Opinion
1:20-cv-298
12-18-2020
ZACHARY THOMAS SPADA, Petitioner v. SUPERINTENDENT BARRY SMITH, et al., Respondents
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by state prisoner Zachary Thomas Spada pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1-1. For the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that Spada's Petition be dismissed without service pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases In the United States District Courts because § 2254 does not provide an appropriate or available federal remedy for his claims. See Id. (stating that federal district courts have a pre-service duty to screen and summarily dismiss habeas petitions that plainly show the petitioner is not entitled to relief). It is further recommended that the Court deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
Because Spada has a pending motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his Petition has been lodged but not filed. See ECF No. 1-1.
II. Report
Spada, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (SCI-Houtzdale), maintains in his Petition that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) is improperly garnishing “Act 84 deductions” from his prison account without authority to do so. ECF No. 1-1 at 1-2. Spada contends that he has a protected liberty interest in his account and that the DOC's deductions violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. Although Spada does not request any specific relief, he presumably wants the Court to order the DOC to stop garnishing money from his account. Id. at 2.
Section 2254 authorizes a federal court to grant a writ of habeas corpus if a prisoner demonstrates that “he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As evidenced by the language of the statute, the purpose of a habeas corpus petition is to challenge the fact of a criminal conviction or the duration of a sentence, and the appropriate remedy is the petitioner's release from illegal custody. See, e.g, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”); Barry v. Brower, 864 F.2d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[A] district court's power to grant a writ of habeas corpus under § 28 U.S.C. 2254 is limited ... to directing [the petitioner's] release from custody.”). In contrast, the “the monetary component of a sentence is not capable of satisfying the ‘in custody' requirement of federal habeas statutes.” United States v. Ross, 801 F.3d 374, 380 (3d Cir. 2015) (collecting cases); Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that “[t]he payment of restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of ‘significant restraint on liberty' contemplated in the ‘custody' requirement of the federal habeas corpus states.”). Consequently, courts have consistently declined to review claims related to fines, garnishments and restitutions under the federal habeas statutes because such claims challenge the conditions of the petitioner's confinement rather than the confinement itself. See Stoltzfoos v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't Corrs., 733 Fed.Appx. 34, 37 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2018); Peterson v. Clark, 2019 WL 1956925, at *1-2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2019) (rejecting petitioner's argument that “fines, restitution and costs” can be challenged in a habeas petition).
Here, Spada is challenging the DOC's collection of fines and restitution pursuant to Pennsylvania's Act 84, 42 Pa. C.S. §9728(b)(5), which requires the DOC to “make monetary deductions of at least 25% of deposits made to inmate wages and personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution” and other court costs. Id. Courts have widely held that such claims challenge an inmate's “conditions of confinement” rather than the “fact or duration” of his confinement. See, e.g., Peterson, 2019 WL 1956925, at *1-2. As such, they are not cognizable in a federal habeas action and Spada's petition must be dismissed. If Spada wishes to pursue his challenge to the DOC's deductions, the proper avenue is a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Montanez v. Beard, 344 Fed.Appx. 833 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that complaint by two prisoners based on deductions from their account to pay criminal penalties pursuant to Pennsylvania's Act 84 stated a due process claim pursuant to § 1983); Rodriguez v. Court of Common Pleas of York County, 2012 WL 1604778, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2012) (acknowledging the potential viability of a due process challenge to Act 84 deductions under § 1983).
In
The Court expresses no opinion as to the potential merits of such a claim.
IIL Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss Spada's Petition prior to service and deny a certificate of appealability.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. AEDPA limits the issuance of a certificate of appealability to circumstances where "the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007). Carver v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 630 Fed.Appx. 133, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2016), the Court of Appeals acknowledged one narrow circumstance in which an inmate might be able to challenge Act 84 or similar deductions in a § 2254 action: where the inmate can demonstrate that the deductions “are somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment.” Id. (quoting Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012)). In that circumstance, the inmate's claim might implicate the “execution” of his sentence. Id. The Court noted, however, that an inmate cannot obtain review of such claims under § 2254 if the “sentencing judgment is silent on the issue.” Id. at 135 (“[B]ecause there was nothing in the judgment forbidding, or even concerning the judgments Carver's challenge to the deductions is not a challenge to the execution of his sentence.”) (internal quotation omitted). Such is the case here. See ECF No. 1-1 at 2 (alleging that the deductions from Spada's account are unlawful because “the Sentencing Court did not specifically authorize deductions from [his] inmate account nor say in its sentencing order how and when costs would be paid). See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, Spada failed to allege the denial of a constitutional right that would entitle him to habeas relief, let alone demonstrate a substantial showing of the denial of such a right. Accordingly, the Court should not grant him a certificate of appealability on his claim.