Summary
holding that the plaintiff's allegation that City officials did not follow established City procedures constitutes a claim concerning random and unauthorized acts
Summary of this case from Dukes v. N.Y.C. Emps.' Ret. Sys.Opinion
04 CIV. 8268 (DLC).
February 15, 2006
Appearances Plaintiff pro se: Vernon Snype
For defendants: Brian Morgan Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of New York New York, New York.
OPINION ORDER
This action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that his right to procedural due process was violated when the City of New York (the "City") auctioned off his vehicle without giving him notice that his vehicle had been seized and an opportunity to reclaim the vehicle. Plaintiff seeks the proceeds from the sale of his car at the auction. Plaintiff and the City have filed cross-filed motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the City's motion is granted with respect to both defendants, and plaintiff's motion is denied. Background
The following facts are not in dispute unless otherwise noted. Vernon Snype ("Snype") is currently incarcerated for an armed robbery committed on July 6, 2002. On July 11, 2002, Snype moved a 1997 Ford Expedition sport utility vehicle, which was registered in his name to a Bronx address (the "Bronx Address"), from a U-Haul storage lot in New Jersey to a parking lot in Queens. At that time, Snype removed the license plates and the registration sticker. He departed with those items, as well as the registration certificate from the vehicle. Snype testified at his deposition that he removed the identifying information so that parking lot attendants could not drive the vehicle without his permission. He was arrested for the armed robbery a few hours later.
On July 12, 2002, Snype's wife informed him that the Explorer was missing from the parking lot where he had left it. Neither Snype nor a family member filed a missing vehicle report. Snype testified that his mother and sister inquired about the vehicle at a Bronx police station and were told that they would have to obtain Snype's drivers license and an authorization to act on his behalf. They did not attempt to obtain those documents and did not again attempt to file a report.
On August 3, 2002, defendant Chris Malerba ("Malerba"), an officer in the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), saw an Expedition driving recklessly in Queens. After the Expedition hit a parked car, the driver of the vehicle fled on foot. The car keys and an alarm activator were in the ignition. A Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") search revealed that the Expedition had not been reported stolen. The VIN database also showed that the vehicle was registered to Snype. The license plates belonged to a different vehicle, however. The police officer attempted to contact Snype at the Bronx Address listed on the vehicle registration but was unsuccessful in doing so. Snype had not updated his address with the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") since his arrest.
According to an affidavit of NYPD Sergeant Christopher Gehrig, the Expedition arrived at the College Point Auto Pound (the "Auto Pound") on August 9, 2002. On August 13, staff members at the Auto Found determined that Snype was the owner of the vehicle; on August 16, they sent a letter to the Bronx Address informing Snype that the vehicle was at the Auto Pound and that he needed to contact the Auto Pound immediately to protect his interest in the vehicle. The letter also explained that Snype had fifteen days to claim his vehicle by appearing with the vehicle's title, registration, and proof of identification. Otherwise, the vehicle could be disposed of pursuant to New York Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1224. Snype's mail from the Bronx Address was not forwarded to him in prison. A friend who continued to reside at that address, Laureen D. Flowers, has submitted an affidavit stating that she received no telephone calls or correspondence regarding the Expedition from the NYPD. Snype thus disputes that the City advised him that it had seized his car and would be disposing of it.
Gehrig further testifies that the practice of the Auto Pound is to allow a person to claim a vehicle at any time prior to the auction of the vehicle if the person presents the requisite proof of title, registration, insurance, and identification. A person who indicates that he is in the process of securing the necessary paperwork is given an additional sixty days to claim the vehicle. The Auto Pound will release a vehicle into the custody of a third party on behalf of an incarcerated owner upon presentation of the requisite paperwork and a notarized letter from the incarcerated person authorizing the third party to retrieve the vehicle.
The Auto Pound received no claim for the return of Snype's vehicle, and on October 1, 2002, the vehicle was sold at auction for $8900. Snype sent a letter dated October 26, 2002 to the DMV stating that he was incarcerated and had lost track of the Expedition and other vehicles, and requesting advice. Snype was informed by the DMV on February 24, 2003 that the vehicle had been seized and sold by the NYPD.
On March 10, 2003, Snype sent a letter to the NYPD stating that it had been brought to his attention that the Expedition had been seized and sold and requesting more information. He also sent a notice that he intended to file a claim against the NYPD with the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York; this notice is notarized and dated May 6, 2003. In a letter of May 15, 2003, a representative of the City of New York Office of the Comptroller acknowledged Snype's claim, informed him that the claim was under investigation, and stated that if the office could not resolve Snype's claim he could bring a lawsuit against the City if it was filed within a year and ninety days from the date of the occurrence. Snype was sent another letter by the Office of the Comptroller on July 14, 2003, reminding him that the one year and ninety day deadline was approaching. Another letter from the Office of the Comptroller, dated the following day, informed Snype that his claim was still under investigation and apologizing for the delay.
The statute of limitations to which the letter appears to be referring is that for negligence and malfeasance of public officers, N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-i.
On September 17, 2003, Snype mailed a complaint to the Bronx County Supreme Court (the "Supreme Court"). Snype attached a copy of that notarized complaint, as well as a faint copy of the certified mail receipt, to his complaint in this action. On November 20, 2003, he sent a follow-up letter stating that he had not yet received an index number. He sent another letter to the Supreme Court on January 15, 2004, inquiring about the status of the Bronx action. In a letter of February 6, 2004, a letter from the Orders Department of the Supreme Court informed Snype that no complaint had been received. Snype sent the Supreme Court yet another letter on March 1, 2004, requesting that his complaint be accepted as timely filed and noting that he had inquired previously about the status of his action. On April 1, 2004, and April 21, 2004, Snype sent letters to a judge at the Supreme Court, noting that he had yet to receive an index number and notice of filing date or any update on the status of his action. On May 4, 2004, the judge's law secretary sent Snype a letter to inform him that his first letter to the judge had been sent to the Clerk's Office for review and response. Neither Snype nor the City has provided further evidence of the status of Snype's state court proceeding.
On October 20, 2004, Snype filed this action, alleging that the City's auctioning of his vehicle constituted a Section 1983 violation. He has moved for summary judgment, arguing that he is entitled to the proceeds of the auction under New York's vehicle abandonment statute, N.Y. Vehicle Traffic Law § 1224(6) (b). The City has likewise moved for summary judgment, on the grounds that plaintiff has not alleged facts controverting the defendants' claim that adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard were provided, and in addition, that municipal liability cannot arise from the facts alleged. It also argues, in response to plaintiff's summary judgment motion, that the availability of an Article 78 proceeding satisfied the plaintiff's right to procedural due process.
Discussion
A court may not grant summary judgment unless the evidence "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. In making this determination, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). "A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Belize NY, Inc., 277 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2002).
To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he has been deprived of a federal right by (2) a person acting under color of state law. See Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). Snype claims that the City has deprived him of procedural due process when it failed to send him notice of the auction. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states "from depriving any person of property without `due process of law.'" Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002).
The City disputes Snype's assertion that he retained a property interest in the vehicle or its proceeds when it was sold. It devotes a large portion of its briefs to establishing that Snype abandoned his vehicle. Under the governing statute, however, whether or not Snype abandoned his vehicle does not appear to determine his ultimate right to the proceeds of its sale at auction. The New York vehicle abandonment statute provides: "Any proceeds from the sale of an abandoned vehicle less any expenses incurred by such local authority shall be held by the local authority without interest, for the benefit of the owner of such vehicle for a period of one year." N.Y. Vehicle Traffic Law § 1224(6) (b). The City has presented no facts or law that would render this provision inapplicable here. It appears, therefore, that Snype had a property interest in the proceeds from the sale of his vehicle for at least one year after the auction.
When reviewing alleged procedural due process violations, the Supreme Court has distinguished between "(a) claims based on established state procedures and (b) claims based on random, unauthorized acts by state employees." Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 91 (2d Cir. 2005). "[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
Snype does not allege that the procedures described in the state vehicle abandonment statute — or any aspect of the City's established procedures for disposing of abandoned vehicles — violated his due process rights. Rather, he argues that these procedures were not followed by City officials in his case when the NYPD failed to send him notice of the seizure and impending auction, and then withheld the proceeds of the auction from him. In other words, he claims to have suffered a random, unauthorized deprivation of property. In these circumstances, the question becomes whether the state has offered an adequate postdeprivation remedy which would allow him to recoup the proceeds of the sale of his vehicle. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 542.
"[P]ostdeprivation remedies made available by the State can satisfy the Due Process Clause." Id. at 538. While there is no requirement under Section 1983 that state remedies be exhausted before suit can be filed in federal court, see Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm., 101 F.3d at 881, the availability of an adequate postdeprivation remedy will defeat a procedural due process claim brought pursuant to Section 1983. Id.
The City argues that New York State provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy in the form of an Article 78 proceeding. An Article 78 proceeding is "an amalgam of the common law writs of certiorari to review, mandamus, and prohibition." Id. It does not, however, allow for the recovery of damages, except when "they are incidental to the primary relief sought." Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). "Because in the usual civil rights action the damages requested cannot be characterized as incidental, such damages could not be obtained in an Article 78 proceeding." Id.
While an Article 78 proceeding would therefore not provide Snype with an adequate remedy, since it would not permit him to recover damages, the state's tort laws provide an alternative avenue of relief that complies fully with Snype's rights under the Due Process Clause. Snype was informed of this remedy in a letter from the DMV, which noted that he could "bring a suit against the City if it is started within one year and ninety days from the date of occurrence," citing N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-i, rather than the shorter statute of limitations applicable to Article 78 proceedings. This regular state judicial proceeding constitutes a fully adequate, even more comprehensive postdeprivation remedy. In short, Snype should have pursued, or must continue to pursue, his remedies in state court.
Snype presents evidence that he tried to pursue his remedies in a state court proceeding but encountered difficulties in timely filing his complaint. As noted above, the current status of that proceeding is unclear. If there has been a judgment on the merits, that judgment would have to be accorded res judicata effect in this action regardless of whether this Court could entertain the suit under Section 1983. Moreover, it is not within the scope of this Court's authority to review the adequacy of a state court judgment under the auspices of Section 1983. See generally Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 475 (1983). Except in very limited circumstances, state court judgments are reviewed solely through the state appellate court system, and ultimately, by the U.S. Supreme Court. The City's motion for summary judgment is accordingly granted.
Because the State has provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy, this Opinion need not address the City's argument regarding the requirement under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a municipal policy or custom be proven to establish municipal liability.
On October 5, 2005, the Court granted the application of counsel for the City to have the arguments in the City's brief applied to defendant Chris Malerba ("Malerba") also, as he had just then been added by name to plaintiff's complaint. The State's provision of an adequate postdeprivation remedy also insulates Malerba from liability under Section 1983. Moreover, the plaintiff has presented no evidence whatsoever that Malerba, the officer who witnessed the accident involving Snype's Expedition and was responsible for removing the vehicle from a public street, committed any unlawful deprivation of Snype's property in the first place. Summary judgment is accordingly granted for Malerba also.
Conclusion
Summary judgment is granted for the City and Malerba. Plaintiff's summary judgment motion is denied. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment for the defendants and close the case.
SO ORDERED.