MAKING, PLACING, PROJECTING, OR DISCHARGING DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE F.S. 790.161(2) Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. willfully and unlawfully [made] [possessed] [threw] [placed] [projected] [discharged] [attempted to [make] [possess] [throw] [place] [project] [discharge]] a destructive device. 2. (a) The act was committed with the intent to [do bodily harm to another.] [do property damage.] (b) The act resulted in [a disruption of governmental operations.] [a disruption of commerce.] [a disruption of the private affairs of .] A "destructive device" is defined as 790.001 790.161 THROWING, MAKING, PLACING, PROJECTING, OR DISCHARGING DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE F.S. 790.161(3) Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. willfully and unlawfully [made] [possessed] [threw] [placed] [projected] [discharged] [attempted to [make] [possess] [throw] [place] [project] [discharge]] a destructive device. 2. The act resulted in [bodily harm to another.] [property damage.] A "destructive device" is defined as 790.001 790.161 THROWING, MAKING, PLACING, PROJECTING, OR DISCHARGING DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE F.S. 790.161(4) Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. willfully and unlawfully [made] [possessed] [threw] [placed] [projected] [discharged] [attempted to [make] [possess] [throw] [place] [project] [discharged]] a destructive device. 2. The act resulted in the death of another. A "destructive device" is defined as 790.001 790.161 DEALER SELLING ARMS TO MINORS F.S. 790.18 Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. was engaged in the business of dealing in arms as a source of revenue. 2. In the course of that business sold to the 3. was at the time under the age of eighteen years. A "dealer in arms" is a person who buys and sells weapons or firearms. A or firearm is legally defined as 790.001 FELONS POSSESSING WEAPONS F.S. 790.23 Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. had been convicted of 2. After the conviction knowingly a. [owned] [had in [ his ] [her] care, custody, 2b as possession or control] [a firearm.] [an electric weapon or device.] b. [carried a which was concealed from the ordinary sight of another person.] If you find that the defendant's civil rights had been restored at the time of the offense, you shall find the defendant not guilty. "Convicted" means that a judgment has been entered in a criminal proceeding by a competent court pronouncing the accused guilty. A ["firearm"] ["electric weapon or device"] ["concealed weapon"] is legally defined as 790.001 "Care" and "custody" mean immediate charge and control exercised by a person over the named object. The terms care, custody and control may be used interchangeably. To "possess" means to have personal charge of or exercise the right of ownership, management or control over the thing possessed. Possession may be actual or constructive. If a thing is in the hand of or on the person, or in a bag or container in the hand of or on the person, or is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person, it is in the actual possession of that person. If a thing is in a place over which the person has control or in which the person has hidden or concealed it, it is in the constructive possession of that person. Possession may be joint, that is, two or more persons may jointly have possession of an article, exercising control over it. In that case, each of those persons is considered to be in possession of that article. If a person has exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed. If a person does not have exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may not be inferred or assumed. White v. State, 539 So.2d 577 SEXUAL BATTERY — VICTIM TWELVE YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER — CIRCUMSTANCES SPECIFIED — F.S. 794.011(4) Before you can find the defendant guilty of sexual battery upon a person twelve years of age or older under specified circumstances, the State must prove the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. was twelve years of age or older. 2. a. [ committed an act [upon] [with] in which the sexual organ of the [ ] [ ] penetrated or had union with the [anus] [vagina] [mouth] of the [ ] [ ].] b. [ committed an act upon in which the [anus] [vagina] of was penetrated by an object.] 3. a. [ was physically helpless to resist.] b. [ coerced to submit by threatening to use force or violence likely to cause serious personal injury and reasonably believed the had the present ability to execute the threat.] c. [ coerced to submit by threat of retaliation against or any other person and reasonably believed that had the ability to execute the threat in the future.] d. [ without prior knowledge or consent of (victim), administered or had knowledge of someone else administering to a narcotic, anesthetic or other intoxicating substance that mentally or physically incapacitated .] e. [ was mentally defective and had reason to believe this or had actual knowledge of that fact.] f. [ (Victim) was physically incapacitated.] 4. The act was committed without the consent of "Consent" means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and does not include coerced submission. Evidence of the victim's mental incapacity or defect, if any, may be considered in determining whether there was an intelligent, knowing and voluntary consent. "Mentally incapacitated" means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his or her conduct due to the influence of a narcotic, anesthetic or intoxicating substance administered to that person without his or her consent, or due to any other act committed upon that person without his or her consent. "Mentally defective" means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect that renders that person temporarily or permanently incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct. "Union" is an alternative to penetration and means coming into contact. "Physically helpless" means that a person is unconscious, asleep , or for any other reason physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act. "Serious personal injury" means great bodily harm or pain, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Give if 3f "Physically incapacitated" means that a person is bodily alleged impaired or handicapped and substantially limited in his or her ability to resist or flee an act. However, any act done for bona fide medical purposes is not a sexual battery. 794.023(victim) Coleman v. State, 484 So.2d 624 794.011 LEWD, LASCIVIOUS, INDECENT ASSAULT OR ACT UPON OR IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILD; SEXUAL BATTERY F.S. 800.04 Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. was under the age of sixteen years. 2. a. [made an assault upon in a lewd, lascivious (1) or indecent manner.] [handled or fondled in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner.] b. committed upon or forced or (2) enticed to commit [actual or simulated sexual intercourse.] [deviate sexual intercourse.] [sexual bestiality.] [masturbation.] [sadomasochistic abuse.] [actual lewd exhibition of the genitals.] [any act or conduct which simulated that sexual battery was being or would be committed on .] c. [committed an act [upon] [with] in which the sexual organ of the [ ] [ ] penetrated or had union with the [anus] [vagina] [mouth] of [ ] [ ].] [committed an act upon in which the [anus] [vagina] of was penetrated by an object.] d. knowingly committed a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of Neither the victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crime charged. As used in regard to this offense the words "lewd," "lascivious" and "indecent" mean the same thing. They mean a 800.04 wicked, lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act. An "assault" is an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence 800.04 is imminent. As used in regard to this offense the words "lewd" and "lascivious" mean the same thing and mean a wicked, lustful, 800.04 unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act. 847.001 800.04 Lanier v. State, 443 So.2d 178 800.04 ARSON — FIRST DEGREE F.S. 806.01(1) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Arson, the State must prove the following [three] [four] elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. [damaged] [caused to be damaged] by [fire] [explosion]. Give 2a or 2. a. The damage was done willfully and unlawfully. 2b b. The damage was caused while defendant was engaged in the commission of (felony alleged). 3. The was a. [a dwelling.] 806.01 b. [an institution in which the damage occurred during normal hours of occupancy.] 806.01 [an institution where persons are normally present.] c. [a structure.] 806.01 4. The defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe the was occupied by a human being. 806.01 "Structure" means: 1. Any building of any kind. 2. Any enclosed area with a roof over it. 806.01 3. Any real property and its appurtenances. 4. Any tent or other portable building. 5. Any vehicle. 6. Any vessel. 7. Any watercraft. 8. Any aircraft. Give only if Define the crime alleged. If burglary, also define crime 2b is alleged that was the object of burglary. 806.01 ARSON — SECOND DEGREE F.S. 806.01(2) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Arson — Second Degree, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. [caused to be damaged] [damaged] a owned by the defendant or another, by [explosion] [fire]. Give 2a or 2. a. The damage was done willfully and unlawfully. 2b b. The damage was caused while defendant was engaged in the commission of (felony alleged). 3. The is a structure. "Structure" means: 806.01 1. Any building of any kind. 2. Any enclosed area with a roof over it. 3. Any real property and its appurtenances. 4. Any tent or other portable building. 5. Any vehicle. 6. Any vessel. 7. Any watercraft. 8. Any aircraft. Give only if Define the crime alleged. If burglary, also define crime 2b is alleged that was the object of burglary. 806.01 CRIMINAL MISCHIEF F.S. 806.13 Before you can find the defendant guilty of criminal mischief, the state must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. injured or damaged 2. The property injured or damaged belonged to 3. The injury or damage was done willfully and maliciously. Give if Among the means by which property can be injured or applicable damaged under the law is the placement of graffiti on it or other acts of vandalism to it. "Willfully" means intentionally, knowingly and purposely. "Maliciously" means wrongfully, intentionally, without legal justification or excuse, and with the knowledge that injury or damage will or may be caused to another person or the property of another person. The punishment provided by law for the crime of criminal up to mischief is greater depending upon the value of the the extent of property damaged. Therefore, if you find the defendant the charge as guilty of criminal mischief, you must applicable determine by your verdict whether: a. [The damage to the property was $1,000 or greater.] [By reason of the damage there was an interruption or impairment of a business operation or public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public service which cost $1,000 or more in labor and supplies to restore.] b. [The damage to the property was greater than $200 but less than $1,000.] c. [The damage to the property was $200 or less.] 806.13 THEFT F.S. 812.014 Before you can find the defendant guilty of Theft, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. knowingly and unlawfully [obtained] [used] [endeavored to obtain] [endeavored to use] the of 2. [ He ] [She] did so with intent to, either temporarily or permanently, [deprive of [ his ] [her] right to the property or any benefit from it.] [appropriate the property of to [ his ] [her] own use or to the use of any person not entitled to it.] If you find the defendant guilty of theft, you must determine by your verdict whether: a. [The value of the property taken was $100,000 or more.] b. [The value of the property taken was $20,000 or more but less than $100,000.] c. [The value of the property taken was $300 or more but less than $20,000.] d. [The value of the property taken was less than $300.] e. [The property was [a will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument.] [a firearm.] [a motor vehicle.] [a horse.] [a cow.] [a pig.] [a kind of livestock.] [a commercially farmed animal.] [an aquaculture species raised at a permitted aquaculture facility.] [a fire extinguisher.] [2000 or more pieces of fruit.] [taken from a posted construction site.]] Proof that a person presented false identification not current in respect to name, address, place of employment or other material aspect in connection with the leasing of personal property, or failed to return leased property 812.022 within 72 hours of the termination of the leasing agreement, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the property was obtained or is now used with unlawful intent to commit theft. Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, give rise to an inference that the person in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen. 812.022 "Obtains or uses" means any manner of: (a) Taking or exercising control over property. 812.012 (b) Making any unauthorized use, disposition, or transfer of property. (c) Obtaining property by fraud, willful misrepresentation of a future act, or false promise. (d) 1. Conduct previously known as stealing; larceny; purloining; abstracting; embezzlement; misapplication; misappropriation; conversion; or obtaining money or property by false pretenses, fraud, deception; or 2. Other conduct similar in nature. "Endeavor" means to attempt or try. "Property" means anything of value, and includes: 812.012 real property, including things growing on, affixed to and found in land; tangible or intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests and claims; and services. "Services" means anything of value resulting from a 812.012 person's physical or mental labor or skill, or from the use, possession or presence of property, and includes: repairs or improvements to property; professional services; private, public or government communication, transportation, power, water or sanitation services; lodging accommodations; and admissions to places of exhibition or entertainment. State of Florida v. Harris, 356 So.2d 315 "Value" means: 812.012 The market value of the property at the time and place of the offense, or if that value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the offense. In the case of a written instrument that does not have a readily ascertainable market value, such as a check, draft or promissory note, the value is the amount due or collectible. In the case of any other instrument that creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege or obligation, the value is the greatest amount of economic loss that the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument. The value of a trade secret that does not have a readily ascertainable market value is any reasonable value representing the damage to the owner suffered by reason of losing an advantage over those who do not know of or use the trade secret. If the exact value of the property cannot be ascertained, you should attempt to determine a minimum value. If you cannot determine the minimum value, you must find the value is less than $300. Amounts of value of separate properties, involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether the thefts are from the same person or several persons, may be totaled in determining the grade of the offense. 812.014 CONTRIBUTING TO CHILD DELINQUENCY OR DEPENDENCY OR TO CHILD IN NEED OF SERVICES F.S. 827.04(3) Before you can find the defendant guilty of contributing to a child 's becoming a [delinquent child] [dependent child] [child in need of services] Delinquency or Dependency, the State must prove the following element beyond a reasonable doubt: [ knowingly which [caused] [tended to cause or encourage] [contributed to] [to become] [becoming] a [delinquent] [dependent] child [in need of services] .] [ , by [act] [threat] [command] [persuasion] [induced] [endeavored to induce] to [perform any act] [follow any course of conduct] [live] so as to cause or tend to cause to [become a dependent child] [remain a dependent child] [become a delinquent child] [remain a delinquent child] [become a child in need of services] [remain a child in need of services] .] "Child" means any person under the age of eighteen years. 827.01 or of or "child in need of services" 39.01 827.04 WORTHLESS CHECK — OBTAINING PROPERTY F.S. 832.05(4) Before you can find the defendant guilty of the State must prove the following seven elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. [drew] [made] [uttered] [issued] [delivered] the check admitted in evidence as State Exhibit 2. did so to obtain [services.] [goods.] [wares.] [ .] 3. The [services] [goods] [wares] [ ] had some monetary value. 4. When did so, there was not sufficient money on deposit in the bank to pay the check. 5. knew when he wrote the check that he did not have was written there was not sufficient money on deposit with the bank. 6. knew he had there was no arrangement or understanding with the bank for the payment of the check when it was presented. 7. The check was in the amount of $150.00 or more. Even if you find all these elements are proved, you should go on to consider the defense. You must find the defendant not guilty if you find either of the following two defenses to have been proved: 1. knew that funds and credit at the bank at the time the check was given were insufficient to pay the check; or 2. had good reason to believe that funds and credit at the bank at the time the check was given were insufficient to pay the check. When an employee of a business receives a check, the business must be regarded as knowing whatever the employee knows about the check. Give if The fact that (defendant) had previously issued a applicable worthless check to the payee did not, by itself, give (payee) reason to believe that (defendant) had insufficient funds to ensure payment of this check. 832.05 PERJURY (Amended) (NOT IN AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING — F.S. 837.012) (IN AN OFFICIAL PROCEEDING — F.S. 837.02) Before you can find the defendant guilty of [Perjury Not in an Official Proceeding] [Perjury in an Official Proceeding], the State must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. took an oath or otherwise affirmed that [ he ] [she] was obligated by conscience or by law to speak the truth in 2. The oath or affirmation was made to who was a 3. while under an oath, made the statement 4. The statement was false. 5. did not believe the statement was true when [ he ] [she] made it. Knowledge of the materiality of the statement is not an element of this crime, and the defendant's mistaken belief that [ his ] [her] statement was not material is not a 837.012 defense to the charge. 837.02 837.011 The law requires the judge to decide if the alleged statement is material, and I have decided that it is material. Therefore, you will not further concern yourself 837.011 with this issue. F.S. 837.07; Carter v. State, 384 So.2d 1255 837.07 MAINTAINING A GAMBLING ESTABLISHMENT F.S. 849.01-A ( 849.02) 849.01 849.02 849.01 849.02 Before you can find the defendant guilty of Maintaining a Gambling Establishment, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. a. [in person or by a servant, clerk or agent,] b. [acting as servant, clerk, agent or employee of another,] had a substantial degree of control over and kept or 849.02 maintained 2. The [place was] [articles were] habitually kept or maintained for the purpose of gambling. A single instance or rare and isolated instances of placing bets or gambling would be insufficient to constitute the crime. But if the property was used at frequent intervals as a place or means for betting, gaming or gambling, the crime has been committed even if the principal use of the property is for some other lawful purpose. It is not necessary to prove that the defendant gambled, or received any profit from the gambling, or that [ he ] [she] wholly owned or controlled the property. It is not necessary to a conviction of this offense that there be direct and positive evidence of gambling. It is sufficient if implements, devices or apparatus commonly used by gambling houses or by gamblers are found under circumstances that convince you that the premises were kept or maintained for the purpose of gambling. A servant, clerk, agent or employee of another who keeps or maintains property for the purpose of gambling is equally guilty with [ his ] [her] employer. 849.02 "Gambling" is a game of chance in which the participant risks money or property on the outcome with the expectation of gaining or losing as a result of the game. and .085, 849.085 DRUG ABUSE — USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA F.S. 893.147(1) Before you can find the defendant guilty of Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. used or had in [ his ] [her] possession with intent to use drug paraphernalia. 2. had knowledge of the presence of the drug paraphernalia. To "possess" means to have personal charge of or exercise the right of ownership, management or control over the thing possessed. Possession may be actual or constructive. If a thing is in the hand of or on the person, or in a bag or container in the hand of or on the person, or is so close as to be within ready reach and is under the control of the person, it is in the actual possession of that person. If a thing is in a place over which the person has control or in which the person has hidden or concealed it, it is in the constructive possession of that person. Possession may be joint, that is, two or more persons may jointly have possession of an article, exercising control over it. In that case, each of those persons is considered to be in possession of that article. If a person has exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may be inferred or assumed. If a person does not have exclusive possession of a thing, knowledge of its presence may not be inferred or assumed. The term "drug paraphernalia" means all equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are used, 893.145 intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this chapter. It includes, but is not limited to: (1) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, or harvesting of any species of plant which is a controlled substance or from which a controlled substance can be derived. (2) Kits used, intended for use, or designed for use in manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, or preparing controlled substances. (3) Isomerization devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in increasing the potency of any species of plant which is a controlled substance. (4) Testing equipment used, intended for use, or designed for use in identifying, or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness, or purity of, controlled substances. (5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled substances. (6) Diluents and adulterants, such as quinine hydrochloride, mannitol, mannite, dextrose, and lactose used, intended for use, or designed for use in cutting controlled substances. (7) Separation gins and sifters used, intended for use, or designed for use in removing twigs and seeds from, or in otherwise cleaning or refining, cannabis. (8) Blenders, bowls, containers, spoons, and mixing devices used, intended for use, or designed for use in compounding controlled substances. (9) Capsules, balloons, envelopes, and other containers used, intended for use, or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances. (10) Containers and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in storing or concealing controlled substances. (11) Hypodermic syringes, needles, and other objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in parenterally injecting controlled substances into the human body. (12) Objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into the human body, such as: (a) Metal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes with or without screens, permanent screens, hashish heads, or punctured metal bowls. (b) Water pipes. (c) Carburetion tubes and devices. (d) Smoking and carburetion masks. (e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, such as a cannabis cigarette, that has become too small or too short to be held in the hand. (f) Miniature cocaine spoons, and cocaine vials. (g) Chamber pipes. (h) Carburetor pipes. (i) Electric pipes. (j) Air-driven pipes. (k) Chillums. ( l ) Bongs. (m) Ice pipes or chillers. In addition to all other logically relevant factors, the following factors shall be considered in determining whether 893.146 an object is drug paraphernalia: (1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object concerning its use. (2) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of this act. (3) The proximity of the object to controlled substances. (4) The existence of any residue of controlled substances on the object. (5) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons whom [ he ] [she] knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this act. The innocence of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, as to a direct violation of this act shall not prevent a finding that the object is intended for use, or designed for use, as drug paraphernalia. (6) Instructions, oral or written, provided with the object concerning its use. (7) Descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or depict its use. (8) Any advertising concerning its use. (9) The manner in which the object is displayed for sale. (10) Whether the owner, or anyone in control of the object, is a legitimate supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed distributor or dealer of tobacco products. (11) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object or objects to the total sales of the business enterprise. (12) The existence and scope of legitimate uses for the object in the community. (13) Expert testimony concerning its use. 893.147 SCHEDULE OF LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 First degree Second degree (depraved Second degree (felony) (premeditated) murder mind) murder — 782.04(2) murder — 782.04(3) — 782.04(1) Manslaughter — 782.07 Third degree (felony) murder — 782.04(4) Attempt Vehicular homicide — 782.071 Culpable negligence — 784.05(2) Aggravated battery — 784.045 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Battery — 784.03 Assault — 784.011 First degree (felony) Second degree (depraved Attempt murder — 782.04(1) mind) murder — 782.04(2) Second degree — Manslaughter — 782.07 (depraved mind) murder — 782.04(2) Second degree (felony) murder — 782.04(3) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Third degree (felony) murder — 782.04(4) Manslaughter — 782.07 Aggravated battery — 784.045 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Battery — 784.03 Assault — 784.011 Second degree (depraved Manslaughter — 782.07 Third degree (felony) mind) murder — 782.04(4) murder — 782.04(2) Attempt Vehicular homicide — 782.071 Culpable negligence — 784.05(2) Aggravated battery — 784.045 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Battery — 784.03 Assault — 784.011 fn_b Second degree (felony) None Third degree (felony) murder — murder — 782.04(4) 782.04(3) Attempt CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Third degree (felony) None Attempt murder — 782.04(4) Aggravated assault — 784.021 Battery — 784.03 Assault — 784.011 Manslaughter — 782.07 None Attempt Aggravated assault — 784.021 Battery — 784.03 Assault — 784.011 Vehicular homicide — 782.071 Culpable negligence — 784.05(1) Culpable negligence — 784.05(2) fn_d Assault — 784.011 None Attempt Aggravated assault — Assault — 784.011 Attempt 784.021(1)(a) Improper exhibition of dangerous weapons or firearms — 790.10 Discharging firearms in public — 790.15 Aggravated assault — Assault — 784.011 Attempt 784.021(1)(b) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Battery — 784.03 None Attempt Aggravated battery — Battery — 784.03 Attempt 784.045(1)(a) Aggravated battery — Battery — 784.03 Attempt 784.045(1)(b) Improper exhibition of dangerous weapons or firearms — 790.10 Discharging firearms in public — 790.15 Culpable negligence — Culpable negligence — None 784.05(2) 784.05(1) Assault of law None Attempt enforcement officer — Assault — 784.011 784.07(2) Battery of law None Attempt enforcement officer — Battery — 784.03 fn_e 784.07(2) Kidnapping — 787.01 False imprisonment — 787.02 Attempt Aggravated assault — 784.021(1)(b) Battery — 784.03(1)(a) Assault — 784.011 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 False imprisonment — None Attempt 787.02 Assault — 784.011 Battery — 784.03(1)(a) Carrying concealed None Attempt weapons — 790.01(1) Carrying concealed None Attempt firearms — 790.01(2) Carrying pistol or None Attempt repeating rifle without first obtaining license — 790.06 Persons engaged in None Attempt (may be criminal offense, applicable when having weapons concealed weapon — 790.07(1) is charged) Carrying concealed weapons — 790.01(1) Improper exhibition of dangerous weapons — 790.10 Persons engaged in None Attempt (may be criminal offense, applicable when having weapons — concealed firearm 790.07(2) is charged) Carrying concealed firearm — 790.01(2) Improper exhibition of dangerous firearms — 790.10 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Discharging firearms None Attempt in public — 790.15 Furnishing weapons to None Attempt minors under 18 years of age, etc. — 790.17 Selling arms to minors None Attempt by dealers — 790.18 Felons; possession of None Attempt (may be firearms unlawful; applicable when exception; penalty — concealed weapon is 790.23 charged) Carrying concealed firearm — 790.01(2) Carrying concealed weapon — 790.01(1) Sexual battery Battery — 784.03 Attempt — 794.011(2) Assault — 784.011 Aggravated assault — 784.021(1)(a) Aggravated battery — 784.045(1)(a) Sexual battery Battery — 784.03 Attempt — 794.011(3) Aggravated battery — 784.045(1)(a) Aggravated assault — 784.021(1)(a) Assault — 784.011 Sexual battery — 794.011(4) Sexual battery — 794.011(5) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Sexual battery — Battery — 784.03 Attempt 794.011(4) Aggravated assault — 784.021(1)(a) Assault — 784.011 Sexual battery — 794.011(5) Sexual battery — 794.011(5) Battery — 784.03 Attempt Assault — 784.011 Unnatural and lascivious act — None Attempt 800.02 Exposure of sexual organs — None Unnatural and 800.03 lascivious act — 800.02 Lewd, lascivious, or indecent None Attempt assault or act upon or in Assault — 784.011 presence of child — 800.04 Battery — 784.03 Unnatural and lascivious act — 800.02 Arson — 806.01(1) None Arson 806.01(2) Arson — 806.01(2) Criminal mischief — Attempt 806.13(1)(b)1 Criminal mischief — 806.13(1)(b)2 Criminal mischief — 806.13(1)(b)3 Criminal mischief — 806.13(2) Criminal mischief — None Attempt 806.13(1)(b)1 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Criminal mischief — Criminal mischief — Attempt 806.13(1)(b)2 806.13(1)(b)1 Criminal mischief — Criminal mischief — Attempt 806.13(1)(b)3 806.13(1)(b)1 Criminal mischief — 806.13(1)(b)2 Burglary with assault or Burglary — 810.02(3) Attempt battery or while armed — Burglary of dwelling 810.02(2) or with human being inside — 810.02(3) Trespass — 810.08(2)(a) Trespass — 810.08(2)(c) Burglary of dwelling or with Burglary — 810.02(3) Attempt human being inside — Trespass — 810.02(3) 810.08(2)(a) Trespass — 810.08(2)(b) Burglary — 810.02(3) None Attempt Trespass — 810.08(2)(a) Possession of burglary tools — None None 810.06 Trespass in structure or None Attempt (except conveyance — 810.08 refuse to depart) Trespass on property other than None Attempt structure or conveyance — 810.09 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Grand theft — first degree None Grand theft — second 812.014(2)(a) degree 812.014(2)(b) Grand theft — third degree 812.014(2)(c) Petit theft — 812.014(2)(c) Cf. Gilford v. State, 313 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1975) Trade secrets — 812.081 Grand theft — second degree None If value is alleged 812.014(2)(b) Grand theft — third degree 812.014(2)(c) Petit theft — 812.014(2)(d) Trade secrets — 812.081 Grand theft — third degree None If value is alleged 812.014(2)(c) Petit theft — 812.014(2)(d) Trade secrets — 812.081 Petit theft — 812.014(2)(d) None No attempt — endeavor is included within definition of theft Possession of altered property — None Attempt 812.016 Dealing in stolen property — None None trafficking — 812.019(1) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Dealing in stolen property — 812.019(1) Attempt managing and trafficking — 812.019(2) Robbery with a firearm or deadly Robbery with a Attempt weapon — 812.13(2)(a) weapon — Grand theft 1st 812.13(2)(b) degree — 812.013(2)(a) Robbery — Grand theft 2d degree 812.13(2)(c) — 812.014(2)(b) Petit theft — Grand theft 3d degree 812.014(2)(d) — 812.014(2)(c) Battery — 784.03 Aggravated battery — 784.045 Assault — 784.011 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Extortion — 836.05 See Davis v. State, 277 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) Robbery with a weapon Robbery — Attempt — 812.13(2)(b) 812.13(2)(c) Petit theft — Grand theft 1st degree 812.014(2)(d) — 812.014(2)(a) Grand theft 2d degree — 812.014(2)(b) Grand theft 3d degree — 812.014(2)(c) Battery — 784.03 Aggravated battery — 784.045 Assault — 784.011 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Extortion — 836.05 See Davis v. State, 277 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) Robbery — 812.13(2)(c) Petit theft Attempt — 812.014(2)(d) Grand theft 1st degree — 812.014(2)(a) Grand theft 2d degree — 812.014(2)(b) Grand theft 3d degree — 812.014(2)(c) Battery — 784.03 Assault — 784.011 Aggravated assault — 784.021 Extortion — 836.05 See Davis v. State, 277 So.2d 300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) Child abuse — 827.04(1) Child abuse Attempt, if willfully — 827.04(2) Negligent treatment of child — 827.05 Child abuse — 827.04(2) None Attempt, if willfully Negligent treatment of child — 827.05 Forgery — 831.01 None Attempt Uttering forged instrument None No attempt — King v. — 831.02 State, 317 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Stopping payment; purchase of None Attempt, except when farm or grove products uttering is — 832.04 charged — 832.04 under $50 Stopping payment with intent None Attempt, except when to defraud — 832.041 uttering is charged; 832.04 if farm or grove product; 832.041 under $50 Worthless check — 832.05(2) (second degree misdemeanor) Worthless checks — 832.05(2) None Attempt, except when uttering is charged Obtaining property by Worthless check Attempt, except when worthless — 832.05(2) uttering is charged checks — 832.05(4) (second degree misdemeanor) Perjury not in official None None proceeding — 837.012 Perjury if official proceeding None None — 837.02 Perjury by contradictory None None statements — 837.021 False reports to law None None enforcement authorities — 837.05 False official statements None None — 837.06 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Bribery — 838.015 None Attempt if only give or accept is charged Unlawful compensation for None Attempt if only give official behavior — 838.016 or accept is charged Corruption by threat against None Attempt if only harm public servant — 838.021 is charged Bribery in athletic contests None Attempt only if give — 838.12(1) is charged Bribery in athletic contests None Attempt only if — 838.12(2) accept is charged Keeping gambling house — 849.01 None Lottery — 849.09(1)(f) Lottery — 849.09(1)(k) Lottery — 849.11 Agents, servants, etc., of None Lottery — keeper of gambling house 849.09(1)(f) — 849.02 Renting house for gambling None Lottery — purposes — 849.02 849.09(1)(k) None Permitting minors and persons None Permitting gambling under guardianship to gamble and billiard or — 849.04 pool table by holder of license — 849.07 Playing at games of chance by lot — 849.11 CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Gambling — 849.08 None None Lottery — 849.09(1)(a) None Attempt Lottery — 849.09(1)(f) Lottery — 849.09(1)(g) Lottery — 849.09(1)(h) Lottery — 849.09(1)(i) Lottery — 849.09(1)(j) Lottery — 849.09(1)(k) Playing at game of chance by lot — 849.11 Gambling devices, etc. — 849.231 Lottery — 849.09(1)(b) None Attempt Lottery — 849.09(1)(f) Lottery — 849.09(1)(g) Lottery — 849.09(1)(h) Lottery — 849.09(1)(i) Lottery — 849.09(1)(j) Lottery — 849.09(1)(k) Gambling devices, etc. — 849.231 Lottery — 849.09(1)(c) None Attempt Lottery — 849.09(1)(f) Lottery — 849.09(1)(g) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Lottery — 849.09(1)(h) Lottery — 849.09(1)(i) Lottery — 849.09(1)(j) Lottery — 849.09(1)(k) Gambling devices, etc. — 849.231 Lottery — 849.09(1)(d) None Attempt Lottery — 849.09(1)(f) Lottery — 849.09(1)(g) Lottery — 849.09(1)(h) Lottery — 849.09(1)(i) Lottery — 849.09(1)(j) Lottery — 849.09(1)(k) Playing at game of chance by lot — 849.11 Gambling devices, etc. — 849.231 Lottery — 849.09(1)(g) None Attempt Lottery — 849.09(1)(h) None Attempt Lottery — 849.09(1)(k) None Attempt Bookmaking on grounds of None Attempt permit-holder — 550.361 (adapted from former 849.24) Bookmaking — 849.25 (1) and (2) None Attempt CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Bookmaking 849.25(3) Bookmaking 849.25(2) Attempt Bookmaking on grounds of permit holder 550.361 Driving under the influence None Attempt — 316.193(1) DUI with damage to property or DUI — 316.193(1) None person — 316.193(3)(c)1 DUI with serious bodily injury DUI — 316.193(1) DUI — 316.193(3)(c)1 — 316.193(3)(c)2 DUI manslaughter DUI — 316.193(1) Vehicular homicide — — 316.193(3)(c)3 782.071 DUI — 316.193(3)(c)2 DUI — 316.193(3)(c)1 Sale, manufacture, delivery or None Attempt, except when possession with intent to delivery is sell, manufacture or deliver charged; controlled substance 893.13(1)(g) if — 893.13(1)(a) possession or delivery of cannabis charged 893.13(1)(f) if possession is charged CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Sale, delivery or possession None Attempt, except when of more than 10 grams of delivery is charged controlled substance 893.13(1)(a) — 893.13(1)(b) 893.13(1)(f) if possession is charged Delivery of controlled None 893.13(1)(a) substance to person under 893.13(1)(g) if 18 years old — 893.13(1)(c) cannabis charged Bringing controlled substance None Attempt into state — 893.13(1)(d) 893.13(1)(f) 893.13(1)(g) if cannabis charged Possession of controlled None Attempt 893.13(1)(g) substance — 893.13(1)(f) if cannabis charged Offense of possession or None Attempt, except when delivery of not more than delivery is charged 20 grams of cannabis — 893.13(1)(g) Obtaining controlled None substances by fraud — 893.13(3)(a)1 Sale, purchase, etc., near None Sale, purchase, public school — 893.13(1)(e) manufacture, etc., 893.13(1)-(4) Possession of drug None Attempt paraphernalia — 893.147(1) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Delivery, possession with None Attempt, except when intent to deliver, or delivery is charged manufacture with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia — 893.147(2) Delivery of drug paraphernalia None None to a minor — 893.147(3) Trafficking in cannabis None Attempt, except when — 893.135(1)(a) delivery is charged 893.13(1)(a) if sale, manufacture or delivery is charged Bringing cannabis into state — 893.13(1)(d) Possession of cannabis — 893.13(1)(f) Possession or delivery of cannabis — 893.13(1)(g) Trafficking in cocaine — None Attempt, except when 893.135(1)(b) delivery is charged 893.13(1)(a) if sale, manufacture or delivery is charged Bringing cocaine into state — 893.13(1)(d) Possession of cocaine — 893.13(1)(f) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Trafficking in illegal drugs None Attempt, except when — 893.135(1)(c) delivery is charged 893.13(1)(a) if sale, manufacture or delivery is charged Bringing same illegal drug as charged into state — 893.13(1)(d) Possession of same illegal drug — 893.13(1)(f) Trafficking in phencyclidine None Attempt, except when — 893.135(1)(d) delivery is charged 893.13(1)(a) if sale, manufacture or delivery is charged Bringing phencyclidine into state — 893.13(1)(d) Possession of phencyclidine — 893.13(1)(f) Trafficking in methaqualone None Attempt, except when — 893.135(1)(d) delivery is charged 893.13(1)(a) if sale, manufacture or delivery is charged Bringing methaqualone into state — 893.13(1)(d) Possession of methaqualone — 893.13(1)(f) CHARGED OFFENSES CATEGORY 1 CATEGORY 2 Contraband — 951.22 None The nature of the contraband may give rise to misdemeanor, lesser included offenses. See Cooper v. State, 512 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Moore v. State, 512 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
But see Martin v. State, 342 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1977); Drotar v. State, 433 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), holding that nonhomicide lessers should not be given when the only issue is whether the death was a lawful or unlawful homicide, but should be given if there is an issue of causation, i.e., whether death was caused by defendant's act or some other unconnected cause. When a nonhomicide offense is a necessarily lesser included offense of the homicide offense, an instruction on the lesser may be necessary. See certified question in Barritt v. State, 517 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), rev'd, 531 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1988).
See Scurry v. State, 521 So.2d 1077 (Fla. 1988).
But see Martin v. State, 342 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1977).
But see Smith v. State, 330 So.2d 526 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and Murray v. State, 328 So.2d 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
See Taylor v. State, 444 So.2d 931 (Fla. 1984).
Rotenberry v. State, 468 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1985)
See Higgins v. State, 565 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1990).
But see Richardson v. State, 523 So.2d 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Sands v. State, 542 So.2d 436 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
Provided that charged offense is a second degree felony under section 893.13(1)(a)1.