Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-02007-JDT-WTL.
June 30, 2004
ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY AND MOTION TO DISMISS
This Entry is a matter of public record and is being made available to the public on the court's web site, but it is not intended for commercial publication either electronically or in paper form. Although the ruling or rulings in this Entry will govern the case presently before this court, this court does not consider the discussion in this Entry to be sufficiently novel or instructive to justify commercial publication or the subsequent citation of it in other proceedings.
Plaintiffs bring this suit against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in acts designed to discourage Plaintiffs from engaging in political associational activities and by conducting an unlawful search of the premises of Solidarity and unlawful seizure of Plaintiff Gwen Frisbie-Fulton. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Stay under an abstention doctrine and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims brought by non-resident Plaintiffs. The court decides these motions as follows:
The complaint listed Officer Bell twice. However, the court could find no indication that there are two defendants named Officer Bell. Therefore, Officer Bell is listed only once by the court in the caption of this case.
I. Background
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges the following: Solidarity Books Collective ("Solidarity") is an independent collective located in Indianapolis, Indiana, at 2123 Boulevard Place. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts that Keni Washington is the owner of the property at 2123 Boulevard Place and had leased the premises to Solidarity. ( Id. ¶ 6.) However, as discussed below, it appears that Emmagee Washington and Georgia Patton are the owners of the building that was inspected, not Keni Washington. Plaintiffs Eric Edgin, Gwen Frisbie-Fulton, Jessica Neisler, Daniel Paquette, Michael Reddy, Kristina Hulvershorn, Karen Nielson, Jane Haldeman, Jonathan Nolen, and Andrew Cart are members of Solidarity. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-16.) According to Plaintiffs, the front three rooms of Solidarity are accessible to the public when Solidarity is open and the remainder of Solidarity, which includes an upper floor and basement, is private. ( Id. ¶ 40.) There are three bedrooms on the upper floor and people reside there. ( Id. ¶ 41.) On August 14, 2003, Paquette, Edgin, and Reddy resided in the private rooms. ( Id. ¶ 56.)
In mid-August of 2003, the City of Indianapolis hosted the National Governor's Association meeting. ( Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs planned a series of protests around the time of the National Governor's Association, and Solidarity was a place where persons gathered to discuss and plan the protests. ( Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiffs allege that members of the Indianapolis Police Department engaged in surveillance and harassment of Plaintiffs prior to August 14, 2003, in order to discourage the members of Solidarity from engaging in the protests. ( Id. ¶ 44.)
On Thursday, August 14, 2003, at approximately 9:00 p.m., more than thirty law enforcement and municipal officers, including Defendants, "descended on Solidarity." ( Id. ¶ 45.) A number of Defendants and other officers and municipal employees went to the front porch of Solidarity and demanded entrance. ( Id. ¶ 47.) The Defendants indicated that they were there to do a fire inspection and health inspection because of receipt of a complaint. It was stated that the law enforcement officers were present to accompany the inspectors. ( Id. ¶ 48.) Defendants did not have a warrant and at no time was a warrant obtained. ( Id. ¶ 49.) One of the Plaintiffs asked if any of the Defendants had a warrant. One of the Defendants responded that a warrant was not necessary to perform a fire inspection, and the Defendants entered the premises. ( Id. ¶ 52.) According to Plaintiffs, at no time was consent given for the entry. ( Id. ¶ 53.) Health and fire inspectors and law enforcement officers entered the premises and engaged in a search of every room of the house which took more than thirty minutes, including non-public areas. The private residential areas were entered and searched by Defendants. ( Id. ¶ 56.) During the time Solidarity was being searched, all of the Plaintiffs, with the exception of Nolen, were on the premises. ( Id. ¶ 57.) While a number of the Defendants searched the premises of Solidarity, other Defendant law enforcement officers took pictures of persons in and about the premises of Solidarity. ( Id. ¶ 59.) The fire inspectors on the scene indicated that the code violations they discovered were minor, and following the search, Keni Washington was issued notices concerning deficiencies. ( Id. ¶ 61.)
At the time of the search, Frisbie-Fulton was traveling near Solidarity in her car and was stopped by unknown Defendants. After ten minutes, she was informed she could leave and proceeded to Solidarity. ( Id. ¶ 60.) On Friday, August 15, 2003, while Nolen was at Solidarity, he noticed that a white van full of unknown uniformed Indianapolis Police Department officers drove by Solidarity on numerous occasions. ( Id. ¶ 62.) At approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 15, 2003, the van stopped in front of Solidarity and numerous officers left the van and began shining their flashlights into Solidarity's yard. The police left and then returned in approximately thirty minutes and again walked around the property, shining their flashlights into the property. ( Id. ¶ 63.) Nolen noticed that when the officers returned they had plastic handcuffs displayed on their belts. ( Id. ¶ 64.)
On December 18, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants in this court; the First Amended Complaint was filed on February 3, 2004. On February 13, 2004, Defendants filed this Motion for Stay and Motion to Dismiss. On March 29, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Response. Defendants' Reply was filed on April 12, 2004.
The following additional facts are presented by the parties in their briefs: On September 18, 2003, a subsequent inspection at Solidarity was conducted by the Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County (HHC). (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A.) On October 17, 2003, HHC filed a complaint in the Marion County Superior Court, Environmental Division under Cause No. 49F120310PL003578 for a mandatory injunction and fine to require the owners of the property to remedy the violations that both inspections revealed. ( Id.) The Enforcement Proceeding identifies Emmagee Washington and Georgia Patton as the owners of the building that was inspected. ( Id.) On March 11, 2004, Emmagee Washington entered into an agreed judgment in the state court proceeding admitting the presence of the claimed violations. (Pls.' Resp., Attach. 1.) The agreed judgment states: "Defendant admits each and every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint." ( Id.) Additionally, it states: "Defendant agrees to correct all violation(s) existing at the property listed above so that the property meets the minimum standards as set forth in The Code of the Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana." ( Id.) The judgment sets a May 6, 2004, hearing date in which the owner is required to show significant progress in remedying some of the violations. ( Id.)
II. Discussion
Defendants argue that under the Younger doctrine, the court should abstain from hearing this case until the state court enforcement proceeding concerning housing code violations is resolved. In Younger v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court held "based on longstanding principles of comity and federalism, that federal courts should refrain from enjoining state criminal prosecutions." Jacobson v. Vill. of Northbrook Mun. Corp., 824 F.2d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Brunken v. Lance, 807 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986); W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1984)). "The Court has extended the holding in Younger to cases in which the relief requested was something other than an injunction in state court." Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 137 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 833 (1996). "The doctrine has been extended to apply to quasi-criminal proceedings . . . and to civil proceedings which implicate certain important state interests." Jacobsen, 824 F.2d at 569 (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Brunken, 807 F.2d at 1330).
Abstention under Younger is appropriate where the state court proceeding 1) is "both ongoing and `judicial in nature'"; 2) implicates important state interests; and 3) allows Plaintiffs "adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges." Crenshaw v. Supreme Court, 170 F.3d 725, 727 (7th Cir.) (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871 (1999). The parties do not dispute that the state court proceeding is judicial in nature or that the state court proceeding implicates important state interests. Plaintiffs argue that abstention is inappropriate because 1) the enforcement proceeding has already been resolved, 2) the federal lawsuit does not interfere with the state proceeding, and 3) Plaintiffs cannot raise constitutional challenges in the state court proceeding because they are not the same parties as the defendants in the state court proceeding.
The court holds that Younger abstention is inapplicable to the present case because Plaintiffs are not parties to the state proceeding, nor are Plaintiffs' interests intertwined with any party to the state court proceeding. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are able to bring their claims in the federal suit as counterclaims or affirmative defenses in the state court enforcement proceeding because the Marion Superior Court, which has general jurisdiction over all civil claims, can entertain a § 1983 challenge to the inspection. However, Plaintiffs are not parties to the state court proceeding; thus, it does not appear that the state court proceeding provides Plaintiffs with an opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. See Gen. Auto Serv. Station LLC v. City of Chi., 319 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2003) (no state forum available where plaintiff was not party to state court proceeding and attempts to intervene were denied); Lemon v. Tucker, 664 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1987) ( Younger inappropriate where federal plaintiffs were not defendants in state action). Moreover, a federal court plaintiff is not required to try to intervene in a state court proceeding in order to bring claims of constitutional violation in federal court. Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Certainly nothing in Younger or the cases following it suggests that persons claiming a violation of their federal rights have an obligation before turning to federal court to see whether there is some state court proceeding that they might join in order to present their federal claims there." (citing Bickham v. Lashof, 620 F.2d 1238, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1980))).
If, as argued by Defendants, Plaintiffs could have brought their § 1983 damages action as a counterclaim against Defendants in state court, then the proper relief under Younger would be to dismiss the action, rather than grant a stay. See Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir.) ("A stay is appropriate when a plaintiff is foreclosed from bringing his damages claims in the state proceeding." (citing Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1998))), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 821 (2002). But see Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a stay, rather than dismissal, under Younger was appropriate although federal plaintiffs could have brought federal claims in state court under the state court's general jurisdiction).
Defendants argue that even though the Plaintiffs in the federal action are not parties to the state court proceeding, Younger is still applicable because the issues in the state court proceeding and federal complaint are closely intertwined. The Supreme Court has held that "there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of them." Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975). In Hicks v. Miranda, the Supreme Court held that Younger abstention was appropriate to bar suit by federal court plaintiffs, theater owners, who sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a state obscenity statute. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). Although the federal plaintiffs were not the same parties as the state court defendants, two employees of the theater who were facing misdemeanor charges under the statute, the Supreme Court held that Younger abstention applied because "[o]bviously, their interests and those of their employees were intertwined" and "the federal action sought to interfere with the pending state prosecution." Id. at 348-49.
According to Defendants, Plaintiffs lawsuit should be subject to Younger abstention because Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenges are based on the same inspection that resulted in the enforcement proceeding and Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims are closely intertwined because the existence of the state case undermines Plaintiffs' claim that the inspection was based on unlawful motive. However, the relevant inquiry is not whether the facts in the state court proceeding and federal case are intertwined, but whether the interests of the federal court plaintiffs are sufficiently intertwined with the interests of the state court defendants so that Plaintiffs are adequately represented in the state court proceeding. See Bickham, 620 F.2d at 1244. Plaintiffs have an interest in engaging in activities protected by the First Amendment without police harassment. Plaintiffs also have an interest in being free from unreasonable searches. These interests remain with the Plaintiffs regardless of where the alleged violations take place. The interests of the state court defendants are primarily limited to whether the property they own violates the code. See id.
Defendants imply from Plaintiffs' statement that they will "seek to amend the complaint as is appropriate," which pertains to identifying the correct owners of the property, that Plaintiffs intend to add the defendants from the state court proceeding as plaintiffs in the federal action. At present, the state court defendants are not plaintiffs in the federal suit; consequently, the court declines to address this argument because the issue is not yet before the court.
Plaintiffs also contend that Younger abstention is not applicable because the state court enforcement proceeding has concluded and that the relief sought in federal court does not threaten to interfere with the state court proceedings. Defendants contend, however, that the enforcement proceeding has not concluded, but that the agreed judgment contemplates that the enforcement proceeding is an ongoing process in which the state court will continue to have jurisdiction and monitor the progress the owner makes through compliance hearings. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs overstate the level of interference necessary for Younger abstention, noting that Younger abstention is applicable when the federal lawsuit might interfere with the state court proceeding. According to Defendants "It is unclear at this point whether the owner will be able to remedy the violations or whether constitutional issues will be raised in a subsequent phase of the litigation. A stay under Younger resolves precisely this type of uncertain[t]y." Because the issue of whether the state court proceeding is ongoing is related to the issue of whether the federal action threatens to intervene in the state court proceeding, the court addresses them together.
Although the March 11, 2004, state court judgment indicates that there will be ongoing proceedings, it is clear that the ongoing proceedings relate to the state court defendants' agreement to correct the violations, but do not involve the issue of whether the defendants are liable. Plaintiffs do not challenge the state proceedings; in fact, the state court defendants admitted liability, and therefore, it appears, they will not be raising affirmative defenses. Although the state proceeding is ongoing with respect to whether the state court defendants have corrected the code violations, Defendants have not explained how issues in the First and Fourth Amendment case could have any bearing on whether the state court defendants corrected the code violations. See Habich v. City of Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2003) (where issues in federal suit were not part of state case or affirmative defense, issues were collateral to state proceeding and Younger inapplicable); see also Am. Fed'n of State, County Mun. Employees v. Tristano, 898 F.2d 1302, 1305 (7th Cir. 1990) ( Younger not applicable because the issues in federal suit were substantially different than issues in state court, and relief requested in federal court "would not unduly interfere with the state proceedings"). Moreover, the claims in the federal lawsuit and the remaining claims in the state court proceeding do not involve the same events: The First and Fourth Amendment claims stem from the Defendants' search of Solidarity on August 14, 2003. The ongoing state proceeding will involve events that take place after March 11, 2004. See Habich, 331 F.3d at 530.
In Simpson v. Rowan, which is cited by Defendants, the Seventh Circuit extended the Younger doctrine to § 1983 damages actions in which the federal plaintiff is a defendant in the pending state criminal proceeding and seeks damages in federal court for misconduct in the criminal case. 73 F.3d at 137. In Simpson, a prisoner who was convicted of felony murder brought a federal suit alleging illegal arrest and search in the criminal case. In his state court post-conviction petition, Simpson renewed allegations that the police made a warrantless arrest and search. The Seventh Circuit held that Younger abstention was appropriate, noting that "Simpson's federal damage action raises constitutional issues that are potentially subject to adjudication in his appeal to the state supreme court." Id. at 138. Although a successful federal court action would not have had a preclusive effect on the state court proceeding, the Seventh Circuit expressed concern that if the plaintiff were to succeed on his damages action before the conclusion of the proceedings in state court, "the resulting federal judgment might undermine the supreme court's consideration of [the plaintiff's] constitutional defenses to his criminal conviction." Id. The Seventh Circuit explained that "[t]he policy against federal interference with pending state proceedings would thus be frustrated as much by a damages award as it would by either an injunction or a declaratory judgment." Id.
In the present case, Defendants have failed to explain how Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims might raise issues that would influence the state court enforcement proceeding. Defendants argue that "Defendants' ongoing attempts to prosecute the violations indicate that the Defendants did not harbor a desire to intrude on Plaintiffs' constitutional rights but instead intended to remedy health and safety violations, which in turn implicate significant state interests. . . . By litigating in federal court prior to the resolution of the Enforcement Proceeding, Plaintiffs seek to deprive the Defendants the opportunity to demonstrate their good faith prosecution of the violations, which in turn substantially undermines their First Amendment claims as to Defendants' alleged ill-motives." This argument addresses how not staying the federal suit could potentially undermine a defense the Defendants plan to raise in the federal lawsuit, but it does not demonstrate how the state proceeding would be undermined. Although several rationales underlie Younger, to aid the federal defendant to bolster its defense to the federal suit is not one of them. Besides, this assertion is meritless. The existence of this federal suit poses no barrier to prosecution of the state court enforcement proceeding against the building owners. Defendants' Motion to Stay is DENIED.
III. Motion to Dismiss Fourth Amendment Claims of Non-Resident Plaintiffs
Defendants move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims of the non-resident Plaintiffs, arguing that the non-resident Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the search at Solidarity. In Plaintiffs' Response, Plaintiffs state that only Solidarity, Keni Washington, Edgin, Paquette, and Reddy raise a Fourth Amendment claim, and that the non-resident Plaintiffs raise only First Amendment claims. (Pls.' Resp. at 9-10.) Because Plaintiffs do not challenge Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' motion will be GRANTED.IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Stay under Younger is DENIED. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amendment claims brought by the non-resident Plaintiffs will be GRANTED.ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED.