Summary
concluding that § 229.119 was violated “because the weld holding the side and back supports together was broken”
Summary of this case from Lupia v. N.J. Transit Rail OperationsOpinion
Case No. 5:02-CV-129
January 30, 2004
OPINION
Plaintiff, Thomas Spade ("Spade"), has sued Defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX"), pursuant to the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51-60, claiming that he was injured as a result of CSX's negligence and/or its violation of the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act ("FLIA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20701. Now before the Court is Spade's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.
I. Facts
On September 4, 1999, Spade was operating locomotive CP 5613 in the course of his employment with CSX as an engineer. While Spade was sitting in the engineer's seat, the seat broke at a point on the left side near the seat back, causing the backrest and Spade to drop to the back toward the left. Following the accident, Spade noticed that the brace holding the backrest had been previously welded and had broken. Spade alleges that his back was severely injured as a result of the accident.
Pursuant to CSX's Train Handling Rules, an engineer is required to inspect a locomotive in his or her charge and to complete a Work Report on the condition of the locomotive. (Train Handling Rule 2.1.4, Pl.'s Br. Supp. Ex. H.) An engineer must report all defects on the Work Report, which is to be left on the locomotive to notify CSX and any employees who subsequently operate the locomotive of the defect, and must also notify the train dispatcher. (Id.; DeLisle Dep. at 16, 19, Pl.'s Br. Supp. Ex. F; Novak Dep. at 35, Pl.'s Br. Supp. Ex. G.) Immediately prior to the beginning of Spade's shift on September 4, CSX engineer David DeLisle ("DeLisle") operated locomotive CP 5613 on a trip from Chicago to Grand Rapids. During the trip, DeLisle noticed the broken weld on the seat but failed to report it. (DeLisle Dep. at 23-24.) DeLisle testified that the broken weld was a defect that should have been reported under CSX's Train Handling Rule 2.1.4 and that his failure to do so was a violation of that rule. (Id. at 24-25.) David Novak, Spade's supervisor, agreed that DeLisle would have violated Rule 2.1.4 if he observed the broken weld and failed to report it. (Novak Dep. at 39-40.)
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)).
III. Discussion
A. Applicable LawSpade has sued CSX under the FELA and the FLIA (formerly codified at 45 U.S.C. § 23 as the Boiler Inspection Act), alleging that CSX failed to provide Spade with a safe place to work.
Spade also alleges a claim of common law negligence, which is not before the Court in the instant motion.
The FELA provides, in pertinent part:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce,. . . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances . . . or other equipment.45 U.S.C. § 51. Courts have held that in light of the remedial purposes underlying the statute, the FELA is to be construed liberally in favor of the injured plaintiff. See Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 763 F.2d 805, 806 (6th Cir. 1985). To establish liability under the FELA, a plaintiff must show: (1) "circumstances which a reasonable person would foresee as creating a potential for harm"; and (2) that the "breach played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury."McGinn v. Burlington N.R.R. Co., 102 F.3d 295, 300 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 So. Ct. 443, 448 (1957)). To prove that an employer was negligent, a plaintiff must establish the common law elements of negligence, including duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation. Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Robert v. Consol. Rail Corp., 832 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1987)); Frieri v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 01 C 7934, 2003 WL 22425022, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2003). However, the quantum of proof in an FELA case is significantly less than that in ordinary negligence cases, as an FELA plaintiff need "show only that the railroad's negligence played any part in causing the injury, instead of proving the ordinary negligence requirement that the negligence be the proximate cause of the injury." Basinger v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 94-3908, 1996 WL 400182, at *4 (6th Cir. July 16, 1996). Thus, as the Supreme Court has observed, "the test . . . is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 448 (1957).
The FLIA provides:
A railroad carrier may use or allow to be used a locomotive or tender on its railroad line only when the locomotive or tender and its parts and appurtenances —
(1) are in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary danger of personal injury; (2) have been inspected as required under this chapter and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this chapter; and (3) can withstand every test prescribed by the Secretary under this chapter.49 U.S.C. § 20701. An employee injured as a result of a violation of the FLIA may bring an action under the FELA based upon the FLIA violation. Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 485, 63 S.Ct. 347, 351 (1943). "Negligence is not the basis for liability under the Act. Instead it `imposes upon the carrier an absolute and continuing duty to maintain the locomotive, and all parts and appurtenances thereof, in proper condition, and safe to operate . . . without unnecessary peril to life or limb.'" Id. (quotingSouthern Ry. Co. v. Lundsford, 297 U.S. 398, 401, 56 S.Ct. 504, 506 (1936)). Thus, liability "is absolute upon proof of an unsafe part and proximate cause" and "the FELA causation standard applies."Green, 763 F.2d at 810. An employer may violate the FLIA in either of two ways: (1) by breaching the broad duty to keep all parts and appurtenances of its locomotives in proper condition and safe to operate without unnecessary peril to life or limb; or (2) by failing to comply with the regulations issued by the Federal Railroad Administration.McGinn, 102 F.3d at 299. An engineer's seat is an appurtenance covered by the FLIA. See Oglesby v. Delaware Hudson Ry. Co., 180 F.3d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1999); Oglesby v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993).
B. The Arguments
Spade contends that he is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability based upon CSX's violation of the FLIA. Spade argues that CSX violated the FLIA by failing to maintain an appurtenance to the locomotive — the engineer's seat — in a proper condition and safe to operate. In addition, Spade argues that CSX violated the FLIA because it violated the following regulations:
§ 229.7 Prohibited acts,
(a) The Locomotive Inspection Act (45 U.S.C. § 22-34) makes it unlawful for any carrier to use or permit to be used on its line any locomotive unless the entire locomotive and its appurtenances —
(1) Are in proper condition and safe to operate in the service to which they are put, without unnecessary peril to life or limb.49 C.F.R. § 229.7(a)(1);
§ 229.119 Cabs, floors, and passageways.
(a) Cab seats shall be securely mounted and braced. . . .49 C.F.R. § 229.119(a).
CSX contends that the motion must be denied for two reasons. First, CSX contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the seat was in an improper condition and unsafe. CSX asserts that there is no evidence that the seat was not securely mounted and braced as required by 49 C.F.R. § 229.7(a)(1) and notes that the evidence, including a videotape showing the condition of the seat at the time of the accident, shows that the seat was securely mounted to the floor. In addition, CSX points out that DeLisle testified that he believed the seat to be safe and found it "extremely comfortable," in spite of the broken weld he observed and that Spade used the seat without incident for the first eight hours of his shift. CSX also notes that Spade's testimony that the weld unexpectedly broke at about 8:20 a.m. on September 4, 1999, is contradicted both by DeLisle's testimony that the weld was broken before Spade's shift began and the videotape showing the seat being used without any indication that the seat was unsafe or posed unnecessary danger of personal injury. Second, CSX contends that summary judgment should be denied because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the seat's condition caused Spade's injuries. With regard to this argument, CSX asserts that DeLisle's testimony that the weld was broken at least twenty hours before Spade alleges it broke creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding the causal connection. In addition, CSX asserts that Spade did not suffer an injury as a result of the September 4, 1999, incident because the evidence shows that Spade experienced pain in his lower back, left buttock, and left thigh long before the accident occurred. As support for this argument, CSX has submitted various medical records and other documents showing that Spade was treated for back pain and associated problems prior to the accident and that Spade admitted on a Family and Medical Leave Act certification dated August 31, 2001, that his back condition commenced in June 1999.
C. Analysis
Based upon its review of the evidence, including the videotape submitted by CSX, the Court concludes that there is no genuine dispute that the seat was in an unsafe and improper condition at the time of the accident. The testimony of Spade and DeLisle, which is uncontradicted, as well as the remaining evidence submitted by the parties, is that the weld on the seat was broken at the time of the accident. The videotape shows the location of the broken weld near the junction of the side and back support bars and illustrates the movement of the seat as a result of the broken weld. The mere existence of the broken weld shows that the seat was not in its proper operating condition. Although DeLisle testified that he did not consider the seat unsafe and that he found it extremely comfortable, DeLisle acknowledged that the broken weld rendered the seat defective and that his failure to report the defective condition was a violation of CSX's own Train Handling Rules. Novak, the CSX Supervisor, agreed with DeLisle. Based upon this evidence, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of fact that CSX violated the FLIA by breaching its duty to maintain the engineer's seat in a proper condition and safe to operate. In addition, the Court concludes that the condition of the seat violated 49 C.F.R. § 229.119(a). CSX's argument that the seat was "securely mounted" ignores the regulation's command that the seat also be securely braced or "supported." Sandstrom v. Chicago N.W. Transp. Co., 907 F.2d 839, 840 (8th Cir. 1990). The seat in this case was not securely braced or supported because the weld holding the side and back supports together was broken.
The Court also rejects CSX's contention that there is a dispute of fact because DeLisle's testimony that the weld was broken before Spade's shift began on September 4, 1999, contradicts Spade's claim that the weld broke during Spade's shift. Spade is not claiming that the seat fell back when the weld broke, but only that the seat fell back during his shift due to the broken weld. The only evidence in the record, which supports Spade's claim, is that the weld was already broken at the time of the accident.
Finally, the Court concludes that the evidence, which again is not in dispute, is that the FLIA violation caused Spade to be injured. CSX's evidence that Spade suffered from a preexisting injury at the time of the accident does not create a dispute of fact as to whether Spade suffered an injury as a result of the condition of the seat. Spade has submitted evidence in the form of an affidavit from his treating physician, Dr. James Ellis, that the accident was a contributing cause to Spade's back injuries. (Ellis Aff. ¶ 3, Pl.'s Reply Br. Ex. I.) This evidence is uncontradicted. CSX's evidence regarding preexisting injury goes to the issue of damages, which Spade concedes is an issue for the jury. See Stevens v. Bangor Aroostook R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 594, 601 (1st Cir. 1996). Thus, the existence of a question regarding the extent of CSX's liability for damages, if any, does not preclude a finding of CSX's liability for violating the FLIA. Therefore, Spade is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
The Court also rejects CSX's assertion that summary judgment might never be appropriate for a party who bears the burden of proof in the absence of some kind of admission by the opposing party or documentary evidence proving the moving party's case because the jury is always free to disregard the plaintiffs testimony. CSX cites no authority for this proposition, and it is contrary to the non-moving party's burden under Rule 56(c), which is to come forward with evidence establishing a genuine issue as to any material fact. CSX has failed to meet that burden in this case, and Spade is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Spade's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.