Opinion
2015 CA 0264
07-12-2016
ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, THE LOUISIANA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ACADIA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ALLEN ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ASCENSION ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ASSUMPTION ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, AVOYELLES ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, BAKER ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, BOSSIER ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, CADDO ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, CALCASIEU ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, INC., CALDWELL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, CAMERON ASSOCATION OF EDUCATORS, CATAHOULA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, CALIBORNE ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, DESOTO ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, EAST BATON ROUGE ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, EAST CARROLL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, EAST FELICIANA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, EVANGELINE ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, FRANKLIN ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, IBERIA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, LAFAYETTE PARISH ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, LAFOURCHE ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, LINCOLN ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, LIVINGSTON ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, MONROE ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, MOREHOUSE ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, NATCHITOCHES PARISH ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, OUACHITA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, PLAQUEMINES ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, RAPIDES PARISH ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, RED RIVER ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ST. HELENA ASSSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ST. JAMES ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ST. JOHN ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ST. LANDRY ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ST. MARTIN ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, ST. MARY ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, TANGIPAHOA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, TENSAS ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, TERREBONNE ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, UNION ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, VERMILION ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, INC., WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, WEBSTER ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, WEST CARROLL ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, WEST FELICIANA ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS, JERILYN CARROLL, CRAIG FOSTER, IONA HOLLAWAY, KAREN MARTIN, JUDY MCSHANN, KAREN RICHARDSON, AND LUCIAN DARYL ROBERSON v. STATE OF LOUISIANA, THE LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION, AND THE STATE OF LOUISIANA THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Brian F. Blackwell Charles L. Patin, Jr. Robert L. Hammonds Randal R. Cangelosi John E. Heinrich Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants St. John the Baptist Parish School Board, The Louisiana Association of Educators, Acadia Association of Educators, Allen Association of Educators, Ascension Association of Educators, Assumption Association of Educators, Avoyelles Association of Educators, Baker Association of Educators, Bossier Association of Educators, Caddo Association of Educators, Calcasieu Association of Educators, Inc., Caldwell Association of Educators, Cameron Association of Educators, Catahoula Association of Educators, Claiborne Association of Educators, DeSoto Association of Educators, East Baton Rouge Association of Educators, East Carroll Association of Educators, East Feliciana Association of Educators, Evangeline Association of Educators, Franklin Association of Educators, Iberia Association of Educators, Lafayette Parish Association of Educators, Lafourche Association of Educators, Lincoln Association of Educators, Livingston Association of Educators, Monroe Association of Educators, Morehouse Association of Educators, Natchitoches Parish Association of Educators, Ouachita Association of Educators, Plaquemines Association of Educators, Rapides Parish Association of Educators, Red River Parish Association of Educators, St. Bernard Association of Educators, St. Helena Association of Educators, St. James Association of Educators, St. John Association of Educators, St. Landry Association of Educators, St. Martin Association of Educators, St. Mary Association of Educators, Tangipahoa Association of Educators, Tensas Association of Educators, Terrebonne Association of Educators, Union Association of Educators, Vermilion Association of Educators, Inc., Washington Association of Educators, Webster Association of Educators, West Carroll Association of Educators, West Feliciana Association of Educators, Jerilyn Carroll, Craig Foster, Iona Hollaway, Karen Martin, Judy McShann, Karen Richardson and Lucian Daryl Roberson Michael G. Fanning Glenn D. Price, Jr. Gretna, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Intervenor Jefferson Parish School Board Christie C. Wood Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr. Alexandria, LA and Joan E. Hunt Willa R. LeBlanc Brook L. Thibodeaux Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee State of Louisiana through the Department of Education James D. "Buddy" Caldwell Attorney General Patricia H. Wilton Assistant Attorney General Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee The Louisiana Board of Elementary & Secondary Education
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
No. C622693 The Honorable R. Michael Caldwell, Judge Presiding Brian F. Blackwell
Charles L. Patin, Jr.
Robert L. Hammonds
Randal R. Cangelosi
John E. Heinrich
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
St. John the Baptist Parish School
Board, The Louisiana Association of
Educators, Acadia Association of
Educators, Allen Association of
Educators, Ascension Association of
Educators, Assumption Association of
Educators, Avoyelles Association of
Educators, Baker Association of
Educators, Bossier Association of
Educators, Caddo Association of
Educators, Calcasieu Association of
Educators, Inc., Caldwell Association
of Educators, Cameron Association of
Educators, Catahoula Association of
Educators, Claiborne Association of
Educators, DeSoto Association of
Educators, East Baton Rouge
Association of Educators, East Carroll
Association of Educators, East
Feliciana Association of Educators,
Evangeline Association of Educators,
Franklin Association of Educators,
Iberia Association of Educators,
Lafayette Parish Association of
Educators, Lafourche Association of
Educators, Lincoln Association of
Educators, Livingston Association of
Educators, Monroe Association of
Educators, Morehouse Association of
Educators, Natchitoches Parish
Association of Educators, Ouachita
Association of Educators,
Plaquemines Association of
Educators, Rapides Parish
Association of Educators, Red River Parish Association of Educators, St.
Bernard Association of Educators, St.
Helena Association of Educators, St.
James Association of Educators, St.
John Association of Educators, St.
Landry Association of Educators, St.
Martin Association of Educators, St.
Mary Association of Educators,
Tangipahoa Association of
Educators, Tensas Association of
Educators, Terrebonne Association of
Educators, Union Association of
Educators, Vermilion Association of
Educators, Inc., Washington
Association of Educators, Webster
Association of Educators, West
Carroll Association of Educators,
West Feliciana Association of
Educators, Jerilyn Carroll, Craig
Foster, Iona Hollaway, Karen Martin,
Judy McShann, Karen Richardson and
Lucian Daryl Roberson Michael G. Fanning
Glenn D. Price, Jr.
Gretna, LA Counsel for Plaintiff/Intervenor
Jefferson Parish School Board Christie C. Wood
Jimmy R. Faircloth, Jr.
Alexandria, LA
and
Joan E. Hunt
Willa R. LeBlanc
Brook L. Thibodeaux
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
State of Louisiana through the
Department of Education James D. "Buddy" Caldwell
Attorney General
Patricia H. Wilton
Assistant Attorney General
Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
The Louisiana Board of Elementary
& Secondary Education BEFORE: GUIDRY, HOLDRIDGE, AND CHUTZ, JJ. HOLDRIDGE, J.
This is an appeal of a summary judgment rendered in a declaratory judgment action, finding the parties' actions did not state a justiciable controversy. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action commenced with a "Petition for Further Relief Pursuant to [La.] C.C.P. [art.] 1878" filed on June 28, 2013, by plaintiffs-appellants, St. John the Baptist Parish School Board (St. John), individually and on behalf of all similarly situated public parish and city school boards operating public elementary and secondary schools in the State of Louisiana, several teacher unions, and seven individual plaintiffs, seeking to recover funds allegedly owed to them by defendants-appellees, State of Louisiana, the Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE), and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Education (LDOE) (collectively referred to as "defendants"). After various exceptions and motions were filed, plaintiffs filed a "Second Supplemental and Amending Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Further Relief on August 30, 2013, asserting that defendants unconstitutionally diverted minimum foundation program (MFP) funds that were constitutionally mandated to be allocated to plaintiffs' school systems as required by La. Const. art. VIII, § 13(B). Article VIII, § 13(B) of the Louisiana Constitution provides:
The plaintiffs included St. John and a proposed class comprised of public parish and city school systems operating pubic elementary and secondary schools in the State of Louisiana including: the Louisiana Association of Educators, Acadia Association of Educators, Allen Association of Educators, Ascension Association of Educators, Assumption Association of Educators, Avoyelles Association of Educators, Baker Association of Educators, Bossier Association of Educators, Caddo Association of Educators, Calcasieu Association of Educators, Inc., Caldwell Association of Educators, Cameron Association of Educators, Catahoula Association of Educators, Claiborne Association of Educators, DeSoto Association of Educators, East Baton Rouge Association of Educators, East Carroll Association of Educators, East Feliciana Association of Educators, Evangeline Association of Educators, Franklin Association of Educators, Iberia Association of Educators, Lafayette Parish Association of Educators, Lafourche Association of Educators, Lincoln Association of Educators, Livingston Association of Educators, Monroe Association of Educators, Morehouse Association of Educators, Natchitoches Parish Association of Educators, Ouachita Association of Educators, Plaquemines Association of Educators, Rapides Parish Association of Educators, Red River Parish Association of Educators, St. Bernard Association of Educators, St. Helena Association of Educators, St. James Association of Educators, St. John Association of Educators, St. Landry Association of Educators, St Martin Association of Educators, St. Mary Association of Educators, Tangipahoa Association of Educators, Tensas Association of Educators, Terrebonne Association of Educators, Union Association of Educators, Vermilion Association of Educators, Inc., Washington Association of Educators, Webster Association of Educators, West Carroll Association of Educators, West Feliciana Association of Educators, Jerilyn Carroll, Craig Foster, Iona Hollaway, Karen Martin, Judy McShann, Karen Richardson, and Lucian Daryl Roberson.
On July 1, 2013, plaintiffs filed a "First Supplemental and Amending Petition for Further Relief Pursuant to [La.] C.C.P. [art.] 1878." In response, defendants filed a dilatory exception of unauthorized use of summary proceeding, alleging that plaintiffs were improperly seeking to utilize summary procedure permitted by La. C.C.P. art. 1878 because it was limited to claims for "[f]urther relief based on a declaratory judgment[.]" After a hearing on August 15, 2013, the trial court rendered judgment sustaining defendants' dilatory exception of unauthorized use of summary proceeding. On July 11, 2013, St. John filed a motion for class certification, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 592, seeking a class to be "comprised of all public parish and city school boards operating public elementary and secondary schools in the [S]tate of Louisiana[.]" The trial court rendered a judgment on September 3, 2013, which denied the motion, but reserved to St. John "the right to re-urge the Motion for Class Certification at a later date." However, on February 18, 2014, the trial court rendered judgment, which denied plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification.
[MFP]. [BESE] ... shall annually develop and adopt a formula which shall be used to determine the cost of a [MFP] of education in all public elementary and secondary schools as well as to equitably allocate the funds to parish and city school systems. Such formula shall provide for a contribution by every city and parish school system. Prior to approval of the formula by the legislature, the legislature may return the formula adopted by [BESE] to [BESE] and may recommend to [BESE] an amended formula for consideration by [BESE] and submission to the legislature for approval. The legislature shall annually appropriate funds sufficient to fully fund the current cost to the state of such a program as determined by applying the approved formula in order to insure a minimum foundation of education in all public elementary and secondary schools. Neither the governor nor the legislature may reduce such appropriation, except that the governor may reduce such appropriation using means provided in the act containing the appropriation provided that any such reduction is consented to in writing by two-thirds of the elected members of each house of the legislature. The funds appropriated shall be equitably allocated to parish and city school systems according to the formula as adopted by [BESE] ... and approved by the legislature prior to making the appropriation. Whenever the legislature fails to approve the formula most recently adopted by [BESE] ... the last formula adopted by [BESE] ... and approved by the legislature shall be used for the determination of the cost of the [MFP] and for the allocation of funds appropriated.The legislature passed Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 17 (SCR 17) at the 2009 legislative session, the vehicle by which the legislature approved the MFP formula developed and adopted by BESE for the 2009-2010 fiscal year as required by La. Const. art. VIII, § 13(B). SCR 17 provided, in pertinent part:
In the event no provision for an annual increase has been provided and this Resolution remains in effect in the Fiscal Year 2010-11 or thereafter, ... [BESE] shall annually adjust the state and local base per pupil amount with approval by the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget. If the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget does not approve the rate established by the [BESE], then an annual growth adjustment of 2.75% shall automatically be applied to the state and local base per pupil amount beginning in the Fiscal Year 2010-11. (Emphasis added.)The legislature passed House Concurrent Resolution No. 243 (HCR 243) at the 2010 legislative session, the vehicle by which the legislature approved the MFP formula developed and adopted by BESE for the 2010-2011 fiscal year as required by La. Const. art. VIII, § 13(B). And again, at the 2011 legislative session, the legislature passed House Concurrent Resolution No. 130 (HCR 130), the vehicle by which the legislature approved the MFP formula developed and adopted by BESE for the 2011-2012 fiscal year as required by La. Const. art. VIII, § 13(B). However, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 99 (SCR 99), the vehicle by which the legislature approved the MFP formula developed and adopted by BESE for the 2012-2013 fiscal year, did not survive the entire fiscal year, as it was declared unconstitutional in La. Fed'n of Teachers v. State, 2013-0120 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 1033, 1071. Following the Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling in La. Fed'n of Teachers v. State, the LDOE allocated funds based on the last MFP formula approved by the legislature and adopted by BESE, which was HCR 130.
Plaintiffs challenged HCR 243, HCR 130, and SCR 99, alleging that they were constitutionally deficient, void from the outset, not validly approved by the legislature, and could not form the basis for determining the cost of the MFP formulas pursuant to La. Const. art. VIII, § 13(B). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that SCR 17 was the last MFP formula adopted by BESE and validly approved by the legislature and therefore, should have been used when determining the allocation of funds appropriated for the 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 fiscal years. Thus, plaintiffs sought an order requiring defendants to comply with the constitutional mandate and award "them [a] cumulative increase of the 2.75[%] annual growth adjustment for the three fiscal year period" in accordance with the cumulative annual growth adjustment language in SCR 17.
On January 16, 2014, defendants filed a peremptory exception raising the objections of no right of action and no cause of action. Defendants alleged that plaintiffs' claims were moot because the funds for the fiscal years in question were fully appropriated and disbursed, and the trial court was powerless to give any relief for the prior fiscal years. Defendants further alleged that the annual growth adjustment language found in SCR 17 was not part of the MFP formulas adopted by BESE and approved by the legislature for the fiscal years in question. However, plaintiffs took the position that what they were seeking was not to compel the appropriation of funds to pay their judgment, but the payment of their judgment from funds that had already been appropriated by the legislature.
Following a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment on April 14, 2014, sustaining the defendants' exception of no right of action as to all of the original plaintiffs with the exception of St. John, and dismissed the claims of those plaintiffs, leaving St. John as the only plaintiff. The judgment further overruled defendants' exception of no cause of action, "but defendants' rights to re-urge such exceptions [were] reserved unto them."
Subsequently, an additional fifty-five public parish and city school boards filed a petition to intervene in the proceedings as additional plaintiffs and adopted the "Second Supplemental and Amending Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Further Relief filed by St. John. The claims of the intervening plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiffs") were identical to the claims of St. John.
The additional public parish and city school boards include the Vermilion Parish School Board, St. Mary Parish School Board, Cameron Parish School Board, Iberville Parish School Board and St. Martin Parish School Board, which were permitted to intervene by order dated February 27, 2014. The Acadia Parish School Board, Allen Parish School Board, Bienville Parish School Board, Bossier Parish School Board, Caddo Parish School Board, Catahoula Parish School Board, City of Baker School Board, City of Bogalusa School Board, Monroe City School Board, Claiborne Parish School Board, Concordia Parish School Board, DeSoto Parish School Board, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, East Feliciana Parish School Board, Evangeline Parish School Board, Franklin Parish School Board, Grant Parish School Board, Iberia Parish School Board, Jackson Parish School Board, Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, Lafourche Parish School Board, LaSalle Parish School Board, Lincoln Parish School Board, Morehouse Parish School Board, Ouachita Parish School Board, Plaquemines Parish School Board, Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, Rapides Parish School Board, Red River Parish School Board, Richland Parish School Board, Sabine Parish School Board, St. Bernard Parish School Board, St. Charles Parish School Board, St. James Parish School Board, St. Landry Parish School Board, Tangipahoa Parish School Board, Tensas Parish School Board, Terrebonne Parish School Board, Union Parish School Board, Vernon Parish School Board, Webster Parish School Board, and West Carroll Parish School Board were permitted to intervene by separate order dated February 27, 2014. The Assumption Parish School Board was permitted to intervene by order dated March 6, 2014. The Jefferson Parish School Board was permitted to intervene by order dated March 31, 2014. The Madison Parish School Board and St. Helena Parish School Board were permitted to intervene by order dated April 1, 2014. The West Baton Rouge Parish School Board was permitted to intervene by order dated May 1, 2014. The West Feliciana Parish School Board was permitted to intervene by order dated May 15, 2014. The Lafayette Parish School Board and St. Tammany Parish School Board were permitted to intervene by order dated May 16, 2014.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were heard before the trial court on June 30, 2014. Consequently, the trial court found that plaintiffs' claims did not present a justiciable controversy and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment stating, in pertinent part:
Plaintiff, Jefferson Parish School Board, filed its own motion for summary judgment, referred to as a "Me Too" motion.
The more important question raised by the state involves the separation of powers and whether this court has any authority whatsoever to tell the legislature how, when, and where to spend money of the state. As argued by the state, the First Circuit has made it clear, and I think we can all certainly understand from our appreciation of civics and our national
constitution and our state constitution, that there is a separation of powers.A judgment in accordance with this oral ruling was signed on July 17, 2014, in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs, dismissing all plaintiffs' claims against defendants. Cross-motions for new trial were before the trial court on September 15, 2014. The trial court denied both motions for new trial on November 10, 2014. Thereafter, plaintiffs sought and were granted a devolutive appeal.
The legislature has the main source, with some input or direction or whatever from the executive branch, has complete and total control over the public fisc. The court interprets laws. It can declare laws constitutional or unconstitutional. It can, in individual cases, say how that law should be applied to the citizens of the state, but it cannot order the state to collect or spend, or appropriate or spend money in a certain way. This court cannot make the 2013-2014 legislature go back and pay money for the fiscal years of '09-'10, '10-'11, '11-'12, or '12-'13.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that on declaratory judgment issues, there must be valid justiciable issues, that courts will not be required to do a vain or useless thing.
* * *
[T]his court does not have the authority or power to tell the legislature to spend money from this current year or any past current year or money that's not there.
So I find that there is no justiciable issue in this case.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Plaintiffs allege that the following errors were committed in the proceedings below:
A. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the [d]efendants.
B. The trial court eared in denying summary judgment in favor of [p]laintiff and [i]ntervenors.
C. The trial court erred in finding that the claims of [p]laintiff and [i]ntervenors did not present a "justiciable controversy."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact for all or part of the relief prayed for by a litigant. Samaha v. Rau, 2007-1726 (La. 2/26/08), 977 So.2d 880, 882; Driver Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Cadeville Gas Storage, LLC, 49,375 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 10/1/14), 150 So.3d 492,496, writ denied, 2014-2304 (La. 1/23/15), 159 So.3d 1058. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with affidavits, if any, admitted for purposes of the motion, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(2); Bolton v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2013-1563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/27/14), 156 So.3d 1179, 1182.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966 was recently amended by 2015 La. Acts 422, § 1; however, the new version of article 966 does not apply to this case as the amendment did not become effective until January 1, 2016, which results in the application of the prior version of article 966 to the instant matter.
The burden of proof to show that no material factual issue exists is on the mover. However, if the party moving for summary judgment will not bear the burden of proof at trial, the mover is not required to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim. Rather, the mover must point out to the trial court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); Gaspard v. Safeway Ins. Co., 2014-1676 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/5/15), 174 So.3d 692, 694, writ denied, 2015-1588 (La. 10/23/15), 184 So.3d 18.
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, under the same criteria that govern a district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Gaspard, supra.
DISCUSSION
Our sole concern in this matter is whether a sufficient justiciable controversy exists. Courts are without power to grant declaratory relief unless such a controversy exists. See Prator v. Caddo Par., 2004-0794 (La. 12/1/04), 888 So.2d 812, 815. It is well settled that courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies. Council of City of New Orleans v. Sewerage And Water Bd. of New Orleans, 2006-1989 (La. 4/11/07), 953 So.2d 798, 800. The Louisiana Supreme Court defined a "justiciable controversy" as "an existing actual and substantial dispute, as distinguished from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute which involves the legal relations of the parties who have real adverse interests, and upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through a decree of conclusive character." Abbott v. Parker, 259 La. 279, 249 So.2d 908, 918 (La. 1971).
Plaintiffs allege that the MFP formulas adopted by BESE for the fiscal years in question are unconstitutional and that, as a consequence, SCR 17 is operative by default for those years. Thus, plaintiffs assert that SCR 17 directs BESE to provide an annual growth adjustment of 2.75% to the MFP formulas for the fiscal years in question and that the legislature is constitutionally mandated to fully fund them in accordance with La. Const. art. VIII, § 13(B).
Defendants counter that any claims concerning the MFP formula for the fiscal years in question became moot once the legislature appropriated the funds, and the courts are powerless to give any relief. Defendants further allege that the MFP formulas for the fiscal years in question have been appropriated, funded, and disbursed, and therefore there is no justiciable controversy at issue. Thus, the defendants contend that a ruling would serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect of law because the annual growth adjustment language relied on by plaintiffs was not a factor in the MFP formulas for the fiscal years in question. Defendants rely on Home v. La. State Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 357 So.2d 1216, 1218 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), writ denied, 359 So.2d 621 (La. 1978), holding that the trial court was powerless to give any remedial relief because all MFP funds had been disbursed.
A justiciable controversy has been broadly defined as one involving "adverse parties with opposing claims ripe for judicial determination," involving "specific adversarial questions asserted by interested parties based on existing facts." However, a justiciable controversy for purposes of a declaratory judgment is one involving uncertain or disputed rights in an immediate and genuine situation, and must be a substantial and actual dispute as to the legal relations of parties who have real, adverse interests. Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 2005-1490 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/10/06), 928 So.2d 618, 622.
It is undisputed that the Louisiana Constitution mandates an annual process for the formulation, adoption, and funding for public education through the establishment of an MFP formula. It is also undisputed that the legislature must annually approve an MFP formula, which appropriates funds, as determined by applying the approved MFP formula in order to ensure a minimum foundation of education in all public elementary and secondary schools. See La. Const. art. VII, § 13(B). All money received by the state or by any state board, agency, or commission shall be deposited immediately upon receipt in the state treasury and any money thereafter remaining in the treasury is credited to the "state general fund." See La. Const. art. VII, § 9(B); see also La. R.S. 49:308. Those monies in the state general fund may only be withdrawn pursuant to an appropriation made in accordance with law. See La. Const. art. III, § 16 and La. Const. art. III, § 10(A). "The term 'specific appropriation made by law' means an appropriation made by an act of the legislature, of a specified sum of money for a specific purpose." Carso v. Bd. of Liquidation of State Debt, 205 La. 368, 386, 17 So.2d 364, 365 (1944).
In the instant matter, a specified sum of money to fund the MFP formula was appropriated by the legislature and disbursed for the fiscal years in question, which did not include the annual adjustment growth language as mandated by SCR 17. This was evidenced by the state and local base per pupil amount of MFP funding remaining $3,855.00 throughout the fiscal years in question. BESE considered the MFP formulas for these fiscal years "no growth formula[s]" because there was a zero increase in the base per pupil amount for the MFP funds to be appropriated. This was further evidenced by the affidavit of Elizabeth Scioneaux, Deputy Superintendent of Management and Finance with LDOE, submitted by defendants, which established that the annual growth adjustment language in SCR 17 was not a factor in calculating the current cost of the MFP formulas for the fiscal years in question. In her deposition, Ms. Scioneaux explained that LDOE did not include the annual growth adjustment language in its calculations for the amount of funds to be disbursed:
The base per pupil amount is the starting point for the cost calculation.
Q: ... [W]hat was the rationale for not including that 2.75% annual growth adjustment?
A: It ... it's not part of ... of the math; it's not part of the calculation of the formula.
Thus, it is clear that the resolutions passed by the legislature to fund the MFP formulas for the fiscal years in question (2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013) did not include an annual growth adjustment of 2.75%. It is also clear that the legislatively appropriated funds were allocated in accordance with the resolutions and were spent in the appropriate fiscal years. Plaintiffs have shown no law, statute, article, provision, or jurisprudence to allow this court to force the legislature to re-allocate and fund from the current fiscal year budget for payments which may have been improperly allocated or unconstitutionally deficient in prior fiscal years. Therefore, we find that plaintiffs' claims present no justiciable controversy because all approved MFP funds have been appropriated and disbursed, and we are powerless to give any relief. See Perschall v. State, 96-0322 (La. 7/1/97), 697 So.2d 240, 251. The issue presented by plaintiffs presents no real justiciable controversy because it is hypothetical and abstract, as it is based on a contingency that cannot arise. A justiciable controversy is, consequently, lacking.
Even if we were to find that a justiciable controversy exists, we would still consider such relief inappropriate given the facts of this matter. Appellate courts, as well as trial courts, may exercise broad discretionary power to decide whether a suit for declaratory judgment is one in which such relief may be appropriate. Billingslev v. City of Baton Rouge, 95-2162 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/30/96), 673 So.2d 300, 303, writ denied, 96-1490 (La. 9/20/96), 679 So.2d 439. Thus, the judgment at issue does not serve the purpose of terminating any immediate, existing controversy between the parties, as the Louisiana Constitution mandates an annual process for developing an MFP formula, which served that purpose. Therefore, a declaratory judgment on the validity and enforceability of the MFP formulas for the prior fiscal years serves no practical purpose, and such a judgment declaring its validity for purposes of a possible cause of action for damages would amount to an impermissible advisory opinion. See Chauvin v. Wellcheck. Inc., 2005-1571 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 114, 118. --------
Moreover, plaintiffs' claims do not present a justiciable controversy because the relief sought requires this court to encroach upon the constitutional delegation of power to the legislative branch and detract from the legislature's control over the finances of the state. See Hoag v. State, 2004-0857 (La. 12/1/04) 889 So.2d 1019, 1024. The traditional notions of justiciability are rooted in the constitution's tripartite distribution of powers into the three branches of government. See Marionneaux v. Hines, 2005-1191 (La. 5/12/05), 902 So.2d 373, 377. An increase in funding is a primary legislative function, which cannot be delegated to either the executive or the judiciary branch. See La. Mun. Ass'n v. State, 2004-0227 (La. 1/19/05), 893 So.2d 809, 844. Thus, we find that the courts of this state are without authority to direct the legislature to "fully fund" plaintiffs, as the courts are constrained by the Louisiana Constitution from impinging upon matters within the realm of the executive and legislative branches of government and must use judicial restraint when litigants seek to circumvent such constitutional provisions. The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that such an action would be in violation of separation of powers. See Hoag, 889 So.2d at 1025-26.
Accordingly, we are compelled to exercise judicial restraint and refrain from encroaching upon the constitutional delegation of power to the legislative branch. We find that there is no justiciable interest in adjudicating the constitutional efficacy of the prior MFP formulas. Because the court cannot entertain any action that does not involve a justiciable controversy, this matter requires a legislative solution rather than judicial intervention.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed. Appeal costs in the amount of $6,092.50 are assessed to plaintiffs-appellants, St. John the Baptist Parish School Board, Acadia Parish School Board, Allen Parish School Board, Assumption Parish School Board, Bienville Parish School Board, Bossier Parish School Board, Caddo Parish School Board, Catahoula Parish School Board, City of Baker School Board, City of Bogalusa School Board, Monroe City School Board, Claiborne Parish School Board, Concordia Parish School Board, DeSoto Parish School Board, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, East Feliciana Parish School Board, Evangeline Parish School Board, Franklin Parish School Board, Grant Parish School Board, Iberia Parish School Board, Jackson Parish School Board, Jefferson Parish School Board, Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, Lafayette Parish School Board, Lafourche Parish School Board, LaSalle Parish School Board, Lincoln Parish School Board, Madison Parish School Board, Morehouse Parish School Board, Ouachita Parish School Board, Plaquemines Parish School Board, Pointe Coupee Parish School Board, Rapides Parish School Board, Red River Parish School Board, Richland Parish School Board, Sabine Parish School Board, St. Bernard Parish School Board, St. Charles Parish School Board, St. Helena Parish School Board, St. James Parish School Board, St. Landry Parish School Board, St. Tammany Parish School Board, Tangipahoa Parish School Board, Tensas Parish School Board, Terrebonne Parish School Board, Union Parish School Board, Vernon Parish School Board, Webster Parish School Board, West Baton Rouge Parish School Board, West Carroll Parish School Board, and West Feliciana Parish School Board.
AFFIRMED.