Opinion
# 2016-032-512 Claim No. 123161
12-20-2016
JOSEPH SOTO v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Joseph Soto, Pro Se Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Joan Matalavage, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel
Synopsis
Claimant is entitled to damages for 22 days of additional, wrongful confinement
Case information
| UID: | 2016-032-512 |
| Claimant(s): | JOSEPH SOTO |
| Claimant short name: | SOTO |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 123161 |
| Motion number(s): | |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | JUDITH A. HARD |
| Claimant's attorney: | Joseph Soto, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, NYS Attorney General By: Joan Matalavage, Assistant Attorney General, Of Counsel |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | December 20, 2016 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
On or about August 30, 2013, claimant Joseph Soto filed this claim with the Clerk of the Court of Claims seeking to recover damages for an alleged wrongful confinement lasting 224 days - from November 13, 2012 through June 24, 2013 - in the Special Housing Units (SHU) at Coxsackie Correctional Facility and Southport Correctional Facility. Claimant also asserts that the alleged wrongful confinement deprived him of his right to due process of law under both the Federal and New York State Constitutions. A trial was conducted on August 24, 2016 at the New York State Court of Claims in Albany, New York. Claimant testified on his own behalf and submitted several documentary exhibits in support of his claim. Defendant called one witness and offered additional documentary evidence regarding claimant's confinement.
The Court notes that many of claimant's exhibits were received into evidence over defendant's objections, with the caveat that the Court would not consider any hearsay statements contained therein.
FACTS
The relevant time line of events underlying this claim is difficult to ascertain given the numerous documents submitted by claimant and defendant. As best the Court can discern, claimant was placed in the SHU at Coxsackie on November 13, 2012, after being issued three misbehavior reports (Exhibit B, Escort Memo; Exhibit B, Inmate Misbehavior Reports). Specifically, the reports alleged that claimant was found to have possessed a weapon and/or an altered item in the form of a paper clip affixed to the end of a ballpoint pen, possessed various documents pertaining to other inmates without authorization, and attempted to create a disturbance and/or a demonstration by distributing said documents (Exhibit B, Inmate Misbehavior Reports). A Tier II hearing on the first misbehavior report was held on November 19, 2012, at which time claimant was found guilty of possession of an altered item (see 7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [14] [ii]) and sentenced to 20 days in the SHU and loss of privileges, including packages, telephone, and commissary (Exhibit A, Inmate Disciplinary History, p. 1). A Tier II hearing on the second misbehavior report was held on December 3, 2012, at which time claimant was found guilty of creating a disturbance (see 7 NYCRR 270.2 [B] [20] [i]) and sentenced to 20 days in the SHU and loss of privileges, including packages, telephone, and commissary (Exhibit A, Inmate Disciplinary History, p. 1).
Given that defendant's exhibits were submitted to the Court unstapled and without page numbers, the Court will refer to each document by its title and, where necessary, its date.
Claimant testified that he believes that he was set up regarding the charges in all three misbehavior reports by the supervisor of the law library, who did not want any Hispanic inmates to work there. --------
There is no indication that a disciplinary hearing on the third misbehavior report was held in December 2012. Indeed, there is little evidence at all in the record as to what transpired between December 3, 2012 and June 14, 2013. It appears that a third disciplinary hearing regarding the November 13, 2012 incident was held at Coxsackie on January 11, 2013, but the record contains no documentation as to the subject matter or the outcome of said hearing (Exhibit 6, Appeal Form to Commissioner; Exhibit B, Memorandum dated March 31, 2013). Claimant was then transferred from Coxsackie to Southport on February 8, 2013 (Exhibit A, Locator System Chronological History Display). On March 31, 2013, claimant's request for a rehearing was granted due to Coxsackie's failure to maintain a complete electronic record of the January 11, 2013 hearing (Exhibit 6, Appeal Form to Commissioner; Exhibit B, Memorandum dated March 31, 2013). On April 4, 2013, a hearing extension was granted based upon the Hearing Officer's unavailability and claimant's medical call out (Exhibit B, Disciplinary Hearing Extension Request). The rehearing appears to have been commenced on April 5, 2013 and completed on April 12, 2013, at which time claimant was found guilty of possessing a weapon and/or an altered item, smuggling, and creating a disturbance and sentenced to 12 months in the SHU and loss of privileges, including packages, telephone, and commissary, with such confinement to conclude on November 13, 2013 (Exhibit B, Superintendent Hearing Disposition). Claimant was found not guilty of possessing documents pertaining to another inmate. On June 14, 2013, those disciplinary findings were reversed (Exhibit B, Memorandum dated June 14, 2013). Claimant alleges that he remained in the SHU for an additional 10 days until his release on June 24, 2013 (Claim ¶ 10).
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, to the extent that the instant claim may be read to allege violations of claimant's rights under the Federal Constitution, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a claim, as it must be brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 and may not be maintained in the Court of Claims, given that the State is not a "person" for purposes of the statute (see Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172, 185 [1996]; Zagarella v State of New York, 149 AD2d 503, 504 [2d Dept 1989]; Ohnmacht v State of New York, 14 Misc 3d 1231 [A], at *2 [Ct Cl 2007]). Further, to the extent that claimant alleges that the period of wrongful confinement constituted a violation of his due process rights under the New York State Constitution, such a claim must also be dismissed. While it is true that, when certain requirements are met, a violation of the State Constitution may give rise to a private cause of action in the Court of Claims (see e.g. Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d at 195-196), where "constitutional tort allegations may be analogized to an existing common-law tort[s] for which there are adequate alternate remedies," a private cause of action will not be available (Augat v State of New York, 244 AD2d 835, 837 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 814 [1998]; see Waxter v State of New York, 33 AD3d 1180, 1181 [3d Dept 2006]). As claimant here clearly has an adequate alternative remedy in his claim for wrongful confinement, his cause of action sounding in a constitutional tort must therefore be dismissed (see Ifill v State of New York, 46 Misc 3d 1228 [A] *7 [Ct Cl 2013]).
With respect to his claim of wrongful confinement, "claimant was required to show that (1) defendant intended to confine him, (2) he was conscious of the confinement, (3) he did not consent to the confinement, and (4) such confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Cass v State of New York, 134 AD3d 1207, 1208 [3d Dept 2015], lv dismissed 27 NY3d 972 [2016] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; accord Miller v State of New York, 124 AD3d 997, 998 [3d Dept 2015]). As the first three elements of this cause of action are not disputed, defendant's liability in this case turns upon whether or not its confinement of claimant in the SHU for 224 days was privileged.
As relevant here, "[d]efendant's confinement of claimant in a[n] SHU is privileged if it was in accordance with the regulations of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision" (hereinafter DOCCS) (Hernandez v State of New York, 48 Misc 3d 218, 220 [Ct Cl 2015]; see Lee v State of New York, 124 AD2d 305, 307 [3d Dept 1986]; see also Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]). Thus, so long as defendant's confinement of claimant was "under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations, [its] actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988] [citations omitted]; see generally Tarter v State of New York, 68 NY2d 511, 518-519 [1986]). "Notably, '[i]t is defendant and not claimant who bears the burden of proving that confinement was privileged' " (Ifill v State of New York, 46 Misc 3d 1228 [A], at *7, quoting Nelson v State of New York, 20 Misc 3d 1125 [A], *2 [Ct Cl 2008], affd 67 AD3d 1142 [3d Dept 2009]; see Gonzalez v State of New York, 110 AD2d 810, 812 [2d Dept 1985], appeal dismissed 67 NY2d 647 [1986]; Sanabria v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d 988, 991-992 [Ct Cl 2010]). Claimant, however, bears the burden of establishing "that a violation of the rules and regulations proximately caused him injury or damage" (James v State of New York, UID No. 2016-018-736 [Ct Cl, Fitzpatrick, J., Oct. 14, 2016]; see Ruggiero v State of New York, UID No. 2010-015-187 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Nov. 1, 2010]; Rivera v State of New York, UID No. 2006-028-008 [Ct Cl, Sise, P.J., Feb. 8, 2006]). The administrative reversal of disciplinary findings alone, without proof of a violation of nondiscretionary rules and regulations, does not establish a wrongful confinement cause of action (see Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159, 1159-1160 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 852 [2013]; Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765, 766 [3d Dept 2001]; Barnes v State of New York, UID No. 2013-015-561 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Aug. 21, 2013]).
The Court finds that defendant has clearly met its burden of establishing privilege with respect to claimant's confinement in the SHU from November 13, 2012 through December 23, 2012. It is well settled that a correction officer may "confine an inmate to his [or her] cell when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the inmate is an immediate threat to the safety, security or order of the prison" (Lee v State of New York, 124 AD2d at 307; see Matter of Bowe v Smith, 119 Misc 2d 453, 455 [Sup Ct, Wyoming County 1983]). Where an inmate is confined pending a disciplinary hearing, such hearing must be commenced within seven days of said confinement, unless the DOCCS Commissioner or his or her designee authorizes an extension therefor (see 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]). As set forth above, the Tier II hearing on claimant's first misbehavior report was held on November 19, 2012 - just six days after his initial confinement in the SHU - and resulted in a sentence of 20 days' confinement (Exhibit A, Inmate Disciplinary History, p. 1). Thus, claimant's confinement was privileged until December 9, 2012 based upon the November 19, 2012 determination. On December 3, 2012, claimant was sentenced, following a hearing on his second misbehavior report, to an additional 20 days in the SHU, with said confinement terminating on December 23, 2012 (Exhibit A, Inmate Disciplinary History, p. 1).
However, claimant's continued confinement in the SHU after his 20-day sentence from the second Tier II determination ended on December 23, 2012 is troubling to the Court. "[A]n inmate's release from an imposed disciplinary confinement in keeplock, or otherwise upon the expiration of an ordered penalty, is a purely ministerial act invoking no discretionary authority even allowing for the understandable, occasional lapse of judgment" (Ramirez v State of New York, 171 Misc 2d 677, 681-682 [Ct Cl 1997]; accord Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d at 406). Even assuming that claimant remained confined pending a disciplinary hearing on his third misbehavior report, such hearing should have been commenced by November 20, 2012, and no valid extensions as to said date are apparent from the record (see 7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]). Because the hearing did not commence until January 11, 2013, the Court finds that defendant's "failure to have timely released claimant from keeplock, which might be termed ministerial neglect, vitiates the Rules and Regulations of [DOCCS] and liability may ensue" (Ramirez v State of New York, 171 Misc 2d at 682; accord Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d at 406). Claimant is, therefore, entitled to damages of $30.00 per day for the 19 days of additional, wrongful confinement from December 23, 2012 through January 11, 2013, for damages totaling $570.00 (see James v State of New York, UID No. 2016-018-736 [Ct Cl, Fitzpatrick, J., Oct. 14, 2016]).
With respect to the remainder of the alleged period of wrongful confinement, the Court finds that defendant has met its burden of establishing privilege with respect to claimant's confinement in the SHU from January 11, 2013 through June 14, 2013. As noted above, following a rehearing of the January 11, 2013 disciplinary determination on April 12, 2013, claimant was sentenced to 12 months in the SHU, with said confinement terminating on November 13, 2013 (Exhibit B, Superintendent Hearing Disposition). Accordingly, claimant's confinement in the SHU was privileged until the administrative reversal of said determination on June 14, 2013. Further, even assuming that, in the course of the proceedings from January 11, 2013 through June 14, 2013, certain officials failed to comply with the ministerial rules or regulations governing disciplinary hearings, claimant has not shown that, if such officials had complied with the rules or regulations in question, the result of the April 2013 hearing would have been different and he would not have been confined (see Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825, 826 [3d Dept 2004]; Lewis v State of New York, UID No. 2007-028-560 [Ct Cl, Sise, P.J., Jul. 16, 2007]; Henderson v Coughlin, 163 Misc 2d 20, 24 [Ct Cl 1994]). However, claimant's additional 10 days in the SHU after the administrative reversal of the disciplinary findings were neither privileged nor explained. Claimant is, therefore, entitled to damages of $30 per day for the 10 days of additional, wrongful confinement from June 14, 2013 through June 24, 2013, for damages totaling $300.00 (see James v State of New York, UID No. 2016-018-736 [Ct Cl, Fitzpatrick, J., Oct. 14, 2016]).
In sum, upon review of all the evidence, including the observation of all witnesses and an assessment of their demeanor, the Court hereby determines that claimant was wrongfully confined for a period of 29 days and is entitled to damages totaling $870.00. To the extent that claimant paid a filing fee, it may be recovered pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 11-a (2).
All motions not previously decided are hereby denied.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
December 20, 2016
Albany, New York
JUDITH A. HARD
Judge of the Court of Claims