Opinion
No. 2023-02905 Index No. 400021/20
10-16-2024
Daniel Spira, respondent, v. National Council of Young Israel, defendant, Young Israel of Hillcrest, appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, NY (Matthew C. Catalano, Karen Y. Bitar, and Gershon Akerman of counsel), for appellant. Hach Rose Schirripa & Cheverie, LLP, New York, NY (Hillary M. Nappi of counsel), for respondent.
Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York, NY (Matthew C. Catalano, Karen Y. Bitar, and Gershon Akerman of counsel), for appellant.
Hach Rose Schirripa & Cheverie, LLP, New York, NY (Hillary M. Nappi of counsel), for respondent.
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P. JOSEPH J. MALTESE LILLIAN WAN JAMES P. MCCORMACK, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Young Israel of Hillcrest appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Karina E. Alomar, J.), entered February 22, 2023. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of that defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action and the demand for punitive damages insofar as asserted against it.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action under the Child Victims Act (hereinafter the CVA) (see CPLR 214-g) against the defendant Young Israel of Hillcrest (hereinafter YIH) and another defendant. The first cause of action alleged that the defendants were liable under different theories of negligence, including negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, for sexual abuse perpetrated against the plaintiff by a youth director employed by the defendants. The complaint included a demand for punitive damages against the defendants. YIH moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action and the demand for punitive damages insofar as asserted against it. In an order entered February 22, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied those branches of YIH's motion. YIH appeals.
"On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) as barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the time within which to commence the cause of action has expired" (Haddad v Muir, 215 A.D.3d 641, 642; see Schearer v Fitzgerald, 217 A.D.3d 980, 981). On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88; see Brophy v Big Bros. Big Sisters of Am., Inc., 224 A.D.3d 866, 868).
The Supreme Court properly denied dismissal of the first cause of action insofar as asserted against YIH on the ground that the CVA violates the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution. "CPLR 214-g, enacted as part of the CVA, provides a revival window for 'civil claims or causes of action alleging intentional or negligent acts or omissions that seek to recover for injuries suffered as a result of conduct which would constitute sex crimes, which conduct was committed against a child less than 18 years of age, for which the statute of limitations had already run'" (Feaster v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 227 A.D.3d 668, 669, quoting S.H. v Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 A.D.3d 180, 184; see Forbes v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 220 A.D.3d 750, 751). "[A] claim-revival statute will satisfy the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution if it was enacted as a reasonable response in order to remedy an injustice" (Matter of World Trade Ctr. Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litig., 30 N.Y.3d 377, 400). Contrary to YIH's contention, the revival of civil claims and causes of action pursuant to the CVA was a reasonable response to remedy the injustice to child sexual assault survivors caused by application of the relevant statute of limitations (see Feaster v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 227 A.D.3d at 669-670; Forbes v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 220 A.D.3d at 752; Schearer v Fitzgerald, 217 A.D.3d at 982-983).
The Supreme Court also properly denied dismissal of the first cause of action insofar as asserted against YIH pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). "[T]o establish a cause of action based on negligent hiring, negligent retention, or negligent supervision of an employee, it must be shown that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury" (Feaster v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 227 A.D.3d at 670 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Brophy v Big Bros. Big Sisters of Am., Inc., 224 A.D.3d at 868). "Causes of action alleging negligence based upon negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are not statutorily required to be pleaded with specificity" (Novak v Sisters of the Heart of Mary, 210 A.D.3d 1104, 1105; see Davila v Orange County, 215 A.D.3d 632, 635). Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint sufficiently pleads a cause of action to recover damages for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of the youth director (see Feaster v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 227 A.D.3d at 670; Belcastro v Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y., 213 A.D.3d 800, 802).
The Supreme Court also properly denied dismissal of the demand for punitive damages insofar as asserted against YIH. "Punitive damages in actions involving negligent hiring, retention, or supervision generally require conduct evincing a high degree of moral culpability, so flagrant as to transcend simple carelessness, or which constitutes willful or wanton negligence or recklessness so as to evince a conscious disregard for the rights of others" (Pisula v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 201 A.D.3d 88, 102; see Moskowitz v Masliansky, 198 A.D.3d 637, 640). Contrary to YIH's contention, at this early stage in the litigation, it is premature to conclude that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to support a claim that YIH acted so recklessly or wantonly in connection with the hiring, retention, and supervision of the youth director as to warrant an award of punitive damages against it (see Rubin v Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 227 A.D.3d 741, 742-743; Pisula v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 201 A.D.3d at 105; Gipe v DBT Xpress, LLC, 150 A.D.3d 1208, 1209).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of YIH's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first cause of action and the demand for punitive damages insofar as asserted against it.
IANNACCI, J.P., MALTESE, WAN and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.