Opinion
19-cv-03099-JSC
08-04-2021
SPRINT SPECTRUM REALTY COMPANY, LLC, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM F. HARTKOPF, JR., Defendant.
ORDER RE: SPRINT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION RE: DKT. NOS. 112, 115
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY United States Magistrate Judge
In its Order on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment, the Court held that “equipment” in Exhibit A of the contract (the Site Description) does not include the other three components of Sprint's system: antennas, cable, or utility runs. (Dkt. No. 109 at 4.) The Court accordingly granted Sprint summary judgment on Mr. Hartkopf's claims for a declaratory judgment. (Id. at 7.) However, even though the Court's interpretation of the contract would appear to doom Mr. Hartkopf's breach of contract claims, the Court gave him the opportunity to file a supplemental opposition since Sprint's summary judgment motion appeared to move for summary judgment on the grounds that Mr. Hartkopf did not have any damages. (Id. at 7.) Now pending before the Court are Mr. Hartkopf's supplemental opposition and Sprint's response. (Dkt. Nos. 112, 115.) Upon review of these papers, the Court again concludes that Mr. Hartkopf's contract claims fail as a matter of law.
All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. Nos. 5, 15.)
Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.
First, the Court did not hold that “equipment” as used in Exhibit A's Site Description is ambiguous. To the contrary, “equipment” unambiguously refers to equipment other than antennas, coaxial cables, and utility runs for the reasons stated in the summary judgment order. (Dkt. No. 109 at 4-6.)
Second, Mr. Hartkopf's attempt to rescind his admission that the only equipment referred to in Exhibit A's Site Description are the four components as discussed in the summary judgment order is unavailing. He unequivocally admitted at oral argument that the only equipment encompassed in Exhibit A's description-under his own interpretation-are the four components discussed in the Site Description. (Dkt. No. 111 at 20; Dkt. No. 109 at 3-4.) Even putting aside his admission, however, he does not identify anything in the parties' agreement that would support an interpretation of “equipment” as used in Exhibit A as including radio frequency setbacks. In other words, regardless of how Mr. Hartkopf's expert calculates the space used by Sprint's property, the question on summary judgment is what the provision for 300 square feet for “equipment” in Exhibit A means. It does not mean radio frequency setbacks as a matter of contract interpretation.
He also does not offer any analysis that supports the conclusion that the 300 feet of equipment provision includes the support material identified by his expert. (Dkt. No. 94-1, Ex. M, ¶ 46.) Nor does he identify any evidence as to what specifically that support material is and how its inclusion breached the contract. Mr. Hartkopf's expert's opinion as to how much space Sprint used always includes the components (antennas, coaxial cables, utility runs) that as a matter of contract interpretation are not included in the 300 feet of equipment. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 47.) Thus, there is no genuine dispute as to whether Sprint breached the contract.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the Court's summary judgment order, (Dkt. No. 109), as well as here, Sprint's motion for summary judgment on Mr. Hartkopf's contract claims is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.